kâ-yôskâtahk ôma nêhiyawêwin:
THE REPRESENTATION OF INTENTIONALITY IN PLAINS CREE

by

JEFFREY THOMAS MÜHLBAUER

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Abstract

This thesis considers the reference system of Plains Cree, an Algonquian language spoken in Canada. I argue that the referential system of this language can be understood as coding distinctions in extensionality; it distinguishes between referents that possess perspectives (‘intentional’) and referents that do not (‘extensional’). With respect to perspectival possession, Plains Cree distinguishes four referential classes: (i) inherently extentional “Inanimate” referents, (ii) contextually extentional “Obviative” referents, (iii) contextually intentional “Proximate” referents, and (iv) unspecified “Animate” referents. I then show that the referential class “Obviative” is decompositional; it is constructed out of components that code referential dependency, which is the confluence of structural ordering and perspectival embedding. Finally, I consider the methodological issues raised by the study of referential types, showing how different data-collection methods interact with the semantics of perspectival possession.
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<tr>
<td>$x \rightarrow y$</td>
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Finally, there’s Clare. You never can tell with porcupines, can you?
'Most men will not swim before they are able to.’

Is not that witty? Naturally, they won’t swim! They are born for the solid earth, not for the water.

And naturally they won’t think. They are made for life, not for thought.

Yes, and he who thinks, what’s more, he who makes thought his business, he may go far in it, but he has bartered the solid earth for the water all the same, and one day he will drown.”

– Hermann Hesse

Steppenwolf
Chapter 1
Introduction: Making truth happen

1.1. Introduction: kâ-yôskâtahk ôma nêhiyawêwin

When I asked a Plains Cree (Algonquian, Northern Plains) speaker about the linguistic structures considered in this thesis, I was told ‘kâ-yôskâtahk ôma nêhiyawêwin,’ literally ‘The Plains Cree language is soft.’\(^1\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{kâ-yôskâtahk ôma nêhiyawêwin.} \\
\text{kâ-yòsk=ât =an-k av =ima nêhiyaw=ê =win} \\
\text{c2-soft =by.air=II -0 PRX=IN.SG cree =AI=NOM} \\
\text{‘The Plains Cree language is soft.’}\(^2\)
\end{align*}
\]

Here, the use of the concept of ‘soft’ (yôsk-) is meant to convey a particular philosophy about the purpose of communication and the way it ought to proceed. As Lightning (1996:62) explains it, the Speaker makes themselves “vulnerable and open” to their audience, not trying to impress their assertions on the audience by force of personality or argument. Rather than speaking to convince (cf. Aristotle’s ‘Rhetoric’), a Plains Cree speaker’s communicative intent is understood as coming from a need to express what they believe is the truth, individualized to the particular audience they are speaking to (Lightning 1996:63). The mechanisms of discourse, then, are organized to set up the proper events for “truth to happen” (Lightning 1996:63). This means that accuracy in representation, both of the Speaker’s beliefs and the beliefs they convey from others, is absolutely crucial to the Speaker’s goals for the discourse; the Hearer(s) must trust the Speaker, and the Speaker must be trustworthy. The Plains Cree language is ‘soft,’ then, because its users prize the “mutual-thinking” (Lightning 1996) that develops between Speaker and Hearer through careful representation, and they value this over the force of logical or charismatic persuasion. This means that, to a speaker of Plains Cree, the grammatical material covered in this thesis relates to how the Speaker “makes truth happen.”

---

\(^1\) Thanks to Joseph Deschamps, \(\text{ᐊᑭᒫᐤᑳᐹᐏᐤ}\), for this form and discussion of its meaning. \(\text{ᑭᓇᓈᐢᑯᒥᑎᐣ}\).

\(^2\) Thanks to H.C. Wolfart (p.c.) for help with the composition of this form.
1.2. How does “truth happen” in Plains Cree?

This thesis considers the construction and maintenance of “truth happenings” in Plains Cree. By “truth happenings,” I mean the way that a speaker of Plains Cree ties together some proposition (e.g. a sentence) with a means to evaluate it. As is demonstrated in this thesis, Plains Cree possesses a rich set of grammatical mechanisms that the Speaker can manipulate to construct these representations of truth.

I claim that there are two basic ingredients to the “truth happening” process in Plains Cree:

(i) A proposition
(ii) A thinker.

That is, truth “happens” when a proposition is held by someone; without this “someone” there can be no truth. Making truth happen amounts to connecting propositions to thinkers. Truth, then, is the result of relativizing a proposition to a person; it is inherently relational or individualized in the sense of Lightning (1996).

If “truth happening” is the process of connecting a proposition to a thinker, we expect that Plains Cree grammar will be concerned with the identification of thinkers, and the linking of propositions to these thinkers. In particular, we expect two kinds of operations to be at play:

(i) Identifying thinkers
(ii) Coding the relation of these thinkers to propositions.

The first process (identifying thinkers) is the primary of the two; it does not matter what the relation of a thinker is to a proposition if there is not yet a thinker. In studying the process of “truth happening” in Plains Cree, then, we should begin by looking at mechanisms that are used to pick out thinkers. This is the core topic of this thesis.

To illustrate these two operations in Plains Cree, let us consider two limited cases of “truth happening.” In the first case, the “Calvin and Hobbes” problem (§1.2.1), we see two things:

(i) There are grammatical forms that distinguish referents that can “think” from referents that can’t.
(ii) These grammatical forms can only be interpreted once a decision has been made about who thinks that the referent can think.

---

3 The characters and comic strip “Calvin and Hobbes” are copyright Bill Watterson. Its use here is for scholarly and illustrative purposes only, and is thus allowed under “Fair Use” copyright laws.
Without this relativization, the grammatical terms still have only the status of propositional elements. In the second case, the “6 degrees of separation” problem (§1.2.2), we see two things:

(i) There are grammatical forms that distinguish which referents are thinking in the given context.

(ii) These grammatical forms are always relativized to what the Speaker knows.

Plains Cree grammar, then, possesses a rich set of devices for discriminating those who can make “truth happen” from those who can’t. The rest of the thesis is concerned with the proper description and modeling of these phenomena.

1.2.1 The “Calvin and Hobbes” problem in Plains Cree

Anyone that has been to a book store or read a newspaper in the last 20 years will be familiar with the comic strip “Calvin and Hobbes” by Bill Watterson. Calvin is a young boy who has a best friend that is a tiger named Hobbes. Being anthropomorphic, Hobbes can walk and talk just like a human, and he goes on many adventures with Calvin. However, at other times in the comic strip, Hobbes is simply an inert stuffed animal. This means that there are two versions of Hobbes presented in the comic strip:

(i) Hobbes is an anthropomorphic tiger.

(ii) Hobbes is a stuffed toy.

This I term the “Calvin and Hobbes” problem – how are we to understand the changing status of Hobbes?

In the Plains Cree language, there are two grammatical classes for nominals, let us call them “A” and “B” for now, and these two classes map directly onto the Calvin and Hobbes problem. Consider a context in which Calvin has lost Hobbes out in the woods, and his father went out to look for him. After finding Hobbes, the stuffed animal, out behind some bushes, the father puts it in bed with Calvin. Upon waking, Calvin runs to inform his mother that Hobbes came back from his evening wanderings. In responding, the mother must either mark Hobbes with grammatical category “A” (2a) or grammatical category “B” (2b).⁴

---

⁴ This context is an actual comic strip by Bill Watterson, and was used to elicit the Plains Cree forms.
(2) a. CATEGORY A
\[ d^\text{\textsuperscript{n}}\hat{\text{\textalpha}} + \hat{p} \Gamma^\text{\textgamma}\varnothing \text{ Hobbes}. \]
kõhtâwiy ki-miskam Hobbes.
\[ k\text{-}ohtâwiy kî\text{-}m =\text{isk} \text{ am Hobbes} \]
2-father PREV-find=by.body.TI-TI Hobbes
‘Your father\text{\_AN} found Hobbes\text{\_IN}.’ (Presented S2)

b. CATEGORY B
\[ d^\text{\textsuperscript{n}}\hat{\text{\textalpha}} + \hat{p} \Gamma^\text{\textgamma}\varnothing \text{ Hobbes} \]
kõhtâwiy miskawêw Hobbesa.
\[ k\text{-}ohtâwiy m =\text{iskaw} \text{ -ê} \text{ -w Hobbes-a} \]
2-father find=by.body.TA-DIR-3 Hobbes-XT
‘Your father\text{\_PROX} found Hobbes\text{\_OBV}.’ (Presented S2)

If the mother marks Hobbes with grammatical category “A,” which is shown by the –isk–am set of suffixes on the verb in (2a), she is saying that Hobbes is a stuffed animal. If she instead chooses grammatical category “B,” which is shown by the combination of the –iskaw–â–w suffixes on the verb and the –a on the noun (2b), she is saying that Hobbes is a walking, talking tiger. For example, if the “A” form is used, subsequent discourse cannot allow Hobbes to speak, walk, or believe anything (e.g. being happy about being found) (3a), while the “B” form can allow Hobbes to talk, walk, and believe things (e.g. being happy about being found) (3b).

(3) a. CATEGORY A
\[ \# \ \n\hat{\text{\textalpha}} \text{, d}^\text{\textsuperscript{n}}\hat{\text{\textalpha}} + \hat{p} \Gamma^\text{\textgamma}\varnothing \text{ Hobbes}; \n\varnothing \Gamma^+\varnothing^\text{\textgamma}\varnothing^{\text{\textgamma}} \Gamma^\mathrm{x}. \]
\# êhâ, kõhtâwiy ki-miskam Hobbes; ê-miywêyihtahk.
\[ êhâ k\text{-}ohtâwiy kî\text{-}mi =\text{sk} \text{ am Hobbes} ê\text{ - miyw=êyiht} \text{ -am-k} \]
yes 2-father PREV-find=by.body.TI-TI Hobbes C1-good=by.mind.TI-TI -3
Intended: ‘Yes, your father\text{\_AN} found Hobbes\text{\_IN}; [Hobbes] was happy.’ (Presented S2)

b. CATEGORY B
\[ \n\hat{\text{\textalpha}} \text{, d}^\text{\textsuperscript{n}}\hat{\text{\textalpha}} + \hat{p} \Gamma^\text{\textgamma}\varnothing \text{ Hobbes} \;\text{;} \n\varnothing \Gamma^+\varnothing^\text{\textgamma}\varnothing^{\text{\textgamma}} \Gamma^\mathrm{x}. \]
êhâ, kõhtâwiy kî-miskawêw Hobbesa; ê-miywêyihtamiyit.
\[ êhâ k\text{-}ohtâwiy kî\text{-}mi =\text{skaw} \text{ -ê} \text{ -w Hobbes-a} ê\text{ - miyw=êyiht} \text{ -am-yi-t} \]
yes 2-father PREV-find=by.body.TA-DIR-3 Hobbes-XT C1-good=by.mind.TI-TI-DS-3
‘Yes, your father\text{\_PROX} found Hobbes\text{\_OBV}; he\text{\_OBV} was happy.’ (Presented S2)

In this situation, then, the mother must choose between representing her own belief about Hobbes and that of her child; does she use the “A” form, which corresponds to what she herself sees, or does she use the “B” form, which corresponds to what her son thinks of his tiger?

\[ ^5 \text{For an explanation of ‘extensional’ (XT), see §1.3.1. below.} \]
The Plains Cree grammatical categories “A” and “B,” then, do two important things relative to the current discussion:

(i) They discriminate between non-thinkers (“A”) and potential thinkers (“B”).
(ii) They require that someone think they are non-thinkers or thinkers.

As such, these two grammatical categories are intimately involved in making “truth happen” in Plains Cree. These two categories are the focus of Chapter 2.

1.2.2 The “6-Degrees of Separation” problem in Plains Cree

In considering our relation to famous or important people, we sometimes count in terms of our relation to people who have been related to famous people. For example, my uncle once wrestled Hulk Hogan. Counting from The Hulk to me, I can say that I am separated from him by one degree of separation (i.e. my intermediate Uncle Ned). Of course, I can’t say that I “know” The Hulk – only that I know someone who knew him. This game of counting intermediate people has sometimes been done as a logic puzzle – as in the hobby of connecting actors to other actors until one of them has starred in a movie with Kevin Bacon (i.e. the “Six Degrees of Separation from Kevin Bacon” game).

Suppose that I am speaking Plains Cree, and I want to tell you something that Hulk Hogan said to my Uncle. In this language, I have a choice of three ways to present this (4).

(4) a. \( \nabla dr' \ A\mathbb{U}^{0} \ \hat{\lambda}. \)
   \( \hat{\lambda} \text{itwêw nâpêw} \)
   \( \hat{\lambda} \text{kosí it} \ =wê-w nâpêw \)
   \( \text{so } \text{thus} =AI -3 \text{ man} \)
   ‘That’s what the man\textsubscript{AN} said’
   (Volunteered S4, Presented S2,S3)

b. \( \nabla dr' \ \nabla \ A\mathbb{U}' \ \hat{\lambda}. \)
   \( \hat{\lambda} \text{kosí étwêt nâpêw} \)
   \( \hat{\lambda} \text{kosí é- it} \ =wê-t nâpêw \)
   \( \text{so } c1-\text{thus} =AI -3 \text{ man} \)
   ‘That’s what the man\textsubscript{AN} said’
   (Volunteered S4, Presented S2,S3)

c. \( \nabla dr' \ \nabla \ A\mathbb{U}^{0} \ (\nabla \%) \ \hat{\lambda}. \)
   \( \hat{\lambda} \text{kosí é-itwêyit (êsa) nâpêwa} \)
   \( \hat{\lambda} \text{kosí é- it} \ =wê-yî -t êsa nâpêw-a \)
   \( \text{so } c1-\text{thus} =AI -DS-3 \text{ EVID man} \ -XT \)
   ‘That’s what the man\textsubscript{OBV} said’
   (Volunteered S4, Presented S2,S3)
While the form in (4a) indicates that I heard the Hulk myself, and the form in (4b) is non-committal on how I heard about this, the final form, in (4c), is what I would say if I wanted to make it clear that I wasn’t there to hear Hulk Hogan tell this – it was something he said to someone else, that I’m passing on. By marking the noun nápêw ‘man’ with the suffix –a, and putting the suffix –yi– in the verb, I am telling you that I don’t know this Hulk Hogan fellow personally, and thus I can’t vouch for this directly. You’d have to go check with my Uncle to make sure that this was really what The Hulk said. Thus, Plains Cree has a way to do this “degree-counting” right in its grammar, by specially-marking the noun and verbs that relate to it.

1.3. Proposal: Individuals related to perspectives

In this thesis, I attempt to model “truth happening” in Plains Cree. In doing this, it is important to remember the distinction between a phenomenon (Greek: φαινόµενον ‘that which appears’) and the model of the phenomenon. I am not claiming that the model I am constructing is, in any sense, ‘real.’ Rather, it is a constructed representation that covers the observable facts and gives us a systematic way to look for new facts to model. In other words, the model is a map, not a territory (cf. Korzybski 1958, Bateson 1971).

1.3.1. Perspective possession

In this thesis, I take “truth happening” to be the relation of individuals to propositions. This is an inherently relativized process; the truth of a proposition is relative to some individual. In particular, the truth of a proposition is relative to the individual’s perspective (in the sense of Kölbel 2002) – the way that individual sees the world. The process of “truth-happening,” then, is the process of mapping a proposition into some individual’s perspective.

Perspectives can be thought of as analogous to other possessed entities (Kölbel 2002); each individual owns one, and uses it to evaluate the truth of propositions. In a sense, it is like a body part that the individual takes with them wherever they go. Parallel to possession, then, we can define a perspective and an individual as being related by possessor relation ‘R’ (Higginbotham 1983).

(5) a. [[John’s dog]] = R(John,dog) = There is a relation between John and the dog.

b. R(x,ψ) = There is a relation between an individual x and a perspective ψ.
In most cases, the relation between the possessor and the perspective is unspecified, analogous to normal possession. However, there are ways to further restrict this relation, by introducing predicates that explicitly restrict this unspecified ‘R’ relation, just as with kinship terms (Burton 1995). With perspectives, these predicates are typically called “propositional attitude” predicates (Russell 1918), and comprise predicates like “think,” “feel,” or “say.”

(6) a. [[John’s mother]] = mother-of(x, John) =
   There is a mother relation between John and x. (Burton 1995)

   b. [[John thinks]] = think(John, ψ) =
   There is a think relation between John and ψ.

A perspective, then, is a domain that an individual possesses with which to evaluate the truth of a proposition.

If the ‘R’ relation of perspective possession is further specified by the addition of predicates, we could expect a language to grammatically separate perspective possession from the relation to the perspective. In fact, in Plains Cree, many of these propositional attitude predicates are built off of one element – the suffix –êyiht ‘by mind.’ Thus, to ‘believe’ is tâpwêwakêyihtam ‘to hold it true in the mind,’ while to ‘think’ is itêyihtam ‘to do thus with it in the mind.’

(7) a. ČιwarziiQa^z^C.C.
   tâpwêwakêyihtam.
   tâpwêwak=êyiht-am
   true =by.mind.TI-TI
   ‘S/heAN believes in itIN, holds it to be true.’

   b. Δ∪^z^C.C.
   itêyihtam.
   it =êyiht-am
   thus=by.mind.TI-TI
   ‘S/heAN thinks thus of itIN.’

Plains Cree, then, could be thought of as coding the having of a perspective (-êyiht) and the relation to the perspective (e.g. tâpwê- ‘true’) as separate linguistic elements, which crucially exist in an structurally-conditioned, asymmetric relation to the holder of perspective. The concept of perspective possession provides a way to model this pattern.

---

6 This asymmetry presents challenges for accounts that treat the perspective holder, the perspective, and the relation to the perspective as an undifferentiated triple (e.g. Kamp 1990). While the current account does not provide a full
The definition of perspective possession adopted here gives rise to two kinds of individuals:

(i) Those that hold a perspective,
(ii) Those that don’t.

For perspective-holders, I use the term “intentional,” because they have “intentions,” which means that they have mental processes directed at something (Brentano 1874). For individuals that do not possess a perspective, I adopt the term “extentional,” since they do not have mental processes directed at anything.\(^7\) “Intentionality,” then, is the property of possessing a perspective.

### 1.3.2. Discourse Representation Theory with perspectives

To model the contexts for perspective possession in Plains Cree, I employ a modified form of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT: Kamp 1981) that is built off of the work of Farkas (1992) and Smith (2004). In this model, each Discourse Representation Structure (DRS: symbolized by a ‘box’ in the representation) represents a perspective (the domain in which the truth of a proposition is evaluated). This perspective is necessarily ‘anchored’ to an individual (Fillmore 1971, Ruwet 1982, Kölbl 2002, Lasersohn 2005, Stephenson 2007), creating a perspective-individual pair (e.g. \(R(x, \psi)\)). This perspective-individual pair is represented in the DRS through the following conventions:

(i) The perspective is represented by the ‘box’ of the DRS itself.
(ii) The individual that possesses this perspective is marked above the upper-left corner of the box.
(iii) The relation between the individual and the perspective is represented by the predicate in angle brackets to the right of the individual.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{x} <R> \\
\text{= R(x,} \psi) \\
\end{array}
\]

---

\(^7\) Thanks to Hotze Rullmann (p.c.) for suggesting this term.
Elements embedded within a perspective are thus placed inside the corresponding ‘box’ of the DRS, and variables related to this perspective are introduced in the frame at the top of each ‘box.’

(9) Jeff: The sun feels good.  

Jeff <say>  
\[ x = \text{say}(Jeff, \psi) \]  
\[ \text{sun}(x) \]  
\[ \text{feel.good}(x) \]

The relation between the individual and proposition is neutrally unspecified. If the Speaker wishes to represent the perspective of some other individual, a second layer of embedding can be added.

(10) Clare: Jeff thinks the sun feels good.  

Clare <say>  
\[ x \text{ Jeff} = \text{say}(Clare, \psi) \]  
\[ \text{sun}(x) \]  
\[ \text{think}(Jeff) \]  
[Jeff <think>]  
\[ x \]  
\[ \text{sun}(x) \]  
\[ \text{feel.good}(x) \]

Of course, the DRS in (10) is not a complete representation of the utterance in (10); I have abstracted away from places and times. For the purposes of understanding the reference-typing

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8 Regarding the argument structure of propositional attitude verbs, Cook (2008) provides evidence that propositions (syntactically CPs) are never the objects of verbs. This is the reason for the treatment of predicates like say in the formalism.

9 Although the implementation here is similar in method to that considered by Kamp (1990), which would model “intentional” as an “external anchor” and “extentional” as an “internal anchor,” the two accounts differ with respect to their ability to model multiple layers (>2) of embedded perspectives, which is crucial for the Plains Cree data considered in Chapter 3.
phenomena in Plains Cree, there does not appear to be a need to distinguish between times and places, although a full model of Plains Cree perspectival meanings will necessarily require their inclusion. In the study of obviation phenomena (Chapter 3), I employ the context variable C of Partee (1989), which can be conceived of as a collapsing of place and time together. This is outlined in section 1.3.3 below.

The use of a DRS to represent a perspective implicates several alterations to the standard DRT developed by Kamp (1981). In particular, the typical DRT convention of carrying referents into embedded boxes cannot here be maintained; to do so would indicate that any referent known to the Speaker would also be known to the possessor of embedded perspectives. Altering this convention allows for the modeling of differences in perspectives regarding referents. For example, the “sun” in the perspective of Clare in (10) is repeated in the embedded perspective of Jeff. This represents that both Clare and Jeff have the same referent in mind. If the variable of the embedded perspective were switched (e.g. to $y$), then Clare and Jeff would have different versions of the “sun” in mind, as schematized in (11).

\begin{equation}
\text{(11) Clare: Jeff thinks the sun feels good.}
\end{equation}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c|c|c}
 & & \\
\hline
Clare <say> & $x$ Jeff & = say(Clare,$\psi$) \\
\hline
 & sun(x) & \\
 & think(Jeff) & \\
\hline
Jeff <think> & $y$ & = think(Jeff,$\psi'$) \\
\hline
 & sun(y) & \\
 & feel.good(x) & \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

The ban on referents carrying into embedded DRS structures also has implications for existential quantification. In typical DRT frameworks, the referent is taken to exist within the DRS it is located in. In the current framework, this existence only holds of a perspective. For example, consider a context in which Clare and Jeff were walking in the woods together and they saw a
large creature run by. Jeff claims this creature was a hodag,\textsuperscript{10} while Clare thinks it was merely an exceptionally large dog. We can model this as in (12), where the predicate ‘large’ is located in both perspectives, while the predicate ‘hodag’ is located only in the perspective possessed by Jeff.

\begin{align*}
(12) & \quad \text{Clare: Jeff thinks he saw a large hodag.}
\end{align*}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
& \textbf{Clare <say> } \\
\hline
\textbf{x} & \\
\hline
\textbf{Jeff} & \\
\hline
\textbf{think(Jeff)} & \\
\hline
\textbf{large(x)} & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
& \textbf{Clare <say> } \\
\hline
\textbf{x} & \\
\hline
\textbf{Jeff} & \\
\hline
\textbf{think(Jeff)} & \\
\hline
\textbf{large(x)} & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
& \textbf{Clare <say> } \\
\hline
\textbf{x} & \\
\hline
\textbf{Jeff} & \\
\hline
\textbf{think(Jeff)} & \\
\hline
\textbf{large(x)} & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
& \textbf{Clare <say> } \\
\hline
\textbf{x} & \\
\hline
\textbf{Jeff} & \\
\hline
\textbf{think(Jeff)} & \\
\hline
\textbf{large(x)} & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
& \textbf{Clare <say> } \\
\hline
\textbf{x} & \\
\hline
\textbf{Jeff} & \\
\hline
\textbf{think(Jeff)} & \\
\hline
\textbf{large(x)} & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

This represents that Clare is only committing to the referent’s bigness, while the idea that it was a hodag is entirely Jeff’s.

Within this model, “Truth-happening” is understood as the process of connecting a proposition to a perspective-individual pairing. This connection provides the means for an individual to evaluate the proposition.

1.3.3. Proposal: Four kinds of referents in Plains Cree

I propose that Plains Cree can be understood to refer to four kinds of individuals, defined in terms of perspectival possession (i.e. intentionality):

(i) Individuals that can never possess a perspective.
(ii) Individuals that cannot currently possess a perspective.
(iii) Individuals that currently possess a perspective.
(iv) Individuals unspecified for perspective possession.

\textsuperscript{10} A ‘hodag’ is a legendary beast that is thought to live in Northern Wisconsin woodland areas, particularly around Rhinelander, Eagle River, Minocqua, and Hayward.
The first kind of individuals, those that can never possess a perspective, correspond to the grammatical category used to mark Hobbes as a stuffed animal in example (2). This category is termed “inanimate” in the literature (cf. Wolfart 1973).

(13) CATEGORY (I) = INANIMATE
\[ \text{CATEGORY (I) = IANIMATE} \]
\[ \text{d"sΔ+ \hat{p} \Gamma_{\text{Hobbes}}} \]
\[ \text{kohtâwi kî-miskam Hobbes.} \]
\[ \text{k-ohtâwi kî- m =isk -am Hobbes} \]
\[ \text{2-father PREV-find=by.body.TI-TI Hobbes} \]
\[ \text{‘Your father\textsubscript{AN} found Hobbes\textsubscript{IN.’}} \]  
(Presented S2)

Here, the verb is coded with two forms that pick out individuals that never possess perspectives:

(i) The suffix –isk ‘done by the body to an inanimate thing’
(ii) The suffix –am ‘inanimate object’

I propose that this category marks individuals that are never able to possess a perspective; they are inherently extentional. This is represented in the formalism as in (14).

(14) \[ \text{EXT}(x) \leftrightarrow \forall \psi \forall y (R(y, \psi) \rightarrow x \neq y) \]
\[ x \text{ is Extentional if and only if for all Perspectives } \psi \text{ and all individuals } y, \text{ if there is a relation } R \text{ between individual } y \text{ with perspective } \psi, \text{ then } x \text{ is not } y. \]

As such, referents marked with this category will be unable to speak, think, or feel, since those are predicates that introduce a relation between a perspective and an individual (§1.3.1).

Modeling the difference in who believes the referent is extentional thus reduces to a differential embedding of the extentional-marking predicate.

(15) \[ \text{d}"sΔ+ \hat{p} \Gamma_{\text{Hobbes}} \]
\[ \text{kohtâwi kî-miskam Hobbes.} \]
\[ \text{k-ohtâwi kî- m =isk -am Hobbes} \]
\[ \text{2-father PREV-find=by.body.TI-TI Hobbes} \]
\[ \text{‘Your father\textsubscript{AN} found Hobbes\textsubscript{IN.’}} \]  
(Presented S2)
a. **Context 1: Extentional w.r.t. Speaker**

Speaker <R>

- x Hobbes
- father(x,Hearer)
- Ext(Hobbes)
- find(x,Hobbes)

b. **Context 2: Extentional w.r.t. Hearer**

Speaker <R>

- x Hobbes
- father(x,Hearer)
- find(x,Hobbes)

Hearer <R>

- Hobbes
- Ext(Hobbes)

Here, the location of the Ext predicate in the perspective of one or the other perspective represents who conceives of Hobbes as extentional. This category is considered in detail in Chapter 2.

The second kind of individuals, those that are currently unable to possess a perspective, are signified by the structure used to mark nápêw “the man” in example (4c), termed “obviative” in the literature (cf. Wolfart 1973).

\[(16) \text{Category (ii) = Obviative} \]

\[\n\text{êkosi ê-itwêyít (ësa) nápêwa}
\text{êkosi ê-itwê-ýi-t ësa nápêw-a}
\text{so cl-say-DS-3 EVID man -XT}
\text{‘That’s what the man_{OBV} said’} \]

(Volunteered S4, Presented S2,S3)

---

11 I am here treating proper names like other variables. This departs from treatments of proper names as ‘rigid designators,’ in the sense of Kripke (1980), but allows for the modeling of different perspectives on a referent identified by a proper name.
Here, the nominal bears a suffix –a, and the verb carries a special suffix –yi–. I propose that this construction codes that the individual is unable to possess a perspective relative to the specified context; the individual is contextually extentional.

\[(17) \quad \text{Ext}(x, C) \leftrightarrow \forall \psi \forall y (R(y, \psi, C) \rightarrow x \neq y)\]

\[x \text{ is extentional at context } C \text{ if and only if for all perspectives } \psi \text{ and all individuals } y, \text{ if there is a relation } R \text{ of } y \text{ with } \psi \text{ at context } C, \text{ then } x \text{ is not } y.\]

This contextual extentionality is always relative to the Speaker’s perspective, and means that “obviative” referents are unable to be assigned a perspective by the Speaker.

\[(18) \quad a. \quad \forall \nu \exists \psi \exists y (R(y, \psi, \nu) \rightarrow x \neq y)\]

\[\text{ékosi é-itwêyít (ësa) nâpêwa}\]

\[\text{ékosi é-itwê -yi -t ësa nâpêw-a}\]

\[\text{so } \text{Cl-say-DS-3 EVID man -XT}\]

\[\text{‘That’s what the man}\text{OBV said’} \quad \text{(Volunteered S4, Presented S2,S3)}\]

b. WELL-FORMED DRS FOR 18A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker &lt;R&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>say(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>man(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ext(x,C)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. ILL-FORMED DRS FOR 18A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker &lt;R&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>say(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>man(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ext(x,C)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>x &lt;say&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>say(x)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Here, the well-formed DRS is one in which there is no perspective assigned to the man, who is marked as obviative (18b). Introducing an embedded perspective for this obviative referent is ill-formed (18c). Modeling “obviation,” then, reduces to modeling a contextual ban on perspective possession. This category is considered in detail in Chapter 3.

The third kind of individuals is those that currently possess a perspective, termed “Proximate” in the literature. This kind of referent is created by contrast between the “Obviative” form and a normal nominal, rather than by anything special about the grammatical forms involved. For example, in (19), the perspective of nâpêw ‘man’ is represented, as shown by the explanation offered by the consultant.

(19) \[
\text{CATEGORY (III)} = \text{“PROXIMATE”} \\
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\forall \langle t < \bar{t}’, \bar{t} \rangle, \forall \bar{t} & : e \wedge w = a m \wedge t nâpêw iskwêw-a \\
c l - \text{see} = b y . e y e . t a - d i r - 3 \text{ man} & \quad \text{woman-xt} \\
\text{‘The man}_{\text{PROX}} & \text{ sees the woman}_{\text{OBV}}.” \\
\text{COMMENT (S2): “In this example, you’re hearing what the man has to say about it.”}
\end{align*}
\]

The “Proximate,” then possess a perspective for the evaluation of the truth proposition. Being a function of contrast with the “Obviative,” this category is also considered in Chapter 3.

The last kind of individuals is the elsewhere case, termed “Animate” in the literature. This kind of individual has neither intentional or extentional properties, as shown by the pair of examples in (20).
(20)  CATEGORY (iv) = “Animate”

a. σ<ν<ŋ° <ŋα. <ŋr^ε
   niwâpmâw ana awâsis
   ni-wâpam -â -w an=a awâsis
   I- see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 DST=AN.SG child
   ‘I see the child / ribbon.’
   Comment (S2): “I don’t know if the child knows about this or not.”

b. σ<ν<ŋ° <ŋα. <ŋr^ε
   niwâpmâw ana sênapân
   ni-wâpam -â -w an=a sênapân
   I- see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 DST=AN.SG ribbon
   ‘I see the child / ribbon.’
   Comment (S2): “The ribbon couldn’t know about this.”

I consider this category in Chapter 2.

1.3.4. Proposal: Constructing obviation via referential dependency

Turning from the kinds of individuals coded in Plains Cree to the manner in which these individuals are coded, I propose that the three categories of individuals are not grammatically equal. In particular, I argue that “inanimate” and “animate” are coded by dedicated forms (Chapter 2), while obviation, by contrast is constructed out of other resources available to the grammar (Chapter 3). Animacy, then is a primitive property of Plains Cree grammar, while obviation is not.

In constructing obviation, I propose that Plains Cree recruits elements that code referential dependency (i.e. the process of making one referent dependent on another for its interpretation). This referential dependency can be understood as the satisfaction of two conditions: (i) a structural condition (c-command/linear precedence, shown on the left side of the table) and (ii) a semantic condition (perspectival embedding, shown on the right side of the table).
Table 1.1.: Two conditions on referential dependency

Depending on the configuration that an obviative referent is used in, a different piece of this referential dependency system will be recruited. In Table 1.2, we see that there are five different configurations for obviation, and they correspond with five different dependency types.

Table 1.2.: The forms of obviation and their dependencies

Obviation, then, is just the application of referential dependency operations to animate referents. The more general property of Plains Cree is referential dependency. This is explored in detail in Chapter 4.

1.4. Relation to previous work

In this section, I consider the ways in which the current model relates to previous work on these topics. In addition, each chapter has its second section devoted to previous work specific to those topics (i.e. §2.2, §3.2, §4.2, §5.2).

1.4.1. Models of subjective meaning

Models of meaning in natural language have developed from a philosophical tradition that sought to develop an explicit language for expressing philosophical concepts. Since Aristotle, this philosophical tradition was crucially concerned with constructing arguments that entail
contradictions (Hume 1748, Tarski 1944), and numerous proposals were made to pare down linguistic forms to their most abstract, objective forms, in order to reduce ambiguity. Imported into work on non-philosophical language (i.e. natural language), this desire for objective, non-ambiguity was maintained (Cresswell 1985:5). This had the result that semantic analyses of natural language tended to focus on contradiction as a means to define the boundaries of meaning in the formal semantic sense (i.e. “It is raining” entails that “it is not raining” cannot also be true). The judge for these contradictions was taken to be someone external to the speech-act – the knower of “how it actually is” out there in the world (Tarski 1944).

While this convenient way of talking about truth has proven useful in the description of meaning in natural language, it has long been noticed that numerous components of the natural languages considered (e.g. English, French, etc.) do not inherently entail contradictions, even when supplied with a specific time and place (e.g. Austin 1962). This includes, minimally, linguistic forms like questions (“May we come in?”), commands (“Open the door!”), and conditionals (“Forget to close the door and you’ll be sorry!”)(Fillmore 1975, Karttunnen 1977). Further, it was noticed that some of these elements in natural language are dependent on a specific individual involved in the speech act (cf. Searle 1965, Cresswell 1985, etc.). For example, an element like the English word “local” could be true when applied to the University of British Columbia for a speaker in Vancouver, but simultaneously untrue for a speaker in Boston (cf. Fillmore 1975, Mitchell 1987). Thus, the move has been away from the calculation of linguistic meaning solely in terms of contradiction-laden, individual-independent “objective” meaning and towards relativized, individual-dependent “subjective” meaning.

One attempt at formalizing these “subjective” contexts was Farkas (1992), which focussed on modeling the distribution and meaning of Romance subjunctives. To model these, Farkas (1992) employed a DRT model in which an individual was paired with a world. More recently, Smith (2003) has employed DRT to model point of view effects in English discourse. The current model takes much of its mechanisms from these works, though exchanges worlds for perspectives.

Recent work on the formalization of subjective meaning has focussed on predicates that trigger so-called “faultless disagreement” (Kölbel 2002, Lasersohn 2005, Stephenson 2007). These are contexts in which one person can utter a proposition, and the other person can disagree without saying the first person was wrong.12

12 I here cite the judgements of Stephenson (2007). I myself cannot utter “No, it isn’t!” in this context.
Lasersohn (2005) and Stephenson (2007) analyze these forms by appealing to the notion of a “judge.” This judge is an individual who judges the proposition to be true relative to a time and world. Being thus relativized, these propositions are inherently “subjective.”

By employing a parallel relativization mechanism, the current work can be considered an extension of that done by Lasersohn (2005) and Stephenson (2007), but is much closer in its implementation to that of Farkas (1992). In all three accounts, truth evaluation is relativized to a particular individual, although some of the other particulars differ (e.g. perspectives vs. sets of worlds). Setting aside these more minor notational and philosophical differences, the important difference between the current model and these other works is that, whereas these other accounts relativize only certain predicates with respect to an individual, the current account relativizes all propositions to a perspective-holder (minimally, the Speaker).

### 1.4.2. Perspectives vs. possible worlds

In this thesis, I employ the notion of a “perspective” for the evaluation domain of a proposition’s truth. While this follows Kölbel (2002), it departs significantly from the treatments typically used for the formal semantics of natural language. This means that a comparison of the current theory to other work is in order.

It should be noted at the outset that none of the reasons for employing “perspectives” are absolutely vital to the current work, representing instead ontological and philosophical disagreement, and thus a semanticist that uses a possible worlds framework can readily translate the current formalisms into those more comfortable to them (i.e. exchange “perspective of x” for “set of worlds epistemically accessible to x” or “doxastic alternatives of x” and other modifications as necessary).

In most theories of meaning, the domain of evaluation for propositions is a “world” (Hintikka 1962, Kripke 1963). What exactly is in a “world” appears to be a matter of some debate, but the canonical view is expressed by Hintikka (1962): a world contains a truth value for every proposition. Sets of worlds, then, are sets of sets of truth values for propositions.

Relevant to our current discussion, this kind of system was used by Hintikka (1962) to model belief. For example, were we playing poker, and I wanted to guess the set of cards in your hand, I could write down every possible set of cards you could have, writing down one possible
hand on each slip of paper. As the game progresses, I could continually narrow down this set of papers based on new information, until I restrict the set papers to only one or two slips of paper. These would be the “worlds” that still depict possible states of the cards in your hand (i.e. epistemic alternatives; Hintikka 1962). Belief, then, is modeled as the continual narrowing of the set of worlds, based on additional knowledge. To believe something is to know the set of worlds that are accessible given your current belief. This is sometimes called an individual’s “doxastic alternatives.”

The core difference between a possible worlds model like this and the perspective model I am here using lies in the notion of exhaustivity; worlds are taken to be exhaustively defined but perspectives are not. That is, a world has a truth value for every proposition in it, whereas a perspective only has a truth value for those propositions that are given to it. This has the result that individuals can only make reference to sets of worlds (since they do not know the truth value of every proposition in existence), but can make reference to a single perspective (since all they have to know is the set of propositions in it). Worlds, then, are always being restricted into a more narrow set (as the beliefs of the referent increases), whereas perspectives are always being specified with more belief content. In this sense, perspectives are something like “partial worlds” or “situations,” depending on the model employed (Barwise 1981).

The advantage of the perspective model is this orientation towards specification. Rather than defining the acquisition of new information as the reduction in number of the set of worlds in the individual’s set of doxastic alternatives, we can define “belief” as the addition of some proposition to some individual’s perspective. More precisely, we can say that an individual possesses different perspectives for different kinds of propositional attitudes; there are perspectives filled with the things they “think” versus perspectives filled with the things they “believe” or “doubt.” Thus, there is the perspective, and then there is the relation to this perspective. This allows us to think carefully about the ways that propositional attitudes are constructed in natural languages like Plains Cree, where these predicates often have two elements (e.g. –éyiht ‘by mind’ and tâpwê- ‘true’; §1.3.1).
1.5. The Plains Cree language

Plains Cree is an Algonquian language originally spoken in the northern Plains of North America by approximately 30,000 speakers. Speakers are typically in their 50’s or older, with some reports of children acquiring the language in the less-populated northern areas (Northern Alberta and Northern Saskatchewan). Since the language has failed to transfer to between two and three generations of speakers in most communities, it is safe to conclude that the language is now in a moribund state.

Plains Cree is part of a larger language group of Central Algonquian languages sometimes called the “Cree Dialect Continuum,” which stretches from Labrador to Alberta. The precise division between dialects and languages is difficult, but the speakers I work with completely lose intelligibility around James Bay (Moose Cree). Speakers are unable to recognize the more eastern varieties (e.g. Montagnais, Innu-Aimun) as a related language. The languages share basic lexical forms, and much morphology, but the phonology, morphophonology, and syntax are significantly different.

1.5.1. Sources

Plains Cree has a strong descriptive tradition, stretching back to the 1840’s (Howse 1844). I here offer a review of available materials that the reader can refer to for particular forms and discussion. I have also included a glossary section at the end of the thesis, which identifies and defines every form used in this thesis. Using this glossary in concert with other grammatical materials should provide the necessary tools to understand the Plains Cree data presented here.

There are three major grammatical descriptions of Plains Cree; Howse (1865), Lacombe (1874), and Wolfart (1973). Of these, Wolfart (1973) is the most accessible, and provides a discussion and analysis of the earlier two works. It represents a clear statement of the principles of grammatical description that Hockett (1966) and Bloomfield (1962) developed, and is thus of interest for theoretical as well as practical reasons.

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13 Note that these estimates are quite old (SIL: 1982).
Beyond these more formal grammatical descriptions are those aimed at a less linguistically-trained audience, written with the intent of introducing beginners to the language, training teachers, and instructing students of the language. In particular, the grammatical descriptions of Wolfart and Carroll (1981), Ahenakew (1987), and Okimâsis and Ratt (1999) are useful sources. The first book is a succinct introduction to the most notable features of Plains Cree grammar. In addition to presenting user-friendly grammatical discussion, the latter two books offer the insights of native Plains Cree speakers, which are sometimes found nowhere else (for example Ahenakew’s discussion of ‘factive’ óma).

In terms of dictionaries, there are three major ones to choose from: LeClaire and Cardinal (1998), Wolfart and Ahenakew (1998), and (Wolvengrey 2001). In work with modern Plains Cree speakers, the 2-volume dictionary by Wolvengrey (2001) is the most useful. It serves as a fully-functional dictionary, comparable to an modern dictionary for Spanish or German. Wolfart and Ahenakew (1998), which is constructed from corpus work, is an excellent companion to published texts, but can only offer words that have been recorded there (e.g. if the texts have no instance of a word for “high-heeled shoes,” the dictionary will not have an entry for this word.)

Plains Cree has one of the best text collections of any language indigenous to North America. Starting with Bloomfield’s work (1930, 1933), high-quality textual work has been consistently produced. Beginning in the late 1980s, the partnership of Ahenakew and Wolfart produced a set of Plains Cree-language books (1993, 1997, 1999, 2000) that provide a significant body of high-quality data, complete with translation, commentary, and glossary. More recently, Wolvengrey (2007) has begun an initiative to publish sets of texts.

Formal linguistic work on Plains Cree has focussed largely on the complex morphosyntax of the language. Relevant work that deals with morphosyntax includes Dahlstrom (1986), Dryer (1996), Hirose (2000), and Déchaine (1999, 2003, 2008). The complex particle system of Plains Cree has been described in detail by Ogg (1991). Clausal structure has been considered by Blain (1997), Long (1999), and Cook (2008). Obviation phenomena has been considered by Wolfart (1978), Russell (1991, 1996), and
Mühlbauer (herein). Other grammatical features that have been considered are pronouns (Blain 1995), weather verbs (Blain 1987), incorporation (Wolfart 1971), possession (Mühlbauer 2004, 2007), word order (Mühlbauer 2003, Wolvengrey 2007, Déchaine 2007), demonstrative ordering (Wolvengrey 2003), preverbs (Cook 2006, Wolvengrey 2006), relative roots (Cook 2003), evidentials (Blain et al. 2006, Blain & Déchaine 2002, 2007), and reduplication (Ahenakew & Wolfart 1983). Phonetic and phonological discussions include treatments of prominence (Mühlbauer 2006), ablaut (Wolfart 1973), epenthesis and deletion (Wolfart 1973), syllable structure (Cook 2003), diminutive palatalization (Hirose 1999), prosody (Cook 2006), and phrasing (Cook & Mühlbauer 2005).

1.5.2. Orthography

There are two orthographies for Plains Cree: (i) the standard roman orthography (SRO), and (ii) the syllabic orthography. I here offer a short guide to understanding these systems, as they relate to the current thesis.

The standard roman orthography’s main notable features are the circumflexes over vowels, which represent vowel quality contrasts (e.g. a [a] vs. â [a], i [i] vs. î [i], o [ʊ] vs. ô [u]), the use of ‘c’ for the palatal [ts], and the use of pre-consonantal ‘h’ to code pre-aspiration. It should be noted that this orthography aims for a highly phonemicized spelling system, and does not closely approximate the surface forms of the language as it is currently spoken. As such, it does not record the wide dialect variation found within Plains Cree. For example, one consultant (S2) turns all [ks] clusters into geminate [ss], often turns CVC sequences into [ʔ]C, and metathesizes all [wa] sequences to [ɔ]. Using the standardized orthography, none of this is written down – just as none of the dialect variation of English is captured in the orthography (e.g. you can’t tell by reading this that I often drift into a heavy Northern Wisconsin accent). The data in this thesis, then, is not suitable for phonological analysis.

The syllabic writing system is favored by many speakers of the language. It represents the same basic vowel and consonant contrasts as the standard roman orthography, but does so syllabically. The shape of the symbol codes the consonantal value, while its orientation codes the vowel. Thus, ᐯᐱᐳᐸ all represent different combinations of [p] with a vowel. This orthography has been used in this thesis because of its value for speakers of the language. Detailed explanations of this system can be found in the dictionary of Wolvengrey (2001), and elsewhere.
1.6. Outline of the thesis

There are five chapters in this thesis, as well as a glossary. They are organized in the following way.

Chapter 2 considers the form, content, and context of the two animacy classes in Plains Cree. I argue there that the formal organization of these two classes can be best understood as dedicated coding that is distributed across all syntactic positions that code reference (e.g. nominal and argument structure). I then argue that the inanimate class is inherently extentional in meaning, while the inherently animate class has no inherent content at all. Contextually, these two classes of nominals are manipulated to code different individual’s perspectives about the referent.

Chapter 3 considers the form, content, and context of obviation. Rather than being a basic grammatical category of Plains Cree, I argue that obviation is best understood as the result of using several independent kinds of morphosyntax to construct the referential category “obviative.” In terms of its specific referential properties, I analyze the obviative as denoting referents that are contextual extentionality. This referential information is then situated within the Speaker’s perspective as a filter on potential perspective embeddings for this referent.

In Chapter 4, I turn to the forms used to code obviation. I propose that Plains Cree constructs obviation out of forms that code the more general property of referential dependency. This referential dependency obeys a structural and a semantic condition that is operative across Plains Cree grammar. Obviation, then, is a by-product of more basic (morpho)syntactic operations of Plains Cree.

In Chapter 5, the focus shifts from analysis of the data to how the data was obtained. Here, I consider the ways that different kinds of data collecting methods affect the outcome, and catalogue how each kind of method interacts with obviation and animacy. From this consideration, I argue that all data is good, so long as we think carefully about the context of its collection.

In Chapter 6, I conclude the discussion and consider its implications. In particular, I consider approaches to the plural/obviative parallels, the behaviour of the suffix –yi– across the Cree languages, and the similarities and differences of the Plains Cree system described here to that shown in Athabaskan languages.

Because Algonquian linguistics has its own terminology, I have included a glossary at the end of the work. This glossary contains every term and every gloss used in this thesis, and what
they mean. It is intended to not only make the thesis more accessible to a non-Algonquianist audience, but to also help make the entire field of Algonquian linguistics accessible to non-specialists.
Chapter 2
The Form, Content, and Context of Animacy

2.1. Proposal

In this chapter, I consider the form, content, and context of the two basic referential classes of Plains Cree, traditionally termed “Animate” and “Inanimate.”

(1) a. “Animate”

\[ \sigma \cdot \text{-am} \cdot \text{-â} \cdot \text{-ak} \cdot \text{-iki} \cdot \text{maskisinak} \]

niwâpamâwak aniki maskisinak

ni-\text{wâp=}am -â -w-ak an =iki maskisin-ak

I-bright=by.eye.TA-DIR-3-PL DST=AN.PL shoe -PL

‘I see\text{AN} those\text{AN} shoes\text{AN}.’

(Presented S2)

b. “Inanimate”

\[ \sigma \cdot \text{-wâp=}aht \cdot \text{-ê} \cdot \text{-n} \cdot \text{an} \cdot \text{=ihi} \cdot \text{maskisin-a} \]

niwâpahtên anihi maskisina

ni-\text{wâp=}aht -ê -n an =ihi maskisin-a

I-bright=by.eye.TI-TI-LP DST=XT shoe -XT

‘I see\text{IN} those\text{IN} shoes\text{IN}.’

(Presented S2)

The form in (1a) shows 4 distinct morphemes that code “Animate” referents (–am–, –â–, –ak, and –iki), and these are mirrored by 4 distinct morphemes in (1b) that code “Inanimate” referents (–aht–, –ê–, –a, and –ihi).

After introducing the proposal, I review the previous literature on animacy in Plains Cree, paying special attention to how the current account relates to these others (§2.2). I then argue that animacy does not have a dedicated locus in the syntax of Plains Cree (§2.3). Rather, animacy is coded in all places that reference is coded. In the verb system, these locations minimally include verbal argument positions (e.g. –am–, –â–, –ê–). Following the syntactic work of Hirose (2000), Déchaine (2003), and Déchaine & Reinholtz (2008) of the verb system of Plains Cree, I schematize this as in (2).

---

1 While my definition of these two classes is new, I have here adopted the traditional terms for them. I used scare quotes in this thesis to show that the terms themselves do not carry any ontological significance. I have maintained this terminology because these are the names used throughout the literature; if I were to change terminology, comparing different approaches would be made much more difficult.
(2) niwâpahtêni
   ni-wâp=aht     -ê-n
   I- see =by.eye.TI-TI-LP
   ‘I see it_in’

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{CP} \\
\text{C} \quad \text{IP} \\
\text{I} \quad \text{vP} \\
\text{wâp-} \quad \text{vP} \\
\text{pro} \\
\text{v} \quad \text{vP} \\
\text{-aht-} \quad \text{VP} \\
\text{[EXT]} \\
\text{pro} \\
\text{V} \quad \text{[EXT]} \\
\end{array}
\]

In the nominal system, referential positions minimally include demonstrative positions (e.g. –iki, –ihi), and determiner-related positions (e.g. –a, –ak).²

(3) anihi maskisina
   an=ihi maskisin-a
   dst=XT shoe -XT
   ‘Those shoes_{IN}

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DEMP} \\
\text{DEM} \quad \text{DEMP} \\
\text{an-} \\
\text{pro} \\
\text{EXT} \quad \text{NUMP} \\
\text{-ihi} \quad \text{[EXT]} \\
\text{NUM} \\
\text{-a} \quad \text{NP} \\
\text{[EXT]} \\
\text{maskisin}
\end{array}
\]

Animacy, then, is distributed across the syntax of Plains Cree.

² For a consideration of the syntax of demonstratives, please turn to §3.3.2.
In section four, I argue that the concept of “animacy” is more precisely defined in terms of extentionality. I show that the two sets of forms (“Inanimate” and “Animate”) map on to the semantic property of extentionality in the following way:

(i) The grammatical class traditionally called “Inanimate” specifies that the referent never possesses a perspective (i.e. are inherently extentional; [EXT]).

(ii) The grammatical class traditionally called “Animate” is unspecified in its content; it does not specify anything about a referent’s extentionality or intentionality.

Thus, Plains Cree has a privative opposition between a form that is specified for extentional content (the “Inanimate”) and a form that is unspecified (the “Animate”).

I define an extentional referent as one that cannot be paired with a perspective (cf. §1.3.1).

Applying this to the two referential classes of Plains Cree, I claim that the “Inanimate” forms will have the content of (6), while the “Animate” forms will have the content of (7).

(6) “INANIMATE” FORM = λx. [EXT(x) ∧ PRED'(x)]

x, such that x is extentional and x is a member of the set of referents denoted by the predicate.

(7) “ANIMATE” FORM = λx. [PRED'(x)]

x, such that x is a member of the set of referents denoted by the predicate.

Finally, in section five I argue that these form-content pairs bear contextual information: a referent’s extentionality is always evaluated within the perspective of some referent. This may be any of three possible perspective possessors:

(i) The Speaker

(ii) The Hearer

(iii) Some prominent third-person (Kuno’s 1972 “Discourse Perspective”)

To adequately model this, I utilize a modified version of the Discourse Representation Theory (DRT: Kamp 1981) proposed by Farkas (1992) and Smith (2003). In this formulation, Discourse
Representation Structures (DRS) are taken to represent perspectives (Kölbel 2002). Consider the Calvin & Hobbes example (§1.3.1).

(8) **HOBSES IS “INANIMATE”**

```
d"\check{\Delta} f^\diamond_b c "\check{\Lambda}\wedge
kochtâwiymiskamHobbes
k-ohtâwiymm=isk
"amHobbes
2-fatherfind=by.body.Ti-TiHobbes
‘Your father found_inan Hobbes.’
```

(Translated S2)

Using the proposed model, we can represent the different individual’s perspectives in the following way:

(i) When Hobbes is “Inanimate” to Speaker, $[\text{Ext}(\text{Hobbes})]$ is embedded in the Speaker’s perspective.

```
Speaker <say>
xHobbes
father(x,Hearer)
\textbf{Ext}(\text{Hobbes})
find(x,Hobbes)
```

(ii) When Hobbes is “Inanimate” to the Hearer, $[\text{Ext}(\text{Hobbes})]$ is embedded in the Speaker’s representation of the Hearer’s perspective.

```
Speaker <say>
xHobbes
father(x,Hearer)
find(x,Hobbes)

Hearer <R>
Hobbes
\textbf{Ext}(\text{Hobbes})
```
When Hobbes is “Inanimate” to some third person (y), $[\text{EXT}(\text{Hobbes})]$ is embedded in the Speaker’s representation of that referent’s perspective.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&lt;say&gt;</th>
<th>x y Hobbes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>father(x,Hearer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>find(x,Hobbes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>y &lt;R&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hobbes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\text{EXT}(\text{Hobbes})$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The modeling of the contextual component of animacy reduces to differential embedding within perspectives.

### 2.2. Previous accounts

In order to understand the discussion of animacy that follows, it is necessary to consider its relation to previous work. In particular, it is necessary to understand previous work on the syntax of Plains Cree, which I review in section 2.2.1.

While the current proposal is built from the significant body of previous work on this topic, it generally departs from previous accounts in four crucial ways:

(i) The treatment of “Inanimate” as the marked member of the opposition (§2.2.2)
(ii) The equating of the “Inanimate” class with extentionality (§2.2.3)
(iii) The treatment of animacy as a syntactic element (§2.2.4)
(iv) The data set considered (§2.2.5)

#### 2.2.1. Syntactic accounts of Plains Cree

Algonquian languages have a great deal of morphology, which has attracted much interest from many of the most influential scholars of the last century, including Leonard Bloomfield, Mary Haas, Ken Hale, Charles Hockett, C.C. Uhlenbeck, and Morris Swadesh. This work can be (very
roughly) broken into two types: (i) American Structuralist accounts and (ii) Generative Grammar accounts, with work in both frameworks continuing to present.

In his account of the grammar of Menominee (Central Algonquian, Wisconsin), Leonard Bloomfield (1962) outlines a positional account of the morphosyntax of the verb and nominal which has been influential for all subsequent work on Algonquian. In this account, the system is conceived of as having slots, for which morphemes were specified. When two morphemes were shown to be in complementary distribution, they were assigned the same slot. Following this method, Bloomfield constructs a description of Menominee that includes 10 suffixal positions and two prefixal positions. Subsequent work in Plains Cree (e.g. Wolfart 1973, Dahlstrom 1986) has posited a similar system.

One of the crucial generalizations that has come out of this work is the decompositional nature of the Algonquian stem. In particular, verbs are composed of multiple morphemes, conveniently labeled “Initials,” “Medials,” and “Finals” based on their order of occurrence. A sample for Plains Cree is shown in (9).

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{wìsak} & \text{-içihciy-} & \text{-in-} & \text{-ê-} \\
\text{pain} & \text{-hand-} & \text{-by.hand-} & \text{-dir-} \\
\hline
\text{INITIAL} & \text{MEDIAL} & \text{FINAL} & \text{AFFIX} \\
\text{AFFIX} & & & \text{AFFIX} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

(9) \text{wisakîchîncînêw.}

\text{‘s/he hurts his/her hand with his/her hand.’ (Volunteered S3)}

The affix that immediately follows the final in transitive verbs (–ê– above) is labeled a “theme sign.”

Building on these generalizations about the decompositional nature of verbal predicates, Hirose (2000) observes that verbs in Plains Cree canonically have one morpheme for each of their arguments; intransitive verbs have one affix beyond the root (“Initial”), transitive verbs have two affixes, and di-transitive verbs sometimes have three.\(^3\) Modeling this in a generative syntactic framework (Chomsky 1982, etc.), Hirose proposed that the affixes that code transitivity be located in the two heads of a split VP, each of which introduces an argument (taken to be pronominal in nature; \text{pro}). The root is introduced in the complement position of the lowest verb phrase. This is all schematized in (10).

\(^3\) This is, of course, a gross characterization. There are numerous cases of single-morpheme verbs in Plains Cree – a trend which appears to be generalized in Blackfoot.
To account for the linear order of these affixes, Hirose (2000) posited a cyclic raising mechanism; the \textsc{root} raises to the left of the first verbal head \textsc{v}, and then these two raise to the left of the second verbal head \textsc{v}, giving the linear order \textsc{root} > \textsc{v} > \textsc{v}.

Considering Algonquian verb syntax in the context of typological work, Déchaine (2003) proposes modifications to Hirose’s (2000) treatment in order to model the relation between Algonquian verbal structure and that of other languages (e.g. English, Semitic, Salish). In particular, she reorders the morphemes and locates the root as an adjunct to the outer verb phrase (vP in transitive structures).

This structure linearizes via phrasal encliticization; each phrase is spelled out as \textsc{spec} > \textsc{head} > \textsc{compliment}, yielding a linear order \textsc{root} > \textsc{v} > \textsc{v} for transitive verbs. This is the version of Plains Cree argument structure that is adopted in the current thesis.
In contrast to the verbal system, the nominal system of Algonquian has received relatively little attention since the first detailed descriptions of Bloomfield (1962), Hockett (1966), and Wolfart (1973). For Plains Cree, the only generative account of nominal morphosyntax that I am aware of is Déchaine (1999). Working from the generalizations made by Hockett (1966), Déchaine argues that affixation in the nominal domain can be represented as in (12).

\[
(12) \quad \text{nimaskisininâna} \\
\text{ni-maskisin-nân-a} \\
\text{l-shoe -1pl -xt} \\
\text{‘Our shoes’ (Presented S2)}
\]

Arguing on the basis of selectional restriction, Déchaine locates the suffixes for possessor number (e.g. –nân) in the head of PersP, introduced in the compliment of D, where the possessor prefix is located (e.g. ni–). Elements that code plurality (e.g. –a) are introduced in NumP related to the NP itself (e.g. maskisin). To linearize this, Déchaine employs two mechanisms: (i) cyclic movement of the NP to the spec of PersP, and (ii) phrasal encliticization. Together, this yields the linear order D > NP > Pers > Num. The basics of this model are adopted for this thesis, although some modifications will be necessary, which are outlined as introduced.

2.2.2. “Inanimate” as semantically specified

Most analyses of the “Animate/Inanimate” distinction in Algonquian languages take “Animate” to be the specified, contentful member of the contrast. This approach is exemplified by
Dahlstrom (1995:64-65), who builds a picture of “Animate” in terms of semantic prototypes. In some form or other, most formal linguists have adopted this view, particularly those linguists who have appealed to a “person hierarchy,” wherein referents are ranked based on their semantic properties, with $[\pm\text{ANIMATE}]$ playing a crucial role (e.g. Blain (1997), Junker (2005), Bliss (2005), Ritter & Wiltschko (2007), etc.). By contrast, the current account treats “Animate” as having no semantic properties, while “Inanimate” is specified.

However, Hockett (1966:62) argues that the systematic shifting of “Inanimate” referents to “Animate” (but not the reverse) points to “Inanimate” as the contentful member of the pair, a position that is also echoed by some other linguists (e.g. Wolfart 1973). The specified/unspecified contrast, then, is based on a combination of discoursal and grammatical properties. This account is further developed in the current proposal.

A third position, proposed most clearly by Goddard (2004) takes the specification relation to be different along different dimensions. On this account, the specification of an animacy form is a function of the context it is used in. For Goddard (2004), “Animate” is unspecified semantically, being “a function of contrast with inanimate,” (Goddard 2004:224), but “Inanimate” is the general member in many morphosyntactic constructions. Put in the terms of this thesis, “Inanimate” is unspecified in form, but specified in semantic content.

Focusing on semantic specification, the current account is only directly at odds with accounts that adopt “Animate” as the semantically-specified class (e.g. Dahlstrom 1995, Ritter & Rose 2005). By contrast, the current proposal is consistent with Hockett’s (1966) generalizations; given the semantically-specified status of “Inanimate,” it should be easier for nominals to slip into the unspecified class (“Animate”) than the other way around.

2.2.3. “Inanimate” as extentional

One can identify three types of semantic proposals that have been put forward to account for animacy patterns in Algonquian. As will be seen, the current proposal, while not completely converging with any of them, assembles the core observations of each line of thought into one unified analysis.

One approach to animacy which I call the “concrete” proposal analyzes Algonquian animacy in terms of the semantic properties that are directly accessible to speakers and

---

5. Note, however, that most of Goddard’s (2004) morphosyntactic data is from Fox (Central Algonquian). The facts gathered from that study do not all have direct correlates in Plains Cree, although many do.
observers. Proposals of this kind fall into two camps: (i) animacy codes a “living/non-living” distinction, and (ii) animacy codes a culturally-defined concept of “power.” The first proposal is the earlier of the two, with its first form coming in 1634 by LeJeune (Thwaites 1896-1901:7.22-23), and being subsequently adopted by Eliot (1666). For example, in his grammar of Massachusset (Eastern Algonquian), Eliot (1666), states “The Animate form or declension is when the thing signified is a living Creature …The Inanimate form or declension of Nouns, is when the thing signified is not a living Creature” (Eliot 1666:10). Of course, even in these early treatments, linguists were well aware that there were significant groups of nouns that were grammatically animate but could not be said to be alive. For example, articles of clothing like socks (13a) and non-living things like dead snakes (13b) are coded as “Animate” in Plains Cree.

(13) a. ASIKAN ‘Sock’ = “Animate”

\[
\sigma\hat{\alpha}\hat{\nu}\hat{\mu}\hat{\lambda}\sigma\hat{\alpha}\hat{\nu}\hat{r}b\hat{a}.
\]

niwâpamâw ana asikan.

\[
ni-wap=am\quad -\acute{a}\quad -w\ an=a\quad asikan
\]

1- see =by.eye.TA-DIR-3 DST=AN.SG sock

‘I see that sock\textsubscript{AN}.’

(Presented S2)

b. DEAD ANIMALS = “Animate”

\[
\sigma\hat{\alpha}\hat{\nu}\hat{\mu}\hat{\lambda}\sigma\hat{\alpha}\hat{\nu}\hat{a}\hat{\nu}\hat{\rho}\hat{\sigma}\hat{\omega}\hat{d}\quad \nabla\quad \sigma\hat{\nu}\hat{\lambda}'.
\]

niwâpamâw ana kinêpi kw ë-nipit.

\[
ni-wap=am\quad -\acute{a}\quad -w\ an=a\quad kinêpi kw ë- nip=i-t
\]

1- see =by.eye.TA-DIR-3 DST=AN.SG snake \quad c1-die=AT-3

‘I see that dead snake\textsubscript{AN}.’

(Presented S2)

The recognition of this descriptive inadequacy caused a disjunction among theorists, such that one group pursued a more detailed concrete analysis, while others moved away from concrete treatments entirely (see below). Among the remaining concretists, perhaps the most well-known is the work of Darnell and Varnek (1976), which claims that animacy “deals with power to maintain and balance the universe and to interact with persons and other interactive beings.” Because accounts of this kind have invariably settled on animate as the marked member, assigning it semantics of the sort just described, these accounts have been widely criticized for being forced to make numerous \textit{ad hoc} claims. For example, what is “powerful” to a Cree speaker about socks (14a), but not hats (14b)?
(14) a. ‘Sock’ = “Animate”

\[
\text{òki asikanak} \\
aw=iki \quad \text{asikan-ak} \\
PRX=\text{AN.PL sock} \quad -\text{PL}
\]

‘these socks\text{AN}’

b. ‘Hat’ = “Inanimate”

\[
\text{ihi astotina} \\
aw=ihi \quad \text{astotin-a} \\
PRX=\text{XT hat} \quad -\text{XT}
\]

‘these hats\text{XT}’

A second approach, conveniently termed the “abstract” approach, analyzes Algonquian animacy as coding a kind of semantics that is an abstraction from the observable facts. An account of this kind is suggested by early French-speaking linguists (e.g. Nicolas 1672, in Daviault 1994), who divided nominals between a class called “noble” and “ignoble.” Most often, grammarians defined these terms similarly to “animate” and “Inanimate” (i.e. living/non-living), but sometimes more abstract discussion was offered, referring to concepts like “esteem” or “objects of consideration.” Goddard (2004) takes this initial step towards a more abstract analysis further, arguing that a useful way to understand Algonquian animacy is to strip the “noble/ignoble” dichotomy of its notions of “esteem” and “living,” leaving only the more abstract notion of “high” versus “low.” Many of the linguists that ascribe to a “person hierarchy” (e.g. Blain 1997, Déchaine and Reinholtz 1999, Junker 2005) must adopt, in some form, this kind of an “abstract” approach to the semantics of animacy.

Where the previous accounts attempted to ascribe the semantic value to the two classes, analyses of the third kind, which I label “grammar” approaches, treat Algonquian animacy as a purely grammatical distinction, with no meaning ascribed to the classes at all. Proponents of this approach point to the apparent inconsistencies in the semantic approach, and draw parallels to the gender systems of Indo-European, which are assumed to be strictly grammatical devices. Frantz (1995), for example, explains that “grammatical gender is a classification of the noun stems themselves, not of the entities to which they refer” (Frantz 1991:8). Most linguists that work within a formal framework have adopted this kind of approach (e.g. Blain 1997, Hirose 2000, Mühlbauer 2007).

The current account agrees with parts of each of these three basic positions, but is not classifiable as any one of these approaches. Like the “concrete” position, I take the animacy
contrast to have a clear, defineable set of semantics that bear some resemblance to the
description offered by Darnell and Varnek (1976). However, the specific definition I have
offered is more abstract; animacy situates references within the discourse constructed by the
Speaker, placing restrictions on their ability to host embedded propositions (i.e. “Inanimate”
referents are extentional). This means that the “Inanimate” class of referents cannot have a
mental state directed at something (i.e. are extentional). This more abstract characterization
subsumes previous attempts to characterize “Inanimate” as “lacking power” or being “ignoble.”

2.2.4. Animacy is syntactically determined

It is often assumed that the division between “Animate” and “Inanimate” is a lexical di-
vision. That is, animacy is an inherent property of stems; stems are either inherently “Animate” or
inherently “Inanimate” (cf. Frantz 1995). This can most easily be seen by checking glossing (e.g.
Bloomfield 1962, Wolfart 1973, Valentine 2001) and dictionaries (e.g. Wolvengrey 2001), which
universally code nominals as either inherently “Animate” or “Inanimate.” This is done so
systematically that a nominal form known to regularly appear with both “Animate” and
“Inanimate” marking is given two lexical entries in the dictionary. Consider as an example the
entry for mistikw ‘tree/stick’ in Wolfart and Ahenakew’s (1998) dictionary of Plains Cree.

(15)   a. mistikw- **NA** tree, post [sic] [sic:NA]

         b. mistikw- **NI** stick, pole, post, log, wooden rail [sic:NI]

(Wolfart & Ahenakew 1998:55)

Here, the lexical item mistikw has been entered twice, once under “Animate” (**NA**) and once
under “Inanimate” (**NI**), with notes about speakers shifting from one form to the other (e.g. there
is apparently a text example of mistikw occurring in “Animate” contexts but denoting a ‘post’).
This set of lexicographic conventions has been standard for several hundred years.

When formal treatments are developed that involve animacy (e.g. Hirose 2000, Bruening
2001, Branigan & MacKenzie 2002), it is assumed that the nominal is inherently coded for
animacy, and the other morphology agrees with it. Syntactic analyses of this kind include both
Minimalist (e.g. Bruening 2001) and Relational Grammar treatments (e.g. Frantz 1991).

In his discussion of animacy in Menominee (Central Algonquian, Wisconsin),
Bloomfield (1962) takes a different view. Bloomfield describes the nominal maeqtek as
“Animate” in its meaning of ‘tree.’ However, he notes that “the same word” can be used in
“Inanimate gender” to describe a ‘stick’ (Bloomfield 1962:29). By treating the same nominal as occurring in two different “gender” contexts, Bloomfield is treating the nominal as independent of its animacy specification. In treating animacy as a part of the syntax of Plains Cree rather than the lexicon, then, the current account follows this kind of approach.

### 2.2.5. The data set

The current analysis brings to light six new generalizations about animacy:

(i) The lack of psych-predicates inflected for “Inanimate” referents (§2.4.3.1)
(ii) The restriction of reflexive-marked verbs to “Animate” referents (§2.4.33)
(iii) Speaker judgments about the non-specificity of “Animate” coded referents (§2.4.4)
(iv) The correlation between Speaker belief and animacy coding (§2.4.2)
(v) The ability of animacy coding to be manipulated for common-ground effects (§2.4.3)
(vi) The ability of animacy coding to be manipulated for point-of-view effects in narrative contexts (§2.4.4)

Any subsequent account of animacy will have to expand to cover this new data set.

### 2.3. The form of animacy: Distributed throughout the syntax

A consideration of Plains Cree’s grammatical forms shows a basic distinction between “Animate” forms and “Inanimate” forms. The “Animate” structure in (16a) shows “Animate” marking within the verb stem (-am-), in its argument-structure (-ā-), and in its pronominal agreement (-w-ak). The demonstrative shows “Animate” marking in its suffixes (-iki). Finally, the nominal shows animate marking in the suffix attached for plurality (-ak). A comparison of these animate forms in (16a) with their “Inanimate” counterparts in (16b) shows the contrast clearly (e.g. -am- vs. -aht- within the verb stem).

(16) a. “Animate” Morphology

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{niwâpamâwak aniki maskisinak} \\
ni-wâp=\text{am} & -\text{ā } -w-\text{ak an } =\text{iki maskisin-ak} \\
1\text{-bright}=\text{by.eye.TA-DIR-3-PL DST=AN.PL shoe } & -\text{PL} \\
\text{‘I see_{AN} those_{AN} shoes_{AN}.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(Presented S2)
b. “INANIMATE” MORPHOLOGY

\[
\sigma^{\langle i^{ \langle U \rangle} \langle i} \sigma^{\Delta} \land \rho \rangle_\omega
\]

niwâp\textit{aht}èn an\textit{hi maskisina}

\[
i-\text{wâp}=\textit{aht} -\hat{\text{e}} -\text{n} -\text{an} =\textit{ihi maskisin-a}
\]

\[
i-\text{bright}=\textit{by.eye.TI-TI-LP} \text{DST}=\textit{XT shoe} -\text{XT}
\]

“I see\textsubscript{IN} those\textsubscript{IN} shoes\textsubscript{IN}.”

(Presented S2)

The four domains of animacy coding are summarized in Table 2.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VERB</th>
<th></th>
<th>DEMONSTRATIVE</th>
<th>NOMINAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROOT</td>
<td>FINAL</td>
<td>THEME</td>
<td>ROOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANIMATE</td>
<td>wâp</td>
<td>am</td>
<td>à</td>
<td>an</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INANIMATE</td>
<td>wâp</td>
<td>aht</td>
<td>am</td>
<td>an</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1. Summary of animacy coding for verb, demonstrative, and nominal

Within models of syntax built on the generative program of Chomsky (1982), there are at least three possible ways to implement a model of animacy forms in Plains Cree, differing in where they locate animacy in the grammatical structure:

(i) HYPOTHESIS ONE: A “lexical” model. The locus of animacy is the nominal root. The feature [\pm EXTENTIONAL] is a specified on nominal roots; animacy does not have any structural locus.

(17) a. nâpêw     : [-Ext]

‘man’

b. maskisin : [+Ext]

‘shoe’

These roots are then merged into the syntax bearing this [\pm EXTENTIONAL] feature, where their inherent properties trigger agreement with other elements in the syntax (cf. Hirose 2000, Bruening 2001).

(18) a. 

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DEMP} \\
\text{DEM} \\
\text{awa} \\
\text{nâpêw} \\
\langle\text{-Ext}\rangle \\
\end{array}
\]

(ii) **HYPOTHESIS TWO**: A “local” model. Animacy is confined to a single, dedicated head in the syntax. If this head is in the nominal syntax, it is a classifier feature introduced external to the nominal root (18) (Mühlbauer 2007).

(19) a. \[
\text{CLASSP} \\
\text{CLASS} \\
\text{Ø} \\
\text{nâpêw} \\
\text{[-EXT]} \\
\text{[-EXT]}
\]

b. \[
\text{CLASSP} \\
\text{CLASS} \\
\text{Ø} \\
\text{maskisin} \\
\text{[+Ext]} \\
\text{[+Ext]}
\]

If this head is instead located in the verbal syntax, it restricts the argument structure (e.g. Theta-roles) of the verb.

(20) a. \[
\text{vP} \\
\text{ARG} \\
\text{Ø} \\
\text{-am-} \\
\text{[-EXT]} \\
\text{[-EXT]}
\]

b. \[
\text{vP} \\
\text{ARG} \\
\text{Ø} \\
\text{-aht-} \\
\text{[+Ext]} \\
\text{[+Ext]}
\]

On either view, animacy is reduceable to a choice in the content of a single, dedicated position.

(iii) **HYPOTHESIS THREE**: A “distributed” model. Animacy is coded in all positions that referential distinctions are coded, with no preference for one position over another.
Animacy syntax, then, is a distributed set of operations aimed at coding a referential property.

In deciding between these different models, it is important to keep in mind that any set of data can be accounted for within any syntactic theory, if we allow enough additional mechanisms. This means that a discrimination between the three possible models involves the reader’s presuppositions about the kinds of structures available to the grammar. A “costly” stipulation to one analysis may be taken for granted in another, meaning that we must have a notion of “cost” before we begin to choose among models. In the following discussion, I consider a stipulation to be more “costly” when it invokes a mechanism that has no surface exponent in the grammar. Thus, the more surface-true a mechanism is, the more desirable it is.

With a notion of “cost” now in hand, let us consider what kind of data each of the three analyses covers, and what kind of data it cannot cover. The lexical account requires three things, which are different from the other two accounts:

(i) Animacy cannot be actively manipulated (§2.3.1).
(ii) Animacy manipulations can only be accomplished by suppletion (§2.3.2).
(iii) Plains Cree has a high degree of homophony (§2.3.3).
As discussed in §2.3.1 through §2.3.3, the lexical model is undesirable on all three counts. Setting this model aside, we can then consider the requirements of the other two kinds of models. These models differ in several respects:

(i) whether or not bare nominals must occur in the scope (i.e. c-commanded by or linear preceded by) of an element that codes animacy (§2.3.4)

(ii) whether or not verbal coding can function in the absence of nominal coding (§2.3.5)

(iii) whether or not nominal coding can function in the absence of verbal coding (§2.3.6)

When the different models are compared to the attested language patterns, along with a notion of cost, it is clear that the distributed hypothesis covers the data with the least amount of extra stipulations.

2.3.1. Animacy is not specified in the nominal

If nouns are specified for animacy, then a shift in animacy value should not be possible. This is because an element that lacks structural expression cannot be manipulated via structural operations. Put another way, we expect that the animacy value of a noun - [+EXTENTIONAL] or [-EXTENTIONAL] – should be a stable property. However, it turns out that animacy values may be contextually manipulated.

As we have already seen several times, speakers are capable of manipulating animacy coding. For example, although the typical animacy value for –skât ‘leg’ is “Inanimate,” in contexts where the Speaker views legs as intentional, the nominal can be marked as “Animate.” This is illustrated in (22), with (22a) having the typical “Inanimate” value (niskâta ‘my Inanimate legs’), and (22b) having the animate value (niskâtak ‘my animate legs’).

(22) a. “INANIMATE” LEGS

\[
\sigma \rightarrow b \subset b \triangleright n \Delta \\
niskâta ñhi \\
ni-skât-a aw =ihi^7 \\
l-leg-XT PRX=XT \\
‘These_{\text{IN}} are my legs_{\text{IN}}’ \\
\text{CONTEXT (S4): Pointing to legs to identify the proper word for them.}
\]
b. “ANIMATE” LEGS

\[ \sigma^b \subset \delta P \]

niskâtak ôki
ni-skât-ak aw = iki
l- leg -PL PRX = PL

‘These\textsubscript{AN} are my legs\textsubscript{AN}’

(Judgment by S4)

CONTEXT (S4): The speaker’s legs are out of his control, acting on their own. They are kicking him or other people.

An example of the manipulation of these animacy contrasts in a discourse is shown by Louis Moosomin’s telling of the ‘Rolling Head’ story (in Bloomfield 1930:§1).\(^8\) In the version of this story told by Moosomin, a woman’s head has been cut off by her husband, but continues to be inhabited by the woman’s mind. The head rolls along the ground, pursuing its children, who flee from it (see §2.5.3 for a more detailed discussion). Throughout the story, the animacy value of the head shifts back and forth from “Inanimate” to “Animate.” A summary of the locations of “Inanimate” and “Animate” shifting for the severed head is given in the table below. Note that in normal Plains Cree speech, the nominal -stikwân ‘head’ is usually framed with “Inanimate” morphology (i.e. its ‘cultural default’ is “Inanimate” as in Jaszczyłt 2004).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>SEVERED HEAD ANIMACY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>Severed Head opens eyes</td>
<td>INANIMATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii</td>
<td>Severed Head speaks</td>
<td>MIX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv</td>
<td>Severed Head asks Utensils</td>
<td>ANIMATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>Boy sees Severed Head talking</td>
<td>INANIMATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xiii</td>
<td>Severed Head stopped</td>
<td>ANIMATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xv</td>
<td>Only Severed Head going</td>
<td>INANIMATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xvii</td>
<td>Severed Head passes fire</td>
<td>ANIMATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xxxii</td>
<td>Boy cries that Severed Head kill Boy</td>
<td>INANIMATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xxxiv</td>
<td>Severed Head sees Great Serpent</td>
<td>ANIMATE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2. Summary of animacy shifting for the severed head story

---

\(^8\) This is a story common to Algonquian peoples across North America (Cowan 1980).
As can be seen, the animacy classification of the severed head changes seven times in the span of approximately 40 clauses. These shifts are considered in detail in section 2.5.3 below, where I argue that they code shifts in the perspective represented in the discourse.

From this evidence, we should conclude that there is active manipulation of the “Inanimate/Animate” contrast to code referential distinctions. The fact that animacy values can shift according to the perspective represented indicates that nouns are not inherently specified for animacy. This runs counter to the expectations of a lexical treatment of animacy, but is expected by both of the other syntactic accounts.

2.3.2. Animacy contrasts are not suppletive

If animacy is a property of nominal stems rather than a property of the syntax, as the lexical theory posits, speakers should not be able to access it to alter its content. Not having a position in the grammatical structure of the language, speakers would have to perform substitution operations, changing one nominal form for another, in order to change animacy values. This would follow patterns of suppletion seen elsewhere in the language, for example the stem miy- ‘give’ encompasses both the root and final of the verbal complex.

(23)  a. Transitive Verb wápam- = 2 Morphemes (wâp- + -am-)

    <i><j>º.
    wápamèw.
    wâp = am -ē -w
    see = by. eye. TA-DIR-3
    ‘S/hePROX sees him/herOBV.’ (Presented S2)

    b. Transitive Verb miy- = 1 Morpheme (miy-)

    /<i>,<j>º.
    miyèw.
    miy -ē -w
    give. TA-DIR-3
    ‘S/hePROX gave it to him/herOBV.’ (Presented S2)

When the transitivity of this verb form is altered, Plains Cree has to employ completely different verb stem, as shown in (24), where the transitive stem is miy- (24a) and the intransitive (Alt) stem is mēki- (24b).
Thus, whenever transitivity is a property of stems instead of affixes, the stem has to be changed when transitivity changes. Supposing that animacy, like transitivity, were a property of stems, predicts that, whenever there is a shift in animacy, there ought to be suppletion of one stem for another. For example, kinêpikw ‘snake’ (‘Animate’) ought to change to (e.g.) sâpâwisk ‘snake’ (‘Inanimate’).

We can find no evidence for suppletion in Plains Cree. When a speaker alters the animacy of a referent, they employ the same nominal stem but with different morphosyntax.

This runs counter to the lexical analysis, which expects that one form or the other of this pair ought to employ a different nominal stem, in parallel to the suppletion pattern seen in verbs.
2.3.3. The necessity of homophony

Plains Cree appears to be a system that has numerous nominal forms that are readily able to occur with both “Animate” and “Inanimate” marking.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORM</th>
<th>“INANIMATE”</th>
<th>“ANIMATE”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>asinîy</td>
<td>bullet</td>
<td>rock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>âtayôhkan</td>
<td>sacred story</td>
<td>spirit being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cikâhkwân</td>
<td>lance</td>
<td>gambling toy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kayâsiyâkan</td>
<td>old dish</td>
<td>Old Dish (person)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kistikân</td>
<td>garden</td>
<td>seed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maskîpîtôn</td>
<td>twisted mouth</td>
<td>Twisted Mouth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mistikw</td>
<td>stick</td>
<td>tree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mistikwâskisin</td>
<td>wooden shoe</td>
<td>Dutch person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mitâs</td>
<td>leggings</td>
<td>pants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>piwâpîskwastotin</td>
<td>steel helmet</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wâpistikwân</td>
<td>white head</td>
<td>person with white hair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wâpimin</td>
<td>white berry</td>
<td>white bead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wâposwayân</td>
<td>rabbit hide</td>
<td>The Rabbitskin People</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3. Forms commonly found in both animacy classes

In lexicographic work on Plains Cree, these forms are listed in the dictionary twice; once under “Animate,” and once under “Inanimate” (cf. Wolfart & Ahenakew 1998, Wolvengrey 2001, and all other lexical work done on the language).

(26)  a. âtayôhkan  â_tCɨⁿb³
      NÂ spirit being, spirit power, spirit guardian, spirit animal

      b. âtayôhkan  â_tCɨⁿb³
      NI sacred story; legend [cf. âtayôhkêwin] (Wolvengrey 2001)

The question that arises is whether this lexicographical homophony should be carried over into the analysis of animacy.

A number of nominal forms in Cree are found to alter the kind of referent they denote when framed with each of the two sets of nominal morphosyntax. For example, kistikân is equivalent to English ‘farm’ when the “Inanimate” set of morphology is applied (27a), but ‘grain’ when the “Animate” set is used (27b).

9 Note that the pattern of animate forms correlating with proper names is only accidental; inanimate forms can easily be used as proper names as well. For example, the Plains Cree name for Blaine lake, Saskatchewan is sîhwîhtâkani-sâkahikan (lit: salt-lake), a form that is invariably inanimate.
A similar phenomenon occurs when a nominal is used as the proper name of a person. Thus *kįskihkômân* refers to a kind of ‘cut off knife’ when marked “Inanimate” (28a), but refers to a particular person named ‘Cut Knife’ (a Sarcee chief) when marked with the “Animate” set (28b).
a. **Noun *kinêpik* ‘snake’ as ‘Animate’**

\[\sigma \hat{\alpha} < 'w \hat{\alpha} > 'w < \hat{\alpha} \quad \hat{\alpha} \sigma \wedge\]

\[\text{nikî-wâpamâw awa kinêpik}\]

\[ni-kî-wâp = \text{am} -\hat{\alpha} -w aw = a \quad \text{kinêpik}\]

\[1-\text{PREV-see by.eye.TA-DIR-3 PRX=AN.SG snake}\]

\[‘\text{I saw this }\text{ snake}’\]

**Context (S2):** Speaker sees a rubber toy snake, thinks it is a real snake, is frightened.

b. **Noun *kinêpik* ‘snake’ as ‘Inanimate’**

\[\sigma \hat{\alpha} < 'w' \hat{\alpha} > 'l \quad \hat{\alpha} \sigma \wedge\]

\[\text{nikî-wâpahtên ôma kinêpik}\]

\[ni-kî-wâp = \text{aht} -\hat{\alpha} -n aw = \text{ima} \quad \text{kinêpik}\]

\[1-\text{PREV-see by.eye.TI-TI-LP PRX=IN.SG snake}\]

\[‘\text{I saw this }\text{ snake}’\]

**Context (S2):** Speaker sees a snake, then realizes it is just a rubber toy.

Here, the use of “Inanimate” morphosyntax makes the nominal stem *kinêpik* ‘snake’ refer to a plastic representation of a snake (29b), while framing it with the “Animate” structure allows it to be construed as an animal (29a).

If we transfer the lexicographic decisions to the formal analysis of animacy, Plains Cree would be analyzed as having more homophony in its nominal domain than any language that has ever existed. For example, a count of a small, 203 page dictionary (Wolfart & Ahenakew 1998) yields roughly 933 nominals.10 If the lexical approach is correct, this same set of nominals would have to be doubled to 1,866. Taking into account that every nominal form can be treated as “Animate” or “Inanimate” (27-29), these homophonous nominals would increase exponentially.

Another option available is to employ statistical sampling. For example, *kinêpik* most often means ‘a real snake’ in texts, being marked with the “Animate” set of morphology. Therefore, this nominal is canonically viewed as “Animate” and listed as such in the lexicon, with the proviso that animacy distinctions may be contextually-shifted. Importantly, this shifting would have to be done in the (morpho)syntax of the language, since this is where all of the mechanisms that overtly code animacy exist (27-29). This means that an analysis of this kind has to posit two layers of modeling in order to account for the data: a lexical component (carrying the inherent specification of the nominal’s animacy), and a syntactic component (carrying the mechanisms for contextually shifting this property).

---

10 The counting of distinct nominal forms is methodologically problematic; nominals are freely derived from other nominals (*mistikw* tree to *mistikomin* ‘acorn’ to *mistikominâhtikw* ‘oak tree’), and they are also freely derived from verbs (*kiskinohamâkê*- ‘teach’ to *kiskinohamâkêwin* ‘leaning, education’). Likewise, the demarcation between classes is also doubtful. These numbers, then, are meant only as metrics of comparison.
While both of these analytic decisions are, in principle, possible, they come at a cost. Either the system has tens of thousands of homophonous nominals, or it posits two grammatical systems and a set of rules to relate them. The three other analyses, which locate animacy in the syntax, do not have to posit either homophony or lexical-syntactic rules.

2.3.4. Animacy coding does not determine the distribution of bare nouns

One possible analysis is that “Inanimate” nominals have a classifier-like functional head in their syntax that codes the animacy of the nominal, and by extension, the referent denoted by the nominal (Mühlbauer 2007). However, there is no evidence in Plains Cree for the existence of an overt classifier. Most¹¹ nominals freely occur in a bare, unaffixed form (Mühlbauer 2006).

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(30)  **Noun without Affixation**

```
\[ ᕥᐢᑮᐦᑮ ᐁᑯᑕ ᑒᓰᐦᑖᔮᐣ ᓃᔭᐤ ᕥ.browser-2s 1 -body from
‘…for you to make medicine there from my body,’ (AA:4.2)
```

This being the case, the purported classifier is generally null.

(31)  a.  **ClassP**

```
  \( \text{Class} \rightarrow \text{N} \rightarrow \text{Ø} \rightarrow \text{[-Ext]} \rightarrow \text{[-Ext]} \)
```

¹¹ The only exception to this generalization are nominals that do not meet the minimal prosodic constraints of the language. Nouns of less than two syllables, for some speakers, have an obligatory vowel added (cf. Wolfart 1973). For example, the stem \( \text{wāw} \)-‘egg’ has an additional vowel added when it occurs in non-suffixed forms; \( \text{wāw} \rightarrow \text{wāwā} \). This vowel is said to change with the animacy of the nominal; thus \( \text{maskw} \)-‘bear’ becomes \( \text{maskwā} \). While this could be interpreted as evidence for the classifier head, two difficulties present themselves: (i) this suffix could just as easily be coding number (singular), as it is taken to do by Wolfart (1973) and in parallel to Blackfoot (Frantz 1970), and (ii) these augment vowels are subject to extreme speaker variation, such that no two speakers I work with have the same organization, and none have the organization described by Wolfart (e.g. S1: \( \text{wāw}s \) and \text{maskwa}, while S2 has \text{wāw} and \text{maskwa}. For S1, the \text{–a} deletes in maskwa under suffixation, while for S2 it does not.). Worse, some speakers appear to have multiple strategies (e.g. S2: \text{wāw} but \text{mīhtī})
If empty categories need to be licensed (Rizzi 1987), this means that this classifier head needs to be within the scope (e.g. c-command) of some other element, in order to receive content, in parallel to other empty categories in natural language (e.g. traces, pro, etc; Chomsky 1982, Longobardi 2004).

(32) XP
    X [−EXT]
    CLASSP [−EXT]
      CLASS N
      Ø maskisin [+EXT] [+EXT]
      Ø nāpēw [−EXT] [−EXT]

This would lead us to expect that the distribution of bare nominals (with null classifier heads) should be restricted in some way. In particular, bare nominals should show a different distribution pattern than forms that include overt animacy coding.

Taking stock of the candidates for giving this classifier head content, we see that Plains Cree has several sets of elements that code animacy distinctions (cf §2.4.1 above). In particular, one set of these elements affixes to the nominal itself (33).

(33) a. “INANIMATE” PLURAL = -a

\[\Gamma^+\langle\bar{e}\rangle r\alpha^* \Leftrightarrow \rho r\alpha_.\]
mìywâsinwa maskisinâ.
\textit{miyw}=âsi-n\text{-}w\text{-}a maskisin\text{-}a
\textit{good}=\text{it} -0\text{-}3\text{-}\text{XT}\text{ shoe} -\text{XT}
‘The shoes\textsubscript{IN} are nice.’

\text{(Presented S2)}

b. “ANIMATE” PLURAL = -ak

\[\Gamma\langle\bar{e}\rangle \Leftrightarrow \alpha_\vee\langle\bar{e}\rangle\] .
mìyosiwâk nāpēwakâ.
\textit{miyw}=is\text{-}w\text{-}\text{ak} nāpēw\text{-}ak
\textit{good}=\text{At}3\text{-}\text{PL}\text{ man} \text{-PL}
‘The men\textsubscript{AN} are good-looking.’

\text{(Presented S2)}
In these cases, the nominal bears overt animacy coding, and thus the putative null classifier would be given content local to the nominal syntax.\(^\text{12}\)

\[\text{(34) a.} \quad \text{NUMP} \]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{NUM} \\
{-a} \\
[+\text{Ext}] \\
\text{CLASS} \\
\text{N} \\
\text{måkæsin} \\
[+\text{Ext}] \\
\end{array}
\]

\[\text{b.} \quad \text{NUMP} \]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{NUM} \\
{-ak} \\
[-\text{Ext}] \\
\text{CLASS} \\
\text{N} \\
\text{nåpěw} \\
[-\text{Ext}] \\
\end{array}
\]

Since these plural forms carry overt animacy coding, they should have a different distribution than bare forms.

There is no evidence for such a difference in distribution; bare nominal forms can occur either before or after animacy coded elements (cf. Reinholtz 1997, Wolvengrey 2003),\(^\text{13}\) dependent on information structure (cf. Wolvengrey 2003, Mühlbauer 2003, Déchaine 2007).

\[\text{(35) a. BARE NOUN FOLLOWS VERB: VERB} \rightarrow \text{DEM} > \text{N} \]

\[
\hat{\text{t}}^{\text{n}} \hat{\text{e}}^{\text{n}} \hat{\text{u}}^{\text{m}} \hat{\text{a}}^{\text{m}} \hat{\text{a}}^{\text{m}} \\
\text{kì-påhpiw awa awásís.} \\
\text{kì- påhpi -w aw } = \text{a awásís} \\
\text{PR} \text{EV-laugh.AI-3 PRX=AN.SG child} \\
\text{‘This child} \text{AN laughed.’} \quad \text{(Wolvengrey 2003)}
\]

\[\text{b. BARE NOUN PRECEDES VERB: N > DEM} > \text{VERB} \]

\[
\hat{\text{t}}^{\text{n}} \hat{\text{e}}^{\text{n}} \hat{\text{u}}^{\text{m}} \hat{\text{a}}^{\text{m}} \\
\text{awásís awa kì-påhpiw.} \\
\text{awásís aw } = \text{a kì- påhpi -w} \\
\text{child PRX=AN.SG PREV-laugh.AI-3} \\
\text{‘A/the child} \text{AN here laughed.’} \quad \text{(Wolvengrey 2003)}
\]

\(^\text{12}\) Locating \(-a\) in NumP follows Déchaine (1997). It could, in theory, be located in a classifier phrase, but the difference is not here crucial. For a consideration of the complications of number and extentionality, turn to §6.2.

\(^\text{13}\) According to Wolvengry (2003), certain orders of noun-demonstrative-verb triples are ruled out (e.g. N V DEM), but the reasons for this are not relevant to the current point about scope. If demonstratives are quantificational (cf. King 2001), these other effects reduce to the scope-taking properties of quantifiers.
In this respect, bare nominals behave exactly like affixed forms; both are insensitive to their ordering with respect to other animacy coded elements.

(36) a. **Bare Noun Follows Verb:** \( \text{Verb}_{\text{AN}} > \text{Demon} > \text{N-ak} \)

\[ \hat{\beta} < [\hat{\alpha} \wedge \hat{\gamma}] \supset \hat{\beta} < [\hat{\alpha} \wedge \hat{\gamma}] \]

\( kî-pâhpiwak ôki awâsisak. \)

\( kî- pâhpi -w-ak aw =iki awâsis-ak \)

\( \text{PREV-laugh.AI-3-PL PRX=AN.PL child -PL} \)

‘This child\(_{\text{AN}}\) laughed.’ (Presented S2)

b. **Noun Not in Scope of Animacy:** \( \text{N} > \text{Demon} > \text{Verb}_{\text{AN}} \)

\[ <[\hat{\alpha} \wedge \hat{\gamma}] \supset \hat{\beta} < [\hat{\alpha} \wedge \hat{\gamma}] \]

\( \text{awâsisak ôki kî-pâhpiwak} \)

\( \text{awâsis-ak aw =iki kî- pâhpi -w-ak} \)

\( \text{child -PL PRX=AN.SG PREV-laugh.AI-3-PL} \)

‘A/the child\(_{\text{AN}}\) here laughed.’ (Presented S2)

This generalization is also supported by a great deal of textual evidence (cf. Wolfart 1996, Mühlbauer 2003); nominals are ordered based on their information structure properties rather than the presence/absence of animacy-coding affixation. In conclusion, then, it is the universal consensus of linguists who have considered Plains Cree (e.g. Wolfart 1973, Dahlstrom 1991, Wolfart 1996, Déchaine 1997, Mühlbauer 2003, Déchaine 2007) that nominals are not restricted in their ordering with respect to elements that carry animacy coding (i.e. demonstratives, verbs). This means that we have no concrete evidence for a null classifier head in the nominal syntax.

### 2.3.5. Animacy Coding is not Asymmetric

Within current theories of syntax (e.g. Kayne 1994, Chomsky 1995), syntactic structure is inherently asymmetric. For example, merging two syntactic elements together results in a phrase projected from one or the other, but not both.

(37) a. \( \alpha \)

\( \begin{array}{c}
\hat{\alpha} \\
\hat{\beta}
\end{array} \)

\( = \beta \) is complement to \( \alpha \)

b. \( \beta \)

\( \begin{array}{c}
\hat{\alpha} \\
\hat{\beta}
\end{array} \)

\( = \alpha \) is complement to \( \beta \)
When we consider cases where \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) share some feature (e.g. plurality), the inherent asymmetry of syntax means that the feature must originate with only one of \( \alpha \) or \( \beta \); one carries the feature and the other matches (“agrees”) with it. The feature-matching element, then, is dependent for its content on the feature-carrying element.

Under an agreement model of this kind, an analysis that posits a dedicated head for animacy in either the nominal or verbal syntax predicts a specific kind of asymmetry between nominal and verbal coding of animacy. If animacy is a property of nominal syntax, the verbal exponents of animacy are agreement (i.e. verbs agree with nouns). If, on the other hand, animacy is a property of verbal syntax, the nominal exponents of animacy are agreement (i.e. nouns agree with verbs).

The evidence from Plains Cree shows that neither the verb’s animacy coding nor the nominal’s is required for the identification of animacy. The system appears to be evenly weighted; neither nominals nor verbs have an asymmetric dominance in the coding of animacy. The only account that can explain this kind of behaviour is one that divorces animacy from localized coding; the distributed hypothesis is the only one that can model the full breadth of Plains Cree animacy data.

### 2.3.51. Animacy without nominals

If verbs agree with nouns, then nominal syntax should be necessary for the licensing of verbal syntax. This predicts that verbal forms should not be able to have animacy coding without a nominal present. These predictions are not borne out in the data.

When there is an overt nominal with overt animacy coding, this asymmetry is not relevant; the nominal gets its animacy value from its local affixation, and the verb reflects this assignment, as shown in (38), where the nominal itself (\textit{maskisin} ‘shoe’) carries plural marking that codes animacy (either \(-a\) in 38a, or \(-ak\) in 38b).
(38)  a. “INANIMATE” Plurality on Noun and Verb

\[ \begin{align*} &\text{maskisina } \acute{\text{e}}-\text{misâki} \\ &\text{maskisin-}a \ \acute{\text{e}}- \text{ mis}=\acute{\text{a}}-\text{k-i} \\ &\text{shoe -}X\text{t \ }C1-\text{big}=\Pi-\text{0-PL} \\ &‘… (as) the {\text{shoes}}_{\text{INAN}} \text{ are } {\text{big}}_{\text{INAN}}.’ \end{align*} \]  

(Presented S2)

b. “ANIMATE” Plurality on Noun and Verb

\[ \begin{align*} &\text{maskisinak } \acute{\text{e}}-\text{misikititik} \\ &\text{maskisin-ak } \acute{\text{e}}-\text{misikiti-}t-\text{i}k \\ &\text{shoe -PL }C1-\text{be.b.} \text{g.} \text{AI-3-PL} \\ &‘… (as) the {\text{shoes}}_{\text{AN}} \text{ are } {\text{big}}_{\text{AN}}.’ \end{align*} \]  

(Presented S2)

As we have seen above (§2.3.4), the case becomes more complex when there is no affixation on the nominal.

(39)  a. Bare Nominal with “INANIMATE” Verb Morphology

\[ \begin{align*} &\text{maskisin } \acute{\text{e}}-\text{misâk} \\ &\text{maskisin } \acute{\text{e}}-\text{mis}=\acute{\text{a}}-\text{k} \\ &\text{shoe } \text{C1-} \text{big}=\Pi-\text{0} \\ &‘… (as) the {\text{shoe}} \text{ is } {\text{big}}_{\text{INAN}}.’ \end{align*} \]  

(Presented S2)

b. Bare Nominal with “ANIMATE” Verb Morphology

\[ \begin{align*} &\text{maskisin } \acute{\text{e}}-\text{misikiti} \\ &\text{maskisin } \acute{\text{e}}-\text{misikiti-}t \\ &\text{shoe } C1-\text{be.b.} \text{g.} \text{AI-3} \\ &‘… (as) the {\text{shoe}} \text{ is } \text{big.’} \end{align*} \]  

(Presented S2)

The verb’s agreement will now have to provide the content for the null functional head in the nominal syntax. In the cases where there is no overt nominal form present, the case becomes still more complex.
a. “INANIMATE” VERB WITHOUT NOMINAL

\( \forall \Gamma \iota \) 
\( \hat{-} \text{-misâk} \)
\( \hat{-} \text{-mis}=\hat{-}k \)
\( c1\text{-big}=\Pi-0 \)
‘… (as) it is big\text{\textsubscript{INAN}}.’

b. “ANIMATE” VERB WITHOUT NOMINAL

\( \forall \Gamma \not\exists \) 
\( \hat{-} \text{-misikitit} \)
\( \hat{-} \text{-misikiti} -t \)
\( c1\text{-be.bigt}=3 \)
‘… (as) it is big\text{\textsubscript{AN}}.’

Now, we will have to even more heavily rely on the verbal agreement; not only will it have to identify the null head, it will now have to create the head itself out of thin air, similar to the syntax posited for ‘pro-drop’ systems like Italian (cf. Rizzi 1986, etc.), which use verbal morphology to identify null subjects.

While it is possible to construct a model that allows for the verbal agreement to reconstruct the identity of a nominal head present in the discourse but not present locally, the case becomes more difficult when we turn our attention to verbs that never take an overt nominal (Pentland 1996).

a. “INANIMATE” VERB WITH EXPLETIVE ARGUMENT

\( \forall \rho \exists \iota \) 
\( \hat{-} \text{-kimiwahk} \)
\( \hat{-} \text{-kimiwan-k} \)
\( c1\text{-rain}=0 \)
‘… (as) it is raining\text{\textsubscript{IN}}.’

b. “INANIMATE” VERB WITH EXPLETIVE ARGUMENT CANNOT HAVE OVERT NOMINAL

\( \ast \) \( \forall \rho \exists \iota \) \( \sigma \wedge \) 
\( \ast \hat{-} \text{-kimiwahk nipiy} \)
\( \hat{-} \text{-kimiwan-k nipiy} \)
\( c1\text{-rain} = -0 \text{water} \)
Intended: ‘Water is raining\text{\textsubscript{IN}}.’

In these cases, there is never any nominal syntax present, but the verb is still inflected for animacy; the “Inanimate” form is required (42a), while the “Animate” form is disallowed (42b).
In these cases, there is no nominal head to reconstruct, leaving the nominal-local hypothesis with a significant problem. If animacy is located in nominal syntax, why is there still animacy when there is no nominal syntax?

It is evidence of this kind that is taken to support an analysis in which the verb codes animacy and the nominal agrees with it. Following the argumentation of Jelinek (1984) and Baker (1996) among others, the absence of a nominal is taken to mean that the nominal’s syntax is peripheral to the central verbal syntax.

2.3.52. Animacy without verbs

As we have just seen, an analysis that locates animacy in a verbal head (i.e. nouns agree with verbs), makes correct predictions for the behaviour of many noun-verb pairings; nominals are optional or may be non-existent while animacy coding still persists. However, there are also cases in which verbs are optional or non-existent but animacy coding still persists. Thus, the argumentation that best supports the verb-local hypothesis is also the argumentation that defeats it.

In connected speech, Plains Cree makes extensive use of verbal ellipsis. In these structures, some previous constituent is gapped in a subsequent, parallel structure. For example, when Alice Ahenakew relates her work with a white family while the mother was away giving birth, she first describes what she did (i.e. she watched the other two girls), then says what the husband did (i.e. he worked outside on the farm), and then repeats, in ellided form, her own tasks.
(43) **Elision of Verb in Discourse**

i. \( \nabla \delta \nabla \beta \sigma \beta \sigma \zeta \phi \phi \beta \phi \delta \phi \delta \), …
   ëkotê ëkwa niya nitay-ayân ôk ãwâsisak kotakak, …
   ëkotê ëkwa ni-ya nit-ay- ayâ -n aw -iki ãwâsis-ak kotak-ak
   there then I-body I- RED-be.at-LP PRX-AN.PL child -PL other-PL
   ‘I stayed there …’
   Lit: ‘I stayed there, these other children, …’

ii. \( \sigma \phi \delta \o \zeta \phi \o \beta \beta \o \beta \), \( \nabla \beta \o \beta \l \phi \o \beta \o \beta \).
   nîso iskwësisak, ê-kanawêyimakik.
   nîsw iskwëw=sis -ak, ê-kanaw=ëyim -ak -ik
   two woman=DIM-PL C1-care=by.mind.TA-1>3-PL
   ‘… and kept the other children, two little girls.’
   Lit: ‘… two girls, taking care of them.’

iii. \( \nabla \beta \delta \phi \zeta \alpha \zeta \alpha \alpha \zeta \beta \zeta \beta \phi \delta \beta \delta \),
   ëkwa wiy âwa nâpêw mâna é-atoskêt, ê-kistikêt wiyaw îtimihk,
   ëkwa w-iya aw =a nâpêw mâna é-atoskê-t, ê-kistikê-t wayawîtim-ikh
   and 3-body PRX=AN.SG man usual c1-work=3 c1-farm -3 outside -LOC
   ‘The man worked outside, on the farm, …’
   Lit: ‘… and this man worked, farming outside,’

iv. \( \nabla \beta \beta \zeta \delta \zeta \delta \zeta \delta \phi \), \( \nabla \delta \zeta \phi \zeta \delta \zeta \delta \phi \).
   ëkwa aya, êkoni ëkwa ôki,
   ëkwa aya, êkoni -k ëkwa aw =iki
   and HES RESUM-PL and PRX=AN.PL
   ‘and I looked after them, …’
   Lit: ‘and uh, these were then the ones,’

(AA §5:5)

Here, the form in (iv) is lacking a verb, but it is not lacking animacy coding; the demonstrative forms present bear marking for “Animate” plural (-iki). This kind of ellipsis can be used with overt nominals (44a) as well as the demonstrative case in (iv).

(44) **a. Ellipsis With Overt Nominal**

Clare \( \check{\rho} \check{\phi} \delta \phi \zeta \delta \delta \), \( \nabla \beta \beta \zeta \delta \zeta \delta \zeta \delta \phi \).
Clare kî-nîmîhitow, ëkwa mâna awâsisak.
Clare kî- nîmîhitow=\( w \), ëkwa mâna awâsis-ak
Clare PREV-dance -3 and also child-PL
   ‘Clare danced, and so did the children, …’
   (Presented S2)

---

14 In order to give the reader a more direct representation of Cree sentence structure, I am here offering more literal translations than are available in the published edition. This is particularly important for the ellipsis example in (iv). The translations done by Ahenakew & Wolfart (1997) are, of course, better for apprehending the broad meaning and intent of the Plains Cree, representing true translation work rather than my rough pony.
b. NON-ELLIPSIS FORM

Clare ṭį̀' Đɘ ø mí̲.  ṭį̀' Đɘ ø ì̲  ṭį̀' Đɘ ø.  ṭį̀' Đɘ ø ì̲.  ṭį̀' Đɘ ø.  ṭį̀' Đɘ ø.  ṭį̀' Đɘ ø.  ṭį̀' Đɘ ø.  ṭį̀' Đɘ ø.  ṭį̀' Đɘ ø.  ṭį̀' Đɘ ø.  ṭį̀' Đɘ ø.  ṭį̀' Đɘ ø.  ṭį̀' Đɘ ø.  ṭį̀' ĐEnlarge

Clare kî-nîmîhtow, êkwa mîna awâsisak kî-nîmîhtowak.
Clare kî-nîmîhtow-ìw, êkwa mîna awâsis-ak
Clare PREV-dance -3 and also child-PL
‘Clare danced, and the children also danced.’ (Presented S2)

Here, the verb can be forced to appear in the second clause (44b), but it is considered awkward. Thus, the verb begins to look as “optional” to animacy coding as the noun is.

While ellipsis shows verbs to be optional, there are also constructions in which verbs are forbidden. This is most clearly shown by equational sentences, which make use of a postposed demonstrative.

(45) EQUATIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS LACK A VERB

Γolicies po
minösak ìki
minös-ak aw =iki
cat -PL PRX=AN.PL
‘These are cats.’ (Presented S2)

It is impossible to give a negative example containing a verb, because there is no verb in Plains Cree directly equivalent to English ‘is’ in these constructions; all verbs available entail some notion of locational presence (e.g. ‘these are here’). These constructions, then, show an instance where animacy coding persists without the possibility of even a null verb form. If animacy is located in the verbal syntax, why is there still animacy when there is no verb?

2.3.6. Conclusion: Animacy is distributed

Summarizing, we see that none of the accounts that posit a dedicated locus for animacy can model the data without invoking additional mechanisms.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>§</th>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Attested</th>
<th>Dedicated Locus for Animacy</th>
<th>No Locus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lexical</td>
<td>Local N</td>
<td>Local V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.1</td>
<td>Active manipulation</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2</td>
<td>Suppletion</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.3</td>
<td>Homophony</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.4</td>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.51</td>
<td>Nounless animacy</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.52</td>
<td>Verbless animacy</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4. Summary of predictions for three hypotheses

A model that posits animacy coding to be distributed across the referential positions of the syntax (VP, DP, DemP, etc.) is most consistent with the data generalizations.

2.4. The content of animacy: “Inanimates” are inherently extentionality

In the following section, I construct a model in which the “Inanimate” class of nominals in Plains Cree bears the semantic feature [EXTENTIONAL], while the “Animate” class of nominals bears no semantic features at all. Informally, a referent is considered extentional if they do not have a mental process directed at some object (Brentano 1874); an extentional referent cannot offer a point of view for a proposition to be considered from. This means that extentional referents are incapable of having beliefs or attitudes. Philosophers sometimes call these kinds of referents “objects” rather than “subjects” (Lyons 1982), a use that has entered common language in the notion of “objectifying” someone. These “objects” cannot perceive anything, believe anything, or be said to think, feel, or speak. I am claiming, then, that the referential class “Inanimate” in Plains Cree carries the meaning that the referent is never able to think, feel, or speak – the referent is just an “object” out there in the world.

More formally, a referent is extentional if (and only if) they cannot be paired with a perspectival domain that provides truth-conditions for propositions. This is represented by the formula in (46) (cf. §1.3.1).

---

15 Statements of the kind “Pornography objectifies human beings” are good examples. Unfortunately, the cross-over of terminology with the more common grammatical notions of “subject” and “object” make this common usage unappealing for use in linguistic analysis.
(46) \( \text{Ext}(x) \leftrightarrow \forall \psi \forall y (R(y, \psi) \implies x \neq y) \)

\( x \) is Extentional if and only if for all Perspectives \( \psi \) and all individuals \( y \), if there is a relation \( R \) between individual \( y \) with perspective \( \psi \), then \( x \) is not \( y \).

Extentionality, then, can be thought of as a checking function; it checks all perspective-individual pairs to ensure that none of them contain the referent given to it. As a checking function, extentionality is restrictive; it restricts possible discourse constructions to those that do not have the extentional referent paired with a perspective. Extentionality, then, is a precondition on the construction of subsequent discourse structures – a property that becomes central when we consider the context of animacy below in section 2.5.

Applying the formalism in (46) to “Inanimate” nominals, we can say that Plains Cree’s “Inanimate” class of nominals are inherently extentional; they can never have a point of view). This yields the formula in (47).

(47) a. “\text{INANIMATE}” \text{FORM} = \lambda x \cdot [\text{Ext}(x) \land \text{Pred}'(x)]

\( x \), such that \( x \) is extentional and \( x \) is a member of the set of referents denoted by the predicate.

b. “\text{INANIMATE}” \text{CONTEXT}

\[ \sigma \Gamma \cdot \text{Hobbes}. \]

\[ \text{nimiskěn Hobbes}. \]

\[ \text{ni-m =isk} \quad -\hat{\text{è-n Hobbes}} \]

\[ \text{l-find=by.body.\text{TT-TT-lp Hobbes}} \]

\[ \text{‘I found}_{\text{INAN Hobbes (the stuffed animal).}} \] (Presented S2)

By contrast, Animate nominals have no semantics beyond their basic nominal meanings. Nominals in this class \textit{may} relate to referents that are interpreted as extentional, or they may be intentional (i.e. offer a point of view); there is no restriction on them in the grammar.\(^{16}\)

(48) a. “\text{ANIMATE}” = \lambda x \cdot [\text{Pred}'(x)]

\( x \), such that \( x \) is a member of the set of referents denoted by the predicate.

b. “\text{ANIMATE}” \text{CONTEXT}

\[ \sigma \Gamma \cdot \text{Hobbes}. \]

\[ \text{nimiskâw Hobbes}. \]

\[ \text{ni-m=iskaw} \quad -\hat{\text{à-w Hobbes}} \]

\[ \text{l-find=by.body.\text{TA-DIR-3 Hobbes}} \]

\[ \text{‘I found}_{\text{AN Hobbes (the walking, talking tiger).}} \] (Presented S2)

\(^{16}\) That is, there is no \textit{inherent} restriction on them. As we will see in Chapter 3, the grammar does place \textit{contextual} restrictions on them.
The difference between “Animate” and “Inanimate,” then, is a difference between a referent who may have intentions (“Animate”), in some context, and a referent who can never have intentions in any context (“Inanimate”).

If we reconsider the possible organizations of the two classes, we now see that the organization must be fundamentally asymmetric. The “Inanimate” class is contentful, specifying that the referent is extentional, while the “Animate” class is contentless, specifying nothing at all.

(49)  a. “INANIMATE” : [Ext]

    b. “ANIMATE” : [Ø]

The “Animate” class, then, can be thought of as the general class, employed whenever the inherent extentionality of a referent is desired to be left vague. In contrast, the “Inanimate” can be thought of as the specific class, employed whenever the inherent extentionality of a referent is needs explicit coding. The use of a general form (“Animate”) where a specific form (“Inanimate”) is expected implies that the general form is carrying the opposite feature; thus, if an “Inanimate” form is expected, the use of an “Animate” form can imply that the referent is inherently intentional (cf. Wolfart 1978 for obviation; §3.5). Thus, modeling the relation between the two animacy classes as asymmetric results in a logic that balances unrestricted meaning with contrastive meaning.

The model I have outlined here makes specific claims about the distribution of animacy in Cree:

(i) The analysis requires that “Inanimate” nominals do not think, feel, or speak (inherently intentional events; Banfield 1982), because they have been coded as strictly extentional (§2.4.1-2.4.3).

(ii) The analysis of “Inanimate” as specified and animate as unspecified means that “Animate” nominals will freely shift their interpretation; “Animates are vague” (§2.4.4).

(iii) The asymmetric relation between a form that carries a specified feature (here, extentional “Inanimates”) and one that does not (here, unspecified animates) means that in certain contexts a blocking relationship is established, wherein the unspecified form acquires the opposite meaning of the specified form; for example, via a Gricean implicature as in Grice (1989) (§2.4.5).

---

17 See Green (1989), among others, for a discussion of purposeful vaguess in English discourse.
The current analysis treats the extentional property of “Inanimate” nominals as inherent to the referent. “Inanimate” nominals, then, should not be able to identify referents that have ever been intentional, an expectation that the data from Plains Cree corroborates (§2.4.6).

2.4.1. Asymmetries in the interpretation of the two classes

In the present analysis, “Inanimate” forms carry inherently extentional content, which means that they refer to inherently extentional referents. By contrast, the animate form is unspecified, which means that it should be unrestricted in its interpretation.

Recall from section 2.4.3. that there are a number of nominal forms that are commonly found with both animate and “Inanimate” marking. A small list of these is repeated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORM</th>
<th>INANIMATE</th>
<th>ANIMATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>asiniy</td>
<td>bullet</td>
<td>rock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atayöhkan</td>
<td>sacred story</td>
<td>spirit being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cikâhkwan</td>
<td>lance</td>
<td>gambling toy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kayâsiyåkan</td>
<td>old dish</td>
<td>Old Dish (person)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kistikân</td>
<td>garden</td>
<td>seed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maskikipitôn</td>
<td>twisted mouth</td>
<td>Twisted Mouth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mistikw</td>
<td>stick</td>
<td>tree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mistikwâskisin</td>
<td>wooden shoe</td>
<td>Dutch person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mitâs</td>
<td>leggings</td>
<td>pants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>piwâpiskwastotin</td>
<td>steel helmet</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wâpistikwan</td>
<td>white head</td>
<td>person with white hair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wâpimin</td>
<td>white berry</td>
<td>white bead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wâposwayân</td>
<td>rabbit hide</td>
<td>The Rabbityskin People</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Repeated) Table 2.3. Forms commonly found in both animacy classes

Taking stock of the interpretations\(^\text{18}\) offered in this list, we see that the “Inanimate” coded forms denote entities that are unable to think, speak, or feel. This is corroborated by discussion with native speakers of the language; rabbit hides, sticks, and bullets are considered mere objects, not intelligent entities. Likewise, while some of the animate forms do denote referents capable of thinking, speaking, or feeling (e.g. piwâpiskwastotin ‘a German,’ átayöhkan ‘a spirit being,’ etc.), others are not (e.g. kistikân ‘seed,’ mitâs ‘pants,’ or wâpimin ‘white bead). Being unspecified, native speakers often express confusion about the reasons for referents being

\(^{18}\) Note that by “interpretation,” I mean more than merely translation. Rather than using interpretation to mean “a set of corresponding English words,” I mean the kind of “thing” out there in the world that the form signifies. Thus, a Plains Cree speaker can say “ôma asiniy” (“this rock”) and point to a bullet lying on the table. The act of pointing, and the understanding on the part of the speaker-hearer pair is the “interpretation” of the form, not an English translation of it.
marked animate (e.g. S2: “I don’t know why rocks are alive. They aren’t, but I’m talking about them like they are.”). Thus, the “Inanimate” class is consistently extentional, while the “Animate” class is inconsistently intentional.

Any nominal can be coded with either animacy class. For example, the nominal stem \textit{kinêpikw} ‘snake’ is accepted in both forms, as in (50).

\begin{enumerate}
\item a. \textsc{animate context for kinêpikw ‘snake’} \\
\quad \textit{σ} \hat{\text{ϕ}} \hbox{$\Downarrow$} \nabla \sigma \ldots \nabla \sigma \ \text{P} \sigma \Delta \text{d}.
\quad \text{nikî-wâpamâw awa kinêpik.} \\
\quad \text{ni-ki-wâp} = \text{am} \ -\hat{\text{a}}-w \ aw =a \ \text{kinêpikw} \\
\quad \text{I-PREV-see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 PRX=AN.SG snake} \\
\quad \text{‘I saw this snake}_\text{AN}.$’ (Presented S2)
\item b. “\textsc{inanimate}” context for \textit{kinêpikw ‘snake’} \\
\quad \textit{σ} \hat{\text{ϕ}} \hbox{$\Downarrow$} \nabla \sigma \ldots \nabla \sigma \ \text{P} \sigma \Delta \text{d}.
\quad \text{nikî-wâpahtën ôma kinêpik.} \\
\quad \text{ni-ki-wâp} = \text{aht} \ -\hat{\text{e}}-n \ aw=\text{ima} \ \text{kinêpikw} \\
\quad \text{I-PREV-see=by.eye.TI-TI-LP PRX=IN.SG snake} \\
\quad \text{‘I saw this snake}_\text{IN}.$’ (Presented S2)
\end{enumerate}

The same is possible with proper names, as shown in (51).

\begin{enumerate}
\item a. \textsc{animate context for hobbes} \\
\quad \textit{σ} \hat{\text{ϕ}} \hbox{$\Downarrow$} \nabla \sigma \ldots \text{Hobbes.} \\
\quad \text{nikî-wâpamâw Hobbes.} \\
\quad \text{ni-ki- wâp}= \text{am} \ -\hat{\text{a}} -w \text{Hobbes} \\
\quad \text{I-PREV-see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 Hobbes} \\
\quad \text{‘I saw Hobbes}_\text{AN}.$’ (Presented S2)
\item b. “\textsc{inanimate}” context for \textit{hobbes} \\
\quad \textit{σ} \hat{\text{ϕ}} \hbox{$\Downarrow$} \nabla \sigma \ldots \text{Hobbes.} \\
\quad \text{nikî-wâpahtên Hobbes.} \\
\quad \text{ni-ki- wâp}= \text{aht} \ -\hat{\text{e}} -n \text{Hobbes} \\
\quad \text{I-PREV-see=by.eye.TI-TI-LP Hobbes} \\
\quad \text{‘I saw Hobbes}_\text{IN}.$’ (Presented S2)
\end{enumerate}

In these cases, the “Inanimate” form correlates with an interpretation of the referent as an extentional “thing” in the world; either a plastic snake, or a stuffed animal. By contrast, the animate form may have intentions (e.g. if the Speaker wants to make the snake or Hobbes think, speak, or feel), but is not required to.

\footnote{See Valentine (2000) and King (1997) for discussion.}
2.4.2. Abstract nominals are always “inanimate”

An extentional referent does not have a perspective. If “Inanimate” nominals are extentional, then we expect that nominals that denote abstract concepts should always be “Inanimate”: the concepts “love” or “John went to the store yesterday” or the event of stubbing my toe on a drawer should never be able to speak, think, or feel.

A productive way to form abstract nominals in Plains Cree is to add the suffix –win to an intransitive verb stem. This creates derivationally-related sets as in (52).

(52)  FORMS BUILT OFF OF ROOT sâk- “LOVE”

a. ḥpʰvə⁰
   sâkihêw.
   sâk  =ih   -ê   -w
   attach=by.neut-DIR-3
   ‘s/hePROX loves him/her’

b. ḥpʰ∆公务员
   sâkihitowak.
   sâk  =ih  =ito  -w-ak
   attach=by.neut=RECIPI-3 -PL
   ‘TheyAN love eachother.’

b. ḥpʰ∆公务员
   sâkihitowin
   sâk  =ih  =ito  -win
   attach=by.neut=RECIPI-NOM
   ‘loveIN’

These nominalized forms are used to denote the concept associated with the activity, and are frequently used in philosophical discourse. In (53), we see three such forms: kisêwâtisiwin ‘grace,’ wîcêhtowin ‘living in harmony,’ kitimâkêyihtowin ‘compassion.’

(53) … ḥpʰΔα⁰  ḥpʰγडटटटटटटटटटटटटटटटटटटटटटटटटटटटटटट�  2-father 21PL 3-merciful=STAT-NOM good-live=by.neut=RECIPI-NOM kitimâkêyihtowin
   have.pity -NOM
   ‘…Our Father’s grace, living in harmony, compassion for one another, …’ (JKN:1.7)

---

20 It is possible, that this suffix is actually two morphemes – the third person suffix -w and a derivational suffix -(i)n. I currently do not have enough evidence to warrant this break, and thus leave it as one unit.
Since these nominalized forms denote concepts, rather than entities in the world, they should never be capable of thinking, speaking, or feeling. Being unable to engage in these activities, they cannot offer a perspective for the evaluation of a proposition; they are always extensional. This means that they should always be coded as “Inanimate,” which is exactly what Plains Cree does. Consider the examples from elicitation in (54), where a verb that takes an abstract nominal sâkihitowin ‘love’ as its argument must be inflected for “Inanimate” (-k) rather than “Animate” (-t) agreement.

(54) Abstract Nominals Must Be “Inanimate”

a. Ṣq'ìhΔì Δq^3 v Γ' <q'r'.
   sâkihitowin ê-miywâsik.
   sâk =ih =ito -win ê- miyw=āsi-k
   attach=by.neut=RECIP-NOM c1-good=ni-0
   ‘Love\textsubscript{IN} is good.’ (Presented S2)

b. * Ṣq'ìhΔì Δq^3 v Γ' <q'r’
   * sâkihitowin ê-miyosit
   sâk =ih =ito -win ê-miyow =si-t
   attach=by.neut=RECIP-NOM c1-good=At-3
   Intended: ‘Love\textsubscript{AN} is good.’ (Presented S2)

Both in texts and elicitation, there are no attested cases of derived, abstract nominals being treated as animate (cf. Wolfart 1973:23).

Speakers can make reference to things larger than events or referents, and in all cases, this reference is coded as “Inanimate”. For example, a Speaker can make reference to a proposition, like ê-ahkosit ‘...that she is sick’ as in (55).

(55) Propositions Are “Inanimate”

σ-∪ₘ"∪ₜ v <ₘ"dₜ’.
   nitéyihién ê-ahkosit.
   ni-it =ēyiht -ê -n ê-ahkosoi -t
   1-thus=by.mind.TI-TI-LP c1-be.sick-3
   ‘I think\textsubscript{IN} that s/he’s sick.’
   Lit: ‘I think thus of it\textsubscript{IN}, that s/he is sick.’ (Translation S2)

A speaker can also make reference to non-linguistic actions or events in the speech context, such as the dropping of a plate on the floor, as in (56).
(56) SPEECH CONTEXTS ARE “INANIMATE”

\[ \text{abe, } \sigma \leq \Gamma \not\rightarrow \Gamma ^{+} \text{,} \]
\[ \text{abe}^n, \text{anima moy miyw̱ásin.} \]
\[ \text{abe}^n \text{ an } = \text{ima moy miywâ = } \text{âsi-n-w} \]
\[ \text{EXCL. DST = IN. SG NEG good} = \text{II - 0-3} \]
\[ ‘ \text{Darn, that}_{\text{INAN}} \text{ is bad}_{\text{INAN}.}’ \]

Context: Speaker has accidentally dropped a plate and broken it.

A speaker can also make reference to entire discourses, such as the purpose for a counselling speech, as in (57), which is elaborated on throughout the following dialogue.

(57) DISCOURSES ARE “INANIMATE”

\[ \text{êwak ôma kîkway, kâ-nitawêyihtahk ôki ka-wihtamawakik, …} \]
\[ \text{êwakw aw = ima kîkway, kâ-nitaw = iyht} \text{ - am-k-ik aw = iki} \]
\[ \text{resum PRX = AN. SG thing c2-towards = by. mind.TI-TI} \text{ - 0-PL PRX = PL} \]
\[ \text{ka-wiht = amaw - ak - ik} \]
\[ \text{FUT-tell = APPLIC-1 > 3-PL} \]
\[ ‘ \text{There is something}_{\text{IN}} \text{ which they want}_{\text{IN}} \text{ me to tell}_{\text{IN}} \text{ them …}’ \]

(Translation S2)

(JKN: 1:1)

In all of these cases, the referent must be coded as “Inanimate.” This is expected under an analysis that treats inanimate morphology as coding extentionality; propositions, speech contexts, and discourses can never, under any circumstances, think, feel, or speak.²¹

2.4.3. Extentionality in the verb system: “inanimates” can’t think, speak, or feel

Verbs systematically code the animacy for their arguments; this coding occurs in two places:

(i) In the final element of the stem (the “final”), including the “Animate” final -isi- in (58a) and the inanimate final -â- in (58b).

(58) a. “ANIMATE” FINAL: -isi-

\[ \Gamma \cap \\Delta \not\rightarrow \rho \rho ^{+} \].
\[ \text{mistik ê-kinositit.} \]
\[ \text{mistikw ê-kinw = si-t} \]
\[ \text{wood c1-long = AT-3} \]
\[ ‘ \text{The tree}_{\text{AN}} \text{ is tall.’} \]

(Presented S2)

²¹ In the West, there is a tradition of personifying abstract concepts (e.g. Philosophy visiting Boethius in the form of a woman). Note that this is no longer the concept of philosophy, but rather the concept made into a human being. As an abstract concept, Philosophy cannot talk.
b. **INANIMATE FINAL: -â-**

\[ \Gamma^n \cap d \ \triangledown \ \rho_{\dot{\alpha}-} \cdot \]

mistik ê-kinwâk.

\( \text{mistikw ê- kinw=â-k} \)

\( \text{wood c1-long} = \Pi-0 \)

‘The stick\(_{\text{IN}}\) is long\(_{\text{IN}}\).’

(59) a. “**ANIMATE**” PRONOMINAL –t

\[ \Gamma^n \cap d \ \triangledown \ \rho_{\cdot t} \cdot \]

mistik ê-kinosit.

\( \text{mistikw ê- kin=w=si-t} \)

\( \text{wood c1-long} = \Pi-3 \)

‘The tree\(_{\text{AN}}\) is tall\(_{\text{AN}}\).’

(59) b. “**INANIMATE**” PRONOMINAL –k

\[ \Gamma^n \cap d \ \triangledown \ \rho_{\dot{\alpha}-} \cdot \]

mistik ê-kinwâk.

\( \text{mistikw ê- kinw=â-k} \)

\( \text{wood c1-long} = \Pi-0 \)

‘The stick\(_{\text{INAN}}\) is long\(_{\text{INAN}}\).’

(59) (ii) In the elements that affix to the stem, including pronominal marking like the “**Animate**” –t in (59a) and –k (59b).

When we compare the kinds of content verb stems can have with the kind of animacy marking they allow, we find that the gaps in the verbal system’s inventory of stems surface exactly where an extentional account of the nominal semantics would expect them. Whenever the event described by the verb is not specifying anything about intentionality, both inanimate and “Animate” verb forms exist. Whenever the verb describes a referentless event, the “Inanimate” form is the only attested case (§2.4.31). Whenever the event described by the verb is intentional for one of its arguments, verb forms that mark that argument as “Animate” are the only ones attested (§2.4.32). Finally, reflexive verb forms always specify “Animate,” rather than “Inanimate,” referents (§2.4.33). From this data, I conclude that verbs marked with “Inanimate” agreement cannot be ascribers of intentions.

**2.4.31. Expletive arguments must be “inanimate”**

Extentionality is the referential property of not having a perspective to evaluate the truth of a proposition in; extentional referents do not have intentions. Among other things, claiming that the “Inanimate” class has inherent extentional content means that whenever there is a need for a
strictly syntactically-conditioned argument, the verb will invariably use “Inanimate” morphology. Since these expletive arguments lack reference, they can never be associated with an intentional referent. The data from Plains Cree supports this conclusion, both for expletive subjects and expletive objects.

Verbs whose subject cannot be construed with a referent are always inflected as agreeing with an “Inanimate” argument (e.g. the pronominal suffix –k). This includes:

(i) Weather verbs, such as *kimiwan* ‘it rains.’

(60) \[ \diamond \; \Diamond \; \langle \Diamond \rangle \; \langle \text{weather, inanimate} \rangle \]
ê-kimiwahk anohc.
ê- kimiwan-k anohc
c1-rain.ii –0 now
‘It\textsubscript{IN} is raining today.’

(Presented S2)

(ii) Verbs that denote temporal events, such as ‘it is Tuesday.’

(61) \[ \Diamond \; \odot \; \odot \; \diamond \; \langle \text{temporal, inanimate} \rangle \]
ê-nîso-kîsikâk anohc.
ê- nîsw-kîsikâ -k anohc
c1-two- be.day-0 now
‘It\textsubscript{IN} is Tuesday today.’

(Presented S2)

(iii) Verbs that give the characteristic properties of something, for example *kinêpikoskâw* ‘there are many snakes there.’

(62) \[ \Diamond \; \diamond \; \diamond \; \diamond \; \langle \text{characteristic property, inanimate} \rangle \]
êkota ê-kinêpikoskâk.
êkota ê- kinêpikw=sk =â-k
there c1-snake =HABIT=II-\theta
‘There\textsubscript{IN} are many snakes there.’

(Presented S2)

Thus, any verb that denotes a time or a weather condition is systematically coded as “Inanimate.”

There are also known cases of morphologically transitive verbs that do not appear to ever take an object. Termed ‘formal objects’ by Bloomfield (1962) and ‘pseudo-intransitives’ by Goddard (1967), these are forms that inflect for an “Inanimate” object, but cannot occur with an overt argument. While these forms are well-attested in Menominee (Bloomfield 1962), in Plains Cree, there are very few attested forms of this kind (cf. Wolfart 1973:39), with the best-known example being shown in (63).
Here, the verb is inflected for an “Inanimate” object. According to the consensus among Algonquianists (cf. Bloomfield 1958, 1962, Goddard 1967, Wolfart 1973, Valentine 2001), this phenomenon can only occur with transitive verbs coded for an “Inanimate” object. While more restricted than expletive subjects, these expletive objects show the same pattern of “Inanimate” only morphology.

2.4.32. Psych verbs prohibit “inanimate” arguments

Verbs that denote events that involve thinking, speaking, or feeling can be thought of as introducing a perspective to evaluate the truth of a proposition in. Verbs of these semantic classes are typically grouped under the heading of “psych verbs” in the literature (Ruwet 1972, 1982, Banfield 1982, Bouchard 1995, etc.), and are thought to be semantically special because they subordinate the proposition with respect to some referent other than the Speaker (Lewis 1979, Cresswell 1985, Mitchell 1987, Farkas 1992). For example, in the sentence “Beth thinks that Norway was a place in Central America,” the embedded proposition is not evaluated with respect to the Speaker’s beliefs, but rather the subject of the psych verb (“Beth”). Thus, these verbs introduce a referent and a referent’s perspective as the relevant domain for the evaluation of the truth of the proposition (cf. Kölbl 2002). This means that, in the terms of the current analysis, verbs of this kind introduce intentional referents (cf. Bouchard 1995).

Plains Cree has numerous verbs of this kind, with an example of each group shown in (64).

(64) a. Thinking verb

\[ \text{tâpwêwakêyihtam.} \]

\[ \text{tâpwêwak=êyiht} \text{-am} \]

\[ \text{truth =by.mind.TI-TI} \]

\[ \text{‘s/he believes it_{INAN}.} \]

(Volunteered S4)
b. **Speaking verb**

\[ \Delta U. \circ \]

\text{itwêw}  
\text{it} = \text{wê}-w  
\text{thus}=\text{AI}-3  
\text{‘s/he says’} \quad \text{(Volunteered S2)}

c. **Feeling verb**

\[ b^\text{q} r^{\text{p}} \]

\text{kaskêyihtam.}  
\text{kask} = \text{êyiht} \quad \text{-am}  
\text{desolate=} \text{by.mind. TI-TI}  
\text{‘s/he feels lonely’} \quad \text{(Presented S2)}

Being inherently intentional, these verbs provide an excellent place to test the semantic content of animacy forms.

When we cross-classify verbs based both on their stem morphology and their meanings, we observe that no psych verbs introduce an extentional (“Inanimate”) argument. In other words, psych verbs, being inherently intentional, prohibit extentional arguments. A preliminary classification is given in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>INANIMATE</th>
<th>ANIMATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sensory (e.g. ‘appear’)</td>
<td>isinâkwan-</td>
<td>isinâkosi-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergo (e.g. ‘be smoked’)</td>
<td>kaskâpahtê-</td>
<td>kaskâpaso-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion (e.g. ‘x feels well’)</td>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>miyomaciho-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellect (e.g. ‘x remembers’)</td>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>kiskisi-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech (e.g. ‘x speaks’)</td>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>pikiskwê-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.5.** Semantic gaps among verbs

For verb forms denoting characteristics of a referent that are observable to an outsider, termed ‘Sensory verbs’ by Hunter & Karpinski (1994), both “Inanimate” and “Animate” forms are attested. Consider the root \text{mihko} ‘red.’ This root can be formed into a verb that codes either “Animate” reference (65a), or “Inanimate” reference (65b).
(65) a. **External Characteristic Verb with “Animate” stem**

\[ \text{…\( \triangledown \) Γ"dri"} \]
\[ \text{ê-mihkosit} \]
\[ \text{ê-mihko=si-t} \]
\[ cl{-}red=AI{-}3 \]
\[ \text{‘…(as) s/he is red}_{\text{AN}}{.} \]

(Presented to S2)

b. **External Characteristic Verb With “Inanimate” stem**

\[ \text{…\( \triangledown \) Γ"\text{=}j̕"} \]
\[ \text{ê-mihkwâk} \]
\[ \text{ê-mihkw=â-k} \]
\[ cl{-}red=II{-}0 \]
\[ \text{‘…(as) it is red}_{\text{IN}}{.} \]

(Presented to S2)

However, when we consider psych verbs *miyomaciho* – ‘feel well,’ we see that there is no attested form that bears “Inanimate” agreement; no dictionary lists one, and I have never seen one in any text.

This non-occurrence of intentional verbs with “Inanimate” (extentional) referents could, in theory, be accidental. However, due to Plains Cree’s pronominal system, we can construct a test to ensure that it is not. This is because, with verbs that carry specific kinds of clause-typing (conjunct order verbs), the two classes of referents (“Animate” and “Inanimate”) have dedicated pronominal marking. Thus, the form in (66a) has *-t* for an “Animate” referent, while the form in (66b) has *-k* for an “Inanimate” referent. This means that the textual pattern can be tested by constructing the form using the available morphology, as in (66b), and presenting it to a speaker.\(^{22}\)

(66) a. **Psych verb with “Animate” agreement**

\[ \text{…\( \triangledown \) Γ"\text{=}\text{ik}n\text{=}j"} \]
\[ \text{ê-miyomâcihot} \]
\[ \text{ê-miyw=mâciho-t} \]
\[ cl{-}good=\text{feel}=-3 \]
\[ \text{‘S/he}_{\text{AN}} \text{ feels well}_{\text{AN}}{.} \]

(Presented to S2)

\(^{22}\) Note that the “inanimate actor” suffix *–makan* (Wolfart 1973) could also be used to build these constructions. However, this suffix appears to be archaic, since three of the speakers I have worked with have not been able to recognize it, either synthetically or in texts. One speaker (S4) uses it in natural speech and is able to understand it in texts, but I have currently been unable to get him to recognized it in elicitation-type settings.
b. **Psych verb with “Inanimate” agreement**

※…▽Γεѣ hann‘.
※…ė-miyomâcihok
ė-miyomâciho-k
cl-feel.well -0
Intended: ‘It<sub>IN</sub> feels well.’  

(Presented to S2)

Here, the “Inanimate”-marked verb is rejected by the Speaker, in line with the attested corpus patterns.

### 2.4.34. Reflexive verbs prohibit “inanimate” arguments

Another place that we could expect in/extentionality to surface is the case of reflexives. In many languages (e.g. English, Icelandic, etc.), the reflexive form of a predicate is licensed when its antecedent is interpreted as intentional (i.e. Logophoric; Hagège 1974, Sells 1987, Stirling 1993, etc.). For example, in English, a reflexive form (e.g. itself) cannot be felicitously used as the object of an eventive verb that has an extentional subject (e.g. ‘a dish’).  

(67)   a. When Shujun tried to get a **dish** out of the cupboard, she dropped **it**.

    b. # When Shujun tried to get a **dish** out of the cupboard, **it** dropped **itself**.

    c. When Shujun tried to get a **dish** out of the cupboard, **it** dropped.

Here, the application of -self to the pronominal it in (67b) infelicitously conveys that its antecedent ‘the dish’ would have to be purposefully breaking itself – that is, the dish had a desire, the capacity for action necessary to carry out this desire, and then set about a course of action that fulfilled it (a sort of dish suicide). This means that the dish would be construed as intentional. Of course, as many mothers have told their guilty children, “dishes don’t break themselves.”

In Plains Cree, reflexivization is done on the verbal predicate via the affixation of -iso- to the stem, providing another testing ground for the correlation between intentionality and animacy.

---

23 Judgments come from multiple speakers of Wisconsin English. Since judgments of speakers of this area are consistently at odds with “canonical” judgments for English pronominals, this is noted here in case the forms are troubling to some native speakers of other dialects.

24 In a situation in which a vase lies broken on the floor, and the only “adult-licensed” referents are a child and a vase, children sometimes resort to the creation of an additional intermediary referent. For example, one friend, as a child, named her hand “Dayday,” and blamed Dayday for the act. That is, the child has imbued some typically “inanimate” referent with intentionality, suitable for ascribing the act to.
Reflexive verbs cannot be marked with “Inanimate” pronominal marking, and cannot be connected to “Inanimate”-marked nominals.

Thus, “Inanimate” forms are banned in a structure that (may) give rise to an intentional interpretation.

2.4.4. Animates are unspecified

The current analysis treats “Inanimate” referents as inherently extentional, and animates as unspecified. If this is correct, “Animate” forms should behave in particular ways:

(i) They should be capable of being construed as extentional.

(ii) They should be capable of being construed as intentional.
They should be capable of being construed as neither intentional nor extentional.

“Animate” forms, then, should be entirely unspecified for the semantics associated with “Inanimate.”

“Animate” referents can be construed as extentional. For example, an “Animate” referent can be both an animal and dead, as the example in (70) shows. Here, the nominal *kinêpikw* ‘snake’ is modified both by an “Animate” coded demonstrative *awa* (coded with the “Animate” singular suffix –*a*), is the argument of an “Animate” coded verb *nipit* ‘s/he is dead’ (coded with the “Animate” pronominal –*t*), and is the object of a transitive verb *wâpam*– ‘see’ that is coded for an “Animate” object (the three morphemes –*am*–, –*ât*, and –*w*).

(70) **“Animate” Nominal In Extentional Context**

\[ \text{*nikî-} \text{wâpamâw} \text{awa} \text{kinêpik} \text{ê-nipit.} \]

\[ \text{ni-} \text{kî-} \text{wâp=} \text{am} \text{-â} \text{-w} \text{aw=} \text{a} \text{kinêpikw} \text{ê-nipi} \text{-t} \]

\[ \text{l-PREV-see=} \text{by.eye.TA-DIR-3 PRX=} \text{AN.SG} \text{snake c1-be.dead-3} \]

‘I saw\text{\textsubscript{AN}} this\text{\textsubscript{AN}} dead\text{\textsubscript{AN}} snake.’

(Translation by S2)

In this context, it is not possible for the snake to be assigned any kind of intentions. For example, it cannot be made the subject of a psych verb like *miyomâciho*– ‘be happy.’

(71) **“Animate” Nominal In Extentional Context**

\[ \# \text{*nikî-} \text{wâpamâw} \text{awa} \text{kinêpik} \text{ê-nipit. kî-miyomâcihow.} \]

\[ \# \text{ni-} \text{kî-} \text{wâp=} \text{am} \text{-â} \text{-w} \text{aw=} \text{a} \text{kinêpikw} \text{ê-nipi} \text{-t} \text{ kî-} \text{miyomâciho=} \text{w} \]

\[ \text{l-PREV-see=} \text{by.eye.TA-DIR-3 PRX=} \text{AN.SG} \text{snake c1-be.dead-3 PREV-be.happy -3} \]

‘I saw\text{\textsubscript{AN}} this\text{\textsubscript{AN}} dead\text{\textsubscript{AN}} snake. It\text{\textsubscript{AN}} was happy.’

(Translation by S2)

Thus, “Animate” referents can occur in contexts where they are forbidden to have intentions; they are interpreted as strictly extentional.

“Animate”-marked nominals may be construed as intentional. In fact, as demonstrated with every example in this entire thesis, intentional contexts always require an “Animate” nominal form. While the requirement of “Animate” forms for intentional contexts could suggest that “Animate” forms carry intentional semantics, the numerous “Animate” forms that cannot be intentional, mean that the relationship between “Animate” forms and intentionality is more complex. For example, attempting to connect the “Animate”-marked nominal *sênapân* ‘ribbon’ to a verb requiring an intentional argument results in infelicity (72a), even though the morphology is well-formed (72b).
(72) a. “Animate” *awa sênapân* ‘this ribbon’ cannot be subject of psych verb

\[ \text{\# } \langle \text{aw} \rangle \text{ sênapân cîhkêyihtam} \]
\[ aw=a \text{ sênapân cîhk=êyiht } -am-w \]
\[ PRX=\text{AN.SG} \text{ ribbon } joy =by.mind.TI-TI-3 \]

Intended: ‘This ribbon\textsubscript{AN} is happy.’ (Presented S2)

b. “Animate” *awa awâsis* ‘this child’ can be subject of psych verb

\[ \langle \text{aw} \rangle \text{ awâsis cîhkêyihtam} \]
\[ aw=a \text{ awâsis cîhk=êyiht } -am-w \]
\[ PRX=\text{AN.SG} \text{ child } joy =by.mind.TI-TI-3 \]

‘This child\textsubscript{AN} is happy.’ (Presented S2)

An “Animate”-marked nominal can be thought of as a condition on the construction of intentionality, but animacy cannot itself be coding it.

Most often, “Animate” nominals are construed as neither intentional nor extentional. Consider the example in (73).

(73) *Unspecified “Animate” wâpos* ‘rabbit’

\[ \langle \text{\sigma} \rangle \text{ wâpos} \]
\[ niwâpamâw ana wâpos \]
\[ \text{ni-wâpam } -\text{w an } =a \text{ wâposw} \]
\[ I- \text{see=}by.eye.TA-DIR-3 \text{ DST=}\text{AN.SG} \text{ rabbit} \]

‘I see\textsubscript{AN} that\textsubscript{AN} rabbit.’ (Presented S2)

Here, the Speaker has expressed that they see a distant rabbit. Asking consultants to comment on the mental state or perspective of the rabbit results in confusion; the rabbit’s mental state is irrelevant. That is, stating that I have seen this rabbit does not commit me to any comment at all on their mental state. They may have also seen me, or they may be entirely unaware of the event. As one consultant (S2) put it, “Who knows what rabbits think about?”

2.4.5. Only the “inanimate” form has specification

In modeling animacy, I have employed a predicate that restricts a nominal to extentional meanings (Ext(x)), rather than intentional ones (Int(x)). There are two logical possibilities to this categorical opposition; either everything that is not extentional is intentional, or everything that is not extentional is simply unmarked semantically. This is exactly the markedness puzzle
found so often in phonological analyses; do we posit a single privative feature of [high], or is it a contrast between two features (e.g. [high] vs. [low]), or a single bivalent feature (e.g. [±high]) (cf. Steriade 1995)?

(74)  
a. EXTENTIONAL AS A BINARY FEATURE

“Inanimate” : [+Ext]
“Animate” : [-Ext]

b. EXTENTIONAL AS A PRIVATIVE FEATURE

“Inanimate” : [Ext]
“Animate” : [Ø]

I here consider what the predictions of these different analyses are, concluding that treating extentionality as a privative feature is more consonant with Plains Cree language data.

The predictions of the potential treatments are clear. If the division is binary ([±EXTENTIONAL]), then the two classes should exhibit symmetric behaviour. This is because each class will have distinct content associated with it. If, however, the division is between one class with a privative feature ([EXTENTIONAL]) and an unmarked form ([Ø]), then the two classes will exhibit asymmetric behaviour. This is because one class will have a marked semantic meaning, and the other class will have nothing associated with it. There are ways to test this difference in Plains Cree.

Marking a referent with “Inanimate” morphosyntax means that it has the property of extentionality; it cannot be said to think, feel, or speak. Thus, in the pair of sentences involving the nominal form *kinêpikw* ‘snake,’ the “Inanimate”-marked form denotes a plastic snake.

(75) “INANIMATE”-MARKED REFERENT

\[
\sigma^\dagger \triangleleft "U\dagger \triangleright P \& d.
\]

nikî-wâpahtên òma kinêpik.

ni-kî-wâp=aht  -ê-n  aw =ima kinêpikw

1-PREV-see=by.eye.TI-TI-LP PRX=IN.SG snake

‘I saw_in this_in snake.’

CONTEXT (S2): Speaker sees a snake, then realizes it is just a rubber toy.

This plastic snake has no intentions; it does not think, it does not feel, it does not speak. It is just an object in the world, incapable of having a perspective for propositions. What, then, does the “Animate” marked form in (76) signify?
(76) “ANIMATE”-MARKED REFERENT

\[
\sigma^\hat{\partial} \langle \hat{L}^o \rangle \langle \hat{L}^r \rangle. \rho \sigma \wedge \varnothing.
\]

niki-wâpamâw awa kinêpik.

\[
i-kî- \text{ wâp}=\text{am} \quad -\hat{a} \quad -w \text{ aw}=a \text{ kinêpikw}
\]

\[
l-\text{PREV-see}=\text{by.} \text{eye.} \text{T4-} \text{DIR-} 3 \text{ PRX}=\text{AN.} \text{SG snake}
\]

‘I saw\text{AN} this\text{AN} snake.’

CONTEXT (S2): Speaker sees a rubber toy snake, thinks it is a real snake, is frightened.

If it were a full, semantically-marked opposite to “Inanimate”, it should signify a referent that has an intention. Thus, the sentence in (76) should mean that the snake is speaking, feeling, or thinking. In fact, this is not the case; the snake in (76) can be entirely intention-less – even dead (77).

(77) “ANIMATE” MARKED REFERENT IS DEAD

\[
\sigma^\hat{\partial} \langle \hat{L}^o \rangle \langle \hat{L}^r \rangle. \rho \sigma \wedge \varnothing. \nabla \sigma \wedge '.
\]

niki-wâpamâw awa kinêpik ê-nipi.

\[
i-kî- \text{ wâp}=\text{am} \quad -\hat{a} \quad -w \text{ aw}=a \text{ kinêpikw} \quad \hat{e}-\text{nipi} \quad -t
\]

\[
l-\text{PREV-see}=\text{by.} \text{eye.} \text{T4-} \text{DIR-} 3 \text{ PRX}=\text{AN.} \text{SG snake} \quad c1\text{-be.dead-} 3
\]

‘I saw\text{AN} this\text{AN} dead\text{AN} snake.’

(Translation by S2)

In such a context, the snake has no intentional state assigned to it whatsoever. It is simply a referent in the world. This interpretive asymmetry between “Animate” and “Inanimate” is robust in Plains Cree; the “Animate” form is semantically unrestricted in its distribution, whereas the “Inanimate” form is semantically restricted.

If “Animate” referents are not inherently intentional, why is it that they often appear to be? For example, the legs of one speaker, normally an “Inanimate” referent marked with the plural –\(a\) and the demonstrative òhi in (78a), when marked with “Animate” morphology (the plural –\(ak\) and the demonstrative òki), take on a mind of their own (78b).

(78) a. “INANIMATE” –SKÂT ‘FOOT’ : FEET ARE EXTENTIONAL

\[
\sigma^{\hat{o}} \beta^C \triangleright^{\Delta^o}.
\]

niskâta òhi.

\[
i-skât-a \quad aw=ihi
\]

\[
l-\text{leg} \quad -\text{XT PRX}=\text{XT}
\]

‘These\text{SN} are my legs\text{SN}.’

(Volunteered S4)

CONTEXT (S4): Pointing to legs to identify the proper word for them in a ‘normal’ context.
b. “Animate” –skât ‘foot’: Feet are intentional

\[ \sigma^{\text{b}}C \gg \rho. \]

niskâtaš ôki.

\[ \text{i}-\text{skât-a}k \text{ aw} =\text{iki} \]

\[ \text{l-} \text{leg} \quad \text{-pl} \text{ prx}=\text{an.pl} \]

‘These\text{an} are my legs\text{an}.' (Volunteered S4)

CONTEXT (S4): The speaker’s legs are out of his control, acting on their own. They are kicking him or other people.

Thus, the “Inanimate” morphology in (78a) is contrasted with the “Animate” set in (78b), with the result that the “Animate” form in (78b) now denotes a referent who is thinking on their own.

Contexts such as those in (78) might lead to the conclusion that “Animate” referents really are inherently intentional. But such accounts fail to account for the contexts where “Animate” referents are not intentional (e.g. 77). Typically, analysts who view animates as inherently intentional appeal to some notion of “fuzzy” categories (cf. Lakoff 1987, Dahlstrom 1995, Bliss 2005); there are “prototypical” members of the “Animate” class, and “less-prototypical” members. On this view, animacy is a gradient, scalar property; “Animate” rocks are “less-prototypical” members of the “Animate” set, while “Animate” children are “more prototypical.”

As Goddard (2004:224) points out, the apparent intentionality of animates is a by-product of their contrast with “Inanimates.” “Animate” referents appear to carry intentional meaning only in contexts where they are contrasted with “Inanimate.” Returning to the examples in (78), the referent –skâta ‘legs’ is typically “Inanimate.” This means that changing the morphology to “Animate” is contrastive. Thus, “Animate” referents only have an intentional meaning when they are set up in contrast with an extentional (“Inanimate”) form.

2.4.6 “Inanimate” nominals are inherently extentional

In addition to “Inanimate” marked nominals being interpreted as extentional, I also claim that they are inherently extentional. An “Inanimate” marked nominal has the property of

---

25 See Bliss (2005) for related discussion of the notion of “sentience” in Blackfoot.
26 Hockett (1966) arrived at the same conclusions about the two classes, saying that the “Animate” class is ‘absorptive,’ but his reasons for concluding this are, ironically, entirely at odds with the argumentation used in this analysis. Like other Algonquianists, Hockett viewed the “Inanimate/Animate” contrast as a lexical property, specified for each noun. He then set about considering when this lexical property could be changed, and determined that it almost universally went from “Inanimate” to “Animate.” Thus, a linguist arguing on entirely different foundational assumptions arrived at the same asymmetry. Ironically, his conclusion of an inherent asymmetry was what caused the present analysis to be developed.
extentionality for all time and in all contexts. In the formalism used here, the claim that extentionality is a stable property of “Inanimates” is modeled by the lack of contextual dependency.

(79) \( \text{Ext}(x) \leftrightarrow \forall \psi \forall y (R(y, \psi) \rightarrow x \neq y) \)

\( x \) is Extentional if and only if for all Perspectives \( \psi \) and all individuals \( y \), if there is a relation \( R \) between individual \( y \) with perspective \( \psi \), then \( x \) is not \( y \).

Without contextual coding, the predicate holds over all contexts. By contrast, a contextual form of extentionality would be formulated as in (80).

(80) \( \text{Ext}(x, C) \leftrightarrow \forall \psi \forall y (R(y, \psi, C) \rightarrow x \neq y) \)

\( x \) is extentional at context \( C \) if and only if for all perspectives \( \psi \) and all individuals \( y \), if there is a relation \( R \) of \( y \) with \( \psi \) at \( C \), then \( x \) is not \( y \).

Here, context-dependency is coded by a context indexical ‘\( C \)’ (cf. Partee 1989). While the form in (80) is possible (and attested: see Chapter 3 on obviation), I take (79) to be the correct formulation for “Inanimate” nominals. This means that “Inanimate” nominals should lack context sensitivity; once a Speaker codes a referent as “Inanimate,” it should not change. Examining Plains Cree data, this inherent extentionality of “Inanimates” is exactly what we find; if we consider only one perspective in a discourse, animacy cannot be altered once an value is selected.

Animacy forms must stay consistent throughout a discourse. There are no instances in texts or in elicitation of a referent slipping unsystematically between “Animate” and “Inanimate” forms. Attempts to make this happen are always rejected. For example, in (81), I have tried to introduce a referent (\( \text{kinêpik} \) ‘snake’) as “Animate” (coded by the verbal agreement \(-am-\ddot{a}-\)), and then, in a subsequent clause, tried to conjoin an “Inanimate” coded verb (\( \dot{e}\)-\( \text{mîhkwâk} \) ‘it is red’) with an “Animate” coded one (\( \dot{e}\)-\( \text{misikitit} \) ‘s/he is big’) to refer to this same referent (\( \text{kinêpik} \) ‘snake’). The result is rejected by consultants.

(81) Switching Animacy is Not Possible

\[
\begin{align*}
\# & \sigma \ddot{\rho} \dddot{d} < ^{\dddot{d}} & \ddot{\rho} - \ddot{\rho} \wedge \ddot{d} \wedge & \dddot{d} \wedge \dddot{d} \wedge \dddot{d} \wedge \ddot{\rho} \ddot{\rho} \wedge \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma \gamma . \\
\# & \text{niwâpamâw kinêpikw. } \dot{e}\text{-mîhkwâk } \ddot{e}kwa \ddot{e}\text{-misikitit.} \\
& \text{ni-} wâp=am & -\ddot{a} & -w \text{kinêpikw. } \dot{e}\text{-mîhkwâk=â-k } \ddot{e}kwa \ddot{e}\text{-misikitit-t} \\
& \text{1-see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 snake} & \text{c1-red}=\text{II-0 and } \text{c1-be.large-3} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Intended: ‘I saw\textsubscript{AN} a snake. It was \textsubscript{AN} red and \textsubscript{AN} large.’ (Presented S2)
Instead, once a referent is set up as “Animate” or “Inanimate,” all subsequent reference to it must maintain this assignment.\(^{27}\) This is shown by the corrected form offered in (82).

(82) **Animacy Must Be Maintained in Subsequent Clauses**

\[
\sigma\hat{\text{d}} \hat{\text{L}}=\text{Heather}. \\
\text{ni}-\hat{\text{w}}\text{pamâw} \text{Heather}. \\
\text{ni}-\text{kî} - \hat{\text{w}}\text{pam} = \text{am} - \hat{\text{a}} - \text{w} \text{Heather} \\
1\text{-PREV-see} = \text{by.eye.TA-DIR-3} \text{Heather} \\
\text{I saw AN Heather.} \quad \text{(Judgment by S2)}
\]

**CONTEXT:** Speaker was at Heather’s funeral.

Here, the verb form bearing “Animate” agreement (\(\hat{\text{w}}\text{pam-}\hat{\text{a}}\)) must be used, even though the referent is dead (and thus technically incapable of having an intention). The verb form bearing “Inanimate” agreement (\(\hat{\text{w}}\text{pahnt-}\hat{\text{am}}\)) is not allowed, even if the Speaker is specifically indicating

\(^{27}\) Controlling, of course, for perspectival shifts of the kind discussed in §2.5 below.

\(^{28}\) The question of whether or not a dead person can still have (non-corporeal) intentions is avoided here, by making explicit reference to the *corpse* of the person, not to the person themselves. In discussions with Plains Cree speakers, it is clear that many people would be willing to consider the referent (as a spirit) capable of intentions even when dead; hence the explicit pointing at the body in the examples.
the dead body. In the present analysis, the shifting from “Animate” to “Inanimate” is disallowed because “Inanimate” codes an inherent property of the referent (inherently extentional), not a contextual one. This refusal to shift the animacy class of dead people is known from textual sources as well (see Goddard 2004).

While animacy is not sensitive to either changes in subsequent discourse or changes in the status of the referent, it is sensitive to shifts in perspectives. For example, if the Speaker’s perspective establishes that a referent is inherently extentional (“Inanimate”), but some other person in the discourse believes that the referent is not inherently extentional (“Animate”), a change in perspective from the Speaker’s to the other person will correlate with a change in animacy. This will be taken up in detail in section 2.4 below. So long as we hold our consideration to only one perspective, the context insensitivity is clear.

2.5. The context of animacy: Relativization to individual perspectives

The content of animacy is linked with its context of use (cf. Fillmore 1975, Cook & Mühlbauer 2007):

(i) In section 2.4.1 we relied on an alteration in felicitous contexts to discern the content of “Inanimate” forms.
(ii) In 2.4.4, we used the context insensitivity of “Animate” forms to argue for its lack of content.
(iii) In section 2.4.5, we relied on contexts of use to determine the contentful status of “Inanimate” and the contentless status of “Animate.”
(iv) In section 2.4.6, we had to carefully control context in order to consider the inherent properties of animacy.

In this section, I consider the contextual properties of animacy in finer detail, arguing that the content of animacy can never be calculated without making reference to someone’s perspective; animacy always codes the beliefs of someone. The shifts in context for animacy, then, are necessarily shifts in perspectives. Modeling the context of animacy thus becomes a task of modelling these perspective shifts.

To model these contextual properties, I employ a modified form of Discourse Representation Theory (DRT: Kamp 1981) that is built off of the observations of Farkas (1992) and Smith (2004). Please turn to Chapter 1, section 1.3.2 for a discussion of how this model works.
This mechanism models the two core properties of animacy:

(i) “Inanimate” has extentional content; “Inanimates” cannot possess a perspective.
(ii) Animacy can be used to represent different individual’s perspectives.

In section 2.5.1, I show how the model accounts for the inherent extentional content of “Inanimate” predicates and the contextually-defined properties of “Animate” predicates. I then show how the analysis accounts for the perspectival properties of animacy. First, in section 2.5.2., I show that all nominals are invariably interpreted within a perspective, which is minimally the Speaker’s perspective. In section 2.5.3., I show that nominals can be embedded in the perspective of the hearer. In section 2.5.4., I show that nominals can be embedded within the perspective of third persons (Kuno’s “Discourse Perspective” – Kuno 1972, 1987, and similar ideas in Banfield 1982).

2.5.1. “Inanimates” as preconditions on embeddings

The “Inanimate” form, being inherently extentional, carries an inherent disjunction from all individual-perspective pairs (cf. §1.3.1).

\[(84)\]

\[a. \text{Ext}(x) \leftrightarrow \forall \psi \forall y (R(y, \psi) \rightarrow x \neq y)\]

\[x \text{ is Extentional if and only if for all Perspectives } \psi \text{ and all individuals } y, \text{ if there is a relation } R \text{ between individual } y \text{ with perspective } \psi, \text{ then } x \text{ is not } y.\]

\[b. \text{“INANIMATE” FORM} = \lambda x. [\text{Ext}(x) \land \text{Pred}'(x)]\]

\[x, \text{ such that } x \text{ is extentional and } x \text{ is a member of the set of referents denoted by the predicate.}\]

Adequate modelling of this extentional property is straightforward within the DRT framework I have constructed.

Within the current framework, a perspective is represented as a Discourse Representation Structure (DRS), with dependent perspectives represented as embedded inside of the outermost perspective. In selecting the “Inanimate” form, then, a Speaker is placing a restriction on possible perspectival embeddings, making the DRS in (85) ill-formed because it says both that the referent *kinépik* “snake” is inherently unable to possess a perspective (extentional) and possesses a perspective.
Assigning a Perspective to an "Inanimate" is not allowed

\[
\text{Ext} \triangleleft \sigma \land \text{\textfrak{q}} \land d \text{\textfrak{a}} \quad \hat{\text{\textfrak{a}}}
\]

\text{anima \ kinêpik \ cîhkêyihtam.}

\[\text{an} = \text{ima \ kinêpik \ cîhk=êyiht} \quad \text{-am} \]

\[PRX=\text{IN.SG \ snake \ joy =by.mind.TI-TI}\]

Intended: ‘That (plastic) snake\text{\textsubscript{IN}} feels happy.’

(85) (Presented S2)

By contrast, the “Animate” form carries no restrictions, allowing it to be freely identified with perspectives, should the Speaker desire it.

\[\triangleleft \triangleleft \cdot \ \text{\textfrak{a}} \land \text{\textfrak{d}} \text{\textfrak{a}} \quad \text{\textfrak{a}} \quad \text{\textfrak{a}}
\]

\text{awa \ kinêpik \ cîhkêyihtam.}

\[\text{aw} = \text{a \ kinêpik \ cîhk=êyiht} \quad \text{-am} \]

\[PRX=\text{AN.SG \ snake \ joy =by.mind.TI-TI}\]

Intended: ‘That\text{\textsubscript{AN}} snake feels happy.’

(86) (Presented S2)
Inanimacy, then, can be seen as carrying a pre-condition on the construction of discourses; it limits the possible embeddings to “Animate” (non-extentional) forms.

2.5.2. Relativizing to the Speaker: Changes in belief

In the present analysis, animacy values are perspectival in nature. If a Speaker views an entity as being inherently extentional (i.e. as inherently lacking a perspective), then the referent will be classified as “Inanimate.” If a Speaker instead views this same referent as either possessing a perspective (i.e. intentional) or unspecified for perspectival properties, then the referent will be classified as “Animate.”

Consider a minimal pair of sentences involving a plastic snake. In this context, I had a brightly colored rubber snake sitting on a shelf in my house. The speaker caught sight out of it out of the corner of her eye and thought it was a real snake for a moment. She gasped, but, upon closer inspection realized that the snake was, in fact, a piece of rubber. I asked her how she would say this in Plains Cree. When the speaker first thinks the snake is ‘real,’ the “Animate” system of morphology is used (87).

(87) Speaker thinks snake is real = “Animate”

\[
\sigma \hat{p} \langle i \hat{L} \rangle \langle i \hat{d} \rangle \hat{p} \sigma \wedge d. \\
\text{niki-wapamaw awa kinêpik} \\
\text{ni-ki- wâp=}a \text{m} \quad \text{-â-}w \text{aw} =a \text{ kinêpikw} \\
I-\text{PREV-see=}b\text{y. eye. TA-DIR-3 PROX=}AN.SG \text{ snake} \\
\text{‘I saw}_\text{AN} \text{ this}_\text{AN} \text{ snake’} \quad \text{(Judgment by S2)}
\]

Later, when she realized that it was not a real snake, but rather a rubber representation, she shifts the nominal to the “Inanimate” set of morphology (88).29

Both forms with and without 
\(-hkân\) are considered acceptable, but (i) is considered more specific (and thus preferred).

29 In this context, an alternative form was also offered, which employs the suffix 
\(-hkân\) ‘pretend or created form of x’ as shown in (i):

(i) \[\sigma \hat{L} \langle i \hat{U} \rangle \hat{L} \wedge p \sigma d^b, \hat{p}.\] \\
\text{ni-wapahten ôma kinêpikohkân.} \\
\text{ni-wâp=}a\text{ht} \quad \text{-ê-n aw=}a\text{ima kinêpikw-hkân} \\
I-\text{see=}b\text{y. eye. TI-TI-LP PRX=}IN.SG \text{ snake} \quad -\text{constructed} \\
\text{‘I saw}_\text{IN} \text{ this}_\text{IN} \text{ fake snack.’} \quad \text{(Volunteered S2)}
Here, the Speaker begins by thinking the snake is a real snake, and frames it with “Animate” morphology, which conveys nothing about its mental state (“Animate” is unspecified). Later, she realizes her mistake – the snake is really just made out of plastic and incapable of trying to bite her – and she thus changes the coding of the referent to “Inanimate.” Crucially, this shift from “Animate” to “Inanimate” happened because the Speaker altered their understanding of the referent. The shift from “Animate” to “Inanimate” or “Inanimate” to “Animate,” then, is necessarily a shift in the speaker’s conceptions of the inherent properties of the referent.

This alteration in the Speaker’s perception of the referent’s properties can be modeled in a straightforward way. In the “Animate” form in (87), the referent is simply a referent; there are no special properties ascribed to the snake by the Speaker. Thus, in the DRS model, the referent *kinêpik* ‘snake’ is embedded within the Speaker’s perspective; it is true in the Speaker’s perspective that they saw a snake. This matches the interpretation given by the native speaker (S2).

(88) Speaker realizes snake is plastic = “Inanimate”

\[
\sigma \hat{\rho} \downarrow \langle \Uparrow \rangle ^{\downarrow} \downarrow \downarrow \rho \cdot \sigma \wedge \delta.
\]

nikî-wâpahtèn ôma kinêpik.

\[
i-kî- \ wâp=\text{aht} \ -\hat{\epsilon}-n \ aw =\text{ima} \ kinêpikw
\]

1-PREV-see=by.eye.TT-TI-LP PROX=IN.SG snake

‘I saw this snake.’  

(Judgment by S2)

In the “Inanimate” form in (88), the snake is coded as inherently extentional. In the DRS model, then, the extentional content of the “Inanimate” form (\(\text{EXT}(x)\)) is embedded within the Speaker’s perspective. This says that the Speaker is claiming that it is true in their perspective that they saw a snake and the snake was an extentional entity (e.g. plastic). This also matches the interpretation given by the native speaker (S2).
The current model, then, successfully covers the contextual properties of animacy when relativized to the Speaker.

### 2.5.3. Relativizing to hearers: effects of common ground

While it is generally assumed that speech act participants will seek to reach a ‘common ground’ where the knowledge of both participants are brought into harmony (Stalnaker 1974), there are times where this simply cannot happen. For example, if one participant has had an experience that the other participant believes to be impossible, the two will not be able to come to a ‘common ground’ for the event. This kind of asymmetry in belief is a good place to test relativization to referents other than the Speaker.

In Plains Cree, events experienced only by the Speaker require that the Speaker’s beliefs be coded. Consider a context in which I am alone in my room and suddenly a red shoe on the floor starts speaking to me. Later, I want to tell a friend about this strange experience. In Plains Cree, the shoe must be marked with ‘Animate’ forms in such a context, as the example in (91) shows (maskisin ‘shoe’ is modified by the animate demonstrative awa ‘this one’ and is the argument of a TA verb pîkiskwât- ‘talk’).

(91) **Speaking Shoe must be “Animate”**

\[
aw \text{mihko-maskisin } é-pîkiskwâsit
\]

\[
awa \text{mihkw-maskisin } é- \text{pîkiskwâsit-}
\]

\[
PRX=\text{AN.SG } \text{red- shoe } \text{c1-speak.TA } -3>1
\]

‘This red shoe, AN talked to me.’ (Judgment S2)

Here, “Animate” forms are used, because the Speaker perceives the referent to be capable of speech. The hearer, not being present at this event, is simply going to have to accommodate the Speaker’s beliefs about this event, regardless of what they may personally think about it.
Suppose my friend walks in immediately after (or interrupting) the event of this shoe speaking to me, and sees me looking stunned, with a red shoe on the floor. While I believe the shoe has spoken to me, my friend sees only a regular shoe laying there. In this context, I have to make a decision about whose perspective to represent – my own, in which the shoe was an “Animate” referent that was capable of talking, or my friend’s, in which the shoe was just a shoe – an inherently extentional referent (“Inanimate”), incapable of speaking. If I want to accommodate my friend’s perspective on this shoe in Plains Cree, the shoe can now be marked “Inanimate” via an inanimate demonstrative ôma, and a derived intransitive verb stem can be used to talk about it (pîkiskwêwât-).

(92) INANIMATE SHOE TO ACCOMMODATE HEARER’S PERSPECTIVE

ôma mihko-maskisin ê-pîkiskwêwâtít
aw =ima mihkw-maskisin ê- pîkiskwê-wâ-t -it
PRX=IN.SG red- shoe cl-speak.AI-IN-EP-3>1
‘This, red shoe talked to me.’ (Judgment S2)

Here, “Inanimate” forms are used, because the hearer conceives of the shoe as extentional (not having heard it speak, and assuming things about shoes that people generally assume about them). The Speaker, who heard the shoe speak, suppresses their own version of the experience to accommodate the hearer’s version.30

Animacy can also be relativized to the hearer when the referent and the event are both known equally well to the Speaker and Hearer. Consider the Calvin and Hobbes examples discussed in the first chapter. Calvin is a child who has a tiger for a best friend; this tiger is taken to be a living, talking tiger by Calvin, but is taken to be a stuffed animal by everybody else. In a context where Hobbes is lost in the woods, and found by the parent, Calvin and the rest of the world have clashing beliefs about the event. This presents the parent with a complex task in Plain Cree; when informing Calvin of the event of finding Hobbes, should they employ “Inanimate” (93a) or “Animate” (93b) forms for Hobbes?

30 It is also possible that the Speaker has here aligned their own beliefs to the Hearer’s (e.g. upon considering what the Hearer would say, the Speaker became convinced that they had experienced some kind of delusion). In that case, the accomodation would be complete; the hearer’s perspective would take over the Speaker’s entirely.
Here, the choice of animacy forms depends on whose beliefs the Speaker desires to represent. According to the consultant (S2), if Calvin’s mother uttered (93a) to Calvin, she would be over-riding Calvin’s belief that Hobbes was real with her own, as if “she were telling him there were no Santa Claus.” Thus, (93a) represents the belief of the Speaker (Calvin’s mother). By contrast, if Calvin’s mother uttered (93b), she would be accomodating Calvin’s belief that Hobbes was real, “because he is a child and you want to respect what he believes.” Thus, (93b) represents the beliefs of Calvin, rather than his mother.

These kinds of relativizations can be represented straightforwardly in the current model of animacy context. The accommodation of the Speaker’s account of the talking shoe simply relativizes the event to the Speaker’s perspective. This is represented by embedding the predicates associated with the shoe (e.g. shoe(x)) in the Speaker’s perspective. The model says that the Speaker is saying that there was a shoe, it was red, and it spoke to them. This matches the judgments of the consultants (S2).

(94) Speaker <say>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>x</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>shoe(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>red(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>speak(x,S)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Likewise, the Speaker’s accommodation of the hearer’s beliefs can be represented by an embedding of what the Speaker takes the hearer’s perspective to be inside their own perspective. Here, the model says that the Speaker says that there was a shoe, it was red, it spoke to them, and the hearer conceives of this shoe as inherently extentional (i.e. “Inanimate”).

(95) Speaker <say>

|x|
|shoe(x)|
|red(x)|
|Speak(x,S)|

Hearer <R>

|x|
|Ext(x)|

The same model can also cover the Calvin and Hobbes cases in (93). To represent the Mother’s beliefs about the Hobbes, we embed the extentional coding of Hobbes within the Speaker’s perspective, as in (96). This says that it is true in the Speaker’s perspective that Hobbes was found by the hearer’s father and Hobbes is an inherently extentional entity (“Inanimate”).

(96) Speaker <say>

|x| Hobbes|
|father(x,Hearer)|
|Ext(Hobbes)|
|find(x,Hobbes)|

In the example in (93b), the Mother is accommodating Calvin’s conception of the event; Calvin’s father bumped into Hobbes in the woods while Hobbes was out looking for a tuna fish sandwich and they walked home together, chatting as they went. We can model this in a DRS by embedding the event inside Calvin (the Hearer’s) perspective, as in (97). This says that it is true in the Speaker’s perspective that the hearer’s father found Hobbes, and it is also true in the hearer’s perspective that hearer’s father found Hobbes.
The current model, then, provides a logic for modelling the complex shifting of Speaker/Hearer perspectives possible with animacy.

2.5.4. Relativizing to third persons: perspective shifts

The current model treats the extentionality of a referent as relativized to a referent. In the cases considered so far, this has been either the Speaker (section 2.5.2) or the Hearer (section 2.5.3). Based on Kuno’s (1972, 1987) work on discourse-prominent third persons in English and Japanese, we could expect that Plains Cree would be able to invoke a “Discourse Perspective” some perspective other than the Speaker or Hearer’s.

Animacy can be relativized to a referent who is not present for the speech act, but whose perspective is considered relevant. Consider again the situation of Calvin losing his tiger Hobbes. If his father finds the tiger in the woods and reports it to Calvin’s mother, while Calvin is not around, he can choose to either represent his own beliefs about Hobbes or Calvin’s. In (99a), he uses “Inanimate” marking on the verbal predicate (-isk-ê-), which codes that Hobbes is inherently extentional (Father’s Perspective). In (98b), he uses “Animate” marking on the verbal predicate (-iskaw-â-), which codes that Hobbes is capable of possessing a perspective (Calvin’s Perspective).
One consultant explained the Father’s ability to use “Animate” marking in this context by saying that “parents can get used to talking about these things like their kids think about them.” Thus, the (98b) example has relativized the animacy of Hobbes to someone who is not present for the speech act (i.e. a third person).

In complex narratives told by gifted storytellers in earlier times, we find evidence for relativizing a third person’s perspective. As we have already seen in section 2.3.1 above, the “Rolling Head” story told by Louis Moosomin (Bloomfield 1930:§1) makes use of animacy shifting. The table summarizing these shifts is repeated here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>SEVERED HEAD STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>Severed head opens eyes</td>
<td>INANIMATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii</td>
<td>Severed head speaks</td>
<td>MIX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv</td>
<td>Severed head asks Utensils</td>
<td>ANIMATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>Boy sees Severed head talking</td>
<td>INANIMATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xiii</td>
<td>Severed head stopped</td>
<td>ANIMATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xv</td>
<td>Only Severed head going</td>
<td>INANIMATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xvii</td>
<td>Severed head passes fire</td>
<td>ANIMATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xxxii</td>
<td>Boy cries that Severed head kill Boy</td>
<td>INANIMATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xxxiv</td>
<td>Severed head sees great serpent</td>
<td>ANIMATE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.6. A summary of “inanimate”/“animate” shifting for the severed head story
When we consider the places where animacy shifts in detail, it is clear that the contrast between “Animate” and “Inanimate” is heavily exploited by the speaker to code the different knowledge states of the two main points of view; the narrator’s and the boy fleeing from the severe head. Let us consider these shifts in finer detail.

When the head is first severed, it is marked as an “Inanimate” referent as its eyes mechanically open; severed heads, after all, do not have the possibility of intentions.

(99) i. **SEVERED HEAD VIEWED AS INHERENTLY EXTENTIONAL (“INANIMATE”)**

Here, the independent-mode verb is marked with the suffix –*makan*, which is used when something is done in a purely extentional way (see, e.g., all uses in kâ-pimwêwêhahk 1998), and is frequently used with mechanical apparatus (e.g., a book or tape-recorder; see Wolvengrey 2001:44). The nominal is marked with the prefix *mi-* which is used when a body-part’s owner is not known to the speaker (see Mühlbauer 2004, 2007). It is then framed with the “Inanimate” demonstrative *ôma*, and the modifier *pisisik* (not translated by Bloomfield) is crucially inserted between the demonstrative and the nominal. When we consider the patterning of this modifier *pisisik* in other discourse contexts, it appears that it means something like ‘routinely’ or ‘every time.’

(100) **THE SEVERED HEAD IS “ROUTINE”**

Here the “Inanimate” properties of the nominal are being presented as they are usually conceived of. So far, the story is going according to *routine*; the referent is in its proper extentional class.

The next moment, something strange happens; the head begins to speak.

---

31 I cite only text examples of *-makan* because none of the speakers I have done elicitation with recognize it.
(101) **SEVERED HEAD IS TRANSITIONAL BETWEEN “ANIMATE” AND “INANIMATE”**

ii. \( \text{êkwa kîtahtawê kâ-pîkiskwê taw} = \text{ima} \; \text{o-stikwân} \)

Then one time C2-speak -3 PRX=IN.SG 3-head

‘then presently [suddenly] that head spoke.'

iii. “\( \text{â, nitôyâkan, tâniwêhkâk?} \)”

“Come, my dishes, where are they? [the children]”

Here, the first clause has been marked with the \( \text{kâ-} \) form of the changed conjunct (see Wolfart 1973, Cook 2007, etc.). Combining this kind of clause with the temporal adverb \( \text{kêtahtawê} \) yields a meaning of suddenness (Wolfart p.c., Cook, p.c., Cook 2007), as seen in the following example from Alice Ahenakew.

(102) **\( \text{KÊTAHTAWÊ + KÂ-} = \text{“SUDDENLY”} \)**

\( \text{êkwa kîtahtawê kâ-takopayit awiyak…} \)

\( \text{êkwa kîtahtawê kâ-tako =payi -t awiyak} \)

And one time C2-arrive=INCH-3 someone

“suddenly someone drove up…” (Ahenakew 2000:§2.1)

Thus, the severed head has suddenly begun to speak. This sudden act signals a clash in the knowledge states about this severed head; is it Extentional or Intentional? The verb is marked with \( \text{–t} \), which is only used with the unspecified “Animate” class. This is expected, since the act of speaking is inherently intentional (e.g. Banfield 1982). However the nominal is once again marked with the “Inanimate” form of the demonstrative, \( \text{o} \) and not \( \text{awa} \). Thus, the verbal agreement is coding an “Animate” referent, while the nominal agreement is coding an “Inanimate” referent. As Goddard (2004) points out, this is one of the only recorded cases of a mismatch between the nominal and verb agreement. In the context, it makes sense, however, because the referent’s extentional state is now under question: is it “Inanimate” or isn’t it?

The severed head then questions its utensils, finds where they went, and rolls off in pursuit of them. During this span, there is no overt nominal or demonstrative, but there are other reasons to suppose that the severed head is now grammatically an “Animate” referent. It is
connected to a set of verbs that code “Animate” actors and introduce strong intentional contexts (iv-vi) (103).

(103) iv. SEVERED HEAD VIEWED AS INTENTIONAL (“Animate”)

\[ sōskwāc kahkiyaw kakwēc-im -ē -w ot-āpacihcikan-a \]
\[ sōskwāc kahkiyaw kakwēc=im -ē -w ot-āpacihcikan-a \]
straight.out all try =by.mouth-Dir-3 3-utensil -xt
‘Without delay, she asked all her utensils.’

Further, the speaking severed head forces the obviation (see Chapter 3) of other referents (103), shown in (104) by the suffix -yi- on the verb kotâwinâ- ‘sink underground.’ She also becomes the possessor of the nominal nâpêm- ‘husband,’ which is only allowed for “Animate” referents (see §4.3.1).

(104) vii. SEVERED HEAD FORCES OBLIGATION, BECOMES POSSESSOR

\[ êkwa têpwêw awa ostikwânis awa. \]
\[ êkwa têpwê-w aw =a o-stikwân-is aw-a \]
then call -3 PR/x=An.GS 3-head -Dim Prox=An.GS
‘Then that head began to call.’

Now the severed head’s transformation from an extentional referent into an intentional one has been completed. The narrator, and his audience, have experienced a significant perspectival shift, and the grammar reflects it.

Thus, we can conclude that the severed head has here become fully an “Animate” referent; it is now conceived of by the Speaker as capable of having intentions (here, expressing a mental state by speaking). It is no surprise, then, when the nominal finally resurfaces in (vii) bearing the “Animate” demonstrative awa (105).
While the audience and the narrator have experienced this perspectival shift, a referent in the story is more recalcitrant. The boy pursued by the head is not so ready to acknowledge that the head is still inhabited by his dead mother. The narrator shifts to him as the central figure by employing a significant discourse shift; he is introduced via a left-dislocation (Mühlbauer 2003).

(106) ix. **Nominal nápēsis ‘boy’ in left dislocation**

\[
\nabla b' \triangleleft \triangleleft \triangleleft \cdot \Delta r' \triangleleft \triangleleft \Delta \check{c}l^\circ \check{b} \check{r} \cdot \check{b} \Delta r' \cdot \check{c}_{<r'} ,
\]

ēkwa awa nápēsis itámaskamik kā-isi-tapasit,
ēkwa aw =a nápē=sis itámaskamik kā-isi-tapasī-t
and PRX=AN.SG man=DIM underground c2-RR-flee -3

‘And that little boy that was fleeing underground,…’

When the head calls to the boy, he turns to look at it. Suddenly, the head is completely “Inanimate” once again (107). This is shown by the use of a verb coding “Inanimate” objects (-aht-am), an “Inanimate” demonstrative ôma, and a subsequent intransitive verb inflected for an “Inanimate” actor using –makan. This last predicate is also coded with –yi–, which codes that the subject is embedded in the perspective of some preceding third person (cf. §4.3.2).

(107) x. phia³w³ g³w³ \(\triangleleft \check{c}_\circ \cdot \Delta r' \check{c}_\circ \cdot \check{b} \check{r} \cdot \check{b} \Delta r' \cdot \check{c} \check{c}''\).

wâhyaw ohci wâpam [̃]ahām ôma pisisik mistikwân ê-pikiskwēmakanîwiyik.

wâhyaw ohci wâp =aht -am aw =ima pisisik mi-stikwân

far from see=by.eye.TI-TI PRX=IN.SG routine UP-head
ê-pikiskwē-makan -yi -k
c1-speak -INACT-DS-0

‘From afar he [the boy] saw that severed speaking head’

Here, the location of the event has been shifted; we now see the head wâhyaw ohci ‘from far away.’ The child looks and sees the head, whose speaking is now mechanical and intentionless, marked overtly with the suffix –makan (see above). Lest we not understand that this boy considers the head to be a purely extentional entity, the narrator introduces a direct quote from the boy to this effect (108).

(108) xii. **Boy claims head is “Inanimate”**

“…āl ̃ p̃b' + p̃b'Δr'\(\check{c}_\circ \cdot \Delta r' \check{c}_\circ \cdot \check{b} \check{r} \cdot \check{b} \Delta r' \cdot \check{c} \check{c}''\)…”

“…nama kêkway kikâwiyinaw. ostikwân [̃]ago kâ-pikiskwēmahk…”

nama kikway ki-kâwiy-inaw o-stikwân [̃]ago kâ-pikiskwē-makan -k

NEG thing 2- mother-21pl 3-head only c2-speak- INACT-0

“…our mother is not there. It is only a talking head…”
Here, the boy overtly denies that the head is inhabited with the mind of his mother. The head is modified with *piko*, which means something like ‘just’ or ‘only’ when postposed to a noun, and the verb of speaking is once again marked with *–makan*. The narrator could not be any more explicit about what the boy believes. Thus, the inherently extentional, “Inanimate” form of *–stikwân* is now been relativized to the boy’s perspective. Throughout the rest of the passage, this contrast between the boy’s perspective and the narrator’s is repeatedly brought to light.

Thus, the story presents two opposing perspectives on the extentionality of the head. The narrator and his audience have inside information on the head that indicates it is capable of intentions; they saw it question the utensils about its children, and heard the rock confirm what her husband had done with them (i–vi). The two boys, by contrast, were not there for those events, and are furthermore naturally resistant to identify the monstrous severed head that pursues them as their mother’s spirit calling them. Thus, the Narrator and his audience are able to treat the severed head as an intentional referent, and when their knowledge is referenced, the narrator uses numerous grammatical devices to convey the intentionality of the head. All of these devices depend on the “Animate” status of the head: it is marked “Animate,” it speaks with animate-marked verbs, and it obviates other referents. By contrast, when the boy’s perspective is referenced, the narrator uses every grammatical device available to code the inherently extentional, “Inanimate” status of the head: it is marked “Inanimate,” all verbs are marked with “Inanimate” morphology, and overt quantifiers are used. Thus, the grammar of Plains Cree has here been exploited to maximal rhetorical effect by a gifted speaker, who is playing on the difference between what his audience expects a severed head to be capable of and what it here becomes.

Modeling this perspectival shift to third persons is straightforward. In all cases, it simply involves an embedding of the third person’s perspective inside of the Speaker’s. For example, when the boy sees the severed head chasing him, the perspective on the severed head is the boy’s (109). This is modeled by embedding the extentional predicate (Ext(y)) inside of the boy’s perspective.

(109) x. wâhyaw ohci wâp=

‘From afar he [the boy] saw that severed speaking head’
2.6. Conclusion

Context informs content (Bateson 1972, Fillmore 1975), and content and form are inseparably linked (McCawley 1988). The two animacy classes of Plains Cree show a convergence of form, content, and context. In terms of form, the two animacy classes are used to code referential contrasts across multiple positions in the clause, including V, v, NumP, and DemP. In terms of content, the “Inanimate” codes extensionality while the “Animate” is unspecified. Form and content are manipulated by speakers to present the perspectives of different individuals. Considering forms allows us to control content and context, while context provides cues to content, and content provides cues to context.
Chapter 3
The Form, Content, and Context of Obviation

3.1. Proposal: Obviation as contextual extensionality

In this chapter, I consider the form, content, and context of a morphological subclass of “Animate” referents in Plains Cree, traditionally termed “Obviative.”\footnote{While my definition of this category is new, I have here adopted the traditional term for it.} A minimal pair is given in (1); the form in (1a) has only “Animate” coding on the verb (–t), while the form in (1b) has a suffix –a attached to the nominal, and an additional suffix –yi– attached to the “Animate” coded verb (wâpiskisi-).

(1) a. “ANIMATE”

\[
\begin{align*}
\langle i \rangle \backslash \nu & \langle i \wedge \rho \rangle' \\
\text{wâpos} & \text{-wâpiskisit} \\
\text{wâposw} & \text{- wâpiski}=si-t \\
\text{rabbit} & \text{cl-white} =_{AI-3} \\
\text{‘A/the rabbit\textsubscript{AN} is white.’} & \text{(Presented S2)}
\end{align*}
\]

b. “OBVIATIVE”

\[
\begin{align*}
\langle i \rangle \backslash \nu & \langle i \wedge \rho \rangle' \\
\text{wâposwa} & \text{-wâpiskisiyit} \\
\text{wâposw-a} & \text{- wâpiski}=si -yi-t \\
\text{rabbit} & \text{-XT cl-white} =_{AI-DS-3} \\
\text{‘… (as) a/the rabbit\textsubscript{OBV} was white.’} & \text{(Presented S2)}
\end{align*}
\]

After reviewing previous work on obviation (§3.2), I then argue that obviation is a construct (§3.3); Plains Cree constructs obviation by combining forms that code “Animate” reference with forms that code dependency. “Obviative,” then, does not have any dedicated forms in the syntax of Plains Cree. A summary of the forms associated with obviation and the present analysis of them is given in Table 3.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORM</th>
<th>CONTENT</th>
<th>EXAMPLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| N-a  | ExtP    | x is Extentional | nāpêwa  
nāpêw-a  
man -XT  
‘man\textsubscript{OBV/IN}’ |
| V-a  |         |         |         |
| DEM=ihi | DEMP | x is Extentional | Ꮩhi  
aw =ihi  
PRX=XT  
‘This one\textsubscript{OBV/IN}’ |
| N-yi-| IP      | x\textsubscript{SUBJ} ≠ y | nikiyowia  
nikamoyiwa  
sing -DS-3-XT  
’s/he\textsubscript{OBV} sings’ |
| V-yi-|         |         |         |
| N-im | NP      | x\textsubscript{OBJ} ≠ y | niwâpamimâwa  
ni-wâp=am -im -â -w-a  
1- see =by.eye.TA-DSJ-DIR-3-XT  
‘I see him/her\textsubscript{OBV}’ |
| V-ê- | VP      | x\textsubscript{OBJ} is Extentional | wâpamêw  
wâp=am -ê -w  
see =by.eye.TA-DIR-3  
‘s/he\textsubscript{PROX} sees him/her\textsubscript{OBV}’ |

Table 3.1. No dedicated obviation forms

I then argue that the referent associated with an “Obviative” construct is extentional within a specified context (§3.4). I define a contextually extentional referent as one that cannot be paired with a perspective in a given context (signified by ‘C’ in the formalism).

(2) \[ \text{Ext}(x,C) \leftrightarrow \forall \psi \forall y (R(y,\psi,C) \rightarrow x \neq y) \]
x is extentional at context C if and only if for all perspectives \( \psi \) and all individuals \( y \), if there is a relation \( R \) of \( y \) with \( \psi \) at context C, then \( x \) is not \( y \).

Applying this to the “Obviative” form in Plains Cree, I claim that a referent classified as “Obviative” will have the content of (4).

(3) \[ \text{“OBVIATIVE” CONSTRUCT} = [\lambda x \cdot \text{Ext}(x,C)] \]
x is extentional at context C if and only if for all perspectives \( \psi \) and all individuals \( y \), if there is a relation \( R \) of \( y \) with \( \psi \) at context C, then \( x \) is not \( y \).

This specified “Obviative” referent can be made to contrast with the unspecified “Animate”. In this contextual contrast, the unspecified “Animate” referent takes on the property of contextual intentionality (sometimes called “Proximate”).
(4) “Animate” *iskwēw* ‘woman’ becomes “Proximate” in contrast to “Obviative”

ê-wâpamât iskwēw nâpêwa  
ê-wâp=am -â -t iskwēw nâpêw-a  
cl-see=by.eye.ta-dir-3 woman man -xt  
‘The woman *PROX* saw the man *OBL*.’

(Presented S2)

= “Proximate” Woman has perspective on event.  
≠ “Obviative” Man has perspective on event.

This gives us a typology of referential contrasts that depend on two variables: (i) extentionality, and (ii) inherent vs. contextual properties.

(5)  
a. “Inanimate”: [Ext]  
b. “Animate”: [Ø]  
c. “Obviative”: [Ext,C]  
d. “Proximate”: [-Ext, C]

I then argue that the “Obviative” form-content pair also bears contextual information (§3.5): a referent’s contextual extentionality is evaluated within the perspective of the Speaker. Building on the model constructed for animacy in Chapter 2, I analyze the obviative as placing restriction on perspectival embeddings. Within the context of the Speaker’s perspective, “Obviative” referents cannot possess a perspective; they cannot both be extentional and perspective possessing.

(6) **ILL-FORMED DRS:**

“Obviatives” **CANNOT POSSESS PERSPECTIVES EMBEDDED IN SPEAKER’S**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker &lt;say&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ext(x,C)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x &lt;R&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⇒ x does not have a perspective

⇒ x has a perspective
In the context of this extentional form, the unmarked “Animate” form gains a perspective within the Speaker’s perspective, and can thus serve as a source of information to the Speaker about the proposition.

(7)

\[
\begin{array}{|c|}
\hline
\text{Speaker <say>} \\
\hline
x \ y \ C \\
\hline
\text{EXT}(y,C) & \leftarrow y \text{ DOES NOT HAVE A PERSPECTIVE} \\
\hline
\hline
x \ <R> \\
\hline
y \\
\hline
y \ <R> & \leftarrow y \text{ HAS A PERSPECTIVE} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

From this organization of perspectives, it follows that something that is true in the “Obviative’s” perspective is not directly true in the Speaker’s; there is an intermediate perspective that always must be considered. This opacity of the “Obviative’s” perspective gives rise to an accessibility condition (cf. Kratzer 1977, 1991), that defines the relation between perspectives (i.e. truth-evaluation domains), as given in (8).

(8) **ACCESSIBILITY CONDITION:** A perspective \( \psi_2 \) is accessible to another perspective \( \psi_1 \) iff \( \psi_2 \) is embedded inside \( \psi_1 \) and there are no intervening embeddings between \( \psi_2 \) and \( \psi_1 \).

Obviation, then, can be used to create chains of perspectives, each of which is accessible only to the perspective immediately outside of it.
This gives rise to the evidential effects of obviation; the “Proximate’s” perspective is a domain that is accessible to the Speaker (i.e. open to direct evidentiality), while the “Obviative’s” perspective is inaccessible to the Speaker (i.e. open only to indirect evidentiality).

3.2. Previous accounts

Obviation is one of the most-studied properties of Algonquian languages, with descriptions going back to the 17th Century (Eliot 1666). The claims made in these different analyses are divergent, making it both important and difficult to situate the current analysis at the outset of the discussion.

While the current proposal is built from previous work on this topic, it departs from previous accounts in five crucial ways:

(i) The treatment of “Obviative” as a property of both discourse and argument structure, rather than primarily one or the other (§3.2.1)
(ii) The treatment of “Obviative” as a construct, rather than a primitive (§3.2.2)
(iii) The treatment of “Obviative” as specified and “Proximate” as contextually-conditioned, rather than “Proximate” as specified (§3.2.3)
(iv) The analysis of the “Obviative” referential class as denoting contextual extentionality rather than empathy, sentience, topic, or focus (§3.2.4)
(v) The range of the data set that the analysis accounts for (§3.2.5)

3.2.1. Obviation as discourse, not argument structure

There are two positions that have been taken on the relevant linguistic domain for obviation in Algonquian:

(i) Obviation is argument structure, with discourse effects being derived.
(ii) Obviation is discourse structure, with argument structure effects being derived.

These approaches differ over the direction of investigation; approach (i) begins with local relations and intends to derive discourse effects, while approach (ii) begins with discourse effects and attempts to derive local relations.

The position that obviation is argument structure, which I term “Grammatical Obviation,” was suggested by the earliest grammarians. For example, Eliot (1666) devotes a great deal of space to verbal paradigms, which has the result of centering the grammatical discussion on argument structure. In linguistic work on obviation in the 20th century, this focus on argument structure has developed in two different directions. One approach, favored by Relational Grammarians (Perlmutter 1983), analyzes obviation as a by-product of the interaction between verbal argument structure and ranking effects. The most extensive implementation of this approach is Rhodes (1976) for Ojibwa, but similar approaches have been implemented in Optimality-theoretic syntax (Aissen 1997). The other argument structure approach has been to analyze obviation as derived from general principles of syntactic structure. In approaches of this kind, obviation can be characterized in terms of binding relations, either simply via c-command or some version of the conditions of Binding Theory (Chomsky 1982). In these analyses, the disjunction properties of obviation are given primary importance (see Chapter 4). Implementations in this approach include Grafstein (1984), Bruening (2001), Déchaine and Wiltchko (2002), Branigan and MacKenzie (2004), Piriyawiboon (2007), and Lochbiler (2007), among many others. In all of these approaches, the focus is on relations within the clause – there is a division between the grammatical component of obviation and its discourse component. Transitive verbs, possession, and dependent clauses are the primary locus of “grammatical” obviation, and “discourse” obviation is either derived (e.g. Aissen 1997, Piriyawiboon 2007) or set aside for future research (e.g. Rhodes 1976).

A consideration of data sets from Plains Cree shows that obviation cannot be a by-product of verbal argument structure, because obviation holds in many domains where there is no verbal coding to support it, including nominal predication (10a) and A\text{IN}T (\text{ANIMATE INTRANSITIVE-TRANSITIVE}) forms (10b) (see Déchaine 1997, Mühlbauer 2002, etc.).
a. NOMINAL PREDICATION

awâsisə ohi
awâsis-ə aw =ihi
child -XT PRX=XT
‘These are the children_{OBV}.’ (Presented S2)

b. OBVIATIVE ARGUMENTS CAN OCCUR WITH VERBS THAT LACK TRANSITIVITY CODING

dë-wāpahcikêt anihi wāpōswa
dë-wāp=aht =ikê-t an =ihi wāpōsw-a
c1-see=by.eye.TI=GEN-3 DST=XT rabbit-XT
‘He_{PROX} watches those rabbits_{OBV}.’ (Presented S2)

Without a strict correlation between obviation and the verb system, analyses that treat obviation as a kind of argument-structure relation are not tenable. In the model proposed here, however, this kind of data is expected; “Obviative” is a referential category rather than a grammatical one, meaning that it is only opportunistically coded in the morphosyntax of Plains Cree.

An alternative view, which I term “Discourse Obviation,” has been suggested by Bloomfield (1962) and subsequent work (e.g. Wolfart 1973, Goddard 1991, Russell 1996). Describing Menominee (Central Algonquian, Wisconsin), Bloomfield considered the referential properties of obviation to be primary, though they fell largely outside of the scope of his linguistic investigation. He described obviation as coding distinguishing between a referent that is the topic of discourse, and those that are not within a given context (Bloomfield 1962:38). Goddard (1991) expands on this discussion to consider the ways that obviation can be manipulated to code changes in discourse structure, and Russell (1996) considers obviation phenomena in terms of point of view. In these accounts, then, the primary focus is on the discoursal properties of obviation, rather than its local argument structure properties.

The current analysis treats the “Obviative” as a referential class, and obviation as a referential distinction. In terms of obviation’s syntactic properties, I argue that they opportunistically employ underspecified forms to build “Obviative” reference. Obviation, then, is a property of discourse, but this discoursal property is constructed through the manipulation of dependency-building syntax (cf. Chapter 4). This combines the observations of both the “Grammatical” obviation and the “Discourse” obviation approaches.
3.2.2. Obviation as a construct, not a primitive

In many analyses, obviation is taken to be located in particular places in the Plains Cree grammatical system. For example, Bruening (2001:121) posits “Obviative” to be a syntactic feature [Obv] in Passamaquoddy (Eastern Algonquian, Maine), which is spelled out by the “Obviative” suffix –ol, following claims made for Potawatomi by Halle and Marantz (1993). He then posits a phrase ‘HP’ (“Head Phrase”) that forces these “Obviative” features to move there to be checked, which is intended to model direct-inverse verbal behaviour. This means that “Obviative” must be a primitive feature of the grammar. Obviation is subsumed within the characterization of local relations between the verb and its arguments.

Other analyses of obviation have followed a similar logic. Aissen (1997) implements an Optimality-Theoretic syntax treats “Obviative” as a primitive, as do many other analysts (Bliss 2005, Branigan & MacKenzie 2004, Grafstein 1984, Piriyawiboon 2007, among others). However, there are several significant problems with analyses of this kind, which warrant a new direction of research.

Obviation has no dedicated forms in the syntax. None of the forms that are typically treated as coding obviation are in fact dedicated “Obviative” morphemes. The absence of dedicated forms challenges accounts that treat obviation as a syntactic primitive. Instead, an adequate account will have to model a system that uses underspecification and restrictions to construct “Obviative” contexts. This underspecification clarifies the case for the formal identity between “Inanimate” and “Obviative” forms (see Hockett 1966, Wolfart 1973), which I pursue in section 3.4. To my knowledge, the only formal account, besides the current analysis, that has attempted to move in that direction is the one proposed by Piriyawiboon (2007), which uses a minimalist framework (Chomsky 1995) and a person-hierarchy analysis to attempt to derive the parallelism.

3.2.3. “Obviative” is specified, “proximate” is contextually-determined

Analyses of obviation phenomena pick one or the other member of the “Proximate/Obviative” contrast to focus on, with the choice being a function of the domain of inquiry.

If the analyst is modelling the syntax of obviation, the focus will be on the “Obviative” class (Grafstein 1984, Bruening 2001, Déchaine & Wiltshko 2002), since this class is coded with numerous pieces of morphology, as discussed in section 3.4. Sometimes, these accounts
refer to “Proximate” agreement (e.g. Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002:433), but this approach is untenable for two reasons:

(i) There is no morphological distinction between a “Proximate” nominal form and the normal “Animate” form (11).

(11) a. “Animate” agreement: –ak, –iki

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{miyosiwak} & \text{ ôki nápêwak.} \\
\text{miyw} & =\text{si-w-ak} \space \text{aw} =\text{iki} \space \text{nápêw-ak} \\
\text{good} & =\text{AI-3-PL PRX=AN.PL man -PL} \\
\text{‘These men\textsubscript{AN} are good.’} \\
\end{align*} \]  

b. “Proximate” agreement: –ak, –iki

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{wâpamêwak} & \text{ ôki nápêwak} \space \text{awâsisa.} \\
\text{wâp} & =\text{am} \space \text{-ê} \space \text{-w} =\text{iki} \space \text{nápêw-ak} \space \text{awâsis-a} \\
\text{see} & =\text{by.eye.TA-\text{DIR-3 PRX=AN.PL man -PL child -XT} } \\
\text{‘These men\textsubscript{PROX} see the child\textsubscript{OBV}.’} \\
\end{align*} \]  

(ii) There is no distinction between “Proximate” agreement and “Obviative” agreement on verbs (12); the “Obviative” has all the agreement of the “Proximate” and then more (cf. Wolfart 1973, 1978).

(12) a. “Proximate” verbal agreement: -ê-w

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{wâpamêw.} \\
\text{wâp} & =\text{am} \space \text{-ê} \space \text{-w} \\
\text{see} & =\text{by.eye.TA-\text{DIR-3} } \\
\text{‘S/he\textsubscript{PROX} sees him/her\textsubscript{OBV}.’} \\
\end{align*} \]  

b. “Obviative” verbal agreement: -ê-\textit{y}-w-a

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{wâpamêyiwa.} \\
\text{wâp} & =\text{am} \space \text{-ê} \space \text{-yì} \space \text{-w-a} \\
\text{see} & =\text{by.eye.TA-\text{DIR-DS-3-XT} } \\
\text{‘S/he\textsubscript{OBV} sees him/her\textsubscript{OBV}.’} \\
\end{align*} \]  

(Wolfart & Carroll 1973)

Lacking any morphosyntactic correlate, the category “Proximate” must necessarily be derived from context, while the “Obviative,” which has morphosyntactic correlates, can be constructed in the syntax.
In analyses of the meaning of obviation, the focus of investigation is the “Proximate” referent. Accounts consider the properties of this referential class; it is the “Topic” of the discourse (Bloomfield 1962), the one “in focus” (Wolfart 1973), or the “hero” of the narrative (Goddard 1991). Its “point of view” properties are considered (Russell 1996), and accounts look at its “empathetic” properties (Oshima 2007). Positioning this “Proximate” class within a discourse, analysts ask how long a “Proximate” can hold its status before being replaced with a different referent (i.e. “Proximate spans”). In discourse studies (e.g. Hasler 2002), the “Proximate” referents are counted and their contexts of use analyzed.

Because the current analysis seeks to account for both the syntactic and semantic properties of obviation phenomena, it must combine the requirements of the syntactic analysis with the observations of the semantic work. By analyzing “Obviative” as a construct and “Proximate” as contextually-conditioned, the morphosyntactic generalizations (i.e. that “Obviative” is coded with additional morphology, and the “Proximate” is indistinguishable from “Animate”) are accounted for. By bringing these morphosyntactic generalizations to bear on the semantic problem, the current account departs from previous semantic work and treats the “Obviative” as the specified class; the “Obviative” is specified for contextual extentionality, while the “Proximate” is only a function of contrast with the “Obviative.” This analysis, then, constitutes a different direction for work on obviation.

3.2.4. The meaning of obviation

A detailed treatment of the meaning of obviation has not been developed outside of the current thesis. Analyses of obviation have either identified its discourse properties in general terms (e.g. “Topic” or “Prominent” or “Focus” as in Bloomfield 1962, Wolfart 1973, Russell 1996), employed functionalist person hierarchies (Frantz 1976, Givón 1979, Aissen 1997, Ritter & Rosen 2005, Oshima 2007), or have not addressed the meaning of obviation at all (e.g. Bruening 2001). Wolfart (1973:14) suggests a future line of research by noting that the formal parallels between “Inanimate” and “Obviative” referential classes likely point to a common semantic property. By analyzing the “Obviative” class as denoting a contextually-extentional referent (a contextual form of the inherent extentionality of “Inanimate”), this analysis develops the suggestion of Wolfart (1973), and offers the first detailed treatment of the semantics of obviation.
3.2.5. The data set

Syntactic accounts of obviation focus on verbal argument structure (e.g. Lochbihler 2007) and, in some cases, clause-level properties (e.g. Bruening 2001, Branigan & MacKenzie 2007). This yields a data set restricted to pairs of single sentences that are not controlled for context or, in some cases, single words that are not complete utterances (e.g. Lochbihler 2007). In functionalist accounts, the data is usually restricted to labels given to forms by previous linguists; a categorical decision by an earlier linguist will be taken as a kind of primary data, and then the different possible semantic models suggested by this label are considered (e.g. Ritter and Rosen 2005, Oshima 2007).

Goddard (1984), who views obviation as discourse-based, provides a wide range of data, introducing concepts like “Proximate and Obviative spans” to describe the large-scale, discourse manipulations of obviation that he demonstrates. However, the data sets are limited to specific kinds of formal narratives (e.g. atâyôhkana ‘sacred stories’), so that the effects of different kinds of speech situations are not controlled for.

In comparison to previous work, then, the most significant contribution of the present analysis is actually the data set it is derived from:

(i) The effects of physical absence on the “Obviative” status of a referent (§3.4.21)
(ii) The interpretation of “Obviative” referents as unaware of the event (§3.4.22)
(iii) The interpretations of “Proximate” referents as speakers, even in contexts where they do not speak (§3.4.3)
(iv) The correlation between “Obviative” and indirect evidentials (§3.5.4).

Regardless of the success or failure of the model constructed here, the enrichment of the data set for obviation provides future linguistic work with crucial generalizations.

3.3. The form of obviation: No dedicated “obviative” marking

The “Obviative” construction is formed by combining any of a set of morphemes with a verbal structure that codes an “Animate” referent. For example, the form in (13a) shows nápêw ‘man’ as the argument of a verb bearing “Animate” marking (-si-t), while the form in (13b) shows the same noun affixed with –a and connected to a verb bearing both “Animate” marking (-si-t) and an additional suffix –yi–.
(13)  a. “Animate”

\[ \nabla \Gamma \sigma' < \sigma < \Delta \sigma' \nabla \]
\[ \text{ê-miyosit ana nápêw} \]
\[ \text{ê-miyw=si -t an } = \text{a nápêw} \]
\[ \text{cl-good} = \text{AI-3 DST=} \text{AN.SG man} \]
\[ ‘\text{as} \text{this}_{\text{AN}} \text{man} \text{is good}_{\text{AN}}.’ \]  

(Presented S2)

b. “Obviative”

\[ \nabla \Gamma \sigma' < \sigma < \Delta \sigma' \nabla \]
\[ \text{ê-miyosisít aníhi nápêwa} \]
\[ \text{ê-miyw=si -yi-t an } = \text{ihi nápêw-a} \]
\[ \text{cl-good} = \text{AI-DS-3 DST=} \text{XT man} \text{-XT} \]
\[ ‘\text{as} \text{this}_{\text{OBV}} \text{man}_{\text{OBV}} \text{is good}_{\text{AN}}.’ \]
\[ ‘\text{as} \text{those}_{\text{OBV}} \text{men}_{\text{OBV}} \text{are good}_{\text{AN}}.’ \]  

(Presented S2)

A diverse set of forms can be shown to occur with the “Obviative” class. This includes the three affixes seen above (–yi–, –ihi, and –a), as well as the suffix –im– in (14a) and the theme sign –ê– in (14b).

(14)  a. Suffix –im– occurs with “Obviative”

\[ \sigma < \sigma < \Gamma. \Delta \sigma' \Delta, < \nabla \sigma' \nabla \]
\[ \text{niwápmimâwa Wâpastim ominôsima} \]
\[ \text{ni=saam} -\text{im} -\text{a} -\text{w-a wâpastim o-minôs-im-a} \]
\[ \text{l=see=see.by.eye.TA-DSJ-DIR-3-XT Wâpastimw 3-cat DSJ-XT} \]
\[ ‘\text{I saw Wâpastim’s}_{\text{PROX}} \text{cat}_{\text{OBV}} \ldots.’ \]  

(Volunteered S1)

b. Theme sign –ê– occurs with “Obviative”

\[ \sigma < \gamma > > \gamma < \gamma > \nabla \gamma \sigma' \nabla \gamma \]
\[ \text{wápamêw} \]
\[ \text{wáp=am} -\text{ê} -\text{w} \]
\[ \text{see } = \text{by.eye.TA-DIR-3} \]
\[ ‘\text{s/he}_{\text{PROX}} \text{sees him/her}_{\text{OBV}}’ \]  

(Presented S2)

There are two ways to think about the form of obviation phenomena in Plain Cree:

(i) HYPOTHESIS 1: “Obviative” is a primitive feature, like “Animate” and “Inanimate.”

(ii) HYPOTHESIS 2: “Obviative” is a construct.

Depending on the choice made in this issue, a number of different expectations about the organization of the system arise. In the subsequent sections, I argue that treating “Obviative” as a construct is a better account.
A grammatical “primitive” is an atomic building block of the grammar; it is used to construct, but is not itself constructed (cf. Link 1984 for atomicity). If we consider “Obviative” to be a primitive (Aissen 1999, Bruening 2001, Ritter & Rosen 2005, Bliss 2005), we expect that there should be a dedicated form or a set of dedicated forms coding “Obviative.” If we find such forms, we can then ask the same questions about its exponence in the grammar that we did with animacy: Is the coding localized to a particular syntactic position or is it the case that it has no particular locus? This would lead us to diagnostics and discussion similar to the issues considered for the syntax of animacy in Chapter 2.

A grammatical “construct” is a non-atomic, concatenation of primitives or other constructs (cf. Link 1984 for atomicity). If we consider the “Obviative” to be a construct, we expect that there will not be any form, or set of forms, that are dedicated to coding it. We can ask how the grammar constructs obviation: what kinds of forms are recruited for the construction of obviation, and in what places in the grammar?

If the Plains Cree shows dedicated “Obviative” forms, obviation can be thought of as an primitive of Plains Cree, akin to animacy. If, however, the system shows no forms dedicated to obviation, but instead shows obviation to be built additively off of more basic forms, then obviation can be thought of as a construct of Plains Cree. This can be tested by considering all the forms in Plains Cree that potentially code obviation, and asking in every case if it codes obviation exclusively. Let us now consider each of these forms in detail.

3.3.1. The nominal suffix –a

The suffix –a occurs on nominals when they refer to an “Obviative” referent.

(15) “OBVIATIVE” NOMINAL AFFIXED WITH –a

\[ \Delta \text{miy} \text{y} \text{i} \text{t} \text{anihi n} \text{ap} \text{w} \text{a} \]
\[ \Delta \text{miy} = \text{si} \text{yi} \text{t} \text{anihi n} \text{ap} \text{w} \text{a} \]
\[ \text{cl-good=AI-DS-3 DST=XT man-XT} \]
\[ ‘\ldots\text{as this} \text{OBV} \text{man} \text{OBV} \text{is good}_{\text{AN}}.’ \]
\[ ‘\ldots\text{as those} \text{OBV} \text{men} \text{OBV} \text{are good}_{\text{AN}}.’ \]

(Presented S2)

The suffix –a also occurs on Independent Order verbs when an “Obviative” interacts with a local person on a transitive verb (16a), or when an “Obviative” referent is the subject of an intransitive (16b) (Wolfart 1973, etc.).
111

(16)  a. “OBVIATIVE” OBJECT OF VERB + 1ST/2ND PERSON SUBJECT = -a

\[ \sigma \langle \text{niwâpamimâw} \rangle \langle \text{Wâpastim} \rangle \langle \text{ominôsima} \rangle \text{ni} \langle \text{-wâp=am} \rangle \langle \text{-im} \rangle \langle \text{-â} \rangle \langle \text{w-a} \rangle \text{Wâpastimw o-minôs-im} \langle \text{-a} \rangle \]

1-see =by.eye.TA-DISJ-DIR-3-XT Wâpastim 3-cat -DISJ-XT

‘I see Wâpastim’s cat.’

(Translation S1)

b. “OBVIATIVE” SUBJECT OF INTRANSITIVE VERB = -a

\[ \text{Clare} \langle \text{Clare omâmâwa ka-nikamoyiw} \rangle \langle \text{Clare o-mâmâ-ka} \rangle \langle \text{nikamo-yi} \rangle \langle \text{-w-a} \rangle \text{Clare 3-mother-XT FUT-sing} \langle \text{-DS-3-XT} \rangle \]

‘Clare’s mother will sing.’

(Presented S2)

This form, then, is systematically associated with “Obviative” nominals, as well as some “Obviative” arguments of verbs. This makes it a likely candidate for dedicated “Obviative” marking.

3.3.11. The traditional view: –a marks “obviative”

Analyses of the suffix –a in Plains Cree and related forms in other Algonquian languages treat it as dedicated to coding “Obviative.” Bloomfield (1933), Dahlstrom (1991), and Goddard (1991) have all treated this form as dedicated to coding the “Obviative” class of referents. Following this approach, many presentations of Plains Cree data adopt an “Obviative” gloss for this suffix (e.g. Mühlbauer 2007, Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002). Wolfart (1973) adopts the same usage, but notes reservations, based on the suffix’s formal parallels to the “Inanimate” suffix –a. If these analyses are correct, this suffix –a is dedicated to coding “Obviative,” and thus constitutes evidence for “Obviation” as a primitive of the grammar.

3.3.12. The current analysis: –a marks extentional referents

There are reasons to believe that –a is not dedicated to coding “Obviative” in Plains Cree. There are contexts where –a occurs, but does not code “Obviation.” However, in all these contexts, –a codes that the referent is extentional – either “Inanimate” or “Obviative.”

A suffix that is formally identical to the “Obviative” suffix –a in (17a) occurs with nominals that refer to non-singular “Inanimate” referents (17b).
This putative "Inanimate" suffix also occurs on intransitive Independent Order verbs, as the example in (18) shows.

(18) "INANIMATE" SUBJECT OF INTRANSITIVE VERB WITH –a

\[ \Gamma + ♯ r' \alpha :: \llcorner \sigma - n \Delta \ \llcorner r' \gamma \]

miywâsinwa aníhi maskisina
miyw=âśi-n-w-a an =ihi maskisin-a
good=II -0-PL DST=XT shoe -XT
‘Those\textsubscript{in} shoes are nice\textsubscript{in}.’

Both the phonological shape of the suffix (/\σ/) and its positioning are identical in all these cases. This total formal identity means that it is impossible to tell whether a nominal affixed with –a denotes an “Inanimate” or “Obviative” referent, unless there is supporting context that codes the animacy of the referent (cf. Wolfart 1973:14,23).

This apparent homophony is not specific to Plains Cree. Across Algonquian, the “Inanimate” –a and “Obviative” –a suffixes have shared an identical shape for a very long time, and across many languages. Both the “Inanimate” suffix –a and the “Obviative” suffix –a in Plains Cree have been reconstructed to have the Proto-Algonquian shape of ✽·ali (Wolfart 1973:14). This means that, in the hypothesized proto-language that Plains Cree is descended from, “Inanimate” and “Obviative” nominals have a suffix whose phonological shape is also identical. This would mean that the shape of the “Inanimate” and “Obviative” suffixes has remained stable for somewhere around 3,000 years (cf. Proulx 1984). A survey of other
Algonquian languages shows the same stability, with some interesting reorganization in Blackfoot (“Inanimate” singular is homophonous with “Obviative” rather than “Inanimate” plural), and a singular/non-singular distinction in Fox. Notably, even where there has been a reorganization of the forms, the “Obviative” form still parallels the “Inanimate” one, as shown in table 3.2.²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LANGUAGE</th>
<th>“INANIMATE”</th>
<th>“OBVIATIVE”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>Plural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cree</td>
<td>Plains Cree</td>
<td>-i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Swampy Cree</td>
<td>-a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Cree</td>
<td>-h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Innu</td>
<td>-a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Fox</td>
<td>-ani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algonquian</td>
<td>Potawatomi</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Menominee</td>
<td>-an</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shawnee</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ojibwa</td>
<td>-i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Passamaquoddy</td>
<td>-ol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algonquian</td>
<td>Blackfoot</td>
<td>-(y)i</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2. “Inanimate” plural and “obviative” across Algonquian

This means that any account of “Obviative” and “Inanimate” –a that treats them as different suffixes must explain 3,000 years of formal identity, holding across languages that bear significant linguistic, spatial, and temporal distance.

As I show in §3.4, “Obviative” shares content with “Inanimate;” both “Inanimate” and “Obviative” code an extentional referent, differing only in how long this extentionality is taken to hold. For the current problem, this means that both the “Inanimate” usage of –a and the “Obviative” usage of –a code that the referent is extentional. Thus, the content contribution that the structural addition of –a makes to a nominal is, minimally, a coding of extentionality.

Since both the “Inanimate” use of –a and the “Obviative” use of –a occur in exactly the same position in nominal and verbal affixation, we could put them in the same position in the syntactic structure. Based on the logic of affixation argued for by Déchaine (1999) (see §2.2.1), we expect that the linear order of affixes correlates with their hierarchy in the syntax: the closer

² For a discussion of approaches to the plural-obviative parallel, see §6.2.
the suffix is to the root, the higher its position in the tree. Since this –a suffix is linearly the most peripheral affix in the nominal structure (cf. Wolfart 1973, Déchaine 1999), it belongs in the lowest position in the nominal syntax⁴.

\[(19)\]
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DP} \\
\text{D} \quad \text{PERSONP} \\
\text{PERS} \quad \text{EXTP} \\
-\text{a} \quad \text{ROOT}
\end{array}
\]

(Adapted from Déchaine 1999:44)

3.3.13. Modelling the “obviative” effects of –a

The resolution of a referent as “Obviative” or “Inanimate” plural, is accomplished by conjoining the structure in (19) with a verb that codes either “Inanimate” or “Animate” for the same referent.⁵

Combining a nominal marked with –a with an “Inanimate” marked verb (e.g. wâpahtam ‘see itIN’) yields an “Inanimate” plural interpretation (20a), while combining it with an “Animate” marked verb (e.g. wâpamêw ‘S/hePROX sees him/herOBV’) yields an “Obviative” interpretation (20b).

\[(20)\]
\[
a. \quad V_{\text{IN}} + N-a = \text{“INANIMATE” PLURAL}
\]
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{wâpahtam kinépikwa} \\
wâp=\text{aht} \quad -\text{am kinépikw-a} \\
\text{see }=\text{by.eye.TI-TI snake }-\text{XT} \\
\text{‘S/he sawIN (the) snakes.’}
\end{array}
\]

(Presented S2)

\[
b. \quad V_{\text{AN}} + N-a = \text{“OBIATIVE”}
\]
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{wâpamêw kinépikwa} \\
wâp=\text{am} \quad -\text{ê} \quad -\text{w kinépikw-a} \\
\text{see }=\text{by.eye.TA-DIR-3 snake }-\text{XT} \\
\text{‘S/he sawAN a/the snake(s)OBV.’}
\end{array}
\]

(Presented S2)

⁴ Spec-to-spec movement then derives the final ordering of the morphemes; see Déchaine (1999:44) for details.

⁵ For a consideration of the plural/"Obviative" ambiguity, see Appendix A below.
This is why, in the verb system, the affixation of –a never appears underspecified; it is always affixed to a predicate that already codes animacy for the referent. Affixing –a to a verb coded for “Inanimate” arguments (e.g. miywâsin ‘It is good’) yields an “Inanimate” plural interpretation (21a), while affixing it to a verb coded for “Animate” arguments (e.g. niwâpamimâwa ‘I see him/her’) yields an “Obviative” interpretation (21b).

\[(21) \quad \text{a. } V_{\text{IN}} + -a = \text{“INIMATE” PLURAL} \]

\[
\Gamma ^{\downarrow} \text{řr}^\downarrow \alpha^\circ.
\text{miywâsinwâ}
\text{miyw} = ^{\downarrow} \text{âsi-n-w-a}
good = ^{\downarrow} 0-3-xT
‘They are nice.’ \quad \text{(Presented S2)}
\]

\[\text{b. } V_{\text{AN}} + -a = \text{“OBVIATIVE”} \]

\[
\sigma ^{\downarrow} \text{řr}^\downarrow \Gamma ^{\downarrow} \text{řr}^\downarrow \
\text{niwâpamimâwa}
\text{ni} \text{-wâp} = ^{\downarrow} \text{am} \quad ^{\downarrow} \text{-im} \quad ^{\downarrow} \text{-â} \quad ^{\downarrow} \text{-w-a}
l \text{-see} = ^{\downarrow} \text{by.eye.TA-DISJ-DIR-3-xT}
‘I see AN him/her/it/them.’ \quad \text{(Translation S1)}
\]

The suffix –a, then, introduces a restrictive operation on the coding of animacy, further narrowing the set of potential referents denoted.

### 3.3.2. The demonstrative suffix –ihi

Plains Cree has a demonstrative system that canonically inflects for two spatial distinctions (proximal ‘near Speaker’ and distal ‘far from Speaker’), animacy (“Inanimate” and “Animate”) and plurality (singular and plural).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>“Inanimate”</th>
<th>“Animate”</th>
<th>“Obviative”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Singular</td>
<td>Plural</td>
<td>Singular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximal</td>
<td>ôma</td>
<td>ôhi</td>
<td>awa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distal</td>
<td>anima</td>
<td>anihi</td>
<td>ana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.3. Canonical demonstrative organization in Plains Cree**

A sample form is given in (22); here, the “Animate” marked demonstrative ôki modifies the nominal ayisiyiniwak ‘people.’
One consultant I have worked with has a different organization; instead of a division between “Animate” and “Inanimate,” this speaker has a division between forms for “Independent” referents (i.e. referents that are not embedded in a 3rd person’s perspective; §4), and forms for “Dependent” referents (i.e. referents that are embedded in a 3rd person’s perspective; §4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Dependent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singular</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Inanimate”</td>
<td>ôma</td>
<td>ôhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Animate”</td>
<td>awa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distal</td>
<td>anima</td>
<td>aniki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ana</td>
<td>anih</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.4. Demonstrative organization of S2**

A sample set is given in (23); here, the dependent form ôhi cannot be used in new discourse contexts involving no other third persons (23a). Instead, the preferred demonstrative in this context is ôki, as in (23b), which is used canonically for “Animate” plurals. However, when the same nominal maskisin ‘shoe’ is related to a third person, ôhi is now felicitous (23c).

(23)  

a. ôhi CANNOT MODIFY AN INDEPENDENT “INANIMATE” PLURAL

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ôhi} & \text{ maskisin miywâsinwa.} \\
aw & =ihi \text{ maskisin-a miyw=âsi-n-w-a} \\
\text{PROX=XT shoe -XT good=II -0-0-XT} \\
\text{Intended: “These shoes are nice.”} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(Presented S2)

b. ôki CAN MODIFY AN INDEPENDENT “INANIMATE” PLURAL

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ôki} & \text{ maskisin miywâsinwa} \\
aw & =ihi \text{ maskisin-a miyw=âsi-n-w-a} \\
\text{PROX=XT shoe -XT good =ii -0-0-XT} \\
\text{Intended: “These shoes are nice.”} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(Volunteered S2)
c. DEPENDENT “INANIMATE” MODIFIED BY ôhi

\( \langle \Delta^a \rangle \beta^"{\Delta} \ L^\text{PR}^a \rangle_? \)
awîna ôhi maskisina?
\( \text{awîna } aw=\text{ihi } maskisin-a \)
who PRX=XT shoe -XT
‘Whose shoes\text{\textsubscript{SIN}} are these here?’  

(Volunteered S2)

For both systems, the “Obviative” is coded with the suffix –ihi.

(24) DEMONSTRATIVE SUFFIX =IHI MODIFIES “OBVIATIVE” REFERENT

\( \omega \bar{L} \cdot \cdot, \langle \eta^\nu \ \Lambda \ d \ \wedge \ \gamma^"{\nu} \nu \rangle \langle \Delta^a \ ) \ \text{PR}^\nu_b \rangle_\alpha \)
namwâc, âhci piko ê-pôsiwêpahnât ôhi kistikâna…
namwâc, âhci piko ê-pôsi =wêp =ahw -â -t aw =ihi kistikân-a
NEG still only C1-ride=throw=by.tool.TA-DIR-3 PRX=XT grain -XT
‘It was in vain, instead he\text{\textsubscript{PRX}} shovelled the grain\text{\textsubscript{OBV}} onto the wagon…’  

(AA 2:3)

Since this suffix occurs whenever the demonstrative codes an “Obviative” referent, it is possible that –ihi is dedicated to coding obviation.

3.3.21. The traditional view: –ihi marks “obviative”

As with the analysis of the suffix –a, the demonstrative suffix –ihi has been treated as dedicated to coding “Obviative” in most analyses of Plains Cree. Bloomfield (1933), Dahlstrom (1991), and Goddard (1991) have all treated this form as dedicated to coding the “Obviative” class of referents. Following this approach, many presentations of Plains Cree data adopt an “Obviative” gloss for this suffix (e.g. Mühlbauer 2007, Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002). Wolfart (1973) adopts the same usage, but, as with –a, notes reservations based on the suffix’s formal parallels to the “Inanimate” suffix –ihi. If these analyses are correct, this suffix –ihi is dedicated to coding “Obviative,” and thus constitutes evidence for “Obviation” as a primitive of the grammar.
3.3.22. The current analysis: –ihi marks extentional referents

There are reasons to believe that –ihi is not dedicated to coding “Obviative” in Plains Cree. There are contexts where –ihi occurs, but does not code “Obviation.” However, in all these contexts, –ihi codes that the referent is extentional – either “Inanimate” or “Obviative.”

As we saw with the suffix –a, the suffix –ihi occurs with “Inanimate” plural referents in the canonical organization of Plains Cree demonstratives.

(25) DEMONSTRATIVE SUFFIX –IHI MODIFIES “INANIMATE” PLURAL REFERENT

\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
\n\n\n
As with the suffix –a, this formal identity means that an account that treats –ihi as dedicated to “Obviative” coding must consider this a case of accidental homophony.\(^6\)

The diachronic work on –ihi has not yet been done definitively (cf. Proulx 1988). It is thought that the suffixes used with demonstrative roots were historically particles, and were incorporated into the demonstratives at a later date (Proulx 1988). Since different languages incorporated particles differently, there is no straightforward mapping to be found. Further, there are thought to be at least two sets of demonstrative roots (Proulx 1988), which makes pinpointing reflexes in daughter languages quite complex. This lack of reconstructive evidence means that the historical argument against accidental homophony that was available for the “Obviative/Inanimate” suffix –a is not currently available here.

However, if we consider the following sampling of demonstrative forms across Algonquian (given in table 3.5), we observe that the “Inanimate” form corresponds to the “Obviative” form. For example, the “Inanimate” plural proximal demonstrative is noti ‘these ones\(_{in}\)’ in Potawatomi (Central Algonquian, Wisconsin), and this corresponds to the “Obviative” form noti ‘these/this one\(_{obv}\).’ Further, in all but the Blackfoot case, the parallel is between “Inanimate” plural and “Obviative.”

\(^6\) Note that in some dialects, the form of –ihi is actually –ih\(a\) (Wolfart 1973). This may be a generalization of –a to the demonstrative system, which normally uses a distinct form for a similar function.
Table 3.5. “Inanimate” plural and “obviative” demonstratives across Algonquian

This means that languages separated by great temporal (3,000 years) and spatial distance (more than 4,000 miles) maintain a parallel between “Inanimate” plural and “Obviative.” In fact, these languages maintain this parallel even when the forms used are different (compare PC –ihi to PQ –ő:l). Were the system in Plains Cree a case of accidental homophony, these parallels across Algonquian would be difficult to explain.

Extending the argumentation from the modelling of –a (§3.3.12), we can say that there is only one suffix –ihi, and two contexts of occurrence for it. As with the nominal suffix –a, the contribution of –ihi to the structure is extentionality; the referent associated with the demonstrative is extentional. The two morphological components of a demonstrative like ōhi (aw=ihi) can be represented as being in two different positions. The first element, which codes the spatial deictic component (e.g. aw– ‘near Speaker’), heads the demonstrative phrase. The second element, which codes the features of the referent (e.g. –ihi ‘extentionality’ or –iki ‘plural’), introduces an argument in the phrase that is complement of the demonstrative. For example, in (26) =ihi heads an extentional phrase and introduces an extentional argument.

(26) 

\[
\text{DEM} \quad \text{EXT} \quad \text{DP}
\]

\[
\text{aw} \quad pro \quad \text{EXT} \quad \text{ihi}
\]
3.3.23. Modelling the “obviative” effects of –ihi

Just as with –a, the coding of extentionality is all that the suffix –ihi needs to do. Further determination of an “Obviative” (contextually extentional) or “Inanimate” (inherently extentional) referent is accomplished by combining this demonstrative with other animacy-coded forms.

(27)  a. V_in + DEM=ihi = “INANIMATE” PLURAL

\[<\text{i}<>\text{C} \triangleright \text{a}>\Delta\]
\[\text{wâpahtam òhi}\]
\[\text{wâp=âht} \ -\text{am aw }=\text{ihi}\]
\[\text{see }=\text{by.eye.TI-TI PROX-XT}\]
\[\text{‘S/he saw}_{\text{in}}\text{ these.’}\]  
(Presented S2)

b. V_an + DEM=ihi = “OBVIATIVE”

\[<\text{i}<>\text{I} \triangleright \text{a}>\Delta\]
\[\text{wâpamèw òhi}\]
\[\text{wâp=am} \ -\text{ê} \ -\text{w aw }=\text{ihi}\]
\[\text{see }=\text{by.eye.TA-DIR-3 PROX-XT}\]
\[\text{‘S/he saw}_{\text{AN}}\text{ this one}_{\text{OBV}}\text{/ these}_{\text{OBV}}\text{.’}\]  
(Presented S2)

The demonstrative suffix –ihi introduces a restriction on the coding of animacy, just as the suffix –a does.

3.3.3. The theme sign –ê–

The theme sign –ê– is one of a set of morphemes known as theme signs; they code part of the argument structure of transitive verbs (see §4.4.2 for detailed discussion). Within the independent order of clause-typing, this particular theme sign covers two argument structure configurations (Wolfart 1973).

First, when the subject of the verb is “Proximate,” and the object is “Obviative,” we get –ê–, as in (28).
Second, when the subject of the verb is “Obviative” and the object is also “Obviative” we get –ê–, as in (29).

(29) 3’ > 3’

\[ \text{<ít<\text{l}ê<ít>} \]
\[ \text{wâpamêyiwa} \]
\[ wâp=am \quad -ê \quad -yi-w-a \]
\[ \text{see}=by.eye.TA-DIR-DS-3-XT } \\
\[ \text{‘S/he_{obv} sees him/her_{obv}’} \]

(Wolfart & Carroll 1973)

The theme sign –ê– appears to be insensitive to the “Obviative” status of the verb’s subject, but always occurs with an “Obviative” object. This would seem to indicate that –ê– codes obviation for objects, meaning that it is dedicated to coding “Obviative.”

### 3.3.31. The traditional view: –ê– marks “third person interactions”

Analyses of –ê– are widely divergent, but very little has been said specifically about this morpheme in the literature. In particular, two main views may be distinguished:


Under such a view, –ê– codes that the third person subject of the verb is ranked higher than the object of the verb along a hierarchy of persons.

(30) **Person Hierarchy Analysis of –ê–**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>3</th>
<th>3’</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) –ê– codes that the subject-object interaction is between third persons, with the rest of the specification being dependent on further affixation (Wolfart 1973, Dahlstrom 1991). On this view, only strings of forms can be characterized for person interactions. For example, Wolfart (1973) discusses forms like –êwak as ‘3\text{rd}’ plural acting on obviative’ (31a) or –
éyiwa as ‘Obviative acting on obviative’ (31b), but does not analyze the theme sign –ê– in much detail.

(31) a. –êwak = “PROXIMATE” PLURAL ACTING ON “OBIATIVE”

\[\text{wāpamēwak.} \]
\[wāp=am \quad -ê \quad -w-ak \]
\[=by.eye.TA-\text{DIR-3-PL} \]
\[‘S/he PROX sees him/her_{OBV}.’ \]

(Presented S2)

b. –êyiwa = “OBIATIVE” ACTING ON “OBIATIVE”

\[\text{wāpamēyiwa.} \]
\[wāp=am \quad -ê \quad -yî-w-a \]
\[=by.eye.TA-\text{DIR-DS-3-XT} \]
\[‘S/he_{OBV} sees him/her_{OBV}.’ \]

(Dahlstrom 1986)

On both views, –ê– is restricted to third person “Animate” interactions, and has either a “Person Hierarchy” function, or an abstract argument structure.

3.3.32. The current analysis: –ê– marks extentional objects

There are reasons to believe that –ê– is not dedicated to coding “Obviative” or even “Animate” interactions in Plains Cree. There are contexts where –ê– occurs, but does not code “Obviation.” However, in all these contexts, –ê– codes extentional objects – either “Inanimate” or “Obviative.”

In elicitation, the object of an independent verb marked with -ê- need not have overt nominal “Obviative” marking (–a) (cf. Cook & Mühlbauer 2007b).

(32) NOMINALS LACK “OBIATIVE” CODING

Clare \text{otinēw} amisk ayis ê-wi-mowāt
Clare take=by.hand-\text{DIR-3} beaver for \text{C1-intend-eat}-\text{DIR-3} ‘Clare; took a beaver; to eat it.’

(Translation S2)

Here, the object of the verb otinēw ‘take’ is amisk ‘beaver,’ which is not marked for extentionality. This state of affairs is extremely common in elicitation when there is other means to disambiguate referent. Contexts that allows the non-occurrence of the suffix –a are:
(i) The subject occurring linearly before the object.
(ii) The alternative reading is pragmatically difficult (e.g. a beaver taking Clare to eat her).

Thus, in examples like (33), the reference is easy to resolve because the subject (Solveiga) precedes the object (Clare).

(33) SUBJECT PRECEDES OBJECT

Solveiga ᵁσ ⁄ CS ⁄ Clare
Solveiga pôn-miyêyimêw Clare
Solveiga pôn- miyw=êyim ⁀w -ê -w Clare
Solveiga stop-good=by.mind.TA-DIR-3 Clare
‘Solveiga(?) stopped liking Clare(?)’

(Translation S2)

While the nominals in (32) and (33) were bare, they can also be overtly coded for “Animate” (non-obviative), as the example in (34) shows. Here, the nominal atimw ‘dog’ has the “Animate” plural suffix –ak applied (34a), rather than the expected extentional suffix –a (34b).

(34) “ANIMATE” PLURAL –ak UNEXPECTEDLY OCCURS IN “OBTIVATIVE” CONTEXTS

a. David ᵁγ ᵅ六年’ <^^1w." <^b≤y=q^.
David mihcêt atimwak ayâwêw.
David mihcêt atimw=ak ayâw ⁀ê ⁀w
Davec many dog -PL have.TA-DIR-3
‘DavidAN has many dogsAN.’

(Translation S2)

b. David ᵁγ ᵅ六年’ <^^1w." <^b≤y=q^.
David mihcêt atimwaa ayâwêw
David mihcêt atimw-a ayâw ⁀ê ⁀w
Davec many dog -XT have.TA-DIR-3
‘DavidAN has many dogsSOBV.’

(Translation S2)

In elicitation, then, we see that “non-Obviative” referents may act on each other with the morpheme –ê–.

Even if we discount this elicitation data, which does not match any known text data, there are further difficulties for an obviation-specificity account of –ê–. There are extant textual cases where the object of –ê– marked verbs appears to be “Inanimate,” not “Obviative.”
In cases like this, we could claim that the noun is de facto “Obviative” because the verb has the morpheme -ê-. However, Wolfart (1973:14) uses this form to exemplify the ambiguity of nominal marking (is it “Obviative” –a or “Inanimate” plural –a?) and concludes that the form is entirely ambiguous. Thus, there appear to be possible cases where –ê– codes an “Inanimate”, not an “Obviative,” object.

The use of –ê– with a potentially “Inanimate” object in this last form, kakwêcimêw, suggests that the object of a verb marked with –ê– may, under certain conditions, be “Inanimate.”

If we turn from “Animate” stems to “Inanimate” stems, we again find a theme sign –ê–. When the stem codes an inanimate object, and a speech-act-participant is acting on this “Inanimate” object, –ê– is used (36b).

(36)  a. 3 > “INANIMATE”

< "C. 
wâpahtam.
wâp=aht -am
see =by.eye.TI-TI
’s/he sees in it’

b. SAP > “INANIMATE”

s< "U.
iwiwâpahtên.
ni-wâp=aht -ê -n
1- see =by.eye.TI-TI-LP
‘I see in it’

In these constructions, the theme sign –ê– combines with stem-level “Inanimate” agreement and pronominal marking to code an “Inanimate” object. This –ê– is in complementary distribution with the -ê- we have seen so far. The first –ê– occurs only with third-person interactions in the independent order TA paradigm, while the second –ê– occurs only with speech-act participants acting on “Inanimate” referents the independent order TI paradigm.
Neither of these theme signs are used in the Conjunct order. Instead, the theme sign –â– is used for all “Animate” direct forms, and the theme sign –am– is used for all “Inanimate” direct forms.8

When two elements are in this kind of perfect complementary distribution, there are two possible solutions:

(i) The two –ê– theme signs are entirely different; there is accidental homophony.

(ii) The two –ê– theme signs are exactly the same.

Considering both the phonological identify (both are [e]) and the structural identity (both are theme signs), it is likely that the two putative morphemes are really only one form.

The evidence suggests that –ê– occurs with extentional objects. It occurs in two places:

(i) “Obviative” objects

(ii) “Inanimate” objects.

On the current view, these two referential classes share the property of extentionality; the “Inanimate” class codes inherent extentionality, and the “Obviative” class codes contextual extentionality. The use of one morpheme for both classes is expected.

As with the nominal suffix –a, and the demonstrative suffix –ihi, the contribution of the theme sign –ê– is extentionality; the referent is coded as extentional. Following Déchaine (2003), Hirose (2000), and Déchaine & Reinholz (2008), the morpheme –ê– can be represented as

7 The brackets indicate the form gotten in elicitation under these conditions.

8 Note that this is not a cross-Algonquian pattern. While Menominee shows the same pattern (Bloomfield 1962), balancing –a– with –ae– other languages like Nishnabemwin appear to not have the TA version of –ê– (Valentine 2001).
occupying the head of VP (see §2.2.1 for discussion). It introduces an extentional argument in its specifier.

(37) 

```
  \[ \begin{array}{c}
    vP \\
    \text{ROOT} \\
    \text{vP} \\
    \text{pro} \\
    v \\
    VP \\
    \text{pro} \\
    -\hat{e}- \\
    [\text{Ext}] \\
  \end{array} \]
```

3.3.3. Modelling the “obviative” effects of –ê–

I have claimed that –ê– is the head of VP, and introduces an extentional argument, which does not distinguish between “Inanimate” and “Obviative.” Distinguishing between “Inanimate” and “Obviative” is done by merging vP, which codes the inherent extentional properties of this argument. If the final in the head of vP is “Inanimate” (inherently extentional) the argument introduced by –ê– in the head of VP is “Inanimate” (38).

(38) “INANIMATE” final in VP = “INANIMATE” argument for VP

```
  \[ \begin{array}{c}
    vP \\
    \text{ROOT} \\
    \text{pro} \\
    v \\
    \text{VP} \\
    \text{pro} \\
    -\hat{e}- \\
    [\text{Ext}] \\
    \text{pro} \\
    [\text{Ext}] \\
    \end{array} \]
```

If the final in the head of vP is “Animate” (unspecified for inherent extentionality), then the argument introduced by –ê– in the head of VP is interpreted as “Obviative” (39).
3.3.4. The predicate suffix \(-im-\)

Another verbal morpheme that appears to correlate with “Obviative” referents is the suffix \(-im-\). This morpheme affixes directly to the stem, interior to theme signs.

This morpheme occurs when the “Obviative” referent is the object of a verb that has a speech act participant as its subject. In table 3.8, we see that \(-im-\) is possible when an “Obviative” acts on an “Obviative,” when a “Proximate” acts on some “Obviatives,” and when a speech act participant acts on an “Obviative.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTRANSITIVE</th>
<th>TRANSITIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OBV</td>
<td>OBV &gt; X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obv &gt; Obv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-im-)</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.8. Distribution of \(-im-\) with “obviative” arguments

This distribution suggests that \(-im-\) could be dedicated to coding obviation with objects.
3.3.41. The traditional view: –im– marks “obviative” objects

The descriptions of this morpheme that are most influential have treated it as an “Obviative” agreement marker. Wolfart (1973), for example, calls it a “thematic obviative sign” (Wolfart 1973:47), while Dahlstrom (1986) refers to it simply as an “Obviative” suffix,” saying that it “marks obviative objects” (Dahlstrom 1986:60), and “specifies that the object is the ‘further obviative’” (Dahlstrom 1986:56). This is based on evidence such as the example in (41); under some contexts, -im– shows up when the object is “Obviative.” As we will see, however, a close consideration of these contexts casts doubt on the status of -im– as an “Obviative” morpheme in the verbal complex.

3.3.42. The current analysis: –im– marks argument disjunction

There are reasons to believe that –im– is not dedicated to coding “Obviative” objects. There are contexts where –im– occurs, but does not code “Obviation.” However, in all these contexts, –im– codes that the object is disjoint from another potential argument in the clause (A disjunction: Saxon 1986 for Dogrib).

Troubling for an account of -im– that treats it as simply “Obviative” agreement, most “Obviative” objects do not have it. For example, when “Proximate” interacts with an ”Obviative”, there is no –im–.

(41) “PROXIMATE” acts on “OBIATIVE” = no –im–
\[\n\n\text{êkotê êkwa itohtahêw ana wiwa} \]
\[\n\text{êkotê êkwa it =oht =ah -ê -w an -a w-iw -a} \]
\[\text{there then thus =walk =CAUS-DIR-3 DST-AN.SG 3-wife-XT} \]
\[\text{‘then that\textsubscript{PROX} [man] took his\textsubscript{PROX} wife\textsubscript{OBJ} there;}’ \]
\[\text{(Ahenakew 2000:5.5)} \]

Nor does a possessed “Obviative” require it.

(42) Possessed “OBIATIVE” OBJECT DOES NOT REQUIRE –im–
\[\n\text{nêwo kêkway kî-miyêw otawâsimisa awa nâpêw,} \]
\[\text{nêwo kîkway kî- miyêw -w ot-awâs-im -is -a aw-a nâpêw} \]
\[\text{four thing PREV-give-DIR-3 3-child-DISJ-DIM-XT PROX-AN.SG man} \]
\[\text{‘Four things that man had given his children,’} \]
\[\text{(Moosoomin in Bloomfield 1930)} \]

Neither does -im– occur regularly when an “Obviative” is acted on by a local person, although this interaction is so rare in texts (i.e. almost non-existent) that elicitation data had to be relied on
instead. Only one of the consultants I have worked with (S1) appears to use this suffix at all, and in examples like (43), where a first person acts on an obviative referent, –im– is not necessary.

(43)  

–im– NOT NECESSARY WITH “Obviative” OBJECT

\[
\begin{align*}
\sigma' & < \text{L′} & \triangledown \text{O′} & \dagger \text{r′L} \\
\text{niwâpamâw} & \ominosimâs \text{a} \\
\text{ni-wâp} & = \text{am} & -\text{â} & -\text{w o-minôs-im -a} \\
\text{1-see} & = \text{by.eye.TA-DIR-3 cat -DSJ-XT} \\
\text{‘I saw [Wâpastimw’s PROX ] cat OBV’} & \text{(Volunteered S1)}
\end{align*}
\]

In all, textual occurrences of -im- are exceedingly rare; only 10 cases were found in four book-length texts (Ahenakew 2000, Minde 1997, Whitecalf 1993, Kâ-pimwêwêhahk 1998). This would be puzzling were -im- a kind of “Obviative” object marking. If it were, it should be mechanically applied to every verb that bears an “Obviative” object. However, as the data clearly demonstrates, this is not the case; the actual conditions of use on -im- with “Obviative” objects are much more specific.

Usually, when the suffix -im- is used in an independent order verb, it co-occurs with the extentional suffix –a.

(44)  

“Obviative” OBJECT WITH –im– CO-OCURS WITH EXTENTIONAL –a

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{mâka âsay mitâtaht otiwâwa ôtah nipesimâwa!} \\
\text{mâka âsay mitâtaht o-têm-iwâw-a ôta ni-pêsi -im -â -w-a} \\
\text{but already ten 3-horse-3pl -XT here 1- bring-DISJ-DIR-3-XT} \\
\text{‘But I have already brought ten of their PROX horses OBV here!’} & \text{(Dahlstrom 1986:117)}
\end{align*}
\]

If –im– could only occur with “Obviative” objects, these two morphemes should always pattern together in this context. However, there are known exceptions to this correlation. The example in (45a) shows a verb form niki-wâpamimâwak ‘I saw them’ that bears both “Animate” plural agreement (-ak), and the suffix –im–.
(45) \(-im–\) CO-OCCURS WITH \(-ak\)

\[ \text{If} \quad \text{\(-im–\) codes obviative, the form in (45) should be as shown in (46), where the suffix \(-a\) occurs instead of \(-ak.\)} \]

(46) \(-im–\) CO-OCCURS WITH \(-a\)

\[ \text{This is a case where the suffix \(-a\) and \(-im–\) are not appearing together, which contradicts the expectations of an analysis that treats \(-im–\) as coding obviation.} \]

In the verbal domain, there are many appearances of the suffix \(-im–\) or a homophonous counterpart:

First, it occurs when a verb’s agent is suppressed and the patient is “Obviative” (47). 

(47) IMPERSONAL SUBJECT WITH “OBIATIVE” OBJECT 

\[ \text{Second, extending this usage into the relational system, suffix \(-im–\) is added when kinship terms are not possessed by any discourse referent (Pentland; p.c. cited in Junker 2003), as exemplified in (48b).} \]
(48)  a. POSSESSED RELATIONAL NOMINAL

\[\text{\textcircled{\textasteriskcentered}d\textcircled{r}\textcircled{h}}\]
okosisa
\(\text{o-kosis-a}\)
\(3\text{-son} \text{-\textasteriskcentered}x\text{T}\)

‘his/her son’  

(Translation S2)

b. NON-POSSESSED RELATIONAL NOMINAL TAKES –im–

\[\text{\textcircled{\textasteriskcentered}d\textcircled{r}\textcircled{r}\textcircled{L}\textcircled{u}}\]
okosisimâw
\(\text{o-kosis-im-\text{\textasteriskcentered}a-w}\)
\(3\text{-son} \text{-DISJ-DIR-3}\)

‘a son’

Lit: ‘he is had as a son’  

(Presented S4)

Third, a morpheme with the identical form –im– is used to make relationalized constructions out of intransitive verbs, usually in concert with the prefix \(\text{\textcircled{\textasteriskcentered}wít}\). This morpheme also appears to occur in exactly the same place in the verb system as the “Obviative” –im–, immediately after the stem.

(49)  –im– OCCURS IN RELATIONAL CONSTRUCTIONS

a. \(\wedge \text{\textcircled{\textasteriskcentered}C\textcircled{\textasteriskcentered}L\textcircled{\textasteriskcentered}P}\) \(\text{\textcircled{\textasteriskcentered}P}\)

… kâ-pê-witapi\text{\textcircled{\textasteriskcentered}makikôki}.
\(\text{\wedge kâ-pê-wít- api-im -ak -ik aw-iki}\)
\(c2\text{-come-with=sit -DISJ-3>1-pl PROX-AN.PL}\)

‘… when I come and sit here with them.’  

(JKN §1.2)

b. \(\wedge \text{\textcircled{\textasteriskcentered}C\textcircled{\textasteriskcentered}L}\text{\textcircled{\textasteriskcentered}l}\text{\textcircled{\textasteriskcentered}t}\)

e-witapi\text{\textcircled{\textasteriskcentered}mat}
\(\text{\wedge e-wít =api-m -\text{\textasteriskcentered}a -t}\)
\(c1\text{-with=sit -DISJ-DIR-3}\)

‘s/he\text{\textcircled{\textasteriskcentered}PROX} sits with him/her\text{\textcircled{\textasteriskcentered}OBJ’}.  

(Presented S2)

The application of this -im- before theme signs is common enough that it can cause language learners to overgenerate forms; learners can accidentally use full TI verbs (which end in the theme -am) as though they were relational constructions.
Finally, there is an –im– that also occurs immediately after the stem of some nominal possessor constructions, as in (51b).

(51)  a. **POSSESSED NOMINAL WITHOUT –im–**

\[ \sigma^L \rho^? \]

nimaskisin

ni-maskisin

1-shoe

‘my shoe’  (Volunteered S2)

b. **POSSESSED NOMINAL WITH –im–**

\[ \sigma^? \rho^? \]

nisîsîpim

ni-sîsîp-im

1-duck-DISJ

‘My duck’  (Volunteered S1)

If all these instances of –im– are all really the same morpheme, then we here have numerous examples of –im– occurring in non-“Obviative” contexts. Thus, it cannot be said that the morpheme codes obviation. It occurs in many contexts where there is no “Obviative” form present, either in the immediate string or in the discourse.

Instead, the data suggests that –im– is a morpheme that affects relational argument structure, and has been recruited to code obviation in some circumstances.
3.3.43. Modelling the “obviative” effects of –im–

The suffix -im- can be understood as a restrictor on arguments, coding that they are disjunct from some other argument. When -im- is introduced in the higher head (vP or nP), this disjunction ranges between its argument and the argument of the lower phrase (VP, NP). When it is introduced in the lower head, it ranges across possible objects in the clause.

Following Déchaine (2003), I take objects to be associated with the lower of the two v heads of the verbal syntax, as exemplified in (52).

(52)

```
vP
   ROOT
      Subject
         v
           VP
              Object
                 V

```

The suffix –im–, then, is inserted into the argument position of the lower VP (Spec,VP), restricting its possible reference, in much the same way that an incorporated form does (cf. Hirose 2000:128, Chung & Ladusaw 2003). For example, (54) shows the structure of a verb niwâpamimâwa ‘I see him/her obv,’ which has an “Obviative” object. The suffix –im– is inserted in the specifier of the VP, and codes that the object is disjoint from some other clausal nominal (here, Wâpastim).

(53) 

`–im– = DISJOINT OBJECT`

```
\sigma \hat{i} < \Gamma \hat{L} < \hat{i} < \wedge \cap \hat{c} > \Gamma \hat{o} \cap \hat{l}

niwâpamimâwa Wâpastim ominôsima

\ni \-wâp=am \-im -\hat{a} -w-a wâpastim o-minôs-im -a
l-see=see.by.eye.TA-DISJ-DIR-3-XT Wâpastimw 3-cat -DISJ-XT

‘I saw Wâpastim’s_{PROX} cat_{OBV} …’
```

(Volunteered S1)
This parallels the structure for an incorporated nominal. (54) shows a verb form kisîpêkîn- ‘clean by hand,’ which has an incorporated nominal –iyâkan ‘dish.’ This incorporated nominal is inserted in the specifier of the VP, to restrict the interpretation of this argument to only dishes (cf. Chung & Ladusaw 2003).

(54) INCORPORATED NOMINAL SYNTAX

kisîpêkîn -iyâkan-ê-
clean  =by.hand-dish  -AI

(Adapted from Déchaine 2003, Hirose 2000)
When -im- is used to add an argument to an intransitive verb (the relational use described in (50) and exemplified in (55) below), it is inserted in the specifier of the higher, transitive head (vP). In this role, it implicates the existence of a verbal head that is not spelled-out overtly.⁹

(55) **Relational Verb Syntax**

\[ \Delta:\text{CA}L' \]

\[ \hat{e}\text{-witapi}m\hat{a}t \]

\[ \hat{e}\text{- w}it =api-im -\hat{a} -t \]

\[ c1\text{-with=sit }\text{-DSJ-DIR-3} \]

\[ 's/he_{PROX} \text{sits with him/her}_{OBV}.' \]

(Presented S2)

This same structure is employed with the nominal uses of –im–. The suffix is inserted in the specifier higher, transitive nominal phrase (nP), as in (57). The presence of this suffix in the specifier position implicates the existence of the transitive head of its phrase, which is not spelled out (Koopman 2000).

---

⁹ Deciding on the right structural representation of intransitive verbs is complicated by the lack of finals (i.e. overt V heads) in many forms. In earlier analyses (e.g. Bloomfield 1962), these intransitive forms were posited to have a null final. Hirose (2000), on the other hand, modelled these forms by placing the root in the VP itself, which made it function as a final itself. For the sake of a systematic representation, I have here stayed with the more traditional framework suggested by Bloomfield (1962) and others; the intransitive verb is a root without a final.
SYNTAX OF –im– ON NOMINALS

> ominôsimisisiwâwa
  o-minôs-im -sis -wâw-a
  3-cat -DISJ-DIM-3PL -XT
  ‘Their PROX cat(s)OBV’

In these structures, what is the content added by the use of the suffix –im–? When considering the distribution of the nominal form, Mailhot (in Clarke 1982) points out that –im– occurs only when the possessum can be conceived of as disjoint from the possessee. The suffix cannot occur when an inalienably possessed body part (e.g. –stikwân ‘head’) is possessed by its original owner (57).

INALIENABLE POSSESSION = No –im–

a. σ∩b·2
   nistikwân
   ni-stikwân
   1-head
   ‘My head’  (Volunteered S1)

Note that this argument, which appears to be supported by data, suggests that the referential types of nominals is more finely subdivided than commonly considered. Shoes would not be disjoint in a manner that ducks are, for example. Considering that shoes are articles of clothing, this distinction should not be surprising, but it deserves further research.
However, the suffix –im– is obligatory when an inalienably-possessed body part is owned by someone besides its original owner (e.g. when a human owns an animal’s body part), as shown in (58).

(58)  SECONDARILY-POSSESSED INALIENABLE = –im–

a. σ∩∩b·σ·
   nitostikwânim
   nit-o-stikwân-im
   1- 3-head -DISJ
   ‘The head that I have as a possession’ (Presented S1)

b. ?/σ∩∩b·?
   ?/ nitostikwân
   nit-o-stikwân
   1-3-head
   --- (Presented S1)

Based on evidence of this kind, Junker (2003) concludes that the nominal form of -im- marks a kind of disjoint reference (x ≠ y). More specifically, we can say that –im– marks that the argument is disjoint from some other argument (‘A disjunction’ as in Saxon 1986 for Dogrib). The suffix –im–, then, is more general than simply coding “Obviative.”

3.3.5. The predicate suffix –yi–

In the verbal morphosyntax, sometimes the only morpheme that distinguishes between the “Obviative” and simple “Animate” form of the verb is the suffix -yi-. For example, the verb form in (59a) ê-miyosit ‘s/he\textsubscript{as} is good’ and the verb form in (59b) ê-miyosiyit ‘s/he\textsubscript{obv} is good’ are only distinguished by the presence of –yi– in the “Obviative” case in (59b).
(59)  a. “ANIMATE” SUBJECT

\[ \text{er} \quad \text{miyosit ana nápêw} \]
\[ \text{er} \quad \text{miyw=si -t an -a nápêw} \]
\[ c1 \text{-good=AI-3 DST-AN.SG man} \]
\[ \text{That}_{AN} \text{ man is good}_{AN}. \]  

(Presented S2)

b. “OBVIAITIVE” SUBJECT = “ANIMATE” SUBJECT + –yi–

\[ \text{er} \quad \text{miyisît anîhi nápêwa} \]
\[ \text{er} \quad \text{miyw=si -yi -t an =ihi nápêw-a} \]
\[ c1 \text{-good=AI-DS-3 DST=XT man-XT} \]
\[ \text{This}_{OBV} \text{ man}_{OBV} \text{ is good}_{AN}. \]
\[ \text{Those}_{OBV} \text{ men}_{OBV} \text{ are good}_{AN}. \]  

(Presented S2)

On an intransitive verb, the suffix occurs immediately after the verb stem (60) and before any person marking.

(60)  “OBVIAITIVE” SUBJECT OF INTRANSITIVE VERB RECEIVES –yi–

\[ \text{er} \quad \text{miyisît} \]
\[ \text{er} \quad \text{atoksê-yi -t} \]
\[ c1 \text{-work -DS-3} \]
\[ \text{‘s/he}_{OBV} \text{ works’} \]  

(Presented S2)

When -yi- occurs on a transitive verb, it is positioned between theme sign (e.g. –â– ‘direct’) and the person marking (e.g. –t ‘Animate’), as shown in (61).

(61)  “OBVIAITIVE” ACTING ON “OBVIAITIVE” RECEIVES –yi–

\[ \text{er} \quad \text{miyisît} \]
\[ \text{er} \quad \text{atoksê-yi -t} \]
\[ c1 \text{-see =by.eye.TA-DIR-DS-3} \]
\[ \text{‘s/he}_{OBV} \text{ sees him/her’} \]  

(Presented S2)

This suffix also occurs as a post-stem suffix on possessed nouns, as shown in (62), where the possessed nominal otêm- ‘his/her horse’ receives the suffix –yi– when the possessor is “Obviative.”
“Obviative” Possessor Receives –yi–

> U↑ A↑ O
otēmiyiwa
o-tēm –yi-w-a
3-horse-DS-3-XT
‘his/her
‚horse
’

(Presented S2)

Summarizing, this morpheme occurs when the “Obviative” referent is the subject of a verb that has either no object (Intransitive) or an object that is not “Proximate.” In table 3.9, we see that –yi– is possible when an “Obviative” is the subject of an intransitive verb, when an “Obviative” acts on an “Obviative,” and when an “Obviative” acts on a speech act participant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTRANSITIVE</th>
<th>TRANSITIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OBV</td>
<td>OBV &gt; X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBV &gt; OBV</td>
<td>OBV &gt; PRX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✽</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.9. Distribution of –yi– with “obviative” arguments

This co-occurrence of -yi- and “Obviative” referents makes it a candidate for dedicated “Obviative” coding.

3.3.51. The traditional view: –yi– marks “obviative” arguments

Analysts have always treated –yi– as coding “Obviative.” Wolfart (1973) calls it an “obviative theme.” Dahlstrom (1986, 1991) continues this treatment, noting that it is restricted to “Obviative” subjects, and all subsequent work on Plains Cree (e.g. Blain 1997, Hirose 2000, Mühlbauer 2007) agrees that the suffix codes “Obviative.”

3.3.52. The current analysis: –yi– marks disjoint subjects

There are reasons to believe that –yi– is not dedicated to coding “Obviative” or even “Animate” interactions in Plains Cree. There are contexts where –yi– occurs, but does not code “Obviation.” However, in all these contexts, –yi– codes that the subject of the predicate is disjoint (x ≠ y) from

---

11 Wolfart (1973), among others, breaks this suffix up into -iyi-wa, where -wa is taken to be a variant of the “Obviative” suffix -a. I have separated the -wa into two morphemes, based on the occurrence of forms like omaskisinîyiw ‘his/her shoe,’ where the suffix -w occurs without a following -a. The difference is not here crucial, but the reader should be aware that there are differences in treatment of this form.
a preceding third person (i.e. A’ disjoint reference; Horseherder 1998 for Navajo) – either “Inanimate” or “Obviative.”

While –yi– occurs with “Obviative” subjects in certain configurations, this is not the only place that this suffix is found. It also occurs with “Inanimate” subjects in specific contexts. In particular, if the “Inanimate” subject of a verb is dependent on some previous third person in the discourse (§4.3.2), –yi– is affixed to the verb. This is seen in (63b), where the verb ê-kinwâyik ‘it<sub>IN</sub> is long’ is the complement of a propositional attitude verb kiskêyihtam ‘s/he<sub>AN</sub> know it<sub>IN</sub>.’ In this context, the inanimate subject of the complement verb receives the suffix –yi.

(63) a. “INANIMATE” SUBJECT WITHOUT –yi–

…. (Presented S2)

b. “INANIMATE” SUBJECT OF VERB IN PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE CONTEXT = –yi–

…. (Presented S2)

In table 3.10, we see that –yi– is possible when an “Inanimate” is the dependent subject of an intransitive verb, when an “Inanimate” acts on an “Obviative,” and when an “Inanimate” acts on a speech act participant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTRANSITIVE</th>
<th>TRANSITIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IN</td>
<td>DEP IN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN &gt; OBV</td>
<td>IN &gt; PROX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–yi–</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.10: Distribution of –yi– with “inanimate” arguments

Comparing these generalizations to those for the “Obviative,” there are two differences:

(i) –yi– sometimes does not occur with “Inanimate” subjects, but it always occurs with “Obviative” subjects.
“Inanimate” referents can never be possessors in Plains Cree (§4.4.1). This eliminates possession constructions as places for –yi– to occur with “Inanimate” referents.

Turning to the shape of the “Inanimate” nominal in these constructions, we see a contrast with the “Obviative” forms. The “Inanimate” nominal connected to a verb without –yi– (64a) has exactly the same form as the “Inanimate nominal connected to a verb with –yi– (64b).

(64) a. “INANIMATE” NOMINAL
\[\n\text{é-kinwâk maskisin} \\
\text{é- kinw=â-k maskisin} \\
\text{c1-long=tt-0 shoe} \\
\text{‘...the/a shoe is long' (Presented S2)}
\]

b. “INANIMATE” NOMINAL AS SUBJECT OF VERB MARKED WITH –yi–
\[\n\text{é-kinwâyik maskisin} \\
\text{é- kinw=â-yi-k maskisin} \\
\text{c1-long=tt-ds-0 shoe} \\
\text{‘...the/a shoe is long' (Presented S2)}
\]

With “Inanimate” referents, the singular/plural contrast is maintained – a contrast not available for “Obviative” forms in Plains Cree. In (65a), the “Inanimate” plural coding on the verb (-i) co-occurs with the nominal suffix used for plural “Inanimate” (-a). By contrast, (65b) shows that an “Obviative” nominal cannot co-occur with “Animate” plural coding on the verb.

(65) a. PLURAL “INANIMATE” CODING CO-OCCURS WITH –yi–
\[\n\text{...é-kinwâyik maskisina.} \\
\text{é- kinw=â-yi-k maskisin-a} \\
\text{c1-long=tt-ds-0-PL shoe -XT} \\
\text{‘...the shoes are long.' (Presented S2)}
\]

b. “OBVIATIVE” NOMINALS CANNOT HAVE PLURAL VERB CODING WITH –yi–
\[\n\text{*...é-kinosiyicik nápêwa.} \\
\text{é- kinw=si-yi -t-ik nápêw-a} \\
\text{c1-long=at-ds-3-PL man -XT} \\
\text{‘...the man is tall.' (Presented S2)}
\]

12 To my knowledge, this fact has never been pointed out. In Plains Cree, possession constructions of the kind “shoe’s laces” or “men’s socks” are instead compounds (maskinëyâpiy lit: “shoe-string” and nápêwasikana lit: “man-socks”, respectively). This is relevant to analyses of English prenominal genitives that treat these as deriving from compound-like underlying structures (e.g. McCawley 1988:385).
The distinction in plurality associated with (65) provides evidence that the “Inanimate” referent is not equivalent to the “Obviative” referent. Thus in (65a), –yi– must be marking something else.

In other members of the Cree language family (e.g. Moose Cree), the “Inanimate” nominal does have additional forms added to it. Whereas –yi– is only marked on the verb in Plains Cree (66a), its Moose Cree counterpart (–li–) is marked on both the verb and the “Inanimate” nominal.

(66) a. Plains Cree: -yi- occurs only on verbs

\[\text{êkâ ê-ohc-âtaw'ëhtahk ê-âyimaniyik atoskêwin.}\]

\[\text{êkâ é- ohc-âtaw =éiyht -am-k ê-âyiman -yi-k atoskêwin}\]

neg C1-rr- discount=by.mind.TI-TI -3 C1-difficult-DS-0 work
‘[my husband] did not think anything of hard work.’ [EM 28]

(67) b. Moose Cree: -li- occurs on both verbs and nouns

\[\text{cwân owîkimâkan-a kîsisamiliwa mósó-wiyâsilîw}\]

\[\text{cwân o-wîkimâkan-a kîs =is -am-li -w-a mósó- wiyâs-lî-w}\]

\[\text{John 3-spouse -xt cook=by.heat.TI-TI -DS-3-xt moose-meat -DS-3}\]

‘John’s wife is cooking some moose meat.’ (Ellis 2000:107)

Crucially, these other Cree languages do not use the nominal suffix added for “Obviative” (-a). This is what would be expected if –yi– marked “Obviation.”

There are two sets of facts that challenge the possibility that an “Inanimate” argument associated with –yi– is an “Obviative” referent:

(i) When –yi– occurs on a verb, the referential contrasts for “Inanimate” arguments are different than for “Obviative.” “Inanimate” is be specified as either plural or singular, whereas the “Obviative” cannot be specified for plurality.

(ii) When –yi– occurs on a verb, other Cree languages (e.g. Moose Cree) mark nominal arguments associated with –yi– instead of “Obviative” coding.

I now consider what an account of –yi– would look like that does not treat it as a dedicated “Obviative” morpheme.

First, we notice that –yi– always and only occurs with subjects (Dahlstrom 1991, Mühlbauer 2007), which implies that –yi– is located in the IP domain, since that is thought to be
the locus of subjecthood in clauses (cf. Chomsky 1986). Putting this within the analysis developed by Hirose (2000) and Déchaine (2003) for Plains Cree’s verb system, we get a structure as in (68).

(68)  
\[ \text{CP} \]
\[ \text{C} \]
\[ \text{IP} \]
\[ -yi- \]
\[ \text{VP} \]
\[ \text{ROOT} \]
\[ \text{v} \]
\[ \text{VP} \]
\[ \text{v} \]

(Adapted from Déchaine 2003)

Here, the presence of the suffix \(-yi-\) signals that the subject of the verb is not some previous third person referent. This means that \(-yi-\) is a component of Plains Cree’s switch reference system. Its content, then, is disjoint reference \((x \neq y)\). This is discussed in Chapter 4 (§4.3.2).

The position of \(-yi-\) accounts for the difference in pronominal forms in the TI conjunct paradigm. Consider the examples in (69). The form with \(-yi-\) shows “Animate” marking (69a), while the form without \(-yi-\) shows “Inanimate” pronominal marking (69b).

(69)  
\text{a. TI Conjunct Verb} + \text{–yi– has} \text{–t}

\begin{align*}
\nabla & \; \hat{L} \cdot < \text{gif} \text{p} > \\
\hat{e} & \text{-wâpahtamiyit} \\
\hat{e} & \text{-wâp=aht -am-yi-t} \\
cl & \text{-see=by.eye.TI-TI -{}\text{-DS-3}} \\
& \text{‘… (as) s/he sees\textsubscript{IN} it.’} \\
\end{align*}

(Submitted S2)

\text{b. TI Conjunct Verb has} \text{–k}

\begin{align*}
\nabla & \; \hat{L} \cdot < \text{gix} > \\
\hat{e} & \text{-wâpahtahk} \\
\hat{e} & \text{-wâp=aht -am-k} \\
cl & \text{-see=by.eye.TI-TI -{}\text{-O}} \\
& \text{‘… (as) s/he sees\textsubscript{IN} it.’} \\
\end{align*}

(Submitted S2)
If -yi- codes IP-level subject properties, the suffix following it could be introduced as IP-level affix (i.e. marking subjects; 63a), whereas the form without -yi-, lacking IP suffixation, could have the suffix introduced in the lower, object position (63b).\(^{13}\)

\[
(70) \quad \text{a.} \quad \text{CP} \\
\quad \text{C} \quad \text{IP} \\
\quad \quad -t \quad \text{VP} \\
\quad \quad \quad -yi- \quad \text{ROOT} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \text{V} \quad \text{VP} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{V}
\]

\[
\text{b.} \quad \text{CP} \\
\quad \text{C} \quad \text{IP} \\
\quad \quad \text{I} \quad \text{VP} \\
\quad \quad \quad \text{ROOT} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \text{V} \quad \text{VP} \\
\quad \quad \quad \quad \quad \text{V} \quad -k
\]

3.3.53. Modelling the “obviative” effects of –yi–

If –yi– codes that subject of the predicate is disjoint from some previous third person (i.e. A’ disjoint reference: Horseherder 1998 for Navajo, §4.3.2 for Plains Cree), we expect a particular distribution for this morpheme.

First, the suffix –yi– should not occur in out-of-the-blue contexts. This is confirmed; with just a single clause in the discourse, –yi– cannot occur. This is true for both “Animate” (71a) and “Inanimate” (71b) arguments.

---

\(^{13}\) I am here avoiding the issue of linearization. See Déchaine & Reinholtz (2008) for a consideration of these issues, where they argue that VPs are constructed via encliticization, which then undergoes snowball movement (cf. Aboh 2004) to the CP level.
(71) **a. “Animate” Verb with –yi– Infelicitous Out-of-the-Blue**

\[
\downarrow \langle \sigma | b \rangle \rangle \quad \left\langle \sigma | \sigma | \Delta \right\rangle \quad \Delta \rangle \rangle \rangle \langle \sigma | b \rangle \rangle \\
\# ë-ëñisiiyit anihi iskëwëwa. \\
ê-êñiw =si –yi-t an =ihi iskëwë-a \\
C1-long =AI-DS-3 DST =XT woman-XT \\
‘That woman\textsubscript{OBV} is tall.’ (Presented S2)
\]


\[
\downarrow \langle \sigma | b \rangle \rangle \quad \left\langle \sigma | \sigma | \Delta \right\rangle \quad \Delta \rangle \rangle \rangle \langle \sigma | b \rangle \rangle \\
\# ë-ñiw=q=âm \text{to} -yi -k an =ima maskisin \\
ê-êñiw =â -yi-k an =ima maskisin \\
c1-long =II-DS-0 DST =IN.SG shoe \\
‘That shoe is long.’ (Presented S2)
\]

If the morpheme –yi– codes A’ disjoint reference, this behaviour makes sense; coding disjointness when there is nothing to be disjoint from would be a strange thing to do. In fact, the repair strategies used by consultants support this; the -yi- forms can only be made felicitous if the consultant imagines some other referent in the discourse.

Second, when two clauses are chained together, –yi– should occur on the second clause if and only if its subject is different from some previously-established third person referent. This is again confirmed by the data. Consider the “Animate” form in (72a) and the “Inanimate” form in (72b). In (72a), the initial verb’s subject is nâpêw ‘man,’ who is the “Proximate” referent of a TA verb that uses a direct theme sign (-â-). The second verb ê-nikamoyit ‘s/he sings’ carries the suffix –yi–. In (72b), the initial verb’s subject is again a “Proximate” nâpêw ‘man.’ The second verb, ê-ñimiwaniyik ‘it is raining,’ carries the suffix –yi–.

(72) **a. Second “Animate” Verb Carries –yi–**

\[
\downarrow \langle \sigma | b \rangle \rangle \quad \left\langle \sigma | \sigma | \Delta \right\rangle \quad \Delta \rangle \rangle \rangle \langle \sigma | b \rangle \rangle \\
nâpêw ë-wâpamât iskëwëwa ê-nikamoyit. \\
nâpêw ë- wâp=âm -â -t iskëwë-a ê-nikamo-yi-t \\
man C1-see =by.eye.TA-DIR-3 woman-XT C1-sing -DS-3 \\
‘The man\textsubscript{PROX} saw the woman\textsubscript{OBV} when she\textsubscript{OBV} was singing.’ (Presented S2)
\]

**b. Second “Inanimate” Verb Carries –yi–**

\[
\downarrow \langle \sigma | b \rangle \rangle \quad \left\langle \sigma | \sigma | \Delta \right\rangle \quad \Delta \rangle \rangle \rangle \langle \sigma | b \rangle \rangle \\
nâpêw ë- wâp=âm -â -t iskëwë-a ê-ñîmîwaniyik. \\
nâpêw ë- wâp=âm -â -t iskëwë-a ê-ñîmîwaniyik \\
man C1-see =by.eye.TA-DIR-3 woman-XT C1-rain -DS-0 \\
‘The man\textsubscript{PROX} saw the woman\textsubscript{OBV} when it was raining.’ (Presented S2)
This suffix –yi– occurs, then, when the second subject is different from the first.

Third, we expect that the suffix -yi- should be used for reference disambiguation when both referents are “Animate.” This is also confirmed. Consider the pair in (73). In (73a), the presence of –yi– on the second verb signals obligatory disjoint reference (73a) from the first verb’s subject, while the absence of –yi– in (73b) signals obligatory co-reference.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(73) a. } & \text{-yi– ON SECOND VERB = DISJOINT REFERENCE} \\
& \text{‘The man\textsubscript{PROX} saw the woman\textsubscript{OBV} when she\textsubscript{OBV} was singing.’} \quad \text{(Presented S2)} \\
& \neq \text{Man is singing} \\
& = \text{Woman is singing}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(73) b. NO –yi– ON SECOND VERB = CO-REFERENCE} \\
& \text{‘The man\textsubscript{PROX} saw the woman\textsubscript{OBV} when he\textsubscript{PROX} was singing.’} \quad \text{(Presented S2)} \\
& \neq \text{Man is singing} \\
& = \text{Woman is singing}
\end{align*}
\]

Here, the only difference in the two examples is the presence/absence of the morpheme –yi–, and this difference correlates with a difference in the interpretation of the subject of the second clause.

This suffix –yi– is also used to disambiguate possessors of nominals, as shown in (74). In (74a), the presence of the suffix –yi– signals the the possessor is different from the subject of the verb (nâpêw ‘man’).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(74) a. } & \text{-yi– ON POSSESSED NOMINAL = DISJOINT REFERENCE} \\
& \text{‘The man\textsubscript{PROX} saw his/her\textsubscript{OBV} horse\textsubscript{OBV}.’} \quad \text{(Presented S2)} \\
& \neq \text{Man’s horse} \\
& = \text{Some other third person’s horse}
\end{align*}
\]
b. NO –yi– ON POSSESSED NOMINAL = CO-REFERENCE

\[ \text{Napew wâpamêw otêma} \]
\[ \text{Napew wáp=am -ê -w o-têm -a} \]
\[ \text{Man see =by.eye.TA-DIR-3 3-horse-XT} \]
\[ 'The man\textsubscript{PROX} saw his/her\textsubscript{OBJ} horse\textsubscript{OBJ}.’ \]
\[ = \text{Man’s horse} \]
\[ = \text{Some other third person’s horse} \]

There is a complication with the possessed nominals. Consider the examples in (75), which show that the forms where the nominal lacks –yi– are not interpreted as obligatorily co-referent, but are instead ambiguous.

(75) a. NO –yi– = EITHER CO-REFERENCE OR DISJOINT REFERENCE

\[ \text{Napew wâpamêw otêma} \]
\[ \text{Napew wáp=am -ê -w o-têm -a} \]
\[ \text{Man see =by.eye.TA-DIR-3 3-horse-XT} \]
\[ 'The man\textsubscript{PROX} saw his/her\textsubscript{OBJ} horse\textsubscript{OBJ}.’ \]
\[ = \text{Man’s horse} \]
\[ = \text{Some other third person’s horse} \]

b. NO –yi– = EITHER CO-REFERENCE OR DISJOINT REFERENCE

\[ \text{Napew wâpahtam omaskisin} \]
\[ \text{Napew wáp=aht -am o-maskisin} \]
\[ \text{Man see =by.eye.TI-TI 3-shoe} \]
\[ 'The man\textsubscript{PROX} saw his/her\textsubscript{OBJ} shoe\textsubscript{OBJ}.' \]
\[ = \text{Man’s shoe} \]
\[ = \text{Some other third person’s shoe} \]

The pattern of -yi- can best be understood if we posit it to code disjoint reference. As a disjoint reference marker, it is infelicitous with single-clause discourses, as we saw in (71), but it is used when its argument is not some previous argument (here, restricted to subjects), as we saw in (72). In this usage as a disjoint reference marker, it is used in the disambiguation of subsequent subjects, as we saw in (73). From this, I conclude that the content of -yi- is best characterized as carrying disjoint reference across subjects, either verbal or nominal (possessors).
3.3.6. Summary: The derivative nature of obviation

The results of this study are shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms</th>
<th>Occurrence</th>
<th>Atomic</th>
<th>Construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[PREDICATE]-a</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>YES – INAN</td>
<td>* ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3.2.1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DEm]=îhi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>YES – INAN</td>
<td>* ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3.2.2.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Verb]-ê</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>YES – INAN</td>
<td>* ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3.2.3.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[PREDICATE]-im</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>YES – ANIM</td>
<td>* ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3.2.4.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[PREDICATE]-yi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>YES – INAN</td>
<td>* ✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3.2.5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.11. “Obviative” forms and their patterning

From this table, it is clear that Plains Cree systematically lacks any dedicated forms that code obviation. Instead, all of the forms that code “Obviative” also can be used in other constructions that do not code “Obviative” reference. “Obviative,” then, is a derived class, and is constructed from several different components of the Plains Cree grammar. The logic of this construction is considered in detail in Chapter 4.

I now turn from the form of “Obviation” to its semantic content.

3.4. The content of obviation: contextual extentionality

We have just seen that the “Obviative” forms are systematically identical to “Inanimate” forms, but range over “Animate” contexts. For example, the suffix –a is used to code obviation on nominals in “Animate” contexts (76a), but also appears in “Inanimate” contexts to code number (76b).

(76) a. “OBVIATIVE” NOMINAL WITH –a

\[ \forall \mathcal{G} \mathcal{H}' \quad <\mathcal{G}', \mathcal{G} = \lambda \Delta. \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{G} \Delta. \mathcal{H} \]  
è-miyosiit anihi nāpe'wā  
è-miyw=si -yi -t an =îhi nāpe'w-a  
C1-good=AI-DS-3 DST=XT man -XT  
‘…(as) this\textsubscript{OBV} man\textsubscript{OBV} is good\textsubscript{AN}.’  
‘…(as) those\textsubscript{OBV} men\textsubscript{OBV} are good\textsubscript{AN}.’  

(Presented S2)
b. “INANIMATE” NOMINAL WITH –a

\[ \nabla \Gamma + \{ r^P \} \sigma'^\Delta \wedge \rho'^\alpha. \]
\[ \text{ê-miywâsiki anihi maskisin-a} \]
\[ \text{ê- miyw=ási-k-i an } =\text{ahi maskisin-a} \]
\[ c1-good=II \ -0-\text{PL DST}=XT \text{ shoe} \ -XT \]
\[ ‘…(as) those\text{\textsubscript{In}} shoes are nice\text{\textsubscript{In}}.’ \] (Presented S2)

The demonstrative sets used for both “Inanimate” and “Obviative” are the same, as shown in (77), where the demonstrative anihi ‘that one’ can either modify an “Obviative” (77a), or an “Inanimate” (77b).

(77) a. “O BVIATIVE” DEMONSTRATIVE WITH –ihi

\[ \nabla \Gamma + \{ r^P \} \sigma'^\Delta \wedge \rho'^\alpha. \]
\[ \text{ê-miysisiyit anihi nápêwa} \]
\[ \text{ê-miyw=si} \ -yi \ -t an =\text{ahi nápêw-a} \]
\[ c1-good=AI-DST-3 DST=XT \text{ man} \ -XT \]
\[ ‘…(as) this\text{\textsubscript{Obv}} \text{man}\text{\textsubscript{Obv}} is good\text{\textsubscript{An}}.’ \]
\[ ‘…(as) those\text{\textsubscript{Obv}} \text{men}\text{\textsubscript{Obv}} are good\text{\textsubscript{An}}.’ \] (Presented S2)

b. “INANIMATE” DEMONSTRATIVE WITH –ihi

\[ \nabla \Gamma + \{ r^P \} \sigma'^\Delta \wedge \rho'^\alpha. \]
\[ \text{ê-miywâsiki anihi maskisin-a} \]
\[ \text{ê- miyw=ási-k-i an } =\text{ahi maskisin-a} \]
\[ c1-good=II \ -0-\text{PL DST}=XT \text{ shoe} \ -XT \]
\[ ‘…(as) those\text{\textsubscript{In}} shoes are nice\text{\textsubscript{In}}.’ \] (Presented S2)

Both the “Obviative” and “Inanimate” occur with the suffix –yi–. For example, in (78a), the “Obviative” referring nominal iskwêwa ‘woman\textsubscript{Obv}’ is the argument of ê-kinosiyit ‘she\textsubscript{Obv} is tall,’ which bears –yi–, while, in (78b), the “Inanimate” verb ê-kinwâyik ‘it\textsubscript{In} is long’ also bears the suffix –yi–.

(78) a. “O BVIATIVE” CO-OCCURS WITH –yi–

\[ \sigma'^\Delta \wedge \rho'^\alpha. \]
\[ \text{awâsis iteyihtam ê-kinosiyit anihi iskwêwa.} \]
\[ \text{awâsis it=éyiht } \ -am \ é- \ kinw=si \ -yi \ -t an =\text{ahi iskwêw-a} \]
\[ \text{child} \ \text{RR=by.mind.ti-TI} \ c1\text{-long}=AI-DST-3 DST=XT \text{ woman-XT} \]
\[ ‘The child\text{\textsubscript{Prox}} thinks that that woman\text{\textsubscript{Obv}} is tall.’ \] (Presented S2)
b. “INANIMATE” CO-OCCURS WITH –yi–

awâsis itêyihtam ê-kinwâyik anima maskisin.

awâsis it=éyiht -am ê-kinw =â -yi -k an=ima maskisin
child  RR=by.mind ti-ti cl-long=DST-0 DST=IN.SG shoe

‘The child thinks that that shoe is long.’ (Presented S2)

When the “Obviative” or “Inanimate” class of referents is the object of a verb, the theme sign –ê– is used. In (79a), we see the verb wâpamêw ‘s/he sees him/her,’ which has an “Obviative” object, and uses the theme sign –ê–. In (79b), the verb niwâpahtên ‘I see it’ has an “Inanimate” object, and uses the same theme sign –ê–.

(79) a. “PROXIMATE” ACTS ON “OBLATIVE” = -ê–

wâp=am -ê -w
see  =by.eye TA-DIR-LP
‘S/he sees him/her.’ (Presented S2)

b. SAP ACTS ON “INANIMATE”= –ê–

ni-wâp=aht -ê -n
1- see  =by.eye TI-TI-LP
‘I see it.’ (Presented S2)

Both the “Obviative” and the “Inanimate” trigger the inverse theme sign –ikw– when they act on other referents. For example, the form in (80a) shows an “Obviative” referent awâsisâ ‘child’ acting on a “Proximate” referent nimâma ‘my mother, which requires the use of the theme sign –ikw– on the verb ê-sêkîhîkot ‘s/he scared him/her.’ In (80b), an identical verb form, ê-sêkîhîkot, is used when an “Inanimate” referent (mohkomân ‘knife’) acts on an “Animate” referent (nimâma ‘my mother’).
This formal parallelism between “Inanimate” and “Obviative” led Wolfart (1973) to suggest that there may be some underlying content that the two referential categories share:

If we rule out accident as the cause of the identity of the animate obviative and the inanimate plural, we have to look for the semantic feature of Cree which these categories have in common. (Wolfart 1973:14)

Formal identity, then, points to content identity, but, until now, the thread of meaning that unites these forms has not been found.

A hint at what the shared content of “Inanimate” and “Obviative” might be is suggested by data like (81). Here, sentence describes an event in which a man is seeing an “Obviative” woman. The nominal iskwêw ‘woman’ bears the suffix –a, and the verb bears TA morphology. When asked about what this sentence could mean, one speaker (S3) responded, “In this example, the woman is not aware that she’s being seen.”

By contrast, a simple “Animate” form evokes no psychological discussion at all, as shown in (82). Here, the nominal awâsis ‘child’ is not marked with any suffixification, and the verb carries
TA marking; the referent is “Animate”. When asked about the awareness of the child for this event, speakers are non-committal; the child could be aware of the event, or he could not.

(82) “ANIMATE” REFERENT IS NOT SPECIFIED FOR AWARENESS

niwâpamâw ana awâsis

I- see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 DST-AN.SG child

‘I see that child.’

Comment (S2): “I don’t know if the child knows about this or not.”

Interpretations like those for (81) bear a striking resemblance to the readings for “Inanimate” nominals that we considered in Chapter 2. There, we saw that the “Inanimate” forms were associated with a referent that was never aware of any event.

(83) “INANIMATE” REFERENT IS NEVER AWARE

nikî-wâpahtê̱n ôma kinêpik

I-PREV-see=by.eye.TI-TI-LP PROX-IN.SG snake

‘I saw this (plastic) snake’

Comment (S2): “It’s just a plastic snake. It doesn’t think anything.”

Here, the speaker is considering a rubber representation of a snake, rather than a real one. The nominal is associated with an overt demonstrative ôma ‘this,’ which codes “Inanimate” referents, and the verb is in the TI form. As far as the utterer of this sentence is concerned, this referent cannot have awareness in any context. This, of course, could not be said of the child in example (81); she has, no doubt, had many intentions in her life, but has none associated with this particular context.

What we see is that an “Inanimate” referent can never have a intention (i.e. is never ‘aware’), while an “Obviative” referent doesn’t have an intention in the context of the event described. The difference between “Inanimate” and “Obviative”, then, appears to be a difference between inherent lack of awareness (“Inanimate”), and contextual lack of awareness (“Obviative”). “Obviative” is a contextual version of “Inanimate,” which means that “Obviative” is contextual extentionality.

Extending the model constructed for animacy (Chapter 2), I define a contextually extentional referent as one that cannot be paired with a perspective in a given context. Following
Partee (1988), I represent the discourse context of an utterance using the variable C. Contextual extentionality, then, is the property of being extentional at context C (84a). Inherent extentionality, by contrast, is the context-independent property of being extentional (84b).

(84) a. **Contextual Extentionality**

\[ \text{Ext}(x, C) \leftrightarrow \forall \psi \forall y (R(y, \psi, C) \rightarrow x \neq y) \]

x is extentional at context C if and only if for all perspectives \( \psi \) and all individuals \( y \), if there is a relation \( R \) of \( y \) with \( \psi \) at context C, then \( x \) is not \( y \).

b. **Inherent Extentionality**

\[ \text{Ext}(x) \leftrightarrow \forall \psi \forall y (R(y, \psi) \rightarrow x \neq y) \]

x is Extentional if and only if for all Perspectives \( \psi \) and all individuals \( y \), if there is a relation \( R \) between individual \( y \) with perspective \( \psi \), then \( x \) is not \( y \).

Applying this to the “Obviative” form in Plains Cree, I claim that a referent classified as “Obviative” will have the content of (85).

(85) “**Obviative**” form = \[ \lambda x \cdot \text{Ext}(x, C) \land \text{Pred}'(x) \] =

Give some \( x \), such that \( x \) is extentional at \( C \) and \( x \) is a member of the set of referents denoted by the predicate.

This differs from the “Inanimate” form, which is analyzed as inherently extentional, as in (86).

(86) “**Inanimate**” form = \( \lambda x \cdot [\text{Ext}(x) \land \text{Pred}'(x)] \]

Give some \( x \), such that \( x \) is extentional and \( x \) is a member of the set of referents denoted by the predicate.

When the “Obviative” is set up in contrast to an unspecified “Animate” referent, the “Animate” receives the opposite extentional value; it is contextually non-extentional (i.e. intentional).

(87) a. “Animate” : [\( \emptyset \)]

b. “Obviative” : [\( \text{Ext} \)] at \( C \)

c. “Proximate Animate” : [-\( \text{Ext} \)] at \( C \)

The formal identity between “Obviative” and “Inanimate,” then, parallels the two classes’ referential identity.

This model of obviation in Plains Cree makes specific claims about what the distribution of “Obviative” constructions must be:
(i) The model requires that extentional “Obviative” referents should not be able to occur with intentional verbs (psych verbs; Bouchard 2005, etc.). An examination of the distribution of “Obviative” referents with these verbs supports this (§3.4.1).

(ii) The model requires that an “Obviative” referent should either have spatial-temporal or intentional deficits in the context, making them “unaware” of that context. An examination of the distribution of “Obviative” referents when there are spatio-temporal or intentional deficits supports this (§3.4.2).

(iii) Because Plains Cree has coding only for extentional referents (“Inanimate” and “Obviative”), intentional referents will be a by-product of contrast with an extentional referent. This is confirmed by a consideration of the “Proximate” referential class (§3.4.3).

All evidence supports the conclusion that the “Obviative” is used when a referent has no contextual intention. This is the contextual parallel to the inherent extentional specification of “Inanimate” referents; “Inanimate” forms are used when a referent has never had a mind (see Chapter 2), while “Obviative” constructions are used when the referent has no contextual intention.

### 3.4.1. Intentional verbs restrict “obviative” reference

Verbs that are inherently intentional (i.e. introduce a perspective) can occur with an “Animate” argument, but not an “Inanimate” one (88). This is because “Inanimate” referents are inherently extentional, and, as such, can never be intentional.

(88) a. **INTENTIONAL VERB WITH “ANIMATE” AGREEMENT**

\[
\nabla (\text{feel.well})^3_{-\text{PRX} = \text{AN.SG woman}}
\]

‘This woman feels well’

(Presented to S2)

b. **INTENTIONAL VERB CANNOT HAVE “INANIMATE” AGREEMENT**

\[
\n\ast (\text{feel.well})^0_{-\text{PRX} = \text{IN.SG shoe}}
\]

‘This shoe feels well’

(Presented to S2)
If “Obviatives” are the contextual equivalent to “Inanimate” nominals, they should show a similar kind of restriction. However, unlike “Inanimate” nominals, this restriction should be conditioned by the intentional properties of the referent within the context, not conditioned by any intentional properties inherent in the referent.

Consider verbs that introduce intentional content: psych verbs (§3.4.11) and speaking verbs (§3.4.12). Denoting intentional events (cf. Banfield 1982, Bouchard 2005), verbs of this kind introduce a context that is not consonant with the meaning of obviation’s eventive extentionality: the verb’s experiencer is intentional (i.e. they have a perspective and there is a proposition evaluated as true/false within it), but the referent, lacking a perspective (being extentional), can not be intentional. In fact, this is exactly what we find; “Obiative” constructions cannot freely occur with intentional predicates.

3.4.11. “Obiative” referents are restricted with psych verbs

As we saw in Chapter 2, a Speaker is able to use a psych verb to ascribe an intention to some referent. In Plains Cree, some psych verbs are lexically-specified, employing a root that holds inherent intentional content (89). Here, the root kisi- carries the semantics of ‘angriness’ in (89a), and the stem pôme- carries the meaning of disappointedness or discouragement in (89b).

(89) a. Root kisi- = ‘angriness’

\[
\begin{align*}
\ldots , & \ 
\text{\ldots, namôy wihkâc aya nôh-kisi} & \text{stawâw} & \text{nî-kâwiy} , \ 
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{name} & \text{ever \ \ conn \ l- \ rr-\text{angry} = \text{appli-dir} - 3 \ 1- \text{mother}} \\
\ldots , & \ 
\text{\ldots, I never stayed angry at my mother …’} \quad (\text{EM 1997:§19})
\end{align*}
\]

b. Root pôme- = ‘disappointedness’

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{\text{\ldots, \ş-kî-mâna-mitoni-pôme}cik, \ldots} \\
\text{\text{\ldots, \ş-kî-mâna} - \text{mitoni-pôme - t-ik}} \\
\text{\text{c1-prev-usual - very - be.disappointed -3-pl}} \\
\text{They used to be very disappointed …’} \quad \text{(EM 1997: §69)}
\end{align*}
\]

Other psych verbs are built using one of Plains Cree’s ‘finals’ or ‘manner suffixes’ (cf. Wolfart 1973, Hirose 2000), in particular -êyi- / -êyiht-/ -êyimo ‘by mind’.\(^{14}\) In (90), the final –êyiht in

\(^{14}\) Wolfart (1973), among others, treats this as two morphemes, -êyi- plus -m/-ht. The differences are not here relevant. However, the division into two morphemes may help explain –êyimo-, which could then be taken to have the common AI final –mo– in it.
(90a) and –ēyimo in (90b) contribute a psychological meaning to the roots, building a verb that conveys a mental property of its subject.

(90)  a. Final –ēyiht = ‘MENTAL STATE’

\[
\begin{align*}
\n\n&\n\n\n\n\end{align*}
\]

\`e-wanēyih\textsubscript{t}hik anim \textsubscript{aya}, …
\`e- wan=ēyih\textsubscript{t} -am-k-ik an- ima \textsubscript{aya}
c1-lose=by.mind.Ti-Ti -0-PL DST-IN.SG CONN
‘their minds are blurred …’  

(EM 1997: §36)

b. Final –ēyimo = ‘MENTAL STATE’

\[
\begin{align*}
\n\n&\n\n\n\n\end{align*}
\]

\`a-oh-ki- tēp =ēyimo -t ka- kihci-wiki -m -it
c2-rr -PREV-enough=by.mind.AI-3 fut-great-reside-DISJ-3>1
‘…, since he had been willing to marrying me; …’  

(EM 1997: §42)

Additional elements, called ‘preverbs,’ can also be affixed to the stem to convey these kinds of meanings. Here, the preverb nōhtē- adds the meaning that the verb’s agent desires the event to happen in (91a), and the preverb wī- in (91b) adds the meaning that the speaker intends for the event to happen.

(91)  a. Preverb nōhtē- = ‘WANT’

\[
\begin{align*}
\n\n&\n\n\n\n\end{align*}
\]

konit êkwa êkota ê-mātoyân êkwa ê-nōhtē-kiwîyân, …
konita êkwa êkota ê- māto-yân êkwa ê- nōhtē-kîwê -yân
just then there cl-cry -1 and cl-want- go.home-1
‘And there I was, I just cried and wanted to go home, …’  

(EM 1997: §3)

b. Preverb wī- = ‘INTEND’

\[
\begin{align*}
\n\n&\n\n\n\n\end{align*}
\]

māka ninikihkwak ê-wī-nanahihtawâkik ê-sīhkimicik, …
māka nī-nikihkwak-ak ê-wī- nanah=ih\textsubscript{t}aw-ak-ik
but 1- parent -pl c1-intend-respect=by.ear.ta-1>3-pl
ê-sīhk =im -it -ik
c1-ad\textsubscript{v}ise=by.mouth.ta-3>1-pl
‘But I was going to obey my parents when they urged me, …’  

(EM 1997: §3)

As this survey shows, Plains Cree has several different formal strategies in its verbal system for constructing psychological predicates.
When obviation is tracked with respect to these forms in two texts (Ahenakew 2000, Minde 1997), the following generalization emerges: the experiencer of an intentional state is almost always non-“Obviative.” For example, this holds for psych verbs constructed from the finals –êyim/–êyiht/–êyimo, as shown in Table 3.12.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>êyim-</th>
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<th>êyiht-</th>
<th></th>
<th>êyimo-</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANIM</td>
<td>OBV</td>
<td>ANIM</td>
<td>OBV</td>
<td>ANIM</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minde</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Ahenakew</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.12. Summary for psych verbs built with –êyim/–êyiht/–êyimo

“Obviative” referents are also restricted with verbs that carry intentional content in other ways (including: kost- ‘fear,’ miyawât- ‘enjoy it,’ kisiwâsi- ‘be angry,’ kitimâkinâso- ‘look on oneself with pity,’ nisitoht(aw)- ‘understand it/him/her,’ yawêsi- ‘be full of anger,’ nêpêwisi- ‘be ashamed,’ kisistaw- ‘be angry with him/her,’ akâwât- ‘desire/lust for it/him/her,’ pômê- ‘be discouraged,’ pakwât- ‘hate it/him/her,’ atamih- ‘make him/her grateful,’ sasihciwih- ‘make him/her ashamed,’ kîhkih- ‘bother him/her,’ kisiwâh- ‘make him/her angry,’ mâkoh- ‘trouble him/her,’ and paciyawêh- ‘anger him/her with speech’), as shown in Table 3.13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ANIM</th>
<th>PSYCH</th>
<th>OBV</th>
<th>PSYCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minde</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahenakew</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.13. Summary of other psych verb forms

Verbs modified by the preverbs wî- ‘intend to’ and nôhtê- ‘want to’ also are restricted in their occurrence with “Obviative” referents, as shown in Table 3.14.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>nôhtê-</th>
<th></th>
<th>wî-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANIM</td>
<td>OBV</td>
<td>ANIM</td>
<td>OBV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minde</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahenakew</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.14. Summary of preverb forms

Altogether, the total distribution of “Obviative” verbs with psych verbs shows that the experiencer of an intentional state is almost never “Obviative.”

---

15 The counting of ‘words’ is a problematic notion in Plains Cree (as elsewhere). The totals are meant to give the reader a rough idea of corpus size.
### Table 3.15. A Summary of psych verbs in 3 texts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ANIM Psych</th>
<th>OBV Psych</th>
<th>WORD COUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minde</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahenakew</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitecalf</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data confirms that there is a restriction on the co-occurrence of “Obviative” referents with psych verbs in Plains Cree – something that is expected if “Obviative” is a contextual form of “Inanimate”.

Notice that there are cases of “Obviative” arguments for psych verbs – a total of 24 cases in the three texts. While these cases may appear to contradict the generalizations of this section, they in fact do not. However, understanding these cases requires a close consideration of the context of obviation, and I therefore defer a discussion of them until section 3.5. There, it will be shown that “Obviative” referents can only be connected with psych verbs if the Speaker does not take responsibility for the assignment of this intentional property.

#### 3.4.12. “Obviative” referents are restricted with speaking verbs

Verbs that refer to acts of speaking show properties similar to verbs of thinking and feeling. This has been documented for numerous languages, including English (Ross 1970), German (Schulz & Griesbach 1965), Mandarin (Li & Thompson 1981, Huang 1981), Romance (Hahn 1952, Farkas 1992), and Greek (Goodwin 1875), and relates to the classic Latin categorization of complementation in terms of _verba sentiendi_ and _dicendi_ ‘verbs of thinking and speaking’ (Hahn 1952, etc.). Banfield (1982) explains: “We can consider communication verbs as a subset of consciousness verbs – communication implies consciousness of what is being communicated.” In both the case of psych verbs and speaking verbs, the agent performing the action must have an intention, else the action cannot be performed; Jane cannot think if she has no thoughts, cannot feel if she has no feelings, and neither can she be said to speak if she has no intentions.\(^\text{16}\) Within

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\(^{16}\) It is possible for a speaker to act as a medium for someone else’s message (e.g. a news anchor reading a teleprompter). If the audience understands this speech to not represent the speaker’s intention (an understanding rarely, if ever, achieved), then the intention relevant is that of the writer, not the speaker. This becomes relevant when we consider examples like _é-itwémakahk_ in Plains Cree (lit: ‘it said’), which inflects for an “Inanimate” actor (_-makan-k_). These forms are used when a referent either (i) chatters mindlessly (as in the rolling head in Chapter 3), or (ii) is simply a vehicle for someone else’s message (e.g. a pipestem or a tape recorder). In these cases, the referent performing the speech action has no intention, and is instead mechanically channeling the content of the speech from some other entity.
the current model, then, we can say that a Speaker is able to use a speaking verb to ascribe an intention to a referent. This makes speaking verbs a relevant area of investigation with respect to obviation, because “Obviative” is here taken to be contextual extensionality (i.e. the contextual lack of an intention).

Plains Cree has several kinds of verbs that convey speech acts. Referents may speak to every one present or no one in particular. Either of these speech contexts is coded by the stem *itwê- ‘say so’* (cf. Mühlbauer 2007). This is the form most often used to introduce a direct quote, and the form itself appears to be recruited as a kind of quotative morpheme (Rhodes 2002, Blain et al. 2006, Blain & Déchaine 2007).

(92) **QUOTATIVE USE OF *itwê-*

a. “…” \( \Delta \text{dr'} \ \Delta \text{r'} \ \Delta \text{U} \cdot \circ \) \( \triangleleft \text{a} \cdot \triangleleft \text{b} \).

“…” ēkos is *itwêw* ana pawâkan.
ēkos isi \( \itw\=-w \) an-a pawâkan
so \( \text{thus thus=} \) 3 dst-AN.SG dream.spirit
“…” That is what that dream spirit **said.**

(Volunteered S4)

b. “\( \nabla \text{y} \cdot \circ \) ᐃ, \( \Delta \text{V} \cdot \circ \), \( \triangleleft \text{b} \), \( \nabla \text{r}^{\circ} \Delta \text{y} \) Debden …”

“pêyakwâw mîn,” *itwêw*, “aya, é-pôsikawiyân Debden …”
pêyakwâw mîna *itwê-w* aya, \( \text{é- pôs=} \) i-ikawi-yân Debden
once also **say-3** CONN C1-ride=CAUS-IMP -1 Debden
“Once also,” **he said**, “I was given a ride to Debden, …”

(AA 2000:§8.3)

When we consider verbs of speaking in Plains Cree, what we see is that “Obviative” referents almost never speak.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEXT</th>
<th>“ANIMATE”</th>
<th>“OBVIAVITE”</th>
<th>WORD COUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minde</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahenakew</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitecalf</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kâ-pimwêwêhahk</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.16. Speaking verbs and obviation**

Focussing on the intransitive verb *itwê-* ‘say so’ shows only one instance of an “Obviative” speaker across all texts considered (this one example, as well as the transitive cases, is discussed in section 3.5 below).
Table 3.17. Intransitive itwê- and obviation

The “Obviative” construction, then, is highly restricted in its distribution with intransitive verbs of speaking.

This ban on “Obviative” occurring with intransitive verbs of speaking is strong enough that it will often cause a previously “Obviative” referent to be shifted to “Animate.” This can create a rapid-fire succession of shifts in the coding for a referent. For example, in a story by Alice Ahenakew, she and her husband Andrew go to visit her sister-in-law and her brother-in-law. In these events, the sister-in-law is “Animate” and the brother-in-law is “Obviative” when she is bad-tempered, gives dirty looks, and talks to Andrew Ahenakew about the brother-in-law (lines vi-x). When the brother-in-law begins telling his story, he is shifted from his status as “Obviative” to become a simple “Animate”, intransitive speaker.

Table 3.18. “Obviative” refers and speaking in a text

Thus, a shift in referent class from “Obviative” to “Animate” has occurred simply because there has been a change in speaker.

We see a similar pattern for intransitive speaking verbs in elicitation, where a consultant refused to accept any intransitive speaking verbs marked for obviation (94).

---

17 Thanks to Inge Genee (p.c.) for this observation.
The speaker’s reasons for rejecting this sentence are illuminating: “If we use ‘ê-twêyit,’ it would be more like a recording, something coming off of an answering machine. It doesn’t sound like it’s coming from a person. Maybe it if was a big committee.” This response suggests that the “Obviative” referential class has a strong meaning of ‘mechanical or impersonal speech’ (i.e. unconscious speech); something that shows a close parallel to the content of “Inanimate” referents considered in Chapter 2.

Summarizing the patterns for intransitive verbs, we see the following generalizations:

(i) “Obviative” speakers are almost non-existent.

(ii) When a referent begins to speak, they are shifted out of the “Obviative” category.

(iii) Verbs of speaking with “Obviative” referents are interpreted as (infelicitous) mindless, mechanistic activities.

These generalizations show that speaking verbs, as a means of assigning an intention to a referent, pattern with verbs of feeling. “Obviative” referents are contextually extentional and thus cannot be assigned intentions.

3.4.2. “Obviative” referents lack awareness

The concept of awareness inherently requires a relation between a perspective and a spatio-temporal context associated with the referent that has this perspective. For example, I could be said to be aware of the sunshine at Eau Claire Dells today if I have a perspective about it and I have a spatio-temporal relation to it during that perspective possession (e.g. I am at Eau Claire Dells, I see and feel the sunshine, and I have a perspective about the sunshine). If I lack either (i) a spatio-temporal relation to this situation, or (ii) an perspective on this situation, I cannot be said to have awareness during that situation. For example, if I am in Vancouver during this sunshine, I can have all the perspectives I want about it, but cannot be said to be aware of it. Likewise, were I to go to Eau Claire Dells and drink two 24-packs of Leinenkugels, I would have a spatio-temporal relation to the situation of it being sunny there, but no associated perspective on it. This means that a spatio-temporal relation is a necessary, but not sufficient condition on awareness; if
I do not have a spatio-temporal relation, I cannot be aware, but if I have a spatio-temporal relation, I may still not be aware. Awareness entails a spatio-temporal relation, but a spatio-temporal relation does not entail awareness.

An “Obviative” referent is extentional in some context (\(\text{Ext}(x,C)\)). Given some context, this definition means that an “Obviative” referent should either (i) lack a spatio-temporal relation to the context, or, if the referent has a spatio-temporal relation to it, then (ii) the “Obviative” referent should have no perspective on it (i.e. they will not be intentional in that context). The data supports this expectation:

(i) A referent that has no spatio-temporal relation to a context will be obviated (§3.4.21).
(ii) When an “Obviative” referent has a spatio-temporal relation to the context, the “Obviative” referent is interpreted as having no intention in that context (§3.4.22).

### 3.4.21. If contextual absence, referent is “obviative”

Based on the definition of awareness given above, one way that a referent could lack an intention in a context is by not being present in the context. Lacking a spatio-temporal relation to the context, it would be hard for a referent to have any intentions associated with it.\(^{18}\)

When one of the referents involved in an event is not present for the event, that referent will invariably be obviated. For example, in a *kakêskîhkêmowin* ‘counselling speech’ given by kâ-pimwêwêhahk (JKN 1998), the Speaker keeps the old man and his father unmarked throughout a discussion of the counselling they gave him. The discourse structure is schematized in Table 3.19, which shows that the old man becomes “Obviative” when a referent that is present in the room is introduced (xii).

\(^{18}\) I am here avoiding the issue of chains of information. For example, if someone who is at Eau Claire Dells calls me and tells me it is sunny, I could be said to be aware of the situation there. As Cook and Mühlbauer (2007) have argued, this chaining of two presences together to create awareness is crucial to Plains Cree grammar.
Table 3.19. “Obviative” reference shifts when topic event shifts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>NON-OBV</th>
<th>OBV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>Father used to tell speaker things</td>
<td>Father</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>Speaker met old man</td>
<td>Old Man</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
<td>Old man reminds speaker of father’s words</td>
<td>Old man, Father</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv.</td>
<td>F tells speaker</td>
<td>Father</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v.</td>
<td>Old man tells speaker</td>
<td>Old Man</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi.</td>
<td>Old man is 88 years old</td>
<td>Old Man</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii.</td>
<td>Direct quote</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii.</td>
<td>Direct quote</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix.</td>
<td>Direct quote</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x.</td>
<td>Old man speaks</td>
<td>Old Man</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xi.</td>
<td>Speaker tells audience member about this when smoke</td>
<td>Audience member</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xii.</td>
<td>Speaker tells audience member what old man said</td>
<td>Audience member</td>
<td>Old Man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.19. “Obviative” reference shifts when topic event shifts

After he relates this conversation (i-x), the Speaker shifts to an event that has happened recently between him and an audience member (xi-xii).

(95)  
xii. \( \text{êkosi nitay-\textit{âcimostawâw ôôm éwak ôpîkiskwêwin}iwiw.} \)
\( \text{ekosi nit-ay -âcimo -staw-â -w aw -ima éwakw ó-pîkiskwê-w-in -yi-w} \)
\( \text{thus 1 -RED-tell.story-BEN-DIR-3 PROX-IN.SG resum 3-speak -3-NOM-DS-3} \)
\( \text{I was repeating his_{obv} words to him in this way.’ (Kâ-pimwêwêhahk 1998: 50.11-12)} \)

The change in the topic event is signalled here by the use of multiple devices in line (xi). First, the clause is begun with the cleft \( \text{éwak ôma ‘it is this one’ which is the Plains Cree equivalent to a paragraph marker (cf. Mühlbauer 2003, Wolvengrey 2007).} \) Then, the referent in the audience is picked out with a proximal deictic \( awa ‘this one’ that is in external sandhi with a locative expression \( ôta ‘here’ denoting the location of the Speaker. This is then combined with the particle \( anohc ‘now/today’ which picks out the speech time as the reference time. Finally, in line
(xii), an entire clause is used to set the time and place; ôta é-pihtwâyahk ‘here while we smoked.’ Thus, the event context has shifted from a recitation of events that are not spatially or temporally connected to the present circumstances to ones that are.

Now that the context has shifted to the speech situation, the suffix set -yî-w is affixed to the nominal pîiskwêwin ‘word.’ In Plains Cree, this construction is only used when the possessor is an “Obviative” referent (§3.3.3). In this context, the possessor is the Speaker’s teacher, who was not present for the event of the Speaker relating his speech. Thus, the teacher is obviated. This is in strong contrast to the equivalent treatment that both the teacher and the Speaker’s father received previously, where both were kept “Animate.” This is shown in the correlative structure in (96), where the the Speaker’s father is coded as “Animate” in the first clause, and the old man (awa kisêyiniw) is coded as “Animate” in the second clause.

(96) BOTH FATHER AND OLD MAN ARE “ANIMATE” AT SAME TIME

iv. ∇√˘b ∘  P / ∆’ / A ”CLΔ’, …
    pêyakwan kâ-ki-isi-wîhtamawit, …
    same C2-PREV-thus-tell=APPLIC-3>1
    ‘The same as he AN [my father] told me, …’

   v. ∇d’ / ∇ ∆’ / A ”CLΔ’ <5<P̂γσơ, …
    êkos ê-isi-wîhtamawit awa kisêyiniw,
    êkosê ë-isi- wîht=amaw-it aw =a kisê=iyiniw
    thus C1-thus-tell=APPLIC-3>1 PRX=SG.AN great=man
    ‘… thus the old man AN told me, …’

We can test this generalization in elicitation by constructing a parallel context. For example, suppose I am at a large family gathering at a house. Entering one room, I hear the local priest gossiping impolitely about my mother. After listening for a moment, I leave the room and go to another part of the house, where my mother and some of the other family is. Seeing me, someone in the family asks why I am annoyed. In explanation, I gesture at my mother and utter (97a) felicitiously. Here, ayamiyhêwiyiniw ‘the priest,’ which identifies the referent who was doing the gossiping, has the suffix –a attached, and the TA verb is coded with the inverse -ikw-. This signifies that this referent is “Obviative.” Crucially, I cannot, in this context, code nikâwiy ‘my mother’ as an “Obviative” referent, as in (97b).
(97) **Context: Mother is present, priest is absent**

a. **Mother is “Proximate” and Priest is “Obviative”**

\[ \nabla \rightdownarrow_{\text{g-d}} d' \sigma \Delta^+ <\Delta'_{\text{g-d}} \sigma < \]

è-mâmiskòmikot nikâwiy ayamihêwiyiniwa
è- mâmiskò=m -iko-t ni-kâwiy ayamihê-w-iyiniw-a
cl-talk =by.mouth.ta-inv-3 1-mother pray -3-person-xt
‘The priest\textsubscript{OBV} is talking about my mother\textsubscript{PROX}’ (Presented S2, S3)

b. **Priest is “Proximate” and Mother is “Obviative”**

\[ \# \nabla \rightdownarrow_{\text{g-d}} d' \sigma \Delta^+ <\Delta'_{\text{g-d}} \sigma < \]

è-mâmiskòmât nikâwiyi ayamihêwîniw
è- mâmiskò=m -â-t ni-kâwiy-a ayamihê-w-iyiniw-a
cl-talk =by.mouth.ta-dir-3 1-mother XT pray -3-person-xt
‘The priest\textsubscript{PROX} is talking about my mother\textsubscript{OBV}’ (Presented S2, S3)

In explanation, the consultant explicitly noted that my mother was in the room, that I was explaining why I was angry, and that I had gestured at her before talking. Thus, I had set the context as the here and now of Speech Time; a context that the priest had no spatio-temporal relation to (i.e. he was absent for it), but my mother did. Further, I am speaking to a group that includes my mother; assuming she hears me, she must have an intention associated with speech time.

Suppose that we alter the situation so that the event I am discussing is occurring while I am speaking, in the same place I am speaking in. Instead of finding him in one room and going to another room, my mother and the priest are both at the dinner table. The priest is at one end of the table, and my mother is at the other. I again hear the priest talking about my mother and become annoyed. Someone asks me why I look annoyed. In this context, the utterance in (98a) is not felicitous, because it codes nikâwiy ‘my mother’ as “Proximate” and ayamihêwîniw ‘the priest’ as “Obviative.” By contrast, I can utter (98b) felicitously, which codes nikâwiy ‘my mother’ as “Obviative” and ayamihêwîniw ‘the priest’ as “Proximate.”

(98) **Context: Priest is present, Mother is absent**

a. **Mother is “Proximate” and Priest is “Obviative”**

\[ \# \nabla \rightdownarrow_{\text{g-d}} d' \sigma \Delta^+ <\Delta'_{\text{g-d}} \sigma < \]

è-mâmiskòmikot nikâwiy ayamihêwîniw
è- mâmiskò=m -iko-t ni-kâwiy ayamihê-w-iyiniw-a
c1-talk =by.mouth.ta-inv-3 1-mother pray -3-person-xt
‘The priest\textsubscript{OBV} is talking about my mother\textsubscript{PROX}’ (Presented S2, S3)
b. PRIEST IS “PROXIMATE” AND MOTHER IS “OBVIATIVE”

\[ \text{ê-mâmiskô=m-â-t ni-kâwiy-a ayamihê-w-iyiniw} \]
\[ c1 \text{-talk} = \text{by.mouth.TA-DIR-3 1-mother-XT pray -3-person-XT} \]
\[ \text{‘The priest \text{PROX} is talking about my \text{mother}_\text{OBV}’} \]  

(The Presented S2, S3)

The priest, having a spatial-temporal relationship to the context and an intention (see section 3.4.12 on speaking verbs), cannot be said to be unaware of the event, and thus must not be obviated. By contrast, my mother does not know about the gossiping (the event that sets the context), and thus has no intention associated with the context.

### 3.4.22. An “obviative” referent that is present is unaware

An “Obviative” referent has no intentional state relevant to the context. For example, in a simple transitive sentence with minimal contextual support, speakers often respond that the obviated referent is not aware that the event is happening.

(99) \[ \text{ê-wâpamât nápêw iskwêwa} \]
\[ c1 \text{-see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 man woman-XT} \]
\[ \text{‘The man \text{PROX} saw the woman \text{OBV}.’} \]  

(Presented S3)

Here, one speaker (S3) explained, “It’s like the woman doesn’t even know that she’s being seen.” This means that the obviation of iskwêw ‘woman’ causes the speaker to judge that referent has no relevant intentional state.

If we change iskwêw ‘the woman’ to “Proximate” and instead code nápêw ‘the man’ as “Obviative,” we get a concurrent alteration in judgments. Here, one speaker (S2) suggested that the sentence meant that the woman was now talking to the speaker, about this man who was staring at her.

(100) \[ \text{ê-wâpamikot nápêw iskwêw} \]
\[ c1 \text{-see=by.eye.TA-INV-3 man -XT woman} \]
\[ \text{‘The man \text{OBV} saw the woman \text{PROX}.’} \]  

(Presented S2)

That is, the consultant has shifted the context to one involving the Speaker and the woman, neither of whom know anything about why this man is doing this.
A referent cannot be coded as “Obviative” in an event that they are both present for and must be intentional in. Recall from the discussion of intransitive speech verbs (section 3.4.12. above) that an intransitive verb of speaking does not easily accept “Obviative” arguments. Here, the referent Martha has been coded as “Obviative”, via the affixation of –a to her name (Marthawa), and the use of a TA direct verb form (kiyokawâ-).

(101) **Speaking Referent Cannot be “Obviative”**

\[\text{Clare} \quad \text{kiyokawât~Marthawa~piponiyik.} \quad \text{“nimiywêyihten ôma,”~ê-itwêyît.} \]

\[\text{Clare} \quad \text{kiyokaw-â~Martha-a~ê~pipon-} \quad \text{yi-k.} \]

\[\text{Clare c1-visit} \quad \text{-DIR-3~Martha-XT~c1-winter-DS-0} \]

\[\text{Clare\textsubscript{prox} went to visit Martha\textsubscript{obv} during the winter.’} \]

According to one consultant (S2), maintaining this referent’s “Obviative” status is unacceptable with the subsequent intransitive speech verb (itwê-), because it would suggest that “it would be more like a recording, something coming off of an answering machine. It doesn’t sound like it’s coming from a person.” Instead, the speaker requires that Martha be switched to an “Animate” referent, with the repetition of a kin-term used to aid reference-tracking (§4.4.1).

(102) **Subjects of Intransitive Verbs of Speaking Must be “Animate”**

\[\text{i. Clare} \quad \text{kiyokawât~Marthawa~piponiyik.} \quad \text{…”} \]

\[\text{Clare\textsubscript{prox} went to visit Martha\textsubscript{obv} during the winter.’} \]

\[\text{ii. “sigma+sigma Upsilon Delta,” Delta.} \]

\[\text{“Older sister! I am happy about this,” she said.’} \]

In light of the facts about obviation and awareness, we can now understand why this is; since the context is set as Clare’s visit home, a context that Martha was present for, the use of obviation for Martha would mean that she had no intention associated with the context that she is speaking in (hence the ‘mechanical’ interpretation).
3.4.3. The emergence of “proximate” via contrast with “obviative”

As we have seen, utterances involving only a single “Animate” third person are unspecified for intentional properties.

(103) “ANIMATE” REFERENT IS UNSPECIFIED FOR INTENTIONALITY

\[
\begin{align*}
\sigma &= \text{\textit{niwâpamâw ana awâsis.}} \\
i-nâp &= \text{\textit{nâpêwa iskwêw,}} \\
\text{\textit{I see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 DST=AN.SG child}} & \text{ (Presented S2)} \\
\text{\textit{I see that child,}} & \text{ (Presented S2)}
\end{align*}
\]

COMMENT (S2): “I don’t know if this child knows anything about this or not.”

However, there are particular contexts in which an “Animate” referent will suddenly appear to have crucial intentional information ascribed to it. In the example in (104), the referent iskwêw ‘woman’ is the object of an inverse-marked TA verb ê-wâpamikot ‘he\textsubscript{OBV} sees her\textsubscript{PROX},’ and has no nominal marking. Speakers (e.g. S2) respond that, “In [104], it seems like you’re hearing what the woman has to say about it. She could be saying ‘the man is looking at me.’”

(104) “ANIMATE” REFERENT GAINS INTENTIONS IN CONTEXT OF “OBVIATIVE”

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{\textit{The man\textsubscript{OBV} saw the woman\textsubscript{PROX}.}} & \text{ (Presented S2)} \\
\text{\textit{The woman is talking here.}} & \text{ (Presented S2)}
\end{align*}
\]

Lacking both a speaking verb and a previous speaking context, there must be something else in the sentence that conveys that the woman is speaking and possessing a perspective (i.e. is intentional).

If only the “Obviative” referent has any content, how could the “Animate” form here seem to have intentional content? In this section, I argue that this reflects the contrastive relationship between the “Obviative” and the unspecified “Animate” classes. When a simple “Animate” can be set up in contrast to the “Obviative,” this gives rise to a meaning for the simple “Animate” that is the opposite of “Obviative.” The intentional “Proximate” referent emerges from this contrast (Wolfart 1973, 1978).

The “Animate” form has no inherent meaning of its own, but can acquire a meaning in the context of a contrast with the “Obviative.” This contrast can be shown either overtly, through
the opposition of two referents (§3.4.31.), or covertly, through the choice of one class of referent over the other (§3.4.32.).

3.4.31. “Obviative” as context for “proximate”

As we have just seen, when an “Animate” referent interacts with an “Obviative,” the “Animate” referent is judged to be intentional. One way to see this effect in full operation is to take a natural discourse involving a human and an animal and reverse the “Obviative”/ “Proximate” reference. A discourse of this kind can be found in Alice Ahenakew’s narrative of an elderly couple surviving starvation by shooting a goose through the smoke hole of their tipi (Ahenakew 2000:§9). In its original structure, this story involves a simple-“Animate” man shooting an “Obviative” goose (105).

(105) “Proximate” man shoots “Obviative” goose

i. \(\text{PROXIMATE} \text{ MAN SHOOTS OBVIATIVE} \text{ GOOSE} \)

ii. \(\text{very} \text{ evid} \text{ c2-slow.person=AI-3} \text{ EVID c1-rr=by.crawling.AI-3} \text{ door} \text{ LOC}

iii. \(\text{he} \text{ AN was very slow in crawling to the door,} \)

iv. \(\text{he} \text{ PROX killed one OBV and it OBV came falling down.'} \text{(Ahenakew 2000:§9.8)} \)

Here, nâpêw ‘the man’ is treated as the “Animate” referent and niska ‘the goose’ is treated as “Obviative.” This is seen by the use of “Animate” verb forms for the man (e.g. kâ-yikicikâwit ‘he was crawling’), the use of TA direct verb forms when the man acts on the goose (e.g. kâ-
wâpamât ‘hePROX saw itOBV’), and “Obviative” forms for the goose (e.g. pé-nîhtakociniyiwa ‘itOBV came falling down’). This is summarized in Table 3.19.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>PROXIMATE</th>
<th>OBVIATIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>Man sees goose flying</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>Goose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>Man crawls to door</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
<td>Goose flies, Man shoots goose</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>Goose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv.</td>
<td>Man kills goose, it falls</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>Goose</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.20. Obviated animal in a story

If “Obviative” codes contextual extentionality, and “Animate” forms contrasted with it code contextual intentionality, switching the classes for the man and the goose in this story should result in an infelicitous interpretation; the goose would be telling the Speaker about an event of a man shooting it. To test this, I went through this story with a consultant (S2), condensing it into its essentials, and accommodating the consultant’s dialect differences at the same time. I then manipulated the “Obviative” and “Animate” coding to make the man “Obviative” and the goose “Animate.” This is done by changing the nominal modifiers for nâpêw ‘man’ to “Obviative” forms (e.g. anihi nâpêwa ‘that manOBV’ rather than ana nâpêw ‘that manAN’), using “Obviative” verb forms (e.g. ênôhtêkatêyit ‘heOBV was starving’), and using inverse verb forms when the man interacts with the goose (e.g. wâpmikow ‘heOBV sees itPROX’).

(106) “OBVIATIVE” MAN SHOOTS “PROXIMATE” GOOSE

i. ḟ destinations <σ><Δ V<γ< Π Gb Gγ.
   kâyas, anihi nâpêwa ênôhtêkatêyit.
   kâyas, an =ihi nâpêw-a ênôht=katê-iy-i-t.
   long.ago DST=XT man -XT C1-lack=eat -DS-3
   ‘In the past, this manOBV was hungry.’

ii. ḟ destinations <σ><γ d< Π G<γ< ΔγGx.
    môya kînwis wâpmikow piyësis ispimihk.19
    môya kînwis wâp=am -ikw-w piyësis ispim-ihk.
    NEG long.time see =by.eye.TA-INV-3 bird above-LOC
    ‘In a short while, heOBV saw a birdPROX up above.’

19 Two relevant notes on the data: (i) this Speaker (S2) regularly drops final pre-aspirated consonants, and (ii) the inverse form preferred here is the unexpected wâpmikow rather than the expected wâpamik (cf. Wolfart 1973).
iii. \( \forall \exists \wedge \neg x \cdot \exists \wedge p \rhd b \rhd \),
\[ \text{ê-otinamiyit opaskiskan,} \]
\[ \text{ê-ot =in -am-yi -t w-pask=is=ikan,} \]
\[ c1\text{-take}=by\text{-hand-TI} \quad =d=3 \text{-shoot}=by\text{-violence.TI}=NOM \]
\[ \text{‘He} \text{OBV took his gun,}’ \]

iv. \( \forall \forall \rhd \rhd \rhd \rhd \rhd p \rhd t \wedge p \rhd r \),
\[ \text{êkwa ê-pâskisokot piyêsis.} \]
\[ \text{êkwa ê-pâsk=isw -iko-t piyêsis and c1-shoot=by\text{-violence.TA-INF}-3 bird} \]
\[ \text{‘and he} \text{OBV shot the birdPROX’.} \]

(Translated from Cree to Cree by S2)

In this retelling, the man has been made “Obviative” and the bird has been made “Proximate.”

This is perfectly grammatical and was ruled well-formed by the Speaker. This is summarized in Table 3.20, which shows that the bird is now “Proximate” and the man is now “Obviative.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>“PROXIMATE”</th>
<th>“OBVIATIVE”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>Man is hungry</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>Man sees bird</td>
<td>Bird</td>
<td>Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
<td>Man takes gun</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv.</td>
<td>Man shoots bird</td>
<td>Bird</td>
<td>Man</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.21. Chart of obviation for modified re-telling

Although this short text is structurally well-formed, it meant something strange. As the Speaker (S2) said, while laughing, “You’re trying to say it from the point of view of the bird. You’d be understood that it’s from the point of view of the bird, but they [the elder Cree Speakers S2 knew in her life] would say ‘What the hell are you talking about?’ ‘You’re trying to talk about it from the bird’s point of view’.” Thus, the juxtapositioning of an “Obviative” form with a “Animate” one creates an intentional, perspectival “Proximate” referent out of the “Animate.”

There are also cases where the same referent shifts from one category to the other, creating a contrast in intentional content. For example, in Alice Ahenakew’s (Ahenakew 2000) telling of a windigo hunting a family friend, the windigo starts out as “Obviative.” Throughout the narrative, the windigo remains “Obviative”, until one crucial juncture in the story (107).

---

20 On some occasions, this Speaker lacks the “Obviative” form of possession and “Obviative” marking on TI verbs – this was one of those times. (See discussion in §5) Specifically, the expected “Obviative” forms ê-otinamiyit and opaskiskaniyiw were not offered here.

21 For those unfamiliar with windigos: windigos are typically described as ex-humans who have become supernatural by consuming raw flesh, usually human flesh (cf. Brightman 1994). They typically hunt people who have spiritual powers of some kind.

22 Examples like this, in which a nominal switches from “Obviative” to proximate across two clauses, are one of several good reasons why the theme sign system cannot be argued to produce the proximate-“Obviative” contrast in Plains Cree. Other evidence includes Alt forms (where obviation holds in a verb that lacks a theme sign), possessor uses (where obviation holds without a verb at all), and embedded clauses such as John niwîhtamâk Clara ê-akhosiyit
Here, the nominal wihtikow is “Obviative” in the first clause (107i), as it presses upon the family friend. In the clause immediately following, however, wihtikow has been stripped of its “Obviative” marking and is connected to a verb lacking the different-subject marker -yi-.

(107) **WINDIGO SHIFTS FROM “OBTIVATIVE” TO “ANIMATE”**

i. ... ∆ʰ=dx ᐆ a ᐪ ᐪ d''Δd’ <a’“∂ ∂.yaml<ψ ÇV,  
... iyikohk mâna ê-kî-ayi-mâkohikot anihi wihtikowa tâpwê,  
iyikohk mâna ê- kî- ayi- mako =h -iko-t an=ihi wihtikow-a tâpwê  
so.much usual C1-PREV-CONN-trouble=by.neut-INV-3 DST=XT windigo -XT true  
‘and hePROX [nēwâpisk] was truly pressed upon by that windigo_{obs} …’

ii. ... ∆ʰ ᐆ ᐪ ǂnûbû-J’ ᐆ a ᐪ a”∂<ŋ.  
... ê-kî- sâskatwêmo t mâna an-a wihtikow  
c1-PREV-scream -3 usual DST-AN.SG windigo  
‘… so much did that windigo_{prox} used to wail.’ (Ahenakew 2000:§1.3)

Going through this story with a native speaker (S2), this passage produced an interesting (and unexpected) result; upon hearing the second clause, the speaker exclaimed, “So she heard it too!! Oh my gosh!” She was emphatic that this structure meant that the Speaker (Alice Ahenakew) had heard this windigo herself. Thus, switching a nominal from “Obviative” to unmarked makes the referent in one context contrast with itself in another context. The windigo is here interpreted as “Proximate” as a function of a contrast with its “Obviative” form.

**3.4.32. Paradigmatic contrast of “animate” with “obviative”**

As Cook and Mühlbauer (2007) point out, there is another context in which the “Animate” form has a particular meaning; paradigms volunteered for coding a chain of information. One speaker (S4) volunteered a paradigm for the appropriate way to use grammatical devices to code the utterer’s spatio-temporal relationship to the referent (cf. Cook & Mühlbauer 2007). In this paradigm, the simple “Animate” form is used when the Speaker had direct contact with the referent (108a), while the “Obviative” form means that the Speaker did not have direct knowledge (108b).

‘John_{prox} told me that Clare_{obs} is sick.’ All of these are cases of proximate/”Obviative” contrast without a theme sign involved.

172
êkosi itwêw pawâkan. 
êkosi it =wê-w pawâkan
thus thus=AI-3 dream.spirit
‘That’s what the dream spirit<\textsubscript{AN} said.’ (Volunteered by S4)
= Speaker heard the dream spirit say it

êkosi ê-itwêyit pawâkana.
êkosi ê-itwê-yi-t pawâkan -a 
thus c1-say-DS-3 dream.spirit-XT
‘That’s what the dream spirit<\textsubscript{obv} said.’ (Volunteered by S4)
= Speaker heard about this from someone who did not witness it.

Here, the “Proximate” form correlates with the Speaker’s direct experience, and is the form used when the Speaker knows the referent’s intentional state.

To understand how these examples work, it is important to remember that a native speaker always knows what has not been said, as well as what has been said. In this set of examples, the choice between forms is unconstrained; the Speaker can choose either the simple “Animate” or “Obviative” construction. By choosing the “Animate” form, the Speaker is implicating that they have a reason for not doing this (i.e., is creating an implicature). Understanding this implication thus requires an evaluation of alternative forms—an operation that creates a contrastive relation between the simple “Animate” and “Obviative” forms. This gives rise to the intentional, “Proximate” interpretation of simple “Animate”.

3.4.4. Summary: “Obviative” as contextual extentionality

An “Obviative” bears contextual, extentional semantics. This is shown by sets of evidence:

(i) The distribution and interpretation of “Obviative” with verbs that ascribe intentional properties (§3.4.1.)

(ii) The distribution and interpretation of “Obviative” in contexts of awareness (presence/absence: §3.4.2.)

(iii) The ability of “Obviative” to contrastively create a contextually intentional referent, termed the “Proximate” (§3.4.3.)

I now turn to the contextual properties of “Obviative.”
3.5. The context of obviation: Speaker knowledge of intentions

As we have seen, a consideration of the content of obviation must constantly involve its context of use. Given the content of obviation, this inherent reference to context should not be surprising; an “Obviative” referent is extentional (i.e. lacks a perspective) in a context. Both the notion of “perspective” and, obviously, the notion of “context” entail that context is as crucial to understanding “Obviative” referents as either its form or content. In this section, I argue that the “Obviative” form is contextually extentional with respect to the Speaker’s perspective.

When a consultant is asked about the usage of “Obviative” constructions, a consensus emerges; as a Speaker, consultants always know what form to say in a given context, but, as a Hearer, they are not able to identify why someone else select a form. As an example, consider the following situation; the Speaker is standing outdoors, talking on a cellphone to her friend. She is standing near a low hill and some trees. There is a female stranger standing close by, who suddenly turns to the Speaker and complains that a man over beyond the hill is staring at her. The Speaker cannot see the man, but wishes to report this event to her friend on the phone. In such a context. In this context, the man must be “Obviative” and the woman who is telling the Speaker about it must be “Proximate,” as shown in (109).

(109) CONTEXT: UNKNOWN, OUT-OF-SIGHT MAN SEES WOMAN WHO TELLS SPEAKER

a. “OBVIATIVE” MAN AND “PROXIMATE” WOMAN
\[\Delta^{\scriptscriptstyle \text{\small \text{by.eye.TA-IN\textsuperscript{V}-3 woman man -}}\text{\small \text{XT}}}\]
\[\text{ê-wâp=am -ikw-t iskwêw nâpêw-a}\]
\[c1\text{-}\text{see=by.eye.TA-IN\textsuperscript{V}-3 woman man -}XT\]
‘A/the man\textsubscript{OBV} is seeing a/the woman\textsubscript{PROX},’ (Presented S2)

b. “PROXIMATE” MAN AND “OBVIATIVE” WOMAN
\[\#\Delta^{\scriptscriptstyle \text{\small \text{by.eye.TA-DIR-3 woman man -}}\text{\small \text{XT}}}\]
\[\#\text{ê-wâpamât nâpêw iskwêwa}\]
\[\text{ê-wâp=am -}ά t nâpêw iskwêw -a\]
\[c1\text{-}\text{see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 woman man -}XT\]
‘A/the man\textsubscript{PROX} is seeing a/the woman\textsubscript{OBV},’ (Presented S2)

In explaining this choice, consultants are confident about the judgment of felicity, and they appeal to the organization of the context – the woman is talking, the man is unknown. Suppose, now, that the speech roles are reversed, and the consultant is the hearer on the phone, not the Speaker of the sentence. She hears her friend utter the same sentence either (109a) or (109b). Suddenly, she is uncertain as to why the obviation pattern has been chosen this way, and the
clear felicity judgment evaporates. As the hearer, she cannot tell what information is being
coded in the “Obviative” “Proximate” chaining. If I ask consultants to think about it, all they
can offer is why they would say it that way, and what possible context configurations would lead
them to speak in that way. The “Obviative” construction, then, appears to place constraints on
speaking, but not on hearing.

In this section, I argue that this asymmetry between speaking “Obviative” forms and
hearing “Obviative” forms reflects a core property of obviation: a referent’s contextual
extensionality is evaluated within the perspective of the Speaker. Building on the model I
constructed for animacy (Chapter 2), I once again utilize a modified version of the Discourse
Representation Theory (DRT: Kamp 1981) model that was proposed by Farkas (1992). The
“Obviative” form places a restriction on embeddings; “Obviative” referents cannot possess a
perspective embedded within the Speaker’s. For example, an “Obviative” referent like iskwēwa
‘the woman’ in (110) cannot possess a perspective embedded inside the Speaker’s
perspective.

(110) a. “OBVIATIVE” WOMAN
\[ \nabla \rho_{fr} \Delta^q \lhd \cdot \]
\[ \ldots \text{ê-kinosiyit iskwēwa} \]
\[ \text{ê-} \text{kinw} = \text{si} - \text{yi} - \text{t iskwēw-a} \]
\[ c1\text{-}\text{long}= \text{AI-DS-3 woman-XT} \]
\[ ' \ldots (\text{as}) \text{the woman}_{\text{obv}} \text{ was tall.'} \] (Presented S3)

b. ILL-FORMED DRS: “OBVIATIVE” WOMAN HAS A PERSPECTIVE

Speaker <say>

\[ x \]
\[ \text{tall}(x) \] & [WOMAN HAS NO PERSPECTIVE]
\[ \text{woman}(x) \]
\[ \text{EXT}(x,C) \] & [WOMAN HAS A PERSPECTIVE]
\[ x <R> \]
\[ \text{tall}(x) \]

In the context of an extentional “Obviative” referent, the unmarked “Animate” form gains a
perspective in which the truth of the proposition can be evaluated. For example, the sentence in
(111) shows a “Proximate” iskwéw ‘woman’ set up in contrast to an “Obviative” awâsisâ ‘child_{OBV}.’ In this context, the woman can possess a perspective on the propositions associated with the child.

(111)  a. **Woman is “Proximate” and Child is “Obviative”**

\[
\begin{align*}
\n\n\end{align*}
\]

b. **Well-formed DRS: “Proximate” Woman Has a Perspective**

When an intentional ascription is made to an “Obviative” referent (e.g. with a verb of speaking, feeling, or thinking), this perspective is embedded within the “Proximate’s” perspective, rather than directly within the Speaker’s. For example, the form in (112a) shows an “Obviative” referent (awâsisâ ‘the child_{OBV}’) associated with a psych verb (ê-miywêyhtamiyit ‘s/he_{OBV} is happy about it_{IN}’). In this context, the “Obviative” child is allowed to possess a perspective, because it is embedded inside of the “Proximate” woman’s perspective (112b).
(112) a. “OBVIATIVE” REFERENT HAS INTENTION IN PERSPECTIVE OF “PROXIMATE"

… Capitals

The “Obviative” referent, then, is a distanced referent; one whose perspective can only be related to the Speaker’s through some intermediate embedding.

In order for this model to adequately cover the data, obviation must behave in a specific set of ways in a specific set of contexts:

(i) Because “Obviative” referents cannot possess a perspective embedded within the Speaker’s, “Obviative” referents should either be forbidden from speaking to the Speaker, or it should force a dissociative reading (Lakoff 1970). This is exactly the pattern of “Obviative” Speaker interactions (§3.5.1).

b. WELL-FORMED DRS FOR (112A): “OBVIATIVE” HAS A PERSPECTIVE EMBEDDED IN “PROXIMATE” PERSPECTIVE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker &lt;say&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C₀ x y z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>woman(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ext(y,C₀)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tell(x,S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ext(z)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x &lt;say&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>y z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>child(y)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>y &lt;like&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C₁ z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>like(y,z)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The “Obviative” referent, then, is a distanced referent; one whose perspective can only be related to the Speaker’s through some intermediate embedding.

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Because an “Obviative” referent’s perspective cannot be directly embedded in the Speaker’s perspective, an intermediary referent must always be present; even if none has been introduced. This pattern holds in Plains Cree (§3.5.2).

The prohibition of directly embedding the “Obviative’s” perspective in the Speaker’s means that “Obviative” referents share many properties in common with indirect evidentials, and thus ought to pattern closely with them. The evidence from Plains Cree confirms this (§3.5.3).

Across all of these contexts, then, we see that “Obviative” referents are systematically extentional with respect to the Speaker’s perspective.

### 3.5.1. “Obviative” perspectives force Speaker dissociation

“Obviative” referents cannot possess a perspective directly embedded inside of the Speaker’s perspective. If this is so, we expect that psych predicates that involve both the Speaker and an “Obviative” referent ought to be highly restricted. In particular, “Obviative” referents should not be able to speak directly to the Speaker, since this would create a perspective for the “obviative” referent within the Speaker’s perspective.

In all four texts I have considered (Ahenakew 2000, kâ-pimwêwêhahk 1998, Minde 1997, and Whitecalf 1993), only a simple “Animate” referent can speak to the Speaker, or in the Speaker’s hearing. By contrast, there are no cases of “Obviative” referents speaking to the Speaker, or being spoken to by the Speaker. Testing this in elicitation, we see that, although the grammar of Plains Cree allows for the construction of “Obviative” Speaker forms (cf. Wolfart 1973), they are consistently rejected by consultants when used with verbs of speaking.

(113) “OBVIATIVE” REFERENT INFELICITOUS SPEAKING TO SPEAKER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a.</th>
<th># σ (\Delta)&quot;CLd(\Delta)ª&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># niwíhtamâkoyiwa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ni-(wîht=amaw) -ikw-yi-w-a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l- (tell=APPLIC-INV-DS-3)-XT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intended: ‘S/he Obviative told me.’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Presented S2, S4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b.</th>
<th># (\nabla) (\Delta)&quot;CL(\Delta)ª&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># … (\tilde{e}-wíhtamawiyit)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\tilde{e}-wíht=amaw) -yi -it</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1-(tell=APPLIC-DS-3)&gt;1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intended: ‘s/he Obviative told me.’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Presented S2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is possible to construct a context for an “Obviative” referent speaking to the Speaker, but it requires a dissociative context, wherein the Speaker does not remember the event, or the event happened in some other world (Lakoff 1970). Consider the example in (114), where an “Obviative” referent (iskwêwa ‘a woman') speaks to the Speaker using a conjunct order verb inflected for obviation (ê-wihtamawiyit ‘she told me’). This utterance is well-formed only if indirect evidentials (e.g. êsa ‘reportedly’) are used and the Speaker was mentally incapacitated (e.g. unconscious) during the event and unable to remember it.

(114) “OBVIATIVE” REFERENTS CAN SPEAK TO SPEAKER WHO DOES NOT REMEMBER IT

... ∆^q<· \n \n ∆"^LΔr>’ \n Δ<\n, \n Δ<"d'r>’.

... iskwêwa ê-wihtamawiyit êsa, ê-ahkosiyit.

iskwêw-a ê-wiht=amaw -yi-it êsa ê-ahkosi -yi-t
woman-XT c1-tell =APPLIC-DS-3>1 EVID c1-be.sick-DS-3
‘… apparently, the woman told me she was sick.’ (Volunteered S2)

Within the current discussion, we can understand why this is. The form in (114) means that a woman that is obligatorily embedded with respect to some other referent said something to the Speaker (i.e. had Speaker-known intentions). That is, there must be an intercessory between the Speaker and the referent, but the sentence, coding an interaction between the “Obviative” referent and the Speaker, is implying that there is no intercessory. How could such a situation happen? The only contexts in which such a thing could even be imagined to occur would be one in which the Speaker was mentally incapacitated when the woman talked to them. It follows, then, that someone has told the Speaker about what this woman said – the Speaker does not know for themselves, being mentally incapacitated at the time. A context that supports an intermediary referent thus makes this form felicitous, where it could otherwise not be imagined.

3.5.2. “Obviative” perspectives force invented “proximate”

A context that lacks an intermediate referent to embed the “Obviative’s” perspective in forces an estrangement reading (e.g. the Speaker was unconscious). This is because the “Obviative” referent cannot have a perspective embedded within the Speaker’s.

Another logical possibility for fixing “Obviative” contexts is to invent a “Proximate” referent to host the “Obviative” referent’s perspective. This would solve the embedding problem in a different way; instead of the Speaker being mentally incapacitated, the “Obviative” referent’s perspective is embedded with respect to some unknown person.
In fact, there is evidence that Plains Cree makes use of this strategy systematically – out-of-the-blue “Obviative” referents are regularly accommodated by inventing “Proximate”'s.

There are a few occasions in elicitation settings in which the “Obviative” form can be considered without a “Proximate” form. For example, consider the example in (116). Without any discourse context, the referent *iskwêw* ‘woman’ must be coded as “Animate,” as in (116a), and an “Obviative” form as in (116b) is ruled infelicitous.

(116) **CONTEXT: OUT-OF-THE-BLUE**

a. Woman is “Obviative”

# iskwêwa ê-miyosiyt.
iskwêw-a ê-miyo =si -yi-t
woman-XT CL-good=AI-DS-3
‘The woman_{OBV} is beautiful.’ (Presented S2)
b. **Woman is “Animate”**

\[
\Delta \overset{\cdot}{\Delta} \quad \land \quad \Gamma \overset{\cdot}{\Gamma}'.
\]

iskwêw ê-miyosit.

iskwêw ê-miyo \(=si-t\)

\[ \text{woman } c1\text{-good}=ai-3 \]

‘The woman is beautiful.’

(Presented S2)

However, if we invent enough context, the “Obviative” form in (116b) can become acceptable. Consider a context in which I asked a consultant to picture that they had overheard (116b) at the next booth in a restaurant. The “Obviative” form of iskwêwa ‘woman\text{obv}’ is now felicitous.

(117) **Context: Overheard at a Restaurant**

a. **Woman is “Obviative”**

\[
\Delta \overset{\cdot}{\Delta} \quad \land \quad \Gamma \overset{\cdot}{\Gamma}'.
\]

iskwêwa ê-miyosiyit.

iskwêw-a ê-miyo \(=si\ -yi-t\)

\[ \text{woman-xt } c1\text{-good}=ai\text{-ds}-3 \]

‘...some guy’s woman\text{obv} is beautiful.’

(Presented S2)

**Comment** (S2): “They were talking about someone’s girlfriend.”

b. **Woman is “Animate”**

\[
\Delta \overset{\cdot}{\Delta} \quad \land \quad \Gamma \overset{\cdot}{\Gamma}'.
\]

iskwêw ê-miyosit.

iskwêw ê-miyo \(=si-t\)

\[ \text{woman } c1\text{-good}=ai-3 \]

‘...the woman\text{an} is beautiful.’

(Presented S2)

In such a context, the utterance was ruled felicitous, but with a crucial change in interpretation; the consultant (S2) explained that this form meant that “they were talking about someone’s girlfriend, or some man’s wife. It’s like saying ‘his woman is beautiful’ in English.” This means that the consultant has invented a “Proximate” referent; she does not know who this referent is, but she has to posit their existence for the form to be acceptable. Thus, the form is felicitous so long as the consultant can invent some unknown “Proximate” referent to fill the gap in the context.

Another example of this kind of invention was offered by a different consultant (S4) when explaining how to construct proper chains of information regarding dreams and prophecy (Cook & Mühlbauer 2007). This form employs an “Animate” intransitive verb form along with \(-yi\)- and a nominal marked with \(-a\); the referent nâpêw ‘man’ is “Obviative” (§3.3).
The consultant (S4) explained that this form could be felicitously uttered in a specific context: the Speaker had not heard about the event directly, but had instead heard about it from someone who had only heard about it second-hand.\(^{23}\)

Within the current model, we can understand why this construction requires this specific context. The verb \textit{itwē}-, being a speaking verb, is inherently intentional – it automatically assigns a perspective to its agent (§3.4.1). However, the referent doing the speaker is “Obviative.” Being “Obviative”, this referent’s perspective cannot be directly embedded under the Speaker’s. Instead, there must be some intermediary perspective – the implied source of this information for the Speaker. The use of this “Obviative” construction, then, inherently implicates an intermediate perspective between the Speaker’s and the “Obviative” referent’s.

### 3.5.3. Obviation patterns with indirect evidentiality

As we have just seen, a “Proximate” referent can be used to facilitate the assignment of a perspective to an “Obviative” referent. This “Proximate” referent can possess a Speaker-embedded perspective, and thus is able to host a perspective for the “Obviative” referent. Put another way, the “Proximate” referent can bear the burden of assertion for whatever intentions the “Obviative” referent has. This means that “Proximate” referents can serve as sources of information for the Speaker.

“Obviative” referents can’t possess a Speaker-embedded perspective. This means that anything that is held to be true in the “Obviative” referent’s perspective must not be directly dependent on the Speaker’s perspective. This means that the “Obviative” referent can never serve as a source of information to the Speaker.

\(^{23}\) I here avoid discussion of the required second-hand source; for a thorough discussion, see Cook & Mühlbauer (2007). Briefly, it is the combination of obviation and clause-typing that creates this intermediary “non-co-present” layer of experiential information. Since the current discussion is about obviation alone, the distinction between these two layers is not necessary.
At the core of this referential split is the concept of accessibility (cf. Kratzer 1981, 1991), which can be thought of as a partial ordering between the domains in which propositions are evaluated (cf. Stephenson 2007, Kratzer 1991). One domain is accessible to another domain if the second domain is ordered after it (119).

(119) \( x > y \) \( \rightarrow \) y is accessible to x

A partial ordering \( (x > y) \) is one part of the logic of part-whole relations (Link 1983); part-whole relations are a particular kind of partial orderings. Since perspectival embedding is a part-whole relation (perspective x is embedded within perspective y), then, it is also a partial-ordering. This means that accessibility relations hold between perspectives.

Under this logic, the “Proximate” referent’s perspective, being embedded directly within the Speaker’s, is accessible to the Speaker’s perspective. The “Obviative” referent’s perspective, however, is embedded inside of some other perspective, which is not directly accessible to the Speaker, but is instead mediated by a middle perspective (the “Proximate”’s). More formally, we can define this as the Accessibility Condition, as in (120).

(120) ACCESSIBILITY CONDITION: A perspective \( \psi_2 \) is accessible to another perspective \( \psi_1 \) iff \( \psi_2 \) is embedded inside \( \psi_1 \) and there are no intervening embeddings between \( \psi_2 \) and \( \psi_1 \).

Following this condition, propositions contained within a single embedding are accessible x.

(121) \((\Psi,x) > (\Psi,y) : (\Psi,y) ACCESSIBLE TO (\Psi,x)\)

By contrast, propositions embedded more than one layer inside of x’s are not accessible to the x.
If we take the outermost box to always be the Speaker, then this Accessibility Condition provides a model of Speaker knowledge. “Obviative” perspectives must always be embedded more than one layer away from the Speaker’s, while “Proximate” referents can be directly embedded. This sets up a set of accessibility relations between referent’s perspectives; the “Obviative”’s perspective is not accessible to the Speaker, while the “Proximate” referent’s is.

This means that all “Obviative” perspectives are only taken by the Speaker to be contingently true; they are only true contingent on their being true in some intermediate person’s perspective. Multiple embeddings, then, must be processed as chains of information (Landman 1986); accessibility to one referent’s perspective is used to carry the evaluation of the proposition forward to the Speaker’s perspective.
Accessibility, then, is a condition on the relations between embedded perspectives.\textsuperscript{24}

Given an organization of reference into “Proximate” referents (Speaker-accessible asserters), and “Obviative” referents (Speaker-unknown referents), we expect a particular set of effects with respect to grammatical forms that code the Speaker’s relation to the truth of a proposition, typically called evidentials (cf. Garrett 2001, Aikhenvald 2004, Blain & Déchaine 2007, etc.). “Proximate” referents, being able to possess perspectives directly accessible to the Speaker’s, ought to have direct evidential force; the Speaker ought to have direct, certain knowledge of propositions that are held to be true in this referent’s perspective. By contrast, “Obviative” referents, being unable to possess perspectives directly accessible to the Speaker’s, ought to have indirect evidential force. There are three kinds of evidence that support this expectation in Plains Cree:

(i) With psych verbs, which are inherently intentional, “Obviative” referents require indirect evidentiality coding, while “Proximate” referents do not (§3.5.31).
(ii) With speaking verbs, the Speaker can have direct evidence for a “Proximate”’s speech act, but can only have indirect evidence for an “Obviative” referent’s (§3.5.32).
(iii) “Obviative” referents pattern closely with indirect evidential markers like \textit{ësa} (§3.5.33).

Evidentials code the relation between the perspective in which the proposition is true and the Speaker’s perspective, whereas obviation codes a referent’s ability to possess a Speaker-known perspective. Both kinds of coding work together to connect the Speaker’s perspective to that in which the proposition is true; obviation introduces the referents whose perspectives are considered, and evidentiality qualifies the Speaker’s relation to those worlds.

\textsuperscript{24} As discussed in §1.3.2, the current model differs from standard DRT in that it does not allow referents to be carried into embedded boxes. This is necessary both for the correlation between a DRS and a perspective, and for these accessibility relations to hold.
3.5.31. “Obviative” psych arguments and indirect knowledge

When we considered the correlation between obviation and psych verbs, we found that there was a strong correlation between psych verbs and obviation; an “Obviative” referent is almost never the experiencer of a psychological state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ANIM Psych</th>
<th>OBV Psych</th>
<th>WORD COUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>95</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12,900</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ahenakew</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.15. (Repeated): A Summary of psych verbs in 3 texts

While this finding is quantitatively significant, it is not qualitatively so; there are 24 cases of “Obviative” experiencers with psych verbs. If there was nothing else to be said about these 24 cases, we would have to conclude that there is a qualitative problem with the analysis. However, upon closer inspection, it is apparent that these 24 cases in fact support the generalization, rather than controvert it.

When we consider these few cases of “Obviative” arguments for psych verbs in more detail, definite patterns emerge: “Obviative” referents can be used with psych verbs if either (i) an evidential is used, (ii) an irrealis construction, or (iii) the authority for the sentence has been established as someone other than the Speaker.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EVIDENTIAL</th>
<th>IRREALIS</th>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obv Psych</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.22. Categorization of “obviative” with psych verbs

For example, the sentence in (125) has an “Obviative” argument for the psych verb itëyihtäm ‘think thus of it,’ and employs an overt evidential morpheme êtokwë.

(125) EVIDENTIAL WITH “OBYVIATIVE” SUBJECT OF PSYCH VERB

... Ñ  pó Ñqë- Ñì  Ñì ÑÌëñ ôçúp', ...
..., ê-kì-êtokwë-aya-itëyihtamiyit, ...
ê- kì- êtokwë-aya- ìt =ëyiht -am-yï-t
C1-PREV-DUBIT-CONN-thus=by.mind.TI-TI-DS-3
‘...; he[obv] [her brother] must have thought …’

(EM 1997:§43)
In (126), we see an example where the event is coded as irrealis. In line (i), the verb 
miyawâtamiyit ‘they are happy’ has an “Obviative” subject (ayisyiniwa ‘people’) and is 
marked with the preverb ka-, which is used in contexts where the truth of the proposition is not 
asserted (‘averidical’ as in Cook 2008). In line (ii), the verb kakwâtakêyihtamiyit ‘they live in 
torment’ is negated with namôya ‘not’ and prefixed with the same preverb ka-.

(126) “Obviative” Subject of Psych Verb and Irrealis Marking

i. “ᑭᓭᒫᓂᑐᐤ ᖋᒪ ᖗᐦ ᖗᐦᓅ ᖋᒫᐦᑲ ᖋᒫᐦᑲ ᖗᐦᔙᐦᑖᒫᐦᑲ, ᖘ ᖗᐦᑲᓅ ᖋᒫᐦᑲᔙᐦᑖ,  ᖘ ᖗᐦᑲᓅ ᖋᒫᐦᑲᔙᐦᑖ, b ᖗᐦᔙᐦᑖᒫᐦᑲ,”  
“kisê-manitow ôm ê-kî-osîhât ayisyiniwa, ka-miyawâtamiyit, 
gentle-god PROX-IN.SG C1-PREV-make=by.neut-DIR-3 person -XT 
ka- miyawât -am-yi-t 
FUT-enjoy.TI-TI -DS-3  
“‘God_PROX has created man to be happy, …

ii. ᖗᐦᔙᐦᑖᒫᐦᑲ ᖘ ᖘᐦᑲᓅ ᖋᒫᐦᑲᔙᐦᑖᒫᐦᑲ;”  
namôy aya ka-kakwâtakêyihtamiyit;” 
namôya aya ka- kakwâtak=êyiht -am-yi-t 
NEG CONNECTIVE FUT-suffer =by.mind.TI-TI -DS-3 
…not to live in torment;”’  
(EM 1997:§37)

In (127), an “Obviative” argument (ayamihêwiskwêwa ‘nuns’) is the experiencer of a psych 
verb (atamihât ‘she_PROX pleased them’), and this “Proximate” third person has been established 
as the source of information on this state.

(127) “Obviative” Subject of a Psych Verb with Authority of “Proximate”

…, ᖗᐦᔙᐦᑖᒫᐦᑲᐦᓅ ᖘ ᖘᐦᑲᓅ ᖋᒫᐦᑲᔙᐦᑖᒫᐦᑲ,  
…, ayamihêwiskwêwa min êwako ê-kî-aya-atamihât, … 
ayamihêw=iskwêw-a mina êwako ê- kî- aya- atam=ih -â -t 
pray =woman-XT also RESUM C1-PREV-conn-please=CAUS-DIR-3 
‘…, and the nuns were happy with her_PROX, too; …’  
(EM 1997:§64)

Most often, several of these conditions are met. For example, there is evidential marking and a 
“Proximate” referent provides the information. Thus, in the example in (127), Emma Minde has 
already explicitly framed the story as coming from her Mother-in-law, and she then carries 
through with this indirect knowledge by marking the clauses relating to the events described as 
guesses (êtikwê) and reports (êsa) (cf. Blain et al. 2006), and keeping the experiencer of the 
intention as “Obviative” (ayamihêwiskwêwa). This is in line with Plains Cree ideals, which hold
the development and maintenance of chains of information as crucial to all discourse (cf. Kâ-pimwêwêhahk 1998, and Wolfart in Kâ-pimwêwêhahk 1998, Chapter 6).

From this closer look, we see that the cases of “Obviative” referents being associated with psych verbs are actually not exceptions to the generalization that “Obviative” referents are contextually extentional. In all these “Obviative” psych cases, the Speaker does not directly know the intentional state of the “Obviative” referent. Instead, this “Obviative” referent’s perspective is systematically distanced from the Speaker’s, either through (i) indirect evidential coding, (ii) a hypothetical, unknown future context (irrealis), or (iii) an intermediate referent (authority).

3.5.32. “Obviative” speakers and indirect knowledge

When we considered obviation with verbs of speaking, we saw that “Obviative” referents are highly restricted as speakers. In particular, intransitive verbs of speaking almost never had an “Obviative” argument associated with them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>itwê- ‘say’</th>
<th>“Animate”</th>
<th>“Obviative”</th>
<th>Word Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
<td>12,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahenakew</td>
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<tr>
<td>Whitecalf</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kâ-pimwêwêhahk</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.17. (repeated): Intransitive itwê- and obviation

In making this generalization, there were two significant gaps: (i) a qualitative gap, since there is one intransitive “Obviative” speaker, and (ii) a valency gap, since we did not consider transitive forms. When we turn our attention from the narrow, quantitative generalization for intransitive verbs to these two gaps, we find further evidence for the content and context properties of obviation; an “Obviative” referent can only speak if the Speaker has not hear it.

While the ban on “Obviative”’s occuring with intransitive speaking verbs is strong, it is not absolute. The only place I have ever located a textual example of this sort is in Kâ-pimwêwêhahk’s recounting of his father’s account of the signing of Treaty 6 (Kâ-pimwêwêhahk 1998:§6). In this example (128),
Here, the Speaker is reporting what his father told him about the speeches made during the signing of the treaty between the Plains Cree and the British – an event that happened before the Speaker was born. Crucially, this means that the Speaker has not witnessed this event of speaking. This is a second-hand narrative context, which parallels the quotative paradigm offered by one speaker (S4) to track sources of information (see section 3.5.2).

Here, the consultant explained that the “Obviative” form (ê-itwêyit nápêwa) would be used if the Speaker did not hear the speech themselves – the same context that the intransitive, “Obviative” speaker is appearing in the text in (128). This means that an “Obviative” referent can be the argument of an intransitive verb of speaking, so long as the Speaker has no direct knowledge of this event. Put another way, the “Obviative” referent can have a perspective only so long as it is not embedded immediately within the Speaker’s.

While intransitive speaking verbs are used when a referent speaks to whoever is present, referents may also speak to other people specifically, which calls for a transitive verb to be used. Most often, the verb used is either one composed of the relative root it- ‘thus’ as in (130), or the applicative form wihtamaw- ‘tell about’ as in (131).

---

25 In much of the rest of this passage, the Queen’s representative is proximate and occurs with intransitive speaking verbs. This is because this other speech is embedded inside the quotation of Kâ-pimwêwêhak’s father; e.g. ‘êkosi kî-itwêw, éwakw âwa kâ-kî-pimohêwêhâk wâháh kî-hotâwâh kî-tâwâh, …’ ‘Thus he spoke, the one who had come representing the Queen,” my late father used to say …’ (JK 1998:§6.5)
(130) *it- ‘SAY TO’*

a. $\Delta U^\circ$

*itèw

\( it \ -ê \ -w \)

\textit{thus-DIR-3}

‘s/he\textsubscript{PROX} said to him/her\textsubscript{OBV}:’  
(Presented \textit{S2})

b. $\ldots, \iota\nu\beta\cdot \subseteq\nu\gamma\epsilon\cdot \n\phi \cdot \n\nu\nu\nu\nu\cdot \iota\nu\epsilon\cdot \n\phi \cdot \Delta \zeta, \ldots$

\( \ldots, \quad \textit{sôskwâc ayisiiniwa} \quad \textit{ê-kî-pêhtawak} \quad \textit{mân} \quad \textit{ê-kî-itât}, \ldots \)

\( \textit{sôskwâc ayisiiniw-a} \quad \textit{ê-kî-} \quad \textit{pê} \quad \textit{=htaw} \quad \textit{=ak} \quad \textit{mân} \quad \textit{ê-kî-} \textit{it-â-t} \)

\( \text{simply person} \quad \text{-xt} \quad \textit{C1-PREV=toward=by.ear.TA-1>3 usual} \quad \textit{C1-PREV=thus-DIR-3} \)

‘I heard him say to anybody, “…”’  
(Minde 1997:§43)

(131) *wihtamaw- ‘TELL ABOUT’*

a. $\Delta \iota\nu\beta\cdot \n\nu\gamma\epsilon\cdot \n\phi \cdot \n\nu\nu\nu\nu\cdot \iota\nu\epsilon\cdot \n\phi \cdot \Delta \zeta$

\( \textit{wihtamawêw} \)

\( \textit{wiht=amaw} \quad \textit{-ê} \quad \textit{-w} \)

\( \textit{tell} \quad \textit{=APPLIC-DIR-3} \)

‘s/he\textsubscript{PROX} tells him/her\textsubscript{OBV} about it.’  
(Presented \textit{S2})

b. $\hat{\rho} \quad \Delta \iota\nu\beta\cdot \n\nu\gamma\epsilon\cdot \n\phi \cdot \n\nu\nu\nu\nu\cdot \iota\nu\epsilon\cdot \n\phi \cdot \Delta \zeta, \ldots$

\( \hat{\rho} \quad \textit{wiht=amaw-ê} \quad \textit{-w} \quad \textit{êsa} \quad \textit{ayisiiniwiw-a} \)

\( \textit{PREV=tell=appli} \quad \textit{-DIR-3 EVID} \quad \textit{person} \quad \textit{-xt} \)

‘He\textsubscript{PROX} had told the people\textsubscript{OBV}, “…”’  
(Minde 1997:§27)

In comparison to the intransitive form, the transitive forms show an almost even split between “Animate” and “Obviative” speakers. The form *it- ‘say to’* has a nearly even distribution of the two kinds of referents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>it- ‘say to’</em></th>
<th>ANIM &gt; OBV</th>
<th>OBV &gt; ANIM</th>
<th>WORD COUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Whitecalf</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Table 3.23. Transitive *it-* and obviation}

Mirroring this pattern, the verb *wihtamaw- ‘tell about’* also shows a more even split.
Table 3.24. Transitive wihtamaw- and obviation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>wihtamaw- ‘tell’</th>
<th>ANIM &gt; OBV</th>
<th>OBV &gt; ANIM</th>
<th>WORD COUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>1</td>
<td>10,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Whitecalf</td>
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<td>Ká-pimwêwêhahk</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

A consideration of these forms in more detail shows two related generalizations: (i) a “Proximate” referent speaks to an “Obviative” when the Speaker has heard the speech themselves, and (ii) an “Obviative” referent speaks to a “Proximate” when the Speaker only knows about it via the “Proximate” referent’s report.

As the counts above showed, a “Proximate” referent speaks to an “Obviative” referent about half of the time in the corpora under consideration. A canonical example is seen in (132).

(132) “PROXIMATE” SPEAKS TO “OBIATIVE” IN SPEAKER’S HEARING

ê-pê- pâhpi-yâhk aw -ima êkwa mâna ê- ki- it -â -t mâna
cl1-come-laugh-21PL PROX-IN.SG now also cl1-PREV-THUS-DIR-3 usual
“We have come once again, to have a good laugh,” he would say to himOBV.’
(AA 2000:§8.2)

Here, the verb form ê-kî-itât uses the TA direct theme sign -â-, which picks up the “Proximate” Andrew Ahenakew from previous discourse. In considering “Proximate” speakers, a distinct pattern emerges. “Proximate” referents speak to “Obviative” ones when the Speaker has witnessed the speech act. Consider the data charted in here, taken from a longer span of Alice Ahenakew relating conversations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>PROX</th>
<th>OBV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>Speaker drives over</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii</td>
<td>Black tells stories</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii</td>
<td>Speaker calls Black a name</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv</td>
<td>Black is named</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v</td>
<td>Andrew tells Black</td>
<td>Andrew</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi</td>
<td>Sister-in-law is bad-tempered</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii</td>
<td>Sister-in-law gives Black dirty looks</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii</td>
<td>Black is about to tell stories</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix</td>
<td>Black tells stories</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>Sister-in-law talks to Andrew</td>
<td>Sister-in-law</td>
<td>Andrew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xi</td>
<td>Black begins to tell stories</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xii</td>
<td>Black tells story</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.25. Transitive speaking and obviation in a text

Here, Alice’s brother-in-law [Black] is introduced as a “Proximate” referent in (ii). He is maintained as the sole, “Proximate”, referent until line (v), at which time he is spoken to by Alice’s husband Andrew [Andrew], which is shown in (132) above. Then, in line (vi), Alice’s sister-in-law [Sister-in-law] is introduced, and heavily marked with verbs denoting intentional content, like ê-mâc-âyiwit ‘be bad tempered.’ She is maintained as a “Proximate”, while her husband [Black] is obviated throughout this short span (133).

(133) **“Black” is obviated while Sister-in-law talks**

                                   viii. ... ꝑ ꝑ ꝑ ꝑ ꝑ ꝑ, ...
... kâ-wî-âcimoyit, ...

kâ-wî- âcimo -yi-t  
c2-intend-tell.story-DS-3  
‘... when he_{OBV} was about to tell stories, …’       (AA 2000:§8.2)

When she then speaks to Andrew, the direct verb form is used, picking up her “Proximate” status as already established (134).

(134) **Sister-in-law is “Proximate” when she speaks**

                                   x. “...” ꝑ ꝑ ꝑ ꝑ ꝑ ꝑ ꝑ, ...
“...” ê-kî-itât mâna, ...
ê-kî- it -â -t mâna  
c1-PREV-thus-DIR-3 usual  
“...,” she would say to him_{OBV}, …’       (AA 2000:§8.2)

Black is then held as “Obviative” until Alice begins reporting his story, in line (xi), as shown in (135), where the “Animate” demonstrative awa is used along with “Animate” verb forms.
Black becomes “Animate” again when speaking

...(135)

\[
\text{x}_i, \ldots, \nabla b' \triangleleft \tau, \nabla d' \nabla b' \hat{\Lambda} \nabla \hat{\rho} \hat{\ell} \cup \downarrow \Delta \hat{\downarrow}, \ldots \]
\[
\ldots, \hat{\epsilon}kwa aya, \hat{\epsilon}kos \hat{\epsilon}kwa mân \hat{\epsilon}ki-mâtâcimot awa, \ldots
\]
\[
\hat{\epsilon}kwa aya, \hat{\epsilon}kosì \hat{\epsilon}kwa mâna \hat{\epsilon}ki- mât= ácimo -t aw -a
\]

and \text{conn}, so \text{then usual } \text{c1-prev-begin=} \text{tell.story-3 prox-an.sg}

‘…, and then, so then, he [my late brother-in-law] would begin to tell stories.’

\text{(AA 2000;§8.2)}

Summarizing, then, we see that, in this passage, every referent that speaks is made “Proximate”, regardless of that referent’s relation to the discourse’s topic structure or to other referents.

Although Alice is clearly talking mainly about her brother-in-law ‘Black’ and his outlandish stories, he is obviated whenever someone else is speaking. This results in a rapid-fire kind of “Proximate” shifting, which would be perplexing under a topic-oriented analysis of obviation, but makes sense if “Proximate” referents are intentional.

“Obviative” referents also frequently speak to “Proximate”s. A canonical case is shown in (136). Here, an “Obviative” referent (Chief Ermineskin) is speaking to a “Proximate” referent (Dan Minde), and the verb of speaking bears the TA inverse theme sign -ikw- to signify this.

(136) “Obviative” Chief Ermineskin speaks to “Proximate” Dan Minde

\[
\text{vi.} \ldots, \hat{\delta} \Gamma' \Delta \tau' \nabla \hat{\rho} \Delta \nabla \delta'; \ldots \]
\[
\ldots, \hat{o}mìsì \hat{i}sì \hat{\epsilon}- \hat{\k}\hat{i}- \hat{t} \hat{k} \hat{o} \hat{k} \hat{t}: \ldots \]
\[
\hat{o}mìsì \hat{i}sì \hat{\epsilon}- \hat{\k}\hat{i}- \hat{i} \hat{t}- \hat{i} \hat{k} \hat{w}-\hat{t}
\]

\text{like thus } \text{c1-prev-thus-inv-3}

‘… and he\text{obv} had said thus to him: “…,” …’

\text{(EM 1997;§43)}

When we consider the contexts in which an “Obviative” referent speaks to a “Proximate”, a strong generalization emerges: “Obviative” referents speak to “Proximate” ones only when the “Proximate” referent being spoken to is the one that has reported this speech to the Speaker. “Obviative” speech acts are never witnessed by the Speaker, but are instead learned about second-hand, with the “Proximate” referent being spoken to as the source of information. An excellent example of this pattern in full operation can be found in Emma Minde’s famous account of the prophecies of Chief Ermineskin. A summary looks like this:
In typical Plains Cree rhetorical style, Emma Minde first identifies the context that led to her knowledge of Ermineskin’s speeches; she heard it from her Father-in-law Dan Minde (137).

(137) **Emma Minde relates context of knowledge for the speech**

\[\text{Speaker hears Dan Minde talk} \quad \text{Dan Minde} \quad \text{-} \]

\[\text{Dan Minde talks about Ermineskin} \quad \text{Dan Minde} \quad \text{Ermineskin} \]

\[\text{Ermineskin counsels Dan Minde} \quad \text{Dan Minde} \quad \text{Ermineskin} \]

\[\text{Ermineskin prophesies to Dan Minde} \quad \text{Dan Minde} \quad \text{Ermineskin} \]

\[\text{Ermineskin tells Dan Minde of future} \quad \text{Dan Minde} \quad \text{Ermineskin} \]

\[\text{Ermineskin speaks to Dan Minde} \quad \text{Dan Minde} \quad \text{Ermineskin} \]

\[\text{Ermineskin speaks to Dan Minde} \quad \text{Dan Minde} \quad \text{Ermineskin} \]

\[\text{Ermineskin speaks to Dan Minde} \quad \text{Dan Minde} \quad \text{Ermineskin} \]

\[\text{Speaker summarizes Ermineskin} \quad \text{Chief} \quad \text{People} \]

\[\text{Speaker direct quotes Ermineskin} \quad \text{People} \quad \text{-} \]

\[\text{Speaker direct quotes Ermineskin} \quad \text{People} \quad \text{-} \]

\[\text{Ermineskin tells things to Dan Minde} \quad \text{Dan Minde} \quad \text{Ermineskin} \]

\[\text{Ermineskin is named} \quad \text{-} \quad \text{Ermineskin} \]

She then relates the connection between Dan Minde and Ermineskin, moving from the most general relation (counselling) to the most specific (an exact quote of what was said); Dan Minde had been counselled by him (iii), had received prophecies from him (iv-v), and was spoken to directly (vi). The flow of information from Ermineskin to Dan Minde to Emma is made extremely explicit. Throughout this setting process, Dan Minde is held as “Proximate” and Ermineskin is obviated, with representative examples in (138) and (139).

(138) **Dan Minde is “Proximate” and Ermineskin is “Obviative”**

\[\text{Ermineskin tells things to Dan Minde} \quad \text{Dan Minde} \quad \text{Ermineskin} \]

\[\text{Ermineskin is named} \quad \text{-} \quad \text{Ermineskin} \]

Table 3.26. “Obviative” referents speaking in a text

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Prox</th>
<th>Obv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>Speaker hears Dan Minde talk</td>
<td>Dan Minde</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii</td>
<td>Dan Minde talks about Ermineskin</td>
<td>Dan Minde</td>
<td>Ermineskin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii</td>
<td>Ermineskin counsels Dan Minde</td>
<td>Dan Minde</td>
<td>Ermineskin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv</td>
<td>Ermineskin prophesies to Dan Minde</td>
<td>Dan Minde</td>
<td>Ermineskin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v</td>
<td>Ermineskin tells Dan Minde of future</td>
<td>Dan Minde</td>
<td>Ermineskin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi</td>
<td>Ermineskin speaks to Dan Minde</td>
<td>Dan Minde</td>
<td>Ermineskin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii</td>
<td>Ermineskin speaks to Dan Minde</td>
<td>Dan Minde</td>
<td>Ermineskin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii</td>
<td>Speaker summarizes Ermineskin</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix</td>
<td>Speaker direct quotes Ermineskin</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>Speaker direct quotes Ermineskin</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xi</td>
<td>Ermineskin tells things to Dan Minde</td>
<td>Dan Minde</td>
<td>Ermineskin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xii</td>
<td>Ermineskin is named</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ermineskin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Throughout the reporting of Ermineskin’s speech, Ermineskin is “Obviative” and Dan Minde is “Proximate.” At the very end, Emma re-identifies who it is that uttered these words – Chief Ermineskin. In doing this, Ermineskin remains “Obviative” (140).

Thus, the “Obviative” referent (Ermineskin) is talking to the “Proximate” referent (Dan Minde) and the Speaker (Emma) has not witnessed the event. Summarizing, then, the referent that has told the Speaker about this event (Dan Minde) is “Proximate” throughout the passage, while the referent who is doing the speaking (Ermineskin) is “Obviative.” The referent speaking is “Obviative”, then, because the Speaker has only indirect knowledge of their speech.

We can test these generalizations about speaking verbs in elicitation settings. Let us consider the following context as an example. I am talking to you on my cell phone, and a woman is standing nearby. She turns to me and says that a man, standing out of my sight on the other side of a hill, is looking at her. I now tell you this on the phone. In such a situation, iskwêw ‘woman’ must be kept in the “Proximate” for the sentence to be felicitous (141a,b).
(141) **CONTEXT: WOMAN TELLS SPEAKER THAT A MAN IS LOOKING AT HER**

a. **WOMAN IS “PROXIMATE” MAN IS “OBTIATIVE”**

\[
\begin{align*}
\n\n\n& \triangledown \leftarrow \triangledown d' \quad \Delta^\omega \circ \lambda \vee \triangledown \\
& \text{é-wâpamikot iskwêw nâpêwâ.} \\
& \text{é-wâp =am } \text{ikw-t iskwêw nâpêw-a} \\
& C1-see =by.\text{eye.TA-INV-3 woman man -XT} \\
& \text{‘The woman}_{\text{prox}} \text{ is seen by the man}_{\text{obv.’}}
\end{align*}
\]

(Presented to S2)

b. **WOMAN IS “OBTIATIVE” MAN IS “PROXIMATE”**

\[
\begin{align*}
& \# \triangledown \leftarrow \triangledown \downarrow \lambda \downarrow \lambda \circ \lambda \triangledown \\
& \# \text{é-wâpamât iskwêwa nâpêw} \\
& \text{é- wâp=am } \text{-á -t iskwêw-a nâpêw} \\
& C1-\text{see } =by.\text{eye.TA-DIR-3 woman-XT man} \\
& \text{‘The man}_{\text{prox}} \text{ saw the woman}_{\text{obv.’}}
\end{align*}
\]

(Presented to S2)

Comment (S2): “You’re getting your information from the man in this one.”

The speaker explained the felicity of (141a) by saying, “The woman could be saying, ‘the man is seeing me’. […] The woman is telling you about it - you’re hearing what she has to say about it. It’s pointing at the person, not who the person is. Just pointing at the person doing the speaking.”

The utterance in (141b) was dispreferred because, “you’re getting your information from the man in this one.” Thus, in a pair of sentences contrasting only in obviation, the choice always conveys who is providing the information. In the context of the Speaker’s direct experience, “Proximate”s are speakers, but “OBTIATIVE”s are not.

When we consider all of the instances of third-person speech interactions, a qualitatively solid generalization emerges: “Proximate” referents speak to “OBTIATIVE” ones when the Speaker has witnessed the event, while “OBTIATIVE” referents speak to “Proximate” ones when the Speaker has only heard about this speech act from the “Proximate” referent. In terms of the current model, we can understand this as a prohibition on direct embeddings for “OBTIATIVE” perspectives; the “OBTIATIVE” perspective cannot be embedded directly inside the Speaker’s, but instead must be embedded within some intermediate perspective.

### 3.5.33. “OBTIATIVE” referents and the indirect evidential ésa

There are short spans in developed Plains Cree discourse where evidential forms like ésa ‘reportedly’ are marked on nearly every clause. For example, in a short story related by Alice Ahenakew about an old couple escaping starvation, there are approximately 48 clauses (not counting quotations) and 31 instances of ésa ‘reportedly.’ Sometimes, there are two occurrences of ésa marked on a single clause as in (142).
Because of both its restriction to a small domain and saturation with evidentials, Blain et al. (2006) have called these ‘evidential spans.’

While evidential spans may occur for a variety of reasons, such as the entire story being a second-hand account as was the case in (142), one place that these spans consistently occur is when an “Obviative” referent possesses a perspective. Thus, in Emma Minde’s recounting of the words of Chief Ermineskin, every single clause that codes Ermineskin’s speech act is marked with ɨsə ‘reportedly,’ and no other clauses are.

Table 3.27. Obviatiation in an ɨsə evidential span

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>PROX</th>
<th>OBV</th>
<th>EVID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>Speaker hears Dan Minde talk</td>
<td>Dan Minde</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii</td>
<td>Dan Minde talks about Ermineskin</td>
<td>Dan Minde</td>
<td>Ermineskin</td>
<td>Conj,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii</td>
<td>Ermineskin counsels Dan Minde</td>
<td>Dan Minde</td>
<td>Ermineskin</td>
<td>Conj, ɨsə</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv</td>
<td>Ermineskin prophesies to Dan Minde</td>
<td>Dan Minde</td>
<td>Ermineskin</td>
<td>Conj, ɨsə</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v</td>
<td>Ermineskin tells Dan Minde of future</td>
<td>Dan Minde</td>
<td>Ermineskin</td>
<td>Conj, ɨsə</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi</td>
<td>Ermineskin speaks to Dan Minde</td>
<td>Dan Minde</td>
<td>Ermineskin</td>
<td>Conj, ɨsə</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii</td>
<td>Ermineskin speaks to Dan Minde</td>
<td>Dan Minde</td>
<td>Ermineskin</td>
<td>Conj, ɨsə</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii</td>
<td>Speaker summarizes Ermineskin</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>Conj, Irreal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix</td>
<td>Speaker direct quotes Ermineskin</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Conj, Irreal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>Speaker direct quotes Ermineskin</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Conj, Irreal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xi</td>
<td>Ermineskin tells things to Dan Minde</td>
<td>Dan Minde</td>
<td>Ermineskin</td>
<td>Conj, ɨsə</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>Ermineskin is named</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ermineskin</td>
<td>Conj</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, in line (iv), when Chief Ermineskin prophesies to Dan Minde, the main verb is marked with ɨsə ‘reportedly’ (143).

(143) “OBVIATIVE” ERMINESKIN SPEAKS, ɨsə IS USED

iv. ɨsə-ki-kiskiwêhokoṭ ɨsə, ɨkâ cêskwa kîkway ɨ~ ɨ-tâwinahk, …
ɨsə-ki-kisk=wê=hw-ikw-t ɨsə ɨkâ cêskwa kîkway ɨ- tâwin- am-k
C1-PREV-know=AI=TA-INV-3 EVID NEG moment something C1-encounter-TI -0
‘He had had prophesies uttered by him_obv, about things which he had not yet
encountered, …’ (EM 1997:§44)
The only sentences not being marked with evidentials are ones embedded in a quotation (ix-x) or the sentences having to do with Emma’s own understanding, for example lines (viii) or (x).

This correlation between evidentials like ūsa and “Obviative” referents is freely identified by speakers, even when entirely unprompted.

(144) “OBVIATIVE” COUNSELLOR, ūsa IS PREFERRED

\[ \nabla \ bq^\gamma \Gamma \ d' (\nabla \hbar) \]
ê-kakêškimikot (ūsa)
ê-kakêšk=im -ikw-t
C1-counsel=by.mouth.TA-INV-3
‘he\_obv counsels him\_PROX’

(Volunteered by S4)

Comment (S4): “It would be better if you say it with ūsa.”

Here, the Speaker is explaining culturally-appropriate ways to describe someone’s counselling activities. In so doing, the Speaker says, “You would say ê-kakêškimikot if someone was getting their counselling out of a book. It would be better if you say it with ūsa.”\(^{26}\) This preference for the addition of ūsa to “Obviative” sources of information is consistent across all speakers I have worked with.

Whenever information comes from an “Obviative” referent, the Speaker marks the event as only indirectly known. Within the current analysis, this is expected, since “Obviative” referents are those referents whose intentions (e.g. speaking) the Speaker has no direct knowledge of. Evidentiality and Obviation are then marking the same kind of Speaker knowledge, only over different domains; the one over the Speaker’s relation to a proposition (Evidentiality), the other over the Speaker’s relation to the (non)perspective of the referent (Obviation).

3.6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have developed an analysis of obviation phenomena in Plains Cree that models its three facets:

(i) FORM: “Obviation” is a construct (§3.3). It is built by recruiting compatible pieces in compatible parts of the grammar.

\(^{26}\) Because of lack of overt nominals in (S4)’s example to disambiguate between “Obviative” and “Inanimate” reference (the two are identical in the inverse; see Wolfart (1973)), and the complications surrounding books as evidential sources of information (i.e. are the books a source in themselves, or only the transmission of someone’s words? (cf. Aikhenvald 2004)), this speaker could either be referring to the “Inanimate” masinahikan ‘book’ or to the unidentified “Obviative” writer of the book.
(ii) **CONTENT:** An “Obviative” referent is one that is contextually extentional (§3.4). It is a referent that lacks a perspective for the contextually-determined span.

(iii) **CONTEXT:** Obviation situates a referent within a chain of information (§3.5). The “Obviative” referent’s perspective is inaccessible to the Speaker. By constructing a model that covers obviation’s form, content, and context altogether, we can begin, for the first time, to systematically consider all obviation phenomena together. In doing this, we can begin to ask questions about the relation of obviation to other components of Plains Cree grammar – a topic that I take up in the next chapter.
4.1. A structural and a semantic condition on referential dependency

Human language systematically exploits context to inform content (cf. Fillmore 1976, Bateson 1975). One of the most productive ways this is done is through the constructions of dependencies – the process of making one element the context for the interpretation of another (Safir 2004). Of the rich taxonomy of dependencies found in natural language, the current discussion has centered on only one kind: referential dependency. These are dependencies in which one referent is used as the context for the interpretation of another. This kind of dependency has been recognized by many researchers in the case of possession (e.g. Higginbotham 1983, Kuno 1988, Barker 1995, Burton 1995, Partee and Borschev 2003, and Mühlbauer 2007, etc.), but the current thesis, which focusses on referents and perspective, shows referential dependence to be a broader property of Plains Cree.

In this chapter, I claim that referential dependency is constructional in Plains Cree. In particular, I claim that the construal of a dependency between two referents must meet two conditions in Plains Cree:

(i) A STRUCTURAL CONDITION: either linear precedence or c-command

(ii) A SEMANTIC CONDITION: perspectival embedding.

Together, these two components form the necessary and sufficient conditions for the construal of a referent as dependent in Plains Cree.

The structural condition on referential dependency is fulfilled through one of two possible structures:

(i) C-COMMAND: The dependent referent must be c-commanded by its antecedent.

(1) \[
\begin{array}{c}
y \\
\end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c}
x \\
\end{array} = x \text{ DEPENDENT ON } y
\]
(ii) **LINEAR PRECEDENCE**: The dependent referent must linearly follow its antecedent.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{PRED}_1 \\
y \\
\text{PRED}_2 \\
x
\end{array}
\quad = \quad \text{X DEPENDENT ON Y}
\]

In the logic of most theories of syntactic structure (e.g. Ross 1966, Langacker 1969, Lakoff 1971, Williams 1997), one structure does not exclude the other. For example, Carden (1986) argues that clause-internal relations are subject to c-command, while clause-external relations are also subject to linear precedence.

The semantic condition on referential dependency is fulfilled through perspectival embedding; the dependent referent must be embedded within the perspective of the referent it is dependent on (3).

\[
\begin{array}{c}
y \\
\text{x} \\
\text{PREDICATE(x)}
\end{array}
\]

This perspectival embedding defines the content of the relation between the two referents: the dependent referent is interpreted within the perspective of its antecedent; all access to \text{x} is mediated by the perspectival domain of \text{y}.

Referential dependency in Plains Cree, then, is the convergence of structural and semantic operations for the purpose of constructing a context for a referent to be interpreted in.
I am therefore making a claim about the necessary and sufficient conditions for the construction of referential dependency in Plains Cree.

If referential dependency is defined as the use of one referent as the context for the interpretation of another, then obviation is a kind of dependent reference. As we saw in Chapter 3, obviation inherently invokes a valuation with respect to some other referent in the discourse. This is seen in the formulation of the “Obviative’s” content (§3.4): the “Obviative” is disjoint from any referent that possesses a perspective, which entails that the “Obviative” must be evaluated with respect to all perspective-possessing referents (4).

\[(4) \quad \text{Ext}(x, C) \iff \forall \psi \forall y (R(y, \psi, C) \rightarrow x \neq y)\]

\text{x is extentional at context C if and only if for all perspectives } \psi \text{ and all individuals } y, \text{ if there is a relation } R \text{ of } y \text{ with } \psi \text{ at context } C, \text{ then } x \text{ is not } y.\]

This is also seen in the formulation of the “Obviative’s” context (§3.5): the “Obviative” referent is embedded within the perspective of a “Proximate” referent, which entails that the “Obviative” is dependent on the truth-evaluation domain (perspective) of the “Proximate”.

\[(5) \quad \text{“Proximate” } <R>\]

\begin{array}{|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Obv} & \text{PREDICATE(Obv)} \\
\hline
\end{array}

\text{PREDICATE(Obv) = True w.r.t. Prox’s Perspective}
The “Obviative” referent, whose content is informed by the contextual availability of a “Proximate” referent (3.4, 3.5), is thus one instance of the broader category of referential dependency in Plains Cree.

Since obviation is a kind of referential dependency, the model of referential dependency developed here predicts that the structural and semantic conditions on referential dependency should be evident in all constructions involving obviation in Plains Cree. Concretely, this means that obviative constructions should show sensitivity to (i) a structural condition of either linear-precedence or c-command, and (ii) a semantic condition of perspectival embedding. Obviation constructions, then, provide an excellent testing ground for the logic of referential dependency proposed here.

In section 4.3, I consider predicate-to-predicate relations and obviation. In §4.3.1, I consider the ordering of “Obviative” referring nominals with respect to “Proximate”’s, showing that the “Obviative” must always succeed the “Proximate”. In §4.3.2, I show that the suffix -yi-, which is used to build “Obviative” reference (§3.3.5), generally codes referential dependency between the subject of the predicate and some structurally-preceding referent. Predicate-predicate relations used to construct obviation, then, demonstrate sensitivity to both the structural and semantic conditions on referential dependency.

In section 4.4, I consider predicate-internal relations and obviation, which are typically subordinative (cf. Hirose 2000, Déchaine 2003). In §4.4.1, I consider nominal-internal dependencies, which is typically called possession. I show that Plains Cree possession generally codes referential dependency between the possessor and the possessum. In §4.4.2, I consider verb-internal dependencies, which are typically coded by theme signs in Plains Cree (cf. Wolfart 1973, etc.). I show that, for at least two of the set of Plains Cree’s theme signs, both conditions on referential dependency hold independent of obviation. Predicate-internal elements that are used to construct obviation, then, also demonstrate sensitivity to both the structural and semantic conditions on referential dependency.

From this discussion, we see that Plains Cree systematically exploits dependency-building operations to construct obviation. Further, we see that, in most cases (§4.3.2, 4.4.1-2), the forms used to build “Obviative” reference have the properties of referential dependency even in constructions where they do not code obviation.
Since obviation is both a construct (§3.3) and dependent (3.4-5), this kind of grammatical organization is expected.

4.2. Previous work

The current proposal and the resulting data generalizations are themselves dependent on much previous work, both in Algonquian linguistics in specific and linguistics in general. For Algonquian linguistics, the previous work of Wolfart (1973) and Dahlstrom (1986) on the basic generalizations of Plains Cree morphosyntax are relevant, as well as the more recent work by Blain (1997), Cook (2007, 2008), Déchaine (1997, 2003), Hirose (2000), and Reinholtz (Déchaine & Reinholtz 1997, 2008). For general linguistic work, the current work relies most heavily on the syntactic work of Carden (1986), McCawley (1988), and Williams (1997). Some of this work is best considered when the appropriate domain of inquiry comes up (e.g. the direct/inverse system in §4.4.2), but other relevant discussion is better considered beforehand, to situate the discussion properly.

4.2.1. Structural conditions on anaphora

The literature is divided on the kinds of structural relations available to natural language (cf. McCawley 1988). For our current purposes, the relevant distinction is between those who posit only one kind of structural relation (i.e. c-command), and those who posit multiple kinds of structural relations (e.g. precedence, c-command, command).

The position that only one kind of structural relation is available to natural language was promoted most strongly by Reinhart (1983). Considering the resolution of anaphoric reference in
English sentences, Reinhart argued that all cases of anaphoric dependencies can be described in terms of one structural relation: c(onstituent)-command. This accounts, she argued, for the ungrammaticality of English sentences like those in (6) (judgments are those presented in Reinhart 1983).\footnote{All of these sentences are perfectly well-formed for me, and for the other native speakers I have asked.}

(6) a. ✽ The actress, who$_i$ Brando kissed in her$_i$ latest film will win the Oscar.
   b. ✽ What actress$_i$ did Brando kiss in her$_i$ latest film?
   b. ✽ Who$_i$ did the police arrest in spite of his$_i$ alibi?
   c. ✽ The guy$_i$ who$_i$ the police arrested in spite of his$_i$ alibi has filed a complaint.

Here, the referent that is supposed to be the antecedent of the pronoun linearly precedes the pronoun, but the structure is ruled ill-formed. Reinhart claims that the pronoun is in an adjunct, rather than in an argument position in these cases, and thus the antecedent does not c-command the pronoun. Based on data of this kind, Reinhart (1983) argues that the relevant structural configuration for the licensing of anaphora in English is c-command, not any kind of linear precedence. This position has been developed in much subsequent work, in particular that of Kayne (1994), who uses c-command as a fundamental component of the logic of linear-ordering relations. For linguists that adopt this position, all linear-precedence relations can be explained in terms of c-command. Any linear-order effects that are not amenable to a c-command analysis are typically judged to be part of discourse considerations, rather than part of syntax (see Van Hoek 1997 for discussion).

There have been several dissenters from Reinhart’s (1983) position. Numerous linguists that worked on the structure of English previous to Reinhart (1983), for example Langacker (1969) and Ross (1967) argue that the linear-precedence relation is relevant to the resolution of anaphora. They consider cases such as those in (7), arguing that pronominalization of the second instance of John in (7b) was a result of a restriction on the linear occurrence of a pronoun with respect to its antecedent: a pronoun may only precede its antecedent if it is in a subordinate clause.

(7) a. Realizing that he$_i$ was unpopular didn’t bother John$_i$.
   b. ✽ Realizing that John$_i$ was unpopular didn’t bother him$_i$.

Beyond this, Carden (1986) and McCawley (1988) have pointed out that the c-command accounts, while yielding strong results in many areas, fail to account for some of the original data set considered for anaphora in English. For example, sentences like those in (8) are not covered.\footnote{All of these sentences are perfectly well-formed for me, and for the other native speakers I have asked.}
by c-command formalizations without significant ad hoc alterations (cf. McCawley 1988:345). Instead, they argued, pronominal relations are not all equal, and some must be calculated at different levels of derivation (cf. Carden 1986)

(8)  a. After Mary it had finished the report, she went home. 
    b. Near the car that John was repairing, he saw a snake.
    c. Near him is where John saw the snake.
    d. It was near him that John saw the snake.  (Carden 1986)

Following this debate, Williams (1997) has argued that the English data Reinhart (1983) used to argue for c-command English must itself be reconsidered. He points out that the sentences Reinhart (1983) presents as ungrammatical are actually grammatical for many English speakers (Williams 1993:236), and argues that both linear precedence and c-command are available structural relations for natural language. This means that, in some form or other, linear precedence is still a part of modern syntactic theory.

In formulating the structural conditions on referential dependency in Plains Cree, I have made reference to both structural dominance (i.e. c-command) and linear-precedence relations. As such, I have committed the analysis to a framework like that of Carden (1986) or Williams (1997), rather than that of Reinhart (1983) or Kayne (1994). In addition, this kind of division in structural relations opens the possibility that different kinds of anaphoric relations are calculated with different mechanisms, as was proposed for English by Carden (1986). As we will see, there are good reasons to suppose that this position is correct, at least for Plains Cree; the language is sensitive to both linear precedence and structural dominance, but not equally in all cases.

4.2.2. Clausal dependency and referential dependency

Cook (2008) argues that the clause system of Plains Cree has at least two kinds of structural relations: (i) relations defined by structural dominance (i.e. c-command; Reinhart 1983), and (ii) relations defined by precedence (i.e. linear precedence; Ross 1967).

In Plains Cree, there is a set of predicates that introduce a structurally subordinate predicate (Cook 2008). This can be shown by their special syntactic properties (see Cook 2008): (i) A quantifier that has scope over the argument of the subordinate clause can occur to the left of the matrix clause (9) but not other kinds of clausal relations.
(9) **Quantifier of argument of second clause appears to left of first clause**

\[ \text{kahkiyaw} \ \text{nikiskêyihten} \ \text{é-ahkosicik} \ \text{nâpêwak} \]

\[ \text{kahkiyaw} \ \text{ni-kisk} = \text{éyiht} \quad \text{é-} \quad \text{al-} \quad \text{á-} \quad \text{é-} \quad \text{nâpêw-ak} \]

\[ \text{all} \quad \text{I-} \quad \text{know}=\text{by.mind} \quad \text{TI-TI-LP C1-sick} \quad \text{-3-PL man} \quad \text{-PL} \]

‘I know that all the men were sick.’ (Cook 2008)

(ii) A nominal relating to an argument of the subordinate clause can occur to the left of the matrix clause (10) but not other kinds of clausal relations.

(10) **Nominal argument of second clause appears to left of first clause**

\[ \text{nâpêwak} \ \text{nikiskêyihten} \ \text{é-nîmihitocik} \]

\[ \text{nâpêw-ak} \ \text{ni-kisk} = \text{éyiht} \quad \text{é-} \quad \text{nîmihito-t} \quad \text{tik} \]

\[ \text{man} \quad \text{-PL I-} \quad \text{know}=\text{by.mind} \quad \text{TI-TI-LP C1-dance} \quad \text{-3-PL} \]

‘I know the men were dancing.’ (Cook 2008)

(iii) A question word relating to an argument of the subordinate clause can occur to the left of the matrix clause (11) but not other kinds of clausal relations.

(11) **Question word argument of second clause appears to left of first clause**

\[ \text{awína} \ \text{é-itwêyan} \ \text{é-itéyihtaman} \ \text{John} \ \text{é-oce mât}? \]

\[ \text{awína} \ \text{é-} \quad \text{it} = \text{wéyan} \ \text{é-} \quad \text{it} = \text{éyiht} \quad \text{-am-an} \ \text{John} \ \text{é-} \quad \text{oce=m} \quad \text{-â} \quad \text{-t} \]

\[ \text{who} \quad \text{C1-thus=}\text{AI-2} \quad \text{C1-thus=}\text{by.mind} \quad \text{TI-TI} \quad \text{-2} \quad \text{John} \quad \text{C1-kiss=}\text{by.mouth} \quad \text{TA-DIR-3} \]

‘Who did you say you think John kissed?’ (Cook 2008)

Based on data of this kind, Cook (2008) concludes that the relation between the two predicates is one of structural dominance; the main predicate has both linear precedence and c-command over the second predicate.

(12) (Cook 2008)
Cook (2008) also shows that there are other kinds of clausal relations in Plains Cree that are more complex than a simple matrix-subordinate distinction can model. Typically, a Plains Cree speaker will begin a discourse with an independent mode verb, and then introduce a series of verbs, each in one of several modes of the conjunct order, as the example in (13) shows.

(13)

i. \( \text{êkwa nêwosâp} \) ~ \( \text{nisto=sâp} \) ~ \( \text{kîsikâw nikî} \) ~ \( \text{papâm =máci=ho} \) ~ \( \text{nán ēkotê} \)
   "Then we toured about over there for fourteen ~ for thirteen days,"

   ii. a tour \( \text{ê-otinamâhk oti} \)
   "we took a tour,"

   iii. bus \( \text{ê-pôsiyâhk, aya,} \)
   "we travelled on a bus,"

   iv. thirteen-day tour \( \text{ê-otinamâhk,} \)
   "we took a thirteen-day tour …"

   v. thirty-six \( \text{ê-ihrsti=yâhk,} \)
   "with thirty-six people …"

   vi. bus \( \text{ê-pôsiyâhk,} \)
   "travelling on the bus."

As Cook (2008) shows, these subsequent conjunct order verbs are dependent on the initial independent mode verb. They are dependent temporally on it, such that temporal coding of the initial clause carries through to the uncoded clause (14).
However, this relation cannot be a straightforward case of c-command, since it shares none of the properties associated with c-command seen above (9-11); here, the second clause’s quantifiers (15a), nominal arguments (15b), and wh-words (15c) cannot occur in front of the initial clause.

(15) a. QUANTIFIERS OF SECOND CLAUSE CANNOT OCCUR IN FRONT OF INITIAL CLAUSE

\[ \star \quad \text{nahay nįįs kwēsimócihtāw mīnisa ē-mícisot.} \]
\[ \star \quad \text{mīnisa nāpē=sis kwēsī =mócik=ihtā -w mīnis-a ē-míciso-t} \]
\[ \text{all man=DIM repeat=be.fun =make-3 berry-XT c1-eat -3} \]

Intended: ‘The boy had fun eating all the berries.’

(Cook 2008)

b. ARGUMENTS OF SECOND CLAUSE CANNOT OCCUR IN FRONT OF INITIAL CLAUSE

\[ \star \quad \text{nahay nįįs kwēsimócihtāw ē-mícisot} \]
\[ \star \quad \text{mīnisa nāpē=sis kwēsī =mócik=ihtā -w ē-míciso-t} \]
\[ \text{berry-XT man=DIM repeat=be.fun =make-3 c1-eat -3} \]

Intended: ‘The boy had fun eating all the berries.’

(Cook 2008)

c. QUESTION WORDS OF SECOND CLAUSE CANNOT OCCUR IN FRONT OF INITIAL CLAUSE

\[ \star \quad \text{nahay nįįs kwēsimócihtāw ē-mícisot?} \]
\[ \star \quad \text{kikwāy nāpē=sis kwēsī =mócik=ihtā -w ē-míciso-t} \]
\[ \text{what man=DIM repeat=be.fun =make-3 c1-eat -3} \]

Intended: ‘What did the child have fun, they ate __ ?’

(Cook 2008)

To model this, Cook (2008) uses Williams’ (1997) model of binding effects with anaphora; the antecedent may be either linearly precedent or structurally dominant. These clause-chaining examples, then, are examples of linear precedence without structural dominance, leading Cook (2008) to build structural configurations as in (16).
Here, the linearly initial clause introduces a set of dependent clauses which rely on it for referential information.

Comparing this model of clausal dependency to the one posited here for referential dependency, the parallels become immediately apparent; in both cases, the dependency is constructed by either structural dominance or linear precedence. The current model of referential dependency, then, extends Cook (2008) from clauses to referents.

4.2.3. Possession and grammatical obviation

It has long been known that obviation marking is obligatory in third-person possession contexts (cf. Bloomfield 1962, Wolfart 1973, Dahlstrom 1986, etc.).

(17) **THIRD-PERSON POSSESSUMS MUST BE “OBTIVATIVE”**

a. $\triangleright \Gamma_{\check{\omega}}'\check{\omega}'L$
   
   ominõsima
   $a-\text{minûs-im-a}$
   3-cat $-\text{DJ }-\text{XT}$
   ‘his/her PROX cat\text{Obv}’

   (Presented S2)

b. $\ast \triangleright \Gamma_{\check{\omega}}'\check{\omega}'\zeta$
   
   $\ast$ ominõsîsim
   $o-\text{minûs-im}$
   3-cat $-\text{DSJ}$
   ‘his/her cat’

   (Presented S2)

Here, a nominal form that lacks the suffix $-a$ (§3.3.1) is rejected. It should be noted that speakers do produce forms without obviation marking in elicitation environments (cf. Cook & Mühlbauer 2006), but these “Obviative” less possessor constructions disappear as context improves.

This fact has often been used to divide obviation into two cases (cf. Rhodes 1976, Dahlstorm 1986, Déchaine & Wiltschko 2002):
(i) “GRAMMATICAL” OBVIAITION: Characterized by obligatory marking and local relations (i.e. possession, but also verb relations in some accounts)

(ii) “DISCOURSE” OBVIAITION: characterized by optionality and non-local relations.

These two contexts of obviation have led to a development of a dichotomy in the literature, such that linguists can choose to work on “grammatical” obviation, and leave “discourse” obviation for some future research (cf. Rhodes 1976, etc.). Thus, obviation is two things, not one thing, under such a view; it is a grammatical operation or a discourse operation, but the relation between the two is not clear.

Notice that this account presupposes some crucial things about possession in order to make its case for the bifurcation of obviation. First, it is necessary to assume that possession relations are not optional, discourse operations – that is, the Speaker has no choice but to employ a possessive based on the clause-level properties of the grammar. Were possession shown to serve a particular set of discourse functions, and be itself an optional process, there would be no reason to divide obviation in two.

The current work offers a way to unify these two domains of obviation once again. In section 4.3.1, I show that possession has discourse properties in Plains Cree, making the division between “grammatical” and “discourse” possession difficult to maintain. Further, I show that these discourse properties have to do with the semantic dependency of the possessed referent, which means that the structure and semantics of possession line up with obviation; both are kinds of referential dependency. Thus, there is no division in obviation; obviation is one thing, and it works in concert with the discourse properties of possession.

4.2.4. The data set

While the general problems considered in this chapter have long been considered for human language, the data from Plains Cree is less well-known, and much of it has never been documented before, even within Plains Cree linguistics. In particular, the following eleven data sets have never, to my knowledge, been documented for Plains Cree:

(i) The linear sensitivity of “Proximate” and “Obviative” referring nominals (§4.3.1)

(ii) The inability of “Obviative” marked nominals to occur in front of the matrix clause where other nominals can (§4.3.12)

(iii) The use of pausing to repair dispreferred “Obviative” > “Proximate” nominal orderings (§4.3.12)
(iv) The structural conditions on the suffix –yi–; the antecedent of –yi– must be in a clause that linearly precedes or structurally dominates –yi– ($\S4.3.21$)

(v) The semantic conditions on the referent that –yi– is dependent on (i.e. that it must be existential and perspective-possessing ($\S4.3.22$)

(vi) The ill-formedness of “Inanimate” possessors ($\S4.4.121$)

(vii) The semantic difference between compounding and possession ($\S4.4.122$)

(viii) The use of possessor forms to manipulate direct vs. indirect speech ($\S4.4.124$)

(ix) The interaction of possession with requirements on Speaker knowledge ($\S4.4.125$)

(x) The linear dependency of independent order inverse forms that involve only third-persons ($\S4.4.222$)

(xi) The relation between inverse forms and familiarity ($\S4.4.223$)

These additions to the available data set on these phenomena mean that, even should another scholar consider my theoretical model to be undesirable, they will still have a much richer data set to work with in the future.

4.3. Cross-predicate dependencies and obviation

“Obviative” constructions can involve relations between two predicates. In the most simple cases, this means noun-noun relations, as exemplified by (18). Here, one nominal predicate, atim `dog,’ relates to another nominal predicate, minôsa ‘cat$\text{OBV}$.’

(18) ᖏᑯᒥᐦᑯᒥᐧᐃᓐ ᖧᐦᑖᑯᒥᕐᓂᖃ ᖨᓐᓇᒧᓐ ᖨᓐᓇᒧᓐ.
    tâhkomêw atim minôsa.
    tâhkʷ=m -ê -w atimʷ minôs-a
    seize=by.mouth-dir-3 dog cat -xt
    `the dog$\text{PROX}$ bit the cat$\text{OBV}$.’ (Presented S2)

More complex cases include the relation between the subject of one predicate and some other predicate, as exemplified by the case of –yi– (19). In (19a), the second verbal predicate has –yi– attached, and codes that its subject is not the previous verb’s subject (Jeff). In (19b), the absence of –yi– allows the subject of the second verb to be construed as co-referent with the previous subject.
In each of these cases, we can ask whether or not the two conditions on referential dependency hold: (i) one referent must be perspectivally embedded inside of the other referent, and (ii) the perspectively-embedded referent must linearly succeed or be c-commanded by its antecedent.

In the following sections, I demonstrate that each of these predicate-predicate relations is sensitive to both the structural and semantic conditions of referential dependency (§4). In section 4.3.1, I show these effects in the relation of nominals to each other; “Proximate” referring nominals must have linear precedence over obviative-referring ones in order for the “Obviative’s” dependency to be correctly constructed. In section 4.3.2, I show these effects for the predicate-suffix –yi–. This suffix meets the structural conditions of dependent reference; the predicate bearing –yi– must either (i) be c-commanded by a predicate containing the antecedent (§4.3.21), or (ii) linearly succeed it (§4.3.22). This suffix also meets the semantic condition on dependent reference; the referent associated with –yi– must be perspectively embedded under this preceding referent.

In all of these cases, the elements that are used to construct the “Obviative” are used to build referential dependency; all elements have both the structural and semantic conditions of referential dependency (§4). The referential dependency of the “Obviative”, then, correlates with the referential dependency of its parts. This is expected on the view of obviation’s form considered in section 3.2, which models the “Obviative” as constructed out of non-dedicated forms.

### 4.3.1. Nominal ordering and referential dependency

Since nominal expressions can be used to refer to “Obviative” referents (§3.4), we expect them to play a role in the construction of “Obviative’s” referential dependency. In particular, we
expect that nominals that refer to “Obviative” referents should necessarily linearly-succeed nominals that refer to “Proximate” referents.

\[
(20) \quad \text{NP}_\text{PROX} \rightarrow \text{NP}_\text{OBV}
\]

We expect this behaviour because the “Proximate” / “Obviative” nominal relations already satisfy the semantic condition on obviation (embedding of the “Obviative” in the “Proximate’s” perspective: §3.5). Showing this kind of linear-precedence dependency, then, nominal-nominal ordering with obviation would satisfy both conditions of referential dependency, as modelled above (§4.2).

These expectations are confirmed in the data; “Proximate” referring nominals must always precede “Obviative” ones. First, in section 4.3.11, I show that “Proximate” referring nominals always precede “Obviative” ones in a discourse. Then, in section 4.3.12, I show that “Proximate” referring nominals precede “Obviative” ones in elicitation contexts. From this evidence, I conclude that “Proximate” referring nominals must have linear precedence over the “Obviative” referring nominals.

From this discussion, we see that nominal-nominal ordering meets both conditions for referential dependency in Plains Cree. First, “Obviative” referring nominals meet the structural condition on referential dependence (c-command or linear precedence: §4.2); “Obviative” referring nominals must linearly succeed “Proximate” nominals. Second, “Obviative” referring nominals meet the semantic condition on referential dependence (perspectival embedding: §4.2); they pick out a referent that is perspectivally-embedded within the “Proximate’s” perspective (cf. 3.5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referential Dependency</th>
<th>Structural Conditions</th>
<th>Semantic Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-command</td>
<td>Linear Precedence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-N</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.2. Nominal-nominal ordering meets the conditions of referential dependency**

This is what is expected under a model of referential dependency like that constructed here.
4.3.1.1. Nominal orderings in texts

In considering the relative ordering of nominals in Plains Cree texts, it is important to note immediately that it is extremely rare for two nominals to occur in the same clause in a developed discourse (cf. Ahenakew 1987, Wolfart & Reinholtz 1993). One of the only clear cases I have found is shown in (21), which has a “Proximate” referring nominal *ayisiyinìwak* ‘people’ preceding an “Obviative” referring nominal *ayisyiniwa* ‘people/person.’

(21) TWO NOMINALS IN THE SAME CLAUSE

<[^\r\s]+<[^\r\s]+\n<[^\r\s]+<[^\r\s]+\n<[^\r\s]+<[^\r\s]+;

*ayisiyinìwak* ê-ýikátéstâcîk ēkoni *ayisyiniwa*;

*ayisiyiniw-ak* ê- yikátéstâ- -t-ik ēkoni *ayisyiniw-a*

*person* -*PL CL-stay.away* -*DIR-PL resum person* -*XT*

‘people*PROX* stay away from that person*OBV*’ (Minde 1997:§38)

Elicitation examples of double nominals are thus synthetic in the sense that they do not represent natural speech, although they are perfectly comprehensible.² To look for nominal-nominal orderings in texts, then, we have to consider orderings in domains larger than clauses.

In developed discourses, the first referent introduced is always “Proximate.” A typical discourse is considered here (Ahenakew 2000:§11.2-3), and is shown clause-by-clause in the following table. Here, the first nominal used refers to the “Proximate” referent, and an “Obviative” referring nominal is not introduced until clause iv.

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² The same should be said for English; I have spoken the language my entire life and have hardly ever heard someone utter a sentence like “John saw Mary.” Its use in linguistic data, then, also represents a synthetic, partial abstraction away from natural speech, which is always embedded in a context.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Prox</th>
<th>Obv</th>
<th>Overt N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>Speaker remembers Old Woman</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Old Woman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii.</td>
<td>S forgets Old Woman’s name</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii.</td>
<td>Old Woman comes driving</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv.</td>
<td>Old Woman camps with</td>
<td>Old Woman</td>
<td>Grand-daughter</td>
<td>Grand-daughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grand-daughter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi.</td>
<td>Old Woman brings Grand-</td>
<td>Old Woman</td>
<td>Grand-daughter</td>
<td>Grand-daughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>daughter with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii.</td>
<td>Old Woman &amp; Grand-daughter</td>
<td>Old Woman, Grand-daughter</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>drive buggy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii.</td>
<td>Grand-daughter beautiful</td>
<td>Grand-daughter</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Grand-daughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix.</td>
<td>Man desires Grand-daughter</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>Grand-daughter</td>
<td>Man, Grand-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>daughter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>daughter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x.</td>
<td>Man flirts with Grand-daughter</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>Grand-daughter</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>xi.</td>
<td>Man scores</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3. “Proximate” referring nouns precede “obviatives” in texts

When a new “Proximate-Obviative” relation is coded (clause ix), overt nominals for both referents are used, with the new “Proximate” oskinîkiw ‘young man’ occurring as a topicalized nominal to the left of the clause. As always, the “Proximate” referring nominal linearly precedes the “Obviative” referring one (22).

(22) “Proximate” Nominal Precedes “Obviative” Nominal in Discourse

ëkwa awa nápêw, wahwâ, pêyak oskinîkiw, akâwâtêw ôhi oskinîkiskwêwa, …
ëkwa aw =a nápêw wahwâ pêyak oskinîkiw akâwât-ê -w
and PRX=AN.SG man EXCL one young.one lust -DIR-3
aw =îhi oskinîk=iskwêw-a
PRX=XT young=woman-XT
‘and a certain man, oh my, a certain young man, PRX desired this young woman, OBV, …’
(Ahenakew 11:2)

This is a typical structure for a Cree discourse. So typical, in fact, that I have gone through many discourses looking for an instance of an “Obviative” referring nominal being introduced before a “Proximate”, but have found none.

The fact that discourses always start with “Proximate” forms has the practical result that “Proximate” nominals always precede “Obviative” forms. This parallels the few cases of double-nominal clauses that we have just seen, lending further support to the conclusion that “Proximate”’s precede “Obviative”’s in natural speech.
4.3.1.2. Elicitation and nominal-nominal ordering

To understand what elicitation data on nominal-nominal ordering is telling us, we need to keep a crucial observation in mind: consultants will often accept orderings as comprehensible that they themselves have never produced, and cannot produce when asked. For example, when asked about the pair of sentences in (23), which differ in their ordering of the “Proximate” referring nominal *atim* ‘dog’ and the “Obviative” referring nominal *minôsa* ‘cat\textsubscript{OBV},’ the consultant initially responded that both forms were “perfectly understandable.”

(23) a. <\textit{\textcircled{\textless} Prox N \textgreater \textcircled{\textless} Obv N}>\textit{\textcircled{\textless} Prox N \textgreater \textcircled{\textless} Obv N}.

\textit{atim} \textit{tahkomêw} \textit{minôsa}.

\textit{atimw} \textit{tahkw=m} \textit{-ê} \textit{-w} \textit{minôs-a}

\textit{dog} \textit{seize=}\textit{by.mouth-DIR-3} \textit{cat} \textit{-XT}

‘The dog\textsubscript{PROX} bit the cat\textsubscript{OBV}.’

(Presented S2)

b. \textit{\textcircled{\textless} Obv N \textgreater \textcircled{\textless} Prox N} <\textcircled{\textless} Prox N \textgreater \textcircled{\textless} Obv N>.

\textit{minôsa} \textit{tahkomêw} \textit{atim}.

\textit{minôs-a} \textit{tahkw=m} \textit{-ê} \textit{-w} \textit{atimw}

\textit{cat} \textit{-XT} \textit{seize} =\textit{by.mouth-DIR-3} \textit{dog}

‘The dog\textsubscript{PROX} bit the cat\textsubscript{OBV}.’

(Presented S2)

However, there are several reasons to think that these sentences are not equally good:

(i) Consultants say that they would not personally say (23b).

(ii) Consultants say that they have not heard people say (23b).

(iii) Consultants often have to repeat (23b) to themselves a few times before offering a grammaticality judgment on it.

(iv) Consultants repeat (23b) as (23a).

This kind of data means that it is necessary to make a distinction between (i) what consultants accept as comprehensible, and (ii) what consultants identify that they, themselves, would say.

When we do this, we get a three-way split in data:

(i) Orderings that consultants rule uninterpretable (\textstar)

(ii) Orderings that are interpretable but consultants cannot themselves produce (?)

(iii) Orderings that are both interpretable and able to be produced by the consultant (\textcheckmark)

\[217\]
Cross-classifying orderings with these three variables, we see that only orderings where the “Proximate” nominal precedes the “Obviative” are both interpretable and produced by the consultant. This is summarized in table 4.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PROX &gt; OBV</th>
<th>OBV &gt; PROX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V N N</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N V N</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N N V</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N V [N V]</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4. Nominal-nominal ordering patterns in elicitation

All orderings are acceptable that have the “Proximate” referring form precede the “Obviative”. The relevant set is shown in (24).

(24) a. C"dľº < \[\] Γ."vº.

tahkomêw atim minôs-a.

\[ \text{tahkw= } m \quad \text{-ê } \quad \text{-w atimw minôs-a} \]

\[ \text{seize=} \text{by.mouth-DIR-3 dog cat -XT} \]

‘The dog<sub>PROX</sub> bit the cat<sub>OBV</sub>.’

(Presented S2)

b. < \[\] C"dľº Γ."vº.

atim tahkomêw minôs-a.

\[ \text{atimw tahkw= } m \quad \text{-ê } \quad \text{-w minôs-a} \]

\[ \text{dog seize=} \text{by.mouth-DIR-3 cat -XT} \]

‘The dog<sub>PROX</sub> bit the cat<sub>OBV</sub>.’

(Presented S2)

c. < \[\] Γ."vº C"dľº.

atim minôs-a tahkomêw.

\[ \text{atimw minôs-a tahkw= } m \quad \text{-ê } \quad \text{-w} \]

\[ \text{dog cat -XT seize=} \text{by.mouth-DIR-3} \]

‘The dog<sub>PROX</sub> bit the cat<sub>OBV</sub>.’

(Presented S2)

d. < \[\] σ¬qzą"ųº Γ."vº \[\] C"dľº.

[PROX > V [OBV > V]]

atim nikiskêyihtên minôs-a ê-tahkomât.

\[ \text{atimw ni-kisk =êyih} \quad \text{-ê } \quad \text{-n minôs-a ê- tahkw= } m \quad \text{-â } \quad \text{-t} \]

\[ \text{dog 1- know=} \text{by.mind.TI-TI-LP cat -XT C1-seize =by.mouth-DIR-3} \]

‘I know that the dog<sub>PROX</sub> bit the cat<sub>OBV</sub>.’

(Presented S2)

e. < \[\] σ¬qzą"ųº \[\] C"dľº Γ."vº.

[PROX > V [V > OBV]]

atim nikiskêyihtên ê-tahkomât minôs-a

\[ \text{atimw ni-kisk =êyih} \quad \text{-ê } \quad \text{-n ê- tahkw= } m \quad \text{-â } \quad \text{-t minôs-a} \]

\[ \text{dog 1- know=} \text{by.mind.TI-TI-LP C1-seize =by.mouth-DIR-3 cat -XT} \]

‘I know that the dog<sub>PROX</sub> bit the cat<sub>OBV</sub>.’

(Presented S2)
Here, all word ordering permutations are well-formed, so long as the “Proximate” referring nominal (here atimw ‘dog’) precedes the “Obviative” one (here minôsa ‘cat(s)obv’).

In contrast to the “Proximate” preceding “Obviative” orderings, forms that have the “Obviative” referring nominal preceding the “Proximate” are dispreferred. In these cases (25a-c), consultants will respond that the forms are understandable, but cannot be uttered by the consultant. Further, consultants also cannot imagine a fluent speaker uttering them.

(25) a. ? C”dº’ Γ.” <∩∧. [V > OBV > PROX ]
   ? tahkomêw minôsa atim.
   tahkw=m ê -w minôs-a atimw
   seize=by.mouth-DIR-3 cat -XT dog
   ‘The dogPROX bit the catOBV.’
   (Presented S2)

b. ? Γ.” C”dº’ <∩∧. [OBV > V > PROX]
   ? minôsa tahkomêw atim.
   minôs-a tahkw=m ê -w atimw
   cat -XT dog seize =by.mouth-DIR-3
   ‘The dogPROX bit the catOBV.’
   (Presented S2)

c. ? <∩∧ Γ.” C”dº’ [OBV > PROX > V]
   ? minôsa atim tahkomêw.
   minôs-a atimw tahkw=m ê -w
   cat -XT dog seize =by.mouth-DIR-3
   ‘The dogPROX bit the catOBV.’
   (Presented S2)

It is ungrammatical for the “Obviative” referring nominal argument of a subordinate clause to be positioned in front of the matrix clause. In (26), the “Obviative” referring nominal minôsa ‘catOBV’ is an argument of the subordinate verb ê-tahkomât ‘itPROX bit itOBV,’ but is positioned in front of the matrix verb nikiskêyihtên ‘I know itIN.’ This is ruled ungrammatical.

(26) “OBVIATIVE” REFERENCING NOMINALS CANNOT OCCUR IN FRONT OF MATRIX VERB

a. * Γ.” σ-ººº <∩∧ ∨ C”dº’. [OBV > V [PROX > V]]
   * minôsa nikiskêyihtên atim ê-tahkomât.
   minôs-a ni-kisk =êyih -ê -n atimw ê- tahkw=m -â -t
   cat -XT l- know=by.mind.TI-TI-LP dog c1-seize =by.mouth-DIR-3
   Intended: ‘I know that the dogPROX bit the catOBV.’
   (Presented S2)

b. * Γ.” σ-ººº ∨ C”dº’ <∩∧. [OBV > V [V > PROX]]
   * minôsa nikiskêyihtên ê-tahkomât atim
   minôs-a ni-kisk =êyih -ê -n ê- tahkw=m -â -t atimw
   cat -XT l- know=by.mind.TI-TI-LP c1-seize =by.mouth-DIR-3 dog
   Intended: ‘I know that the dogPROX bit the catOBV.’
   (Presented S2)
By contrast, “Proximate” referring nominal arguments of subordinate verbs can occur in front of matrix verb.

(27) “PROXIMATE” REFERRING NOMINALS CAN OCCUR IN FRONT OF MATRIX VERB

a. $<$ $\cap \bigcup \subseteq \in \Gamma \Delta \chi \nabla \subseteq \Gamma^d \mathcal{L}'$.  
   [PROX > V [OBV > V]]
   atimkiskêyihtên minôsa ê-tahkomât.
   $\text{atimw ni-kisk } =\text{êyiht } -\text{ê } -\text{n minôs-a } ê\text{- tahkw=m } -\text{â } -\text{t}$
   dog 1- know=by.mind.TI-TI-LP cat -XT C1-seize =by.mouth-DIR-3
   ‘I know that the dog$_{\text{PROX}}$ bit the cat$_{\text{OBV}}$.’
   (Presented S2)

b. $<$ $\cap \bigcup \subseteq \in \Gamma \Delta \chi$  
   [PROX > V [V > OBV]]
   atimkiskêyihtên ê-tahkomât minôsa.
   $\text{atimw ni-kisk } =\text{êyiht } -\text{ê } -\text{n ê-tahkw=m } -\text{â } -\text{t minôs-a}$
   dog 1- know=by.mind.TI-TI-LP C1-seize =by.mouth-DIR-3 cat -XT
   ‘I know that the dog$_{\text{PROX}}$ bit the cat$_{\text{OBV}}$.’
   (Presented S2)

We can conclude, then, that there is a strong asymmetry, then, between orderings where the “Proximate” referring nominal is first, and those where the “Obviative” is first.

Another variable in these orderings is the theme sign system; the use of an inverse verb form (shown by the verbal suffix $–ikw–$ on the verb) significantly degrades judgments, particularly for orderings where the “Obviative” is in front of the verb. For example, the form in (28a), which has the verb tahkomik ‘it$_{\text{PROX}}$ was bitten by it$_{\text{OBV}}$’ in initial position and the “Obviative” nominal preceding the “Proximate,” is interpretable but unnatural. Any form with the “Obviative” nominal in initial position (28b-c) is ruled completely uninterpretable.

(28) a. $\cap \bigcup \subseteq \in \Gamma \Delta \chi^o$  
   [V > OBV > PROX ]
   $\text{? tahkomik atimwa minôs}.$
   $\text{tahkw=m } -\text{ê } -\text{w atimw-a } \text{atimw}$
   seize=by.mouth-DIR-3 dog -XT cat
   ‘The dog$_{\text{OBV}}$ bit the cat$_{\text{PROX}}$.’
   (Presented S2)

b. $\ast \cap \bigcup \subseteq \in \Gamma \Delta \chi^o$  
   [OBV > V > PROX]
   $\ast \text{atimwa tahkomik minôs}.$
   $\text{atimw-a } \text{tahkw=m } -\text{ê } -\text{w minôs}$
   dog -XT seize =by.mouth-DIR-3 cat
   Intended: ‘The dog$_{\text{OBV}}$ bit the cat$_{\text{PROX}}$.’
   (Presented S2)
c. * awkward '.

* atimwa minôs tahkomik.

 atimw-ą  minôs tahkw=m  -é  -w

dog  -XT seize  =by.mouth-DIR-3 cat

Intended: 'The dog_{OBV} bit the cat_{PROX}.' (Presented S2)

Likely, this degradation of the ability of consultants to parse these forms has to do with the extra contextual demands that the inverse form places on the hearer (see §4.4.22 below).

The ungrammatical constructions that have an “Obviative” referring nominal preceding a “Proximate” can be repaired prosodically. If there is a pause placed between the “Obviative” referring nominal and the rest of the clause, speakers find the examples easier to parse, and even natural-sounding. For example, the form in (29a), which has the “Obviative” referring nominal atimwa ‘dog_{OBV}’ in initial position, is ungrammatical, but the form in (29b), where there is a pause after this same nominal, is considered natural-sounding.

\((29)\)

a. * awkward '.

* atimwa tahkomik minôs.

 atimw-ą  tahkw=m  -é  -w minôs

dog  -XT seize  =by.mouth-DIR-3 cat

Intended: 'The dog_{OBV} bit the cat_{PROX}.' (Presented S2)

b. awkward '.

 atimwa,  tahkomik minôs.

 atimw-ą  tahkw=m  -é  -w minôs

dog  -XT seize  =by.mouth-DIR-3 cat

'I know that the dog_{PROX} bit the cat_{OBV}.' (Presented S2)

Pausing can also repair the cases where the “Obviative” nominal precedes the matrix clause, as in (30). For example, the form in (30a), which does not have a pause after the initial “Obviative” nominal minôsa ‘the cat_{OBV},’ is bad, but the form in (30b) which has a pause is good.

\((30)\)

a. * awkward '.

 minôsa nikiskêyihêtân atim ê-tahkomât.

 minôs-ą  ni-kisk  =êyiht  -ê  -n atimw  ê- tahkw=m  -â  -t

cat  -XT l-  know=by.mind.TI-TI-LP dog  CI-seize  =by.mouth-DIR-3

Intended: 'I know that the dog_{PROX} bit the cat_{OBV}.' (Presented S2)

\[ This pausing strategy appears to be a kind of topicalization. As such, it requires previous context to be felicitous. \]
b. \( \Gamma \gamma \delta \gamma \sigma \rho \eta \pi \eta \mu \nu \alpha \beta \vdash \triangle \nabla \cup \cap \); \( \text{[OBV pause V [V > PROX]]} \)

minôsa, nikiskêyihtên atim ê-tahkomât.

\( \text{minôs} - \text{a} \ ni - \text{kisk} = \text{êyiht} - \text{ê} - \text{n atimw} \text{ê} - \text{tahkw}=m - \text{â} - \text{t} \)

\( \text{cat} - \text{XT I} - \text{know} = \text{by.mind.TI-TI-LP dog} \text{ C1-seize} = \text{by.mouth-DIR-3} \)

‘The cat\text{OBV}, I know that the dog\text{PROX} bit it\text{OBV}.’

(Presented S2)

Understanding why this pausing helps improve these orderings requires a better understanding of the role of prosodic information in the syntax of Plains Cree than is currently possible (see Cook 2006 for discussion).

This linear restriction that “Proximate” referring nominals need to precede “Obviatives” can be exploited in context-poor sentences to determine thematic roles without any obviation marking on the nominal (i.e. the suffix –\( a \); 3.3.1 or the demonstrative suffix –\( ihi \); 3.3.2). In (31a), the first nominal is consistently interpreted as the subject of the verb, and the second nominal is consistently interpreted as the object.

(31) a. \( \Delta \nabla \sigma \alpha ^\circ \text{i} \rho \nu \sigma \Delta \nabla \sigma \alpha ^\circ \).

\( \text{nâpêw sâkihêw iskwêw} \).

\( \text{nâpêw sâk} = \text{ih} - \text{ê} - \text{w iskwêw} \)

\( \text{man} \text{ love}= \text{by.neut-DIR-3 woman} \)

‘That man loves the woman.’

\( \neq \text{ ‘The woman loves that man.’} \)

(Volunteered S2)

b. \( \Delta \nabla \sigma \alpha ^\circ \text{i} \rho \nu \sigma \Delta \nabla \sigma \alpha ^\circ \).

\( \text{iskwêw sâkihêw nâpêw} \).

\( \text{iskwêw sâk} = \text{ih} - \text{ê} - \text{w man} \)

\( \text{woman love}= \text{by.neut-DIR-3 man} \)

‘The woman loves that man.’

\( \neq \text{ ‘That man loves the woman.’} \)

(Volunteered S2)

Nominal-level obviation marking is only preferred when the ordering of the two arguments is reversed. For example, in (32a), the intended interpretation, that the first nominal iskwêw ‘woman’ is the “Obviative” one, is unavailable. In (32b), this interpretation is gotten by adding the suffix –\( a \) to iskwêw ‘woman,’ and a pause is again preferred (32b).
(32) a. Δ^\text{aŋ} \cdot \triangleleft \text{ā} \cdot \text{ā}.\text{q} \circ \hat{x} \circ \propto \cdot \text{i}, \propto \circ \propto \circ \propto .
iskwêw nâpêw sâkihêw
iskwêw an -a nâpêw sâk =ih -ê -w
woman DST-AN.SG man love=by.neut-DIR-3
≠ ‘The man loves the woman’

b. Δ^\text{aŋ} \cdot \triangleleft \text{ā} \cdot \text{ā}.\text{q} \circ \hat{x} \circ \propto \cdot \text{i}, \propto \circ \propto \circ \propto .
iskwêwa, nâpêw sâkihêw
iskwêwa nâpêw sâk =ih -ê -w
woman-XT man love=by.neut-DIR-3
‘The woman, the man loves.’

Thus, the unmarked ordering appears to be that “Proximate”’s linearly precede “Obviative”’s.

4.3.2. The suffix -yi- constructs referential dependency

In section 3.3.5, I considered the suffix -yi-, which has traditionally been taken to code “Obviative” arguments of predicates. For example, an “Animate” intransitive subject does not need –yi– (33a), while an “Obviative” intransitive subject requires it (33b).

(33) “Obviative” subjects require –yi–

a. Δ^\text{āŋ} \cdot \triangleleft \text{ā} \cdot \text{ā}.\text{q} \circ \hat{x} \circ \propto \cdot \text{i}, \propto \circ \propto \circ \propto .
… ê-miyosit ana nâpêw.
ê-miyosi =si -t an =a nâpêw
c1-good =AI-3 DST=AN.SG man
‘…that man is good’

b. Δ^\text{āŋ} \cdot \triangleleft \text{ā} \cdot \text{ā}.\text{q} \circ \hat{x} \circ \propto \cdot \text{i}, \propto \circ \propto \circ \propto .
… ê-miyosit anihî nâpêwa.
ê-miyot=si -yi -t an =ihi nâpêwa-a
c1-good =AI-DS-3 DST=XT man-XT
‘… this man is goodAN.’
‘… those men are goodAN.’

In that discussion (§3.3.5), I showed that this suffix cannot be considered a dedicated “Obviative” morpheme because it occurs with “Inanimate” as well as “Obviative” “Animate” referents (34).
The suffix –yi– occurs with “Inanimate” subjects

i. ◂σνςσ<"ΔΓ

mèton è-nipahi-misâyik òma mug wîtapîhtam,

‘[he was] sitting before an enormously big mug[IN, …’

ii. ◂σνςσ<"ΔΓ

miton èkota è-asiwâtiyik anima yellow è-isinâkwakhk.

‘[itIN was] filled to the brim with something that looked yellow.’ (Ahenakew 2000 3:4)

In §3.3.5, I proposed an analysis of –yi– which treated it as an IP-level coder of disjoint subjects.

(Adapted from Déchaine 2003)

While this models the internal (i.e. word-level) structural properties of this form, I did not consider its external (i.e. clause-level) structural properties. To do this, it is necessary to consider both the content and context of this suffix – a task I take up here.

In this section, I construct a model of -yi- that extends its coverage beyond its clause-internal properties to include its clause-external properties. Since the suffix –yi- is used in “Obviative” constructions, we expect its context of use to show both the structural and semantic conditions necessary for the construction of dependent reference. In section 4.3.21, I consider the structural context of –yi–. I argue that it can only occur when its predicate is in one of two structural configurations: either (i) it is structurally-dominated by another predicate (4.3.211), or (ii) linearly preceded by another predicate (4.3.212). These structural conditions match the conditions on referential dependency exactly (cf. §4). I then turn to the semantic context of –yi–, and show that correlated to this structural dependency is a referential dependency; the subject that is coded by -yi- must be embedded within the perspective of some third person
(4.3.22). This semantic condition matches the semantic condition on referential dependency exactly (cf. §4.1.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Conditions</th>
<th>Semantic Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-yi-</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Reference</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.5. The suffix –yi– meets the conditions of referential dependency**

Taken altogether, the picture developed for -yi- bears strong parallels to the model of dependent reference proposed in this chapter (§4.1.). I conclude that the this suffix thus codes dependent reference for subjects, which suggests that it falls within the domain of switch reference (cf. Stirling 1993) – a possibility explored in Appendix A.

### 4.3.21. Structural conditions on -yi-

The suffix –yi– has the exact structural requirements that referential dependency has. In the most simple case, the clause it depends on structurally dominates it (§4.3.211).

(36) $\text{PRED}_1 \rightarrow y \rightarrow \text{PRED}_2 \rightarrow x \rightarrow \text{PRED}_2$-$yi$

In more complex cases, the clause it depends on for reference linearly precedes, but does not structurally dominate it (§4.3.212).

(37) a. $\text{PRED}_1 \rightarrow y \rightarrow \text{PRED}_2 \rightarrow x \rightarrow \text{PRED}_2$-$yi$

b. $\text{PRED}_1 \rightarrow y \rightarrow \text{PRED}_2 \rightarrow \text{PRED}_3 \rightarrow x \rightarrow \text{PRED}_3$-$yi$
Based on the model of referential dependency’s structural characteristics that I have proposed for Plains Cree (§4.1.), this is exactly the kinds of structural relations we expect for -yi-.

4.3.211. –yi– is c-commanded by its antecedent

As Cook (2008) has argued, one kind of clausal relation in Plains Cree is c-command (§4.2.2). When we consider the occurrence of the suffix -yi- with these kind of constructions, we find that it will occur whenever its predicate is c-commanded by a previous predicate and the subject is different from a third person in this matrix predicate. In both the “Obviative” subject in (38a) and the “Inanimate” subject in (38b), the subordinate predicate has a subject that is not the subject of the matrix predicate. In both instances, the lower predicate receives the suffix -yi-.

(38) a. “Obviative” Subject of Verb with –yi–

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{â\text{¬}\text{V}^o \Delta\text{U}^a \text{C}^c \ \nabla \ \sigma\text{-b}^l\text{r}^r \ \Delta\text{v}^q \text{<l>}}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\text{nâpêw itêyihtam ê-nikamoyît iskwêwa}
\]

\[
\text{nâpêw it \ =êyiht \ -am ê- nikamoyît -t iskwêwa-a}
\]

\[
\text{man \ thus=by.mind.TI-TI \ C1-sing \ -DS-3 \ woman-XT}
\]

‘The man\textsubscript{PROX} thinks the woman\textsubscript{OBV} is singing.’

(Presented S2)

b. “Inanimate” Subject of Verb with –yi–

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{â\text{¬}\text{V}^o \ Delta\text{U}^a \text{C}^c \ \nabla \ \Gamma\text{¬r}^r \ \text{L\text{¬p}^p<\gamma>}}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\text{nâpêw itêyihtam ê-misâyik maskisin}
\]

\[
\text{nâpêw it \ =êyiht \ -am ê- mis=â \ -yi \ -k \ maskisin}
\]

\[
\text{man \ thus=by.mind.TI-TI \ C1-big=STAT-DS-0 \ shoe}
\]

‘The man\textsubscript{AN} thinks the shoe is big\textsubscript{IN}.

(Presented S2)

This generalization is also true of possessed predicates, although possession constructions only allow “Animate” possessors (§4.4.1).
\(\text{“Obviative” Possessors receive } -yi-\)

a. \(\text{â. V}\circ <\text{L}^\circ <\text{q}^\circ <\text{q}^\circ >\) 
\(\text{nâpêw wâpamêw iskwêwa otêmiyiwa}\)
\(\text{nâpêw wâp=am } -ê -w \text{ iskwêw-a o-têm } -yi-w-a\)
\(\text{man see =by.eye.TA-DIR-3 woman-XT 3-horse-DS-3-XT}\)
\(\text{‘The man PROX saw the woman’s horse_OBVI.’}\) (Presented S2)

b. \(\text{â. V}\circ <\text{C}^\circ <\text{q}^\circ <\text{q}^\circ >\)
\(\text{nâpêw wâpahtam iskwêwa omaskisiniyiw}\)
\(\text{nâpêw wâp=aht } -am \text{ iskwêw-a o-maskisin-yi-w}\)
\(\text{man see =by.eye.TI-TI woman-XT 3-shoe -DS-3}\)
\(\text{‘The man PROX saw the woman’s shoe_IN.’}\) (Presented S2)

Here, the possessed predicate (-têm ‘horse/dog’ and maskisin ‘shoe’) is possessed by someone other than the subject of the verb, and the possessed predicate is affixed with -yi-.

From this data, we see that -yi- occurs on subordinate predicates. Structurally, we can represent this configuration as a c-command relation between the main clause’s argument and the subject in the lower clause.

\[\text{(40)}\]
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{PRED}_1 \\
\downarrow \\
y \\
\uparrow \\
\text{PRED}_2 \\
\downarrow \\
x \text{ PRED}_2-\text{yi}
\end{array}
\]

This models one of the most basic configurations that licenses the occurrence of -yi- on predicates in Plains Cree.

\[\text{4.3.212. } -yi- \text{ is linearly preceded by its antecedent}\]

While -yi- systematically occurs on subordinate predicates, it also occurs in configurations where its predicate is part of a chain of predicates (cf. Cook 2008).

\[\text{(41)}\]
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{PRED}_1 \\
\downarrow \\
y \\
\uparrow \\
\text{PRED}_2 \\
\rightarrow \\
x \text{ PRED}_2-\text{yi}
\end{array}
\]

This introduces three logical possibilities for the relation between the predicate bearing -yi- and its antecedent:

(i) The predicate bearing -yi- may immediately follow the predicate it is dependent on.
I now consider each of these three possibilities in turn.

A predicate bearing \( \text{–yi–} \) may occur directly after another predicate that it is dependent on, but not subordinated to. Consider the example in (42), where the last predicate (\( \text{ê-kî-kiskinohamâkosiyit} \) ‘he\text{PROX} learned’) is coded with \( \text{–yi–} \).

This means that the subject of this predicate is not the previous third person ‘him,’ which is the possessor of the previous nominal \( \text{owikimâkana} \) ‘his\text{PROX} wife\text{OBV}’ and the object of \( \text{ê-wîcihikot} \) ‘she\text{OBV} helped him\text{PROX}.’

Here, the relation between this clause and previous clauses is not straightforward structural c-command; the second predicate marked with \( \text{–yi–} \) (\( \text{ê-kî-kiskinohamâkosiyit} \) ‘she had gone go school’) is part of a chain of clauses, rather than a subordinate clause (cf. Cook 2008), and immediately follows a the clause it is dependent on (…\( \text{ê-wîcihikot aya owikimâkana} \) ‘his\text{PROX} wife\text{OBV} helped him\text{PROX}’).
The preceding predicate may also be a possessed nominal, as the string in (44) demonstrates. In this example, the first predicate marked with –yi– (ê-kiskinohamâkêyit ‘she\textsubscript{OBV} was a teacher’) linearly succeeds the initial clause that it is dependent on (ê-isiyawësit ‘he was angry’). The subsequent predicates marked with –yi– (ê-wiyawîyit ‘she\textsubscript{OBV} went out’ and ê-ayâyit ‘she was there’) each follow a possessed nominal predicate that makes referent to the referent that the subject of the clause is dependent on (wîwa ‘his\textsubscript{PROX} wife\textsubscript{OBV}’ and osikosa ‘his\textsubscript{PROX} mother-in-law\textsubscript{OBV}’).

(44) \(–yi–\) follows possessed predicate

i. \(\dot{\text{C}}\sigma r' \nabla r' \Delta r' \Delta' \Delta r' \Delta r' \Delta r' \nabla r' \nabla r' \), ...
   tânis étikwê ê–ê–ê-isiyawësit ëkwa awa, ...
   tânisi étikwê ê–isi =yawësi -t ëkwa aw -a
   how EVID 3-thus=wrathful-3 and PRX-AN.SG
   ‘And I do not know what he\textsubscript{AN} was so angry about, …’

ii. \(\nabla r' \Delta r' \Delta r' \), ...
   ê-kiskinohamâkêyit wîwa ê-wiyawîyit ...
   ê-kisk =ino =h =amaw =ikê-yi -t w-îw -a ê-wiyawi-yî-t
   c1-know=by.hand=CAUS=APPLIC=AI -DS-3 3-wife-XT C1-go.out-DS-3
   ‘… but when his\textsubscript{PROX} wife\textsubscript{OBV} the teacher went out …’

iii. \(\nabla r' \Delta r' \Delta r' \), ...
   ëkwa osikosa mîn ëkota ê-ayâyit, ...
   ëkwa o-sikos -a mîna ëkota ê-ayâ -yi -t
   and 3-mother.in.law-XT also there C1-be.there-DS-3
   ‘… and his\textsubscript{PROX} mother-in-law\textsubscript{OBV} was there as well, …’ (Ahenakew 5:7)

This is also a case of linear-precedence (45).

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{y} & \text{wiwa} & \rightarrow & \text{x} & \text{ê-wiyawîyit} \\
\hline
\text{PRED}_1 & & & & \text{PRED}_2
\end{array}
\]

In both of the case in (42) and (43), then, the predicate coded with –yi– linearly succeeds the predicate it is referentially dependent on but is not structurally dominated by it. This means that the suffix –yi– occurs on a predicates that are not straightforwardly c-commanded by their antecedent.

While in the preceding examples pivot predicate immediately precedes the predicate bearing –yi–, the two predicates may be further apart. The example in (46) shows this kind of configuration. Here, the antecedent is only associated with the first predicate (ê-ki-nakiskawât ‘he\textsubscript{PROX} met
her\textsubscript{OBV}). The next predicate (\(\text{ê-kiyokêyân} \ 'I \ was \ visiting'\)) makes no reference to the antecedent at all. The next clause, which is conjoined with \(\text{êkwa} \ 'and,'\) has a predicate that is dependent for its reference on the initial predicate, and bears \(\text{\textasciitilde yî} \ (\text{ê-ki-miyohtwâyit} \ '\text{she} \text{OBV} \ was \ a \ good \ person')\).

\(\text{(46) Predicate marked with \(\text{\textasciitilde yî} \) is separated from initial predicate}\)

\begin{itemize}
\item[i.] \(\sigma \hat{P} \sigma-\Delta \rho \check{b}^\uparrow \check{b}^\downarrow \Delta=\Delta b \sigma x\).
Nîkî-nitawi-kiyokân nîcêwâkan owâskahikanikh.
\(\text{Nî-ki- nitawi-kiyokê-n ni-wicêw} \ =\hat{a} \ =\text{kan o-wâskahikan-ihk} \)
\(1- \ PREV \text{-go} \ \text{visit} \ -LP \ 1- \text{accompany}=\text{DIR}=\text{NOM} \ 3 \text{-house} \ \text{-LOC} \)
'I \ went \ to \ visit \ my \ friend\textsubscript{AN} \ in \ his \ home.'

\item[ii.] \(\nabla \hat{P} \ a \rho \check{b}^\uparrow \Delta \check{b}^\downarrow \nabla \ \rho \check{b}^\downarrow \check{b}^\uparrow \).
\(\text{ê-ki-nakiskawât iskwêwa ê-kiyokêyân}, \)
\(\text{ê- ki- nak} \ =\text{iskwêw} \ -\hat{a} \ -t \text{iskwêw-a ê-kiyokê-yân} \)
\(c1-\text{PREV-meet}=\text{by.body.TA-DIR} \ 3 \text{-woman-XT c1-visit-l} \)
'\text{He}_{\text{PROX}} \ had \ met \ a \ woman_{\text{OBV}} \ when \ I \ was \ visiting, \ ...' \\

\item[iii.] \(\nabla \check{b} \check{b} \nabla \hat{P} \check{b} \check{b} \).
\(\text{êkwa tontonê ê-ki-miyohtwâyit}. \)
\(\text{êkwa tontonê ê- ki- miyw=htwâ } \text{-yî-t} \)
\(\text{and \ intense c1-\text{PREV-good} } =\text{behave-DS-3} \)
'... \ and \ \text{she}_{\text{OBV}} \ was \ really \ kind.' \ (Presented S2)
\end{itemize}

This is a case where another predicate intervenes in the linear-precedence relation, as schematized in (47).

\(\text{(47) \hfill PRED}_1 \rightarrow \text{PRED}_2 \rightarrow \text{PRED}_3 \hfill \)
\(\text{y} \ ê\text{-nakiskawât} \ ê\text{-kiyokêyân} \ x \ ê\text{-miyohtwâyit} \)

Thus, another predicate can intervene between the \(\text{\textasciitilde yî} \)-marked clause and its antecedent.

A third possibility is that the predicate marked with \(\text{\textasciitilde yî} \) is linearly distant from its pivot predicate and is c-commanded by a clause that lacks reference to this antecedent. An example of this kind is shown in (48). Here, the second predicate marked with \(\text{\textasciitilde yî} \) (\(\text{ê-wî-pôn-akhosiyit} \ '\text{she \ will \ stop \ being \ sick}'\)) is separated from a predicate that makes reference to its pivot (\(\text{nitawi-wâpamêw} \ '\text{he \ went \ to \ see \ her}' \) or \(\text{omâmâwa} \ '\text{his \ mother}'\)) by another predicate (\(\text{ninitawêyihtên} \ '\text{I \ want \ it}'\)), which it is c-commanded by (see §4.3.21).
(48) \(-y\text{i}\) – PREDICATE C-COMMANDED BY INTERVENING PREDICATE

i. \(\sigma \gamma \text{\&} \beta \) \(\text{\&} \text{\&} \gamma \text{\&} \text{\&} \gamma \), …
  nicêwâkan nitawi-wâpamêw omâmâwa, …
  \(n\)-wicêw=â=kân nitawi-wâp=am -ê -w o-mâmâ-a
  l-accompany=DIR=NOM go=see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 3-mother-XT
  ‘My friend\(_{\text{PROX}}\) has gone to visit her\(_{\text{PROX}}\) mother\(_{\text{OBV}}\), …’ (Presented S2)

ii. … \(\n\beta\) \(\sigma \text{\&} \text{\&} \gamma \text{\&} \gamma \text{\&} \beta \) \(\text{\&} \beta \) \(\text{\&} \beta \) \(\text{\&} \beta \).
  … êkw\(a\) ninitawëyihtën ka-pôn-ahkosi\(_{\text{yi}}\).
  êkw\(a\) ni-nitaw=ëyiht -ê -n ka-pôn-ahkosi\(_{\text{yi}}\) -\(t\)
  and 1-toward=by.mind.TI-TI-LP C1-stop-sick -\(\text{DS}\)-3
  ‘… and I want her\(_{\text{OBV}}\) to stop being sick.’ (Presented S2)

This is a case where an intervening predicate \(c\)-commands the predicate bearing \(-y\text{i}\) – (49).

(49)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{PRED} \_1\\ \gamma \\
\text{wâpamêw}
\end{array} \quad \rightarrow \quad \begin{array}{c}
\text{PRED} \_2\\ \gamma \\
\text{PRED} \_3\\ \text{x} \\
\text{ê-wi-pôn-ahkosi\(_{\text{yi}}\)}
\end{array}
\]

Considered in light of Cook’s (2008) analysis of clause-chaining constructions as precedence relations, we immediately see parallels in the problem of identifying the antecedent clause for \(-y\text{i}\). The clause that \(-y\text{i}\) relates to is this initial, discourse-setting clause (i.e. the “pivot” clause; Stirling 1993), rather than the immediately preceding, and/or structurally dominant clause. Seen in this way, the suffix \(-y\text{i}\) can be understood as part of a more general pattern of anaphora in Plains Cree; its antecedent can either structurally dominate it or linearly precede it.

4.3.22. Semantic conditions on \(-y\text{i}\)

So far, we have seen that the suffix \(-y\text{i}\) codes a disjunction from some previous referent, but we have said very little about the properties of this antecedent. When we do this, we immediately notice a cluster of related requirements for the antecedent:

(i) The antecedent must be in the previous discourse (§4.3.221).

(ii) The antecedent must be “Animate” (§4.3.222).

(iii) The antecedent must possess a perspective for the predicate marked with \(-y\text{i}\) to be evaluated within (§4.3.223).
(iv) If the matrix predicate is a psych verb, the c-commanded predicate must bear –yi– (§4.3.224).

Taken together, these four observations point to the same conclusion: the suffix –yi– codes that its argument is embedded within the perspective of some previous referent.

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|}
\hline
x & y \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

This is expected within the model of dependent reference constructed in this chapter (§4.1.).

4.3.221. The antecedent of –yi– must be in previous discourse

We have already seen the requirement for the antecedent to be in the previous discourse. In section 4.3.211, we considered cases where the antecedent was in the matrix clause, while, in section 4.3.212, we considered cases where the antecedent was in a linearly precedent clause. In fact, this precedence is all that is required structurally; the antecedent can be either the subject (51a) or the object (51b) of previous clauses.

(51) a. ANTECEDENT OF –yi– IS SUBJECT

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{nitawi-witastoskêmit, } & \text{â-hakosi-yi-t wîwa.} \\
n-\text{nitawi-wit} & =\text{atoskê=m-it } \text{â-hakosi-yi-t wîwa} \\
1\text{-friend} & \text{c1-come-with=work } =\text{DJ-3>l c1-sick } -\text{DS-3 3-wife-XT} \\
\text{My friend came to work with me, his}_{\text{PROX}} \text{wife}_{\text{OBV}} \text{was sick.} \quad \text{(Presented S2)}
\end{align*}
\]

b. ANTECEDENT OF –yi– IS OBJECT

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{nitawi-witastoskêmit, } & \text{â-hakosi-iy-t wîwa.} \\
n-\text{nitawi-wit} & =\text{atoskê=m-ak } \text{â-hakosi-iy-t wîwa} \\
1\text{-friend} & \text{c1-go- with=work } =\text{DJ-1>3 c1-sick } -\text{DS-3 3-wife-XT} \\
\text{I went to work with my friend, his}_{\text{PROX}} \text{wife}_{\text{OBV}} \text{was sick.} \quad \text{(Presented S2)}
\end{align*}
\]
Here, the antecedent, *nicêwâkan* ‘my friend,’ is the subject of (51a), as shown by the portmanteau verbal affix –*it*, which codes that a 3rd person referent is acting on the Speaker. Conversely, the form in (51b) has the antecedent as the object, as shown by the portmanteau verbal affix –*ak*, which codes that the Speaker is acting on a 3rd person referent.

### 4.3.222. The antecedent of –*yi*– must be “animate”

As Wolfart (p.c.) has pointed out, the antecedent must be “Animate” in order for –*yi*– to occur on subsequent predicates. Consider the pairwise contrast in (52). Here, only a structure coding the referent of the matrix clause as “Animate” (the TA form *miskaw*– ‘find’ in 52b) allows for the application of –*yi*– to the subsequent predicate. Within the context of the current model, this ban on “Inanimate” antecedents makes sense; “Inanimate” referents are those that inherently lack a perspective (see Chapter 2).

(52) If Antecedent is “Inanimate,” no –*yi*–

a. σ⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁰⁻ Hobbes ⊃ ⊃ P⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁰ACHE Calvin.
   nimiskêni Hobbes ê-pê-kiyokêt Calvin.
   *ni-m=isk* –*ê-n Hobbes ê- pê- kiyokê-t Calvin-a
   *1-find=by.body.TI-TI-LP Hobbes c1-come-visit* -3 Calvin-XT
   ‘I found Hobbes when Calvin came to visit.’ (Presented S2)

b. # σ⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁰⁻ Hobbes ⊃ ⊃ P⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁰ACHE Calvin.<
   # nimiskêni Hobbes ê-pê-kiyokêyit Calvin.<
   *ni-m=isk* –*ê-n Hobbes ê- pê- kiyokê-yi-t Calvin-a
   *1-find=by.body.TI-TI-LP Hobbes c1-come-visit* -3 Calvin-XT
   ‘I found Hobbes when Calvin< came to visit.’ (Presented S2)

Without a perspective, the referent cannot force a subsequent referent to be referentially dependent on it.

### 4.3.223. The antecedent of –*yi*– must have a perspective

Even if the antecedent is in previous discourse (§4.3.221) and “Animate” (§4.3.222), –*yi*– can still fail to occur if the final condition is not met; the antecedent must possess a perspective. An instructive near-minimal pair of this is seen in Sarah Whitecalf’s speech on the Sundance

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5 It is possible that this form is actually –*i-t*, where –*i*– is the theme sign coding a 1st person object (see Déchaine & Reinholtz 2008), and –*t* codes a 3rd person “Animate” subject. I am taking the less controversial approach here because the difference is not relevant to the current discussion.
(Whitecalf 1993:§16,17). When she refers to an audience member (H.C. Wolfart) and his desire to learn about Cree ways, she uses a psych predicate (kiskēyiht- ‘know’), a psych preverb (nôhtē- ‘want’), and then marks the subordinate clause ê-ispayiyik ‘it works’ with the suffix –yi–.

(53) **ANTECEDENT IS A SPECIFIC PERSON, –yi– IS USED**

\[ \nôhtê\text{-}kiskēyihtahk \tanisi \text{ê-ispayiyik} \omega \text{ma kînhiyâwiwininaw.} \\
\text{ê-}nôhtê-kisk\text{=}êyiht\text{-}am-k \tanisi \text{ê- is =payî- n-yi-k} \\
\text{c1-want-know=by.mind-TI-3 how c1-thus=INCH-IT-DS-0} \\
\text{aw-ima ki-nêhiyâw-i-w-in -inaw.} \\
\text{PROX-IN.SG 2-cree -AT-3-NOM-21PL} \\
\text{‘[he]_{AN} wants to understand how [our Cree culture]_{IN} works’ (Whitecalf 1993:§16)} \\
\]

Whitecalf employs a parallel structure later on in the same speech, but this time the subordinate predicate ê-ispayik ‘it\text{IN} works’ lacks the suffix –yi–. Here, the very same verb (ê-ispayik ‘it works’), in a similarly subordinative structure lacks the suffix –yi–.

(54) **ANTECEDENT IS GENERIC, NO –yi– IS USED**

\[ \nôhtê\text{-}kisk\text{=}êyiht\text{-}am-k \tanisi \text{ê-ispayik} \\
\text{mitoni têpi-kiskinowâpahtahki òma nipâkwêsimowikamik tânisi ê-ispayik} \\
\text{mitoni têpi- kisk=inw =wâp =aht -am-k-i aw-ima} \\
\text{intense enough-know=by.hand=see =by.eye.TI-TI -0-SUBJ PROX-IN.SG} \\
\text{nipâkwêsimow-ikamikw tânisi ê-is=payî -k} \\
\text{sun.dance -3-place how c1-thus=INCH-0} \\
\text{‘When the Whites\text{AN} have watched and learned enough about how} \\
\text{the Sundance-Lodge\text{IN} works, …’ (Whitecalf 1993:§17)} \\
\]

When speakers are asked about these pairs of sentences, their explanations always appeal to notions of point of view. For example, the pair of sentences offered by Sarah Whitecalf have been explained by two different speakers (S2, S3) as coding a contrast in points of view; the first sentence (wherein H.C. Wolfart wishes to know how the Cree Culture works) represents H.C. Wolfart’s point of view, whereas the second sentence does not represent any third person’s point of view. The combination of judgments like this and the textual patterns led Wolfart (p.c.) to describe this distinction as one between a discourse-prominent third person and a generic third person.

This set of interpretations by native speakers makes sense when we consider the context of Sarah Whitecalf’s discussion; in the first example (53), she is referring to a specific audience...
member, and what his intentions are (i.e. he has a desire to learn about Cree culture). In the second example (54), she is not referring to any specific referent, but rather the general behaviours of generic people (môniyâsak ‘the whites’). Crucially, this second example employs subjunctive morphology (-i); there is no current intention for a real referent, only possible future intentions for unknown referents. The example in (53), then, represents the perspective of H.C. Wolfart, while the example in (54) represents no one in particular’s.

We can model this in the DRT framework developed thus far by exploiting the presence versus absence of an embedded perspective. In the case of the example in (53), which represents the perspective of H.C. Wolfart, we can assign this referent (W) an embedded perspective (55). Embedding the referent y, identified with “Cree culture” inside of the perspective of H.C. Wolfart (W) forces y to be dependent on W. With this dependency established, the linear and structural rules for applying -yi- come into play, and the subordinate predicate ispayi- ‘function’ is coded with -yi-, since its subject is different from, and dependent on, an antecedent, which commands it.

(55) \[ \text{ê-nôhtê-kiskêyihtahk tânisi ê-ispayiniyik ôma kinêhiyâwiwininaw.} \]

‘[he]_{AN} wants to understand how [our Cree culture]_{IN} works’ (Whitecalf 1993:§16)

Speaker <say>

y

Cree.culture(y)

Wolfart <want>

y

know(W,y)

work(y)

\[ \text{‘work’ EMBEDDED IN WOLFART’S PERSPECTIVE} \]
Turning now to the case in (54), we do not assign an embedded perspective to môniyâsak ‘the whites’ (56).

(56) .mitoni têpi-kiskînôwahta-ôma nipâkwêsîmowîkamik tânisi ê-ispayik
  mitoni têpi- kisk=inw =wâp =aht -am-k-i aw-îma
  intense enough-know=by.hand=see =by.eye.TI-TI -0-SUBJ PROX-IN.SG
  nipâkwêsîmo-w-ikamikw tânisi ê-is=payi -k
  sun.dance -3-place how CL-thus=INCH-0
‘When the Whites have watched and learned enough about how the Sundance-Lodge works,’ (Whitecalf 1993:§17)

Speaker <say>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>x</th>
<th>y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>whites(x)</td>
<td>Sun.Dance(y)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>know(x,y)</td>
<td>work (y)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘Work’ EMBEDDED IN Speaker’s PERSPECTIVE

Here, there is no embedded perspective, and thus there is no referent for the “Inanimate” subject of the subordinate clause to be dependent on. Lacking such a dependence, the application of -yi- is not licensed, and the predicate ispayi- ‘function’ does not receive this suffix.

4.3.224. Propositional attitude verbs force –yi–

If the matrix verb is a verb that expresses a propositional attitude, and its subject meets the three previous criteria (in previous discourse, “Animate,” existential), subjects in the subordinate clause must be coded with –yi–. Consider the pairwise contrasts in (57) and (58). In (57), the matrix clause is a propositional attitude verb (itêyihtam ‘heAN think thus of itAN’), and the subordinate clause ê-nikamoyît ‘she sings_{obv}’ has iskwêw ‘woman’ as its subject. In this configuration, the lower predicate must have –yi– affixed (57b).
The same holds true with “Inanimate” subjects; the subordinate clause must be marked with –yi–, as the minimal pair in (58) shows.

(58) **Propositional Attitude Verbs force –yi– for “Inanimate” referents**

a. ḥ Vo ^b^iy^O^C^c^ ⊏ σ b j ′ ^a^q^c^.<j.  

nâpêw itêyihtam ê-nikamoyît iskwêwa  

nâpêw it ê-yiht -am ê- nikamo-ît iskwêw-a  

man thus=by.mind.TI-TI 1-sing -DS-3 woman-XT  

‘The manPROX thinks the womanOBV is singing.’  

(Presented S2)

b. * ḥ Vo ^b^iy^O^C^c^ ⊏ σ b j ′ ^a^q^c^.<j.  

* nâpêw itêyihtam ê-nikamot iskwêw  

nâpêw it ê-yiht -am ê- nikamo-t iskwêw  

man thus=by.mind.TI-TI 1-sing -3 woman  

‘The manAN thinks the womanAN is singing.’  

(Presented S2)

Since propositional attitude verbs always introduce a perspective for the experiencer (cf. §1.3, §2.4, §3.4), these constructions code that the subject of the lower predicate is evaluated within the perspective of the subject of the propositional attitude verb. This is shown in (59).
4.3.23. Conclusion: -yi- constructs referential dependency

Taken altogether, we now have a model of the referential dependency coded by the suffix –yi– in Plains Cree. First, we see that this dependency has structural correlates, including the necessity of one referent to structurally dominate or linearly precede the other. Second, we see that dependency has semantic properties; the dependent referent must be embedded inside the perspective of the antecedent.

From this analysis, we see that the function of -yi- overlaps with the “Obviative” referential category, but the two are not identical. This is because -yi- defines a structural position for a dependent referent (i.e. the subject of the predicate), whereas the “Obviative” is a particular kind of referent, whose inability to convey information to the Speaker often requires the construction of chains of discourse-level dependencies (§3.5). When the conditions on “Obviative” usage coincide with those for the suffix -yi-, the “Obviative” referent can be coded by the suffix -yi-. Thus, when an “Obviative” referent, which is dependent on a “Proximate’s” perspective (vis-a-vis its extentional content: see chapter 3, section 3.4), is the subject of a verb, it is de facto a dependent subject, which triggers the application of -yi- to the verb.
(60) **Dependent Subject** → **-yi-**

...\( \langle D \rangle < L' \rangle \, \langle V^o \rangle \, \langle D^p \rangle < D \rangle \, \langle P \rangle < D' \rangle \).

... è-wâpamât nâpêw iskwêwa kâ-kinosiyît
eè-wâp=am -à -t nâpêw iskwêw-a kâ-kinw=si -yi -t
c1-see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 man woman-XT C2-long=STAT-DS-3

‘...the man\( _{\text{PROX}} \) saw the woman\( _{\text{OBV}} \) who was tall.’ (Presented S2)

In other configurations, the “Obviative” referent is still referentially dependent, but not in a configuration that licenses **-yi-**. Thus, when an “Obviative” referent is the object of a verb, it is not a dependent subject, and thus there will be no **-yi-** on the verb.

(61) **Not Dependent Subject** → No **-yi-**

...\( \langle D \rangle < L' \rangle \, \langle V^o \rangle \, \langle D^p \rangle < D \rangle \, \langle P \rangle < D' \rangle \).
eè-wâpamât nâpêw iskwêwa kâ-wîtatoskêmât
eè-wâp=am -à -t nâpêw iskwêw-a kâ-wît=atoskê=m- â -t
c1-see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 man woman-XT C2-long=work=DJ-DIR-3

‘The man\( _{\text{PROX}} \) saw the woman\( _{\text{OBV}} \) who he\( _{\text{PROX}} \) works with.’ (Presented S2)

Thus, the verbal system can be said to use a semantically-compatible morpheme to opportunistically track “Obviative” referents. This is a significantly different conclusion than we would be led to by an analysis that posits **-yi-** to be “Obviative” agreement, and leads to a significantly different picture of the grammar’s organization.

4.4. Predicate-internal dependencies and obviation

So far, we have considered the construction of referential dependency that involves two predicates. This included (i) nominal-nominal relations (§4.4.1), and (ii) dependent subjects (§4.4.2). Both of these constructions shared a structural constraint; the predicate containing the dependent referent must linearly succeed the predicate containing its antecedent precedence.

While these predicate-predicate relations all have been demonstrated to code referential dependency via linear precedence, the model of referential dependency developed here also expects that referential dependencies can be coded strictly via c-command.
This could, in principle, be a relation between predicates, as shown by the c-command cases with

\[ v_i \] (§4.3.21).

However, the models of Hirose (2000) and Déchaine (2003) require that predicate-internal relations must necessarily use c-command, because the predicate is constructed out of successively restricting, c-commanding components (see Chapter 2, §2.2.1).

Thus, when we consider predicate-internal dependencies, we necessarily consider c-command environments.

In the following sections, I consider predicate-internal relations in “Obviative” constructions. In section 4.4.1, I show that nominal-internal relations always code both structural c-command and perspectival embedding; they meet both conditions of dependent reference. The obligatory coding of obviation in these environments thus becomes transparent. In section 4.4.2, I show that verb-internal relations also code both structural c-command and perspectival embedding. In the case of the ‘direct’ forms (§4.4.21), the structure is equivalent to nominals; there is both c-command and perspectival embedding. Turning to the ‘inverse’ forms (§4.4.22), I show that the inverse form breaks c-command between the dependent referent and its antecedent (cf. Déchaine & Reinholtz 1997, 2008), but introduces a linear-precedence constraint. In all
cases of predicate-internal relations, then, “Obviative” constructions show a sensitivity to both the structural and semantic conditions on dependent reference.

4.4.1 Possession as referential dependency

Plains Cree possession constructions are strictly head-marking; the possessum receives inflection for possession, while the possessor receives no coding at all (cf. Wolfart 1973).

(65) **Possessum receives coding, possessor does not**

\[ \Delta rains \triangleright \hat{q}r \Leftrightarrow \]
iskwêw ominôsîma
iskwêw w-minôs=im-a
woman 3-cat =DSJ-XT
‘the woman’\textsubscript{PROX} cat\textsubscript{OBV}

(Presented S2)

As can be seen in (65), the third-person possessed forms obey a particular “Proximate” to “Obviative” pattern; the possessor is “Proximate” and the possessum is “Obviative.” Removing the “Obviative” suffix –a from the possessum is ungrammatical, as exemplified by (66b).

(66) **Possessor must be “Proximate” and possessum must be “Obviative”**

\[ \Delta rains \triangleright \hat{q}r \Leftrightarrow \]
a. \iskwêw ominôsîma
iskwêw w-minôs-im-a
woman 3-cat =DSJ-XT
‘the woman’\textsubscript{PROX} cat\textsubscript{OBV}

(Presented S2)

b. \* \iskwêwa ominôsim
iskwêw-a w-minôs-im
woman-XT 3-cat =DSJ
Intended: ‘the woman’\textsubscript{OBV} cat\textsubscript{PROX}

(Presented S2)

The “Proximate” and “Obviative” mapping cannot be reversed in possession constructions. The “Proximate” referent always maps onto the possessor, and the “Obviative” referent always maps onto the possessum.\(^6\) This is a widely-known property of possessor constructions in Plains Cree

\(^6\) It is important to note that in elicitation, possessums can lose their obviation coding (cf. Cook & Mühlbauer 2006). Further, even in natural speech, when possessed forms are arguments of verbs, the verb can show simple “Animate” agreement, rather than the expected “Obviative” pattern (cf. Wolfart 1973). It seems that these constructions have to do with cases where the Speaker wishes to subordinate a referent initially, to introduce the referent felicitously, and then moves that referent to “Proximate” status (cf. English, John’s brother Bill called me yesterday.).
Given such a correlation between obviation and possession, the current model expects that possession should show the two conditions on referential dependency:

(i) **Structural Condition**: It should show c-command or linear precedence effects.
(ii) **Semantic Condition**: It should show perspectival embedding.

In the next two sections (4.4.11-12), I demonstrate that both of these conditions hold with possession constructions; possession is a kind of referential dependence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Structural Conditions</th>
<th>Semantic Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-command</td>
<td>Linear Precedence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possession</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✘</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referential Dependency</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6. Possession meets the conditions of referential dependency

The reason for the tight correlation between possession and obviation, then, becomes transparent.

### 4.4.11. Possessors c-command possessums

Based on the pattern of head-marking and the additive affixation, Déchaine (1999) analyzed possessor constructions as being built out of a hierarchy of forms, as in (67).

(67) niminôsiminânak

*ni-minôs-im -nân-ak*

*I- cat -DSJ-1PL-PL*

‘our cats’

(Volunteered S1)
In Chapter 3 (§3.3.4), I proposed a modification to this structure based on the properties of the suffix –im. In particular, I split the NP into two heads, in the same manner that Hirose (2000) split Plains Cree’s VP structure (cf. §2.2.1).

\[
\text{(68)}
\]

ominôsimisisiwâwa
\[ o-minôs-im\ -sis\ -wâw-a \]
3-cat \[ -\text{DISJ}-\text{DIM}-3\text{PL} \ -\text{XT} \]
‘Their \text{PROX} cat(s)\text{OBV}’
Here, the higher head of nP introduces the external argument of the nominal structure (i.e. the possessor), while the lower head of NP introduces the internal argument of the nominal structure (i.e. the possessum). This corresponds directly with the model of verbal structure proposed by Hirose (2000) and modified by Déchaine (2003).

(69) \( \sigma<\hat{\imath}<\hat{\imath}^* \)
niwâpamâw
\( ni\text{-}wâp=am \) \( -\hat{\imath} \) \( -w \)
\( 1\text{-}see=\text{see.by.eye.TA-DIR-3} \)
‘I see him/her/it\( _{AN} \) …’

(Volunteered S1)
Here, the higher phrase (vP) introduces the subject argument, while the lower phrase (VP) introduces the object argument. Thus, possessors are structurally akin to subjects, and the nominal’s own referential argument (Williams’ 1981 ‘R’ argument) is akin to an object.

Given a model of this kind, the possessor is always structurally-superior to the possessum; it is introduced in the higher head (nP), and thus c-commands the argument in the next highest head (the R argument of NP).

(70)

\[
\text{NP} \\
\text{ROOT} \\
\text{Poss’r} \\
\text{N} \rightarrow \text{NP} \\
\text{Poss’m} \\
\text{N}
\]

This configuration means that possession constructions fulfill the structural condition on referential dependency (§4.1); the dependent referent is structurally subordinated to its antecedent.

4.4.12. Perspectival embedding with possession

In order to demonstrate that possession is a kind of referential dependency, it is not sufficient to show that it meets the structural conditions of referential dependency. In addition, it is necessary to demonstrate that these structural conditions parallel a semantic condition; the referent that is c-commanded by its antecedent must also be interpreted within the perspective of that antecedent (§4.1). For possession, this means that the possessum, the lower argument of the nominal structure (§4.4.11), must be embedded in the perspective of the possessor, which is the higher argument of the nominal structure (§4.4.11).
Without this, possession cannot be said to code a kind of referential dependency, and we are left wondering why it should so closely parallel obviation, which is hypothesized to code such a dependency (§3.4, §4.1).

In fact, a systematic consideration of possessor semantics strongly suggests that the possessum is indeed embedded in the perspective of the possessor. In section 4.3.12.1, I show that “Inanimate” referents, which are inherently unable to possess a perspective (§2.4), cannot be possessors – a fact that is expected if possessors are inherently perspectival. In section 4.4.122, I show that the possessor must always be existential and specific in Plains Cree, which parallels the findings for the antecedent of –yí–marked subjects seen above (§4.3.2). In section 4.4.123, I show that possession induces an implication that the possessor holds the proposition expressed about the possessum to be true. Following this, I show in 4.4.12.4 that possession is intimately related to indexicality, which is expected if possessors are perspective-holders. Finally, in section 4.4.125, I show that possession interacts with the knowledge states of the speech-act participants, placing knowledge restrictions that support the conclusion that possession induces an expectation that the evaluation of the proposition should happen in the perspective of the possessor. Taken altogether, I consider this evidence to strongly support the conclusion that the possessum is embedded in the perspective of the possessor. This means that possession meets the semantic condition on referential dependence.

4.4.12.1. “Inanimate” referents cannot be possessors

Unlike English, Plains Cree does not allow possessors to be “Inanimate”. There are no forms in any text, and consultants consistently explain that they are ill-formed in elicitation (72). Here, the form that inflects the nominal –skāt ‘leg’ for possession by téhtapiwin ‘table’ is rejected. Instead, the consultant volunteers a form that compounds téhtapiwin ‘chair’ together with –skāt ‘leg,’ giving it one total pitch contour for the entire construction (cf. Mühlbauer 2006 for pitch and the ‘word’).
“INANIMATE” REFERENTS CANNOT BE POSSESSORS

a. $\sigma^\lambda d \sigma^\gamma \cup^\gamma \Delta^\gamma \sigma^\delta \tau^\beta \Delta^\beta$.
   $\star$ nipîkonên têhtapiwin oskâta.
   ni-pîkw=n -ê -n têht=api=win o-skât-a
   1- see=by.hand-TI-LP upon=sit=NOM 3-leg -XT
   Intended: ‘I broke the chair’s$_{SN}$ legs.’ (Presented S2)
   COMMENT (S2): ‘You’re saying the chair is alive.’

b. $\sigma^\lambda d \sigma^\gamma \cup^\gamma \Delta^\gamma \sigma^\delta \tau^\beta \Delta^\beta$.
   nipîkonên têhtapiwiniskâta.
   ni-pîkw=n -ê -n têht=api=win-skât-a
   1- see=by.hand-TI-LP upon=sit=NOM-leg -XT
   ‘I broke the chair’s$_{SN}$ legs.’ (Presented S2)

One consultant (S2) specifically identified animacy as the problem, saying that “it seems like you’re saying the chair is alive, but you’re also saying the chair isn’t alive.”

Recall from chapter 2 (§2.4) that “Inanimate” referents are unable to function as the subjects of verbs that have intentional semantics (§2.4.4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>“INANIMATE”</th>
<th>“ANIMATE”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sensory (e.g. ‘appear’)</td>
<td>isinâkwan-</td>
<td>isinâkosi-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undergo (e.g. ‘be smoked’)</td>
<td>kaskâpahté-</td>
<td>kaskâpaso-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion (e.g. ‘x feels well’)</td>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>miyomaciho-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellect (e.g. ‘x remembers’)</td>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>kiskisi-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech (e.g. ‘x speaks’)</td>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>pikiskwê-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.5. (Repeated) Semantic gaps among verb classes

From that data and other sources (§2.4), I argued that “Inanimate” nominals are inherently extentional; they can never possess a perspective for the truth of a proposition to be evaluated in.

Following this logic through to the current discussion of possession, we can understand the restriction on “Inanimate” nominals as providing evidence about the semantics of possessor constructions. If possession in Plains Cree is inherently perspectival (i.e. the possessum is perspectivally-embedded in the possessor), the impossibility of “Inanimate” possessors is expected.

4.4.122. Possessors are always existential

In Plains Cree, the possessor is always interpreted as existential and specific (as opposed to generic). Consider the contrast in (73).
(73)  a. **Compound nominal = generic possessor**

\[ \sigma_{\text{at}} < Ć < Ć^3 > Ć \vee < Ć > ^{\rho} r \alpha . \]

ninôhtê-atâwân nápêwaskisina.

\[ ni-nōhtē-atâwê-n nápêw-maskisin-a \]

1- want- buy -LP man -shoe -XT

= ‘I want to buy men’s shoes.’ (Presented S2)

\[ \neq \text{‘I want to buy the man’s shoes.’} \]

Comment (S2): “You’re just going to the store to buy shoes.”

b. **Overt possessor = specific, existential possessor**

\[ \sigma_{\text{at}} < Ć < Ć^3 > Ć \vee ^{\rho} r \alpha . \]

ninôhtê-atâwân nápêw omaskisina

\[ ni-nōhtē-atâwê-n nápêw o-maskisin-a \]

1- want- buy -LP man 3-shoe -XT

\[ \neq \text{‘I want to buy men’s shoes.’} \]

= ‘I want to buy the man’s shoes.’ (Presented S2)

Comment (S2): “You’re talking about some particular man.”

Here, I have set up the context as one in which I want to go to a shoe store to purchase shoes. The consultant (S2) explains that, in this context, I can only utter (73a) felicitously. I cannot utter (73b), because “you are talking about some particular man, and how you want to buy his shoes. You’re not going to a store to buy shoes anymore.” Thus, the compound form nápêwaskisina ‘men’s shoes’ in (73a), which has one pitch contour (cf. Mühlbauer 2006) and shows a loss of the initial nasal of maskisin ‘shoe,’ correlates with the generic type of possession, while the form in (73b), which has an independent nominal and possessor inflection, correlates with an specific, existential reading.

Like with the restrictions on “Inanimate” possessors, we have also seen this kind of pattern before. In section 4.3.2, we saw that the antecedent in a construction involving –yi– had to be existential.

(74)  **Existential antecedent = –yi– on predicate**

\[ \nabla \sigma_{\text{t}} < Ć^3 > Ć x Ć σ \sigma \nabla \Delta ^{\rho} r \sigma \alpha \Delta \sigma \tilde{\sigma} \tilde{\alpha} . \]

ê-nôhtê-kiskêyihthahk tânisi ê-ispayinîyik ôma kinêhiyawîwininaw.

ê- nôhtê-kisk=éyiht-am-k tânisi ê- is =payî- n-yi-k

c1-want-know=by.mind-TI-3 how c1-thus=INCH-II-DS-0

aw-ima ki-nêhiyaw=i=w=in -inaow.

PROX-IN.SG 2-cree =AT=3=NOM-21PL

‘[he]prox wants to understand how [our Cree culture] works’ (Whitecalf 1993:§16)
(75) **NON-EXISTENTIAL ANTECEDENT = NO –yi– ON PREDICATE**

\[ \text{mitoni têpi-kiskinowâpahtahki ôma nipâkwêsîmowîkamik tânisi ë-ispayik} \]

\[ \text{intense enough-know=by.hand=see =by.eye.TI-TI -0-SUBJ PROX-IN.SG} \]

\[ \text{nîpâkwêsimo-w-ikamikw tânisi ë-is =payî -k} \]

\[ \text{sun.dance -3-place how C1-thus=INCH-0} \]

‘When the Whites have watched and learned enough about how the Sundance-Lodge works,’ (Whitecalf 1993:§17)

This contrast was understood in terms of perspectival possession; in order for a referent to possess a perspective, they had to be existential (i.e. they had to exist in the discourse).

Following this logic in the current case, we can understand the requirement of a possessor to be existential as deriving from the requirement of this referent to possess a perspective. Possession constructions in Plains Cree, then, always assign a perspective to the possessor.

### 4.4.123. Possession blocks speaker attitudes towards possessum

When a speaker wishes to express their opinion about some property of a referent, they cannot use a possession construction, if the possessor is someone other than themselves. Consider the following example from Alice Ahenakew’s reminiscences, shown in (76). In this example, the referent onâpêma ‘her husband’ is first introduced as a possessed nominal, and then shifted to an independent form ana nâpêw ‘that man.’

(76) **POSSESSED NOMINAL SHIFTED TO INDEPENDENT FORM**

\[ \ldots \text{mâk ékw ânih onâpêma, ëy, ë-ki-nipahi-mac-âyiwit ana nàpêw,} \]

\[ \text{mâkâ ëkwa an-ihi o-nâpêw=m -a ëy ë- kl- nipahi- maci-ayiw =i -t} \]

\[ \text{but then dst-xt 3-man =DSJ-XT INTERJ C1-PREV-to.death-bad- someone=AI-3} \]

\[ \text{an =a nàpêw} \]

\[ \text{DST=AN.SG man} \]

‘…but her, _man_ had been extremely ill-tempered,’

(Ahenakew §5.4)

Here, the Speaker (Alice Ahenakew) has been talking about the Irish woman she worked for, and the woman’s husband secondarily. She has just offered an opinion on the qualities of this woman (she had been very good-natured), and now switches her topic to the man. She starts with a strongly contrastive nominal referring to the man, following by an interjection and a pause. She then re-identifies the man using the non-possessed form _ana nâpêw_ ‘that man.’
I asked a consultant (S2) about this construction, and her commentary is illuminating. As the construction stands, the consultant was certain that the Speaker is expressing her own opinion about the man’s qualities (i.e. that she thinks he was very ill-tempered). I then changed the utterance so that there is no independent nominal (and the concurrent switch to simple “Animate” verbal morphology).

(77) INFELICITOUS TO LEAVE THE REFERENT AS POSSESSED

When the consultant was asked to consider this change, she explained that it would be inappropriate given the context, because “it could make you think that the woman thought her husband was a bad person, but it’s [the Speaker] that thinks that.”

In the current model, we have relativized the evaluation of truth to a possessed perspective (see chapter 1). Within this framework, we can understand the different between (76) and (77) as a difference in which perspective the truth of the proposition is interpreted in. Based on the consultant’s discussion, it is clear that the example in (76) is interpreted as true in the Speaker’s perspective; the Speaker takes the man to be a bad person.

(78) ...Ìb Ñb. <ισ"A ñα VL, Ñ, Ñ ê òσ"A ñ∩ <ιρA’ <ια. ò>V, mák ékw anih onâpêma, éy, é-kâ-nipahi-mac-âyiwit ana nâpêw, mâka ékwa an-ihí o-nâpêw=m-a éy é- kî- nipahi- maci-âyiw =i -yi-t but then dst-xt 3-man =DSJ-XT INTERJ CI-PREV-to.death-bad- someone=AI-DS-3 ‘…but her PROX husband, hey, he OBV had been extremely ill-tempered,’ (Presented S2)

Speaker <say>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>x</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>man(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>bad.person(x)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By contrast, the consultant’s explanation for the example in (77) suggests that the proposition is true in the woman’s perspective, rather than the Speaker’s; the woman takes her husband to be a bad person.
Thus, the presence/absence of a possessor construction changes whose perspective the truth of the proposition is evaluated within. When possession is present, the proposition associated with the possessee is neutrally interpreted within the perspective of the possessor. This suggests that possessor constructions induce a perspectival embedding of the possessee.

### 4.4.124. Possession and knowledge of speech act participants

If the use of a possessed nominal implicates that predicates associated with the possessee are evaluated in the perspective of the possessor (§4.4.123), we expect an even stronger effect when using second-person possession. For example, in English, the use of possessor structures is known to induce a presupposition violation in certain contexts. Consider the pair of forms in (80), uttered out of the blue when the speaker has just rushed into the room.

(80)  

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x</td>
<td>y</td>
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x <R>

<p>| | |</p>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| bad.person(y) |
| husband(y,x) |

Here, an utterance that involves a referent related to the hearer requires a great deal of supporting context to make it felicitous. In particular, we would need some kind of contextual support to

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7 Examples are those of Irene Heim, which she gave in a guest lecture in a semantics class at UBC in the spring of 2003.
explain how it is that the Speaker knows more about the Hearer’s mother than the Hearer does (e.g. perhaps I was at her house, visiting, while you were at this meeting that I was late for). One consultant, explained that “In [the form in (80b)], it sounds like you’re going to tell me I have to do something about this.” A search of Google confirms this restriction for 2nd person possession: among the first 40 instances of “Your mother is sick,” the majority are hypothetical situations (e.g. “Suppose your mother is sick…”). The only two realis contexts for this utterance are (i) a doctor informing the children of their mother’s condition, or (ii) a father informing his children of their mother’s condition. In both types of cases, the reaction on the hearer’s part was one of obligation. This suggests that, at least in English, possession constructions are intimately connected to knowledge states of referents. Within the current model, this means that they are intimately involved with perspective.

In this regard, Plains Cree shows exactly the same properties that English does. Possessor constructions related to the Hearer require significant contextual support to be felicitous, and cannot simply be uttered out of the blue. Here, the consultant (S2) rejects the form in (81b) out of the blue. In doing so, she asks how I would know anything about her younger sister. She then creates an imaginary context for (81b), in which I was friends with her younger sibling, and I had called her this morning to find out how she was doing.

(81) 2ND PERSON POSSESSION IS INFELICITOUS OUT-OF-THE-BLUE

a. σᵣ⁻¹ \( \nabla \) \( \downarrow \) "d'I'.
   ni-simis ê-ahkosit.
   ni-simis ê- ahkos-i-t
   1-younger.sibling c1-sick -3
   ‘My younger brother is sick.’ (Presented S2)

b. # σᵣ⁻¹ \( \nabla \) \( \downarrow \) "d'I'.
   # ki-simis ê-ahkosit.
   ki-simis ê- ahkos-i-t
   2-younger.sibling c1-sick -3
   ‘Your younger sister is sick.’ (Presented S2)
   Comment (S2): “How do you know anything about my younger sister?”

Thus, the form that relates the referent to the Hearer requires stronger contextual support than the one that relates the referent to the Speaker.

Within the current model, we can understand this property of possession as a condition on perspectival embedding. Neutrally, a referent possessed by the Hearer will be evaluated in the Hearer’s perspective.
Embedded in this way, the Speaker is unintentionally suggesting that it is true in the Hearer’s perspective that the referent is sick, equivalent to uttering a sentence like “You know that your younger sister is sick.” If the Hearer does not know of this proposition, then the claim made about the Hearer’s perspective will fail to be accepted.

By contrast, if we set up a strong enough discourse context, the referent (and the proposition) can be embedded within the Speaker’s perspective.
Possession, then, can induce expectations about whose perspective the proposition is embedded within. Neutrally, the proposition is evaluated within the perspective of the referent identified as the possessor, with strong contextual support necessary to undo this expectation. This suggests that possessors are interpreted as perspective-holders.

4.4.125. Changing possession changes the Speaker

Following a long line of research (e.g. Searle 1950, Bar-Hillel 1954), Banfield (1982) considers direct and indirect quotation, concluding that forms that pick out facets of the speech situation (indexicals; Searle 1950, Kaplan 1989, etc.) can only shift their reference when there is a new speaker. For Banfield (1982), there are two ways that the Speaker can change:

(i) A change in conversational turns; Some different human being is now uttering linguistic forms

(ii) Some other person’s speech is being represented by the same speaker (i.e. indirect quotation)

In Plains Cree, possession parallels this shift in indexicality.

The use of possessor terms provides crucial information about whether the Speaker is speaking as themselves or representing someone else’s speech. Consider the pair of forms in (84). In a context in which I am talking to a woman who is married to my brother, the sentence in (84a) corresponds to an indirect quotation of her statement, whereas the form in (84b) corresponds to a direct quotation.
(84) **CHANGING POSSESSOR = CHANGE FROM INDIRECT TO DIRECT QUOTATION**

a. \( \nabla \langle "d^p \rangle \sigma^r \Gamma^\land, \, \rho \cap C^3 \rangle \).
   è-akhosit **niśimis**, kititwân.
   è-akhosi-t **ni-simis** kit-itwê-n
   c1-sick-3 **I-younger.sibling** 2- say -LP
   ‘You said that my younger **brother** is sick.’ (Presented S2)

b. \( \nabla \langle "d^p \rangle \sigma^r \land \vee \cap C^3 \rangle \).
   è-akhosit **ninâpêm**, kititwân.
   è-akhosi-t ni-nâpê=m kit-itwê-n
   c1-sick -3 **I-man** =DSJ 2- say -LP
   ‘You said, “my husband is sick.”’ (Presented S2)

Thus, the modification of kin terms, from one that relates only to the Speaker to one that relates only to the Hearer changes the type of speech act from indirect quotation to direct.

Possession constructions are also crucial for the disambiguation of speakers. Consider the sentence in (85), which has a speaking verb è-itwêt ‘she says’ with a pronominal subject. Here, consultants say that the structure is well-formed, but ambiguous; we do not know whether the quotation is of Clare or Martha’s speech.

(85) **REFERENTIALLY AMBIGUOUS VERB OF SPEAKING**

Clare \( \nabla \sigma^r \land \vee \cap C^3 \rangle \). “\( \sigma^r + \nabla \rho^" "U^\land \rangle \nabla \Delta U^\land \rangle \).”
Clare è-kiyokawât Marthawa è-piponiyik. “nimiywêyihten ôma,” è-itwêt.
Clare è- kiyokaw-â -t Martha-a è- pipon- yi-k.
Clare c1-visit -DIR-3 Martha-XT c1-winter-DS-0
   ni-miyw=êyiht -ê-n aw -ima è-it =wê-t
   1- good =by.mind.TI-TI-LP PROX-IN.SG C1-thus=AI-3
   ‘Clare**PROX** went to visit Martha**OBV** during the winter. “I am happy about this”, she**AN** said.’

When asked how to disambiguate this, the consultant (S2) volunteered a fix that overtly employed a kin term.

(86) **AMBIGUITY FIXED WITH A KINSHIP TERM**

i. Clare \( \nabla \rho \vee \cap C^3 \rangle \). “Clare è-kiyokawât Marthawa è-piponiyik.
Clare è-kiyokawâ Martha è-piponiyik.
Clare c1-visit -DIR-3 Martha-XT c1-winter-DS-0
   ‘Clare**PROX** went to visit Martha**OBV** during the winter.’
ii. “σΓ+νηωση’ ΓΩ ν ρση’ σΓ,” ΓΔΓ.’
“nimiywêyihten ôma ê-pê-kiyokêt nimis,” ê-itwêt.
ni-miywêyihten ôma ê-pê-kiyokêt nimis,” ê-itwêt.

Here, the fixed form inserts reference to my older sister nimis in the quoted material. By doing this, we now know that Martha (who is Clare’s younger sister) is the utterer of the quotation, rather than Clare.

Within the model of perspective developed in this thesis, we can understand this shift in possession as a shift in perspectives. The pairwise contrast between direct and indirect speech can be understood as a contrast in the embedding of the referent denoted by the possessum. In indirect speech (84a), the referent nisîmis ‘my younger brother’ is embedded within the Speaker’s perspective.

(87) ν<"d’ ΓσΓ,’ ρ∩Σ.2.
ê-ahkosit nisîmis, kititwân.
ê-ahkosî-t nî-sîmis kit-itwê-n
C1-sick-3 I-younger.sibling 2- say -LP
‘You said that my younger brother is sick.’ (Presented S2)

Speaker <say>

x

younger.brother(S,x)

Hearer <say>

x

sick(x)

This has the result of distributing the burden of truth conditions between the Speaker and the embedded perspective (here, identified with the Hearer); the Speaker is saying that they have a brother and that the Hearer claims this brother is sick. ⁸ By contrast, the direct speech case in

⁸ It may be that the existence of the brother is presupposed rather than asserted, but this difference is not relevant to the current contrast.
(84b) locates the referent within the embedded perspective (again identified with the Hearer) as shown in (88).

(88) \[ \nabla \darr "\text{dr}' \sigma \Delta \land \rho \cap \sigma \Delta \uparrow \].

ê-ahkosit ninâpêm, kititwân.
ê- ahhosi-t ni-wiki=m =â =kan kit-itwê-n
\( c1 \text{-sick} \) \(-3 \text{ 1-live=DSJ=DIR=NOM 2- say }-LP \)
‘You said, “my husband is sick.”’  

(Presented S2)

Speaker \textless say\textgreater

\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
H \textless say\textgreater \\
\hline
x \\
\hline
\text{husband}(x, H) \\
\hline
\text{Sick}(x) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Here, the burden of truth conditions is placed entirely on the embedded perspective; all the Speaker is saying is that the Hearer uttered a specific proposition. Similarly, the use of the possessor construction \textit{nimis} ‘my older sister’ in the quotation in (86) tells us whose perspective to embed the proposition in.

(89) ii. “\( \sigma \Gamma + \nabla \Delta \gamma \uparrow \land \nabla \lor \rho \gamma \sigma \Gamma \gamma \)” \( \nabla \Delta \Delta \gamma \). 

“nimiywêyihten ôma ê-pê-kiyokêt \textit{nimis},” ê-itwêt.
\( ni \text{-miyw}=êyiht \) \(-ê-n aw \) -ima \( ê- pê\) \( 
\text{kiyokê-t} \textit{nimis} \) \( ê- it =wê-t \)
\( l\text{-good}=\text{by.mind.TI-TI-LP PROX-IN.SG c1-come-visit}\ \(-3 \text{ 1-older.sister c1-thus}=AI-3 \)
“I am happy that \textit{my older sister} \text{AN} has come to visit,” \text{she AN} said.’
Thus, the possession construction is providing crucial information about whose perspective the proposition should be evaluated within. This suggests that possessor constructions are intimately connected to perspectival embedding.

### 4.4.13. Conclusion: Possession is referential dependence

From this discussion, we see that possession in Plains Cree meets both of the conditions necessary for the construal of a referential dependency. First, we saw in section 4.4.11. that the possessum is always structurally c-commanded by the possessum, which means that possession meets the structural condition on referential dependence (§4.1). Second, we saw in section 4.4.12. that there are good reasons to suppose that the possessum is perspectively-embedded inside the perspective of the possessor, which means that possession meets the structural condition on referential dependence (§4.1).

Since possession meets both of these conditions, it should be no surprise that possession systematically correlates with obviation in constructions involving two third-person referents. Recall from chapter 3 (§3.4-5) that the “Proximate” referent, which is created via contrast with an “Obviative” (§3.4), is the referent whose perspective propositions associated with the “Obviative” are evaluated in. This means that, in possession constructions, the possessor will invariably map onto the “Proximate” referent (since the possessor is always the perspective holder; §4.4.12) and the possessum will invariably map onto the “Obviative” referent (since the possessum is always the referentially-dependent referent). Thus, obviation and possession code much the same kind of information, meaning that their systematic co-occurrence is expected.
4.4.2. Theme signs and referential dependency

As is well known, Plains Cree transitive verbs are composed out of two pieces (cf. Wolfart 1973, Dahlstrom 1986, Hirose 2000). The last element of the verb stem, termed the ‘final’ in the Algonquianist literature (cf. Bloomfield 1962), codes that the verbal predicate is transitive, and introduces the verb’s agent (cf. Hirose 2000, Déchaine 2003).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(90) Verb Final: } & \text{-}am-
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
wâpam- \\
wâp & =am- \\
\text{see} & =by.eye.TA- \\
\text{ROOT} & =\text{FINAL-}
\end{align*}
\]

Following the final is another suffix, termed a ‘theme sign’ (Bloomfield 1962), which codes the other half of the verb’s argument structure (cf. Hirose 2000, Déchaine 2003, Déchaine & Reinholtz 2008).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(91) Theme sign: } & \text{-ê-}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
wâpamê- \\
wâp & =am -ê \\
\text{see} & =by.eye.TA-DIR \\
\text{ROOT} & =\text{FINAL -THEME}
\end{align*}
\]

There are two basic types of theme signs: (i) the ‘direct’ theme signs, and (ii) the ‘inverse’ theme sign.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(92) a. Direct theme sign: } & \text{-ê-}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
wâpamê- \\
wâp & =am -ê \\
\text{see} & =by.eye.TA-DIR \\
\text{ROOT} & =\text{FINAL -THEME}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{b. Inverse theme sign: } & \text{-ikw}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
wâpamîkw- \\
wâp & =am -ikw \\
\text{see} & =by.eye.TA-INV \\
\text{ROOT} & =\text{FINAL -THEME}
\end{align*}
\]
Typically, the alternation between “direct” and “inverse” is explained in terms of a “person hierarchy” (cf. Blain 1997, Ritter & Rosen 2005, etc.), but a consideration of the agreement patterns in Plains Cree shows that the predicted blocking patterns ($2 > 1 > \text{Prox} > \text{Obv} > \text{Inan}$) are not found, making such an explanation untenable. Instead, the theme sign system appears to be a method for solving the reference tracking ambiguities seen in languages like English, where previous argument structure sets up expectations about the reference resolution of anaphora in subsequent clauses.

(93)  a. Bill saw John, and then he hit him.  
      = Bill hit John.  
      = (?) John hit Bill.
Here, the English example has an initial transitive clause, which sets up an expectation about the identity of the two pronominals in the following clause (i.e. that the transitive relation is the same as the previous clause). If the opposite reference for the pronouns is desired (i.e. that John hit Bill), then the structure typically requires additional context. Comparing this to Plains Cree, we see that the theme sign system explicitly disambiguates these two potential readings.

(94)  a. “DIRECT” = SAME ARGUMENT STRUCTURE AS PREVIOUS CLAUSE

      Bill ᐄ<ᓇᐱ John<ᓇ, ᐄ<LM.\textless'\textless'.
      Bill wâpamêw Johna, êkwa ê-pakamahwât.
      Bill see=by.eye.\textit{TA-DIR-3} John-\textit{XT} and C1-hit =by.tool.\textit{TA-DIR-3}
      ‘Bill saw John, and then he hit him.’
      = Bill hit John.
      ≠ John hit Bill.  

b. “INVERSE” = OPPOSITE ARGUMENT STRUCTURE TO PREVIOUS CLAUSE

      Bill ᐄ<ᓇᐱ John<ᓇ, ᐄ<LM.\textless'\textless'.
      Bill wâpamêw Johna, êkwa ê-pakamaho\textit{kit}.
      Bill see=by.eye.\textit{TA-DIR-3} John-\textit{XT} and C1-hit =by.tool.\textit{TA-INF} -3
      ‘Bill saw John, and then he hit him.’
      ≠ Bill hit John.
      = John hit Bill.  

Here, the choice of a theme sign for the subsequent clause tells us who is hitting who. Plains Cree’s theme sign system, then, is overtly coding something that English has to do with context.
The theme sign system of Plains Cree has an intimate relationship to obviation, though none of the morphemes can be said to code obviation directly (cf. §3.33). Given a verb that involves a “Proximate” and an “Obviative”, the direct theme sign –ê– maps “Proximate” onto subject (95a), and the inverse theme sign –ikw maps “Obviative” onto subject (95b). Here, the suffix –â– is used when the “Proximate” referent awâsis ‘the child’ is the subject, and the inverse theme sign –ikw is used when the “Obviative” referent atimwa ‘the dog’ is the subject.

(95) a. “PROXIMATE” ACTS ON “O BVIATIVE” = –ê–

<畎>( имени) <畎> <畎> <畎> <畎> <畎>.
wâpamêw awâsis atimwa.
wâp=am –ê –w awâsis atimw-a
see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 child dog –XT
= ‘The childPROX sees the dogOBV.’
≠ ‘The the dogOBV sees childPROX.’ (Presented S2)

b. “O BVIATIVE” ACTS ON “P ROXIMATE” = –ikw–

<畎> <畎> <畎> <畎> <畎> <畎>.
awâsis wâpamik atimwa.
awâsis wâp=am –ikw atimw-a
child see=by.eye.TA-INV dog –XT
≠ ‘The childPROX sees the dogOBV.’
= ‘The the dogOBV sees childPROX.’ (Presented S2)

Given the close relationship between theme signs and obviation, we expect that theme signs should code referential dependency. This means that they should meet both of the conditions on referential dependency:

(i) **STRUCTURAL CONDITION:** They should show either c-command or linear precedence between the dependent referent and its antecedent.

(ii) **SEMANTIC CONDITION:** They should perspectivally-embed this same structurally-dependent referent in its antecedent.

All that remains is to evaluate the theme signs’ behaviour to see if these expectations are borne out.

I first consider the direct theme sign -ê-. In section 4.4.211, I consider the structural conditions on this theme sign, arguing that it always occurs when the argument it introduces is structurally subordinated to the subject of the verb, which is introduced by the verb’s final (cf. Hirose 2000, etc.). This means that it meets the structural condition on referential dependence. Then, in section 4.4.212, I turn to the semantic conditions on the use of this theme sign. In so
doing, I show that the argument introduced by this theme sign is always embedded in the perspective of its antecedent - the subject of the verb. As such, the direct theme sign –ê– meets both the structural and semantic conditions on referential dependency. Its use in obviation constructions thus becomes transparent.

I then turn to the inverse theme sign –ikw. In section 4.4.221, I examine the structural properties of this theme sign. I show that, in contrast to the direct theme sign, it is not structurally-subordinated to the argument introduced by the final. Instead, it is c-commanded by the referent in the highest position of the predicate – sometimes called the ‘topic’ operator (cf. Déchaine & Reinholtz 2008). This means that the inverse theme sign meets the structural condition on referential dependence. Following this, I consider the semantic conditions on the inverse theme sign in section 4.4.222. I demonstrate that the argument introduced by the theme sign is always embedded within the perspective of its antecedent – the ‘topic’ operator. This means that the inverse theme sign –ikw also meets both conditions on referential dependency.

4.4.21. The direct theme sign –ê– constructs referential dependency

In this thesis, the theme sign –ê– is considered to occur in three constructions of the independent order: (i) speech-act participants acting on “Inanimate” referents (96a), “Proximate” referents acting on “Obviative’s” (96b), and “Obviative” referents acting on “Obviative” referents (96c).

(96) a. **Speech-act Participant acts on “Inanimate”: –ê–**

\[
\sigma<\hat{\tau}<>^U\niwâpahtên
\ni-wâp=aht\quad -ê\quad -n
\]

\(l\text{- }\text{see }=by\text{.eye.TI-DIR-LP}\)

‘I see it

(Presented S2)

b. **“Proximate” acts on “Obviative”: –ê–**

\[<\hat{\tau}<>^o\]

wâpâmêw

\(wâp=am\quad -ê\quad -w\)

\(\text{see}=by\text{.eye.TA-DIR-3}\)

‘s/he\text{PROX sees him/her\text{OBV}.’} \quad \text{(Presented S2)}

c. “Obviative” acts on “Obviative” : –ê–

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{wâpamêyiwa} & \quad \text{wâp}=am -ê -yi-w-a \\
\text{see}=by.\text{eye} .\text{TA-DIR-DS-3-XT} & \quad \text{‘s/he}_{\text{obs}} \text{ sees him/her}_{\text{obs}} \\
\end{align*}
\]
(Wolfart 1996)

Treating this as the distribution of –ê– means that, compared to the hypothesized proto-forms (cf. Goddard 1974, 1983, 2008), Plains Cree has collapsed two homophonous theme signs together; the TI theme *–ê– and the TA theme *–ê–.

As is shown in the three examples above (96), the theme sign –ê– is used in “Obviative” constructions. As such, the current analysis expects that it should obey both of the conditions on referential dependency:

(i) **Structural Condition**: It should introduce either c-command or linear-precedence requirements for its referent (§4.1).

(ii) **Semantic Condition**: It should require the referent associated with it to be embedded in the perspective of the referent it is structurally-dependent on (§4.1).

In the following sections, I demonstrate that this is exactly what the theme sign –ê– does. As such, it can be considered to code referential dependency in Plains Cree.

### 4.4.211. Structural conditions on –ê–

Numerous linguists have analyzed the Plains Cree verb system as being organized into a series of hierarchically-related heads. Hirose (2000) as modified by Déchaine (2003), for example, puts the transitive verb’s two argument affixes (the final and the theme) in the two heads of the decomposed VP (vP and VP, respectively).

\[ (97) \]

```
```

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{vP} & \\
\text{ROOT} & \quad \text{pro} \\
\text{FINAL} & \quad \text{VP} \\
\text{pro} & \quad \text{THEME} \\
\end{align*}
\]
As such, the theme signs are expected to always enter into c-command; specifically, the argument introduced by the final should always structurally-dominate the argument introduced by the theme sign. If this is so, all that remains to be shown is the specifics regarding the theme sign –ê–.

While all the direct theme signs could be analyzed as occupying this lower head position, there are particularly good reasons to treat –ê– as occupying this lower head. Recall from Chapter 3 (§3.3.3) that the direct theme sign –ê– can be analyzed as introducing an extentional object.

In such a model, the further discrimination between inherent and contextual extentionality (i.e. selection between an “Inanimate” and “Obviative” object) is achieved by the restrictive relation between the final and the theme sign; the choice of finals decides whether the object is inherently or contextually extentional.

(99)  

a. niwâpahtê̂n  

\( ni\text{-}wâp=aht\text{-}ê\text{-}n \)  

I-see=by.eye.TI-DIR-LP  

‘I see\text{IN} it.’  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>vP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>wâp-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-aht-) [EXT]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ê- [EXT]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= “\text{INANIMATE}” \text{OBJECT}
b. wâpamêw
    wâp\textit{=}am -ê -w
    \textit{see} =by.\textit{eye.}TA-\textit{DIR-3}
    ‘S/he\textit{PROX} sees him/her\textit{OBRV}.’

Since the final and the theme sign are in a c-command relation, the logic of the structure entails that the arguments they introduce are in the same relation; the argument introduced by the final c-commands the argument introduced by the theme sign.

(100) \textbf{DIRECT THEME SIGN (–ê–) : C-COMMAND}

This means that the theme sign –ê– satisfies the structural condition on referential dependency, via c-command.

\textbf{4.4.212. Semantic conditions on –ê–}

Since the final informs the content of the theme sign –ê– via c-command, it is expected that the argument introduced by the final has a correlated effect on the argument introduced by the theme sign. In fact, when we consider the semantics of the relation between the two arguments, we see exactly this kind of correlation: the argument introduced by the theme sign is always interpreted within the perspective of the argument introduced by the final. This is demonstrated both by considering when the theme sign –ê– occurs, and when it cannot occur.
4.4.2121. –ê– occurs with perspectively-embedded objects

There are three contexts that allow the occurrence of –ê–. First, it occurs when the subject of the verb is a speech-act participant, and the object is “Inanimate”.

(101) a. σ<ิ<"U³
niwâpahtên
ni-wâp=aht -ê -n
l- see =by.eye.TI-DIR-LP
‘I see itIN.’ (Presented S2)

b. σ<ิ<"U³
kiwâpahtên
ki-wâp=aht -ê -n
l- see =by.eye.TI-DIR-LP
‘You see itIN.’ (Presented S2)

Second, it occurs when the subject of a verb is “Proximate”, and the object is “Obviative”.

(102) <ি<"Tº
wâpamêw
wâp=am -ê -w
see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3
‘s/hePROX sees him/herOBV.’ (Presented S2)

Finally, it occurs when both the subject and the object of the verb are “Obviative”, although I have been unable to get a consultant to recognize or produce this form, and it does not occur in any of the four large texts I have searched (Ahenakew 2000, Minde 1997, Kâ-pimwêwêhahk 1998, and Whitecalf 1993). This means that my only sources for it are paradigms supplied by grammatical descriptions (e.g. Wolfart 1973, Wolfart & Carroll 1973, Wolfart 1996).

(103) <ि<"Tº<�<ิ
wâpamêyiwa
wâp=am -ê -yi-w-a
see=by.eye.TA-DIR-DS-3-XT
‘s/heOBV sees him/herOBV’ (Wolfart 1996)

Lacking data, we can only hypothesize about what the “Obviative” acting on “Obviative” constructions mean, and wait until data on these forms materializes.
First and second persons are uncontroversially capable of possessing perspectives (cf. Banfield 1982). When we check these forms with consultants, the results confirm this expectation.

(104)  a. \( \sigma \wedge d \sigma^? \ <d <_{\_p} \).  
\textit{ni}pîkonën wâpamon.  
\textit{ni}-pikw =n -ê -n wâpamon  
\textit{1- break=by.hand-DIR-LP mirror}  
‘I broke the mirror\textsubscript{in.}.’ (Presented S2)  

b. \( \rho \wedge d \rho^? \ <d <_{\_p} \).  
\textit{kipîkonën wâpamon}.  
\textit{ki}-pikw =n -ê -n wâpamon  
\textit{2- break=by.hand-TI-LP mirror}  
‘You broke a mirror\textsubscript{in.}.’ (Presented S2)  

The first-person form in (104a) is interpreted such that the Speaker knows that they broke a mirror, and cannot be felicitously uttered if the Speaker is unsure either if it was a mirror that was broken or if the mirror indeed broke. By contrast, consultants reject the second person form unless the situation is set up such that the Hearer has already informed the speaker that the proposition expressed here is true. Otherwise, the form becomes interpreted as harsh, or aggressive, and would be used if “maybe the person was denying that they broke the mirror, and you were telling them that you know they did it” (S2). Often, these 2\textsuperscript{nd} person forms are only interpreted as questions that lack question coding (e.g. \textit{ci}), and declarative statements are impossible to imagine.

(105)  2\textsuperscript{ND} PERSON AGENT FORCES QUESTION INTERPRETATION  
\begin{align*}  \rho \cap \cup \wedge U \wedge \sigma b \mu' <d r^\wedge. \\
\textit{kitîyih\textsubscript{en} ê-nikamot awâsis}. \\
\textit{kit-it} =\textit{êyiht} -ê -n ê-nikamo-t awâsis \\
\textit{2- thus=by.mind.TI-DIR-LP C1-sing -3 child}  \\
= ‘(Do) You think the children are singing?’  \\
\ne ‘You think the children are singing.’ (Presented S2)  
\end{align*}  

This elicitation data is confirmed by a survey of texts, where 2\textsuperscript{nd} person subjects with -ê- are typically only used with future markers in strong commands, such as the bear’s semi-prophetic promise in (106a), without future-coding, such as the mind-reading contexts in (106b-c), or when the Speaker is repeating something that the Hearer has already established (106d).
(106) a. **Certainty that hearer will act with verb bearing –ê**

   “lığ ᓲᐦᔨᐣ ᓩᐦ ᐅ ᐁᔅᐦ ᐱᒪ ᐱ ᐱᐦᐦᑦᑦ,’ …
   “mâka misawâc kîyâpîc kîka-tôtên ôma kâ-pē-ititân,’ nîtítik,’ …
   mâka misawâc kîyâpîc kî-ka- itôt-ê -n aw =ima kâ-pê- it -it -ân nit-it-ikw
   but in any case still
   "but, in any case, you will do it nevertheless, that which I have come to tell you’,” …
   (Ahenakew 2000 4:3)

b. **Reading hearer’s person’s mind with verb bearing –ê**

   “ᑭᑖᐣᐍᐦᑕᐏᐣ ᐆᒪ, ᓱᔨᐣ ᓧᑦ ᐱᔨᐦᑖᐣ ᐱᒪ, …
   ‘kititêyihtên ôma, “tânis ôma k-êsi-kâhcitinitân ôma, …
   kit-ît =êyiht -ê -n aw =ima tânisi aw =ima
   2-thus =by.mind.TI-DIR-LP PRX =IN.SG how PRX =IN.SG
   kâ-isi- kâhciti =n -it -ân aw =ima
   c2-thus-get.ahold =by.hand-1>2-1 PRX =IN.SG
   ‘You think, “How will I get hold of you, …”’
   (Ahenakew 2000 4:3)

c. ‘ᑭᑎᑌᔨᐦᑌᐣ ᐆᒪ, “ᐦᑖᓂᓯᐦᑖᐣ ᐱᒪ, …
   ‘kititêyihtên ôma, “tânis ôma k-êsi-kâhcitinitân ôma, …
   kit-ît =êyiht -ê -n aw =ima tânisi aw =ima
   2-thus =by.mind.TI-DIR-LP PRX =IN.SG how PRX =IN.SG
   kâ-isi- kâhciti =n -it -ân aw =ima
   c2-thus-get.ahold =by.hand-1>2-1 PRX =IN.SG
   ‘You think, “How will I get hold of you, …”’
   (Ahenakew 2000 4:3)

d. **Repeating hearer’s thoughts with verb bearing –ê**

   “ᐃᐦᐦᑖᐘᐠ ᓱᔨᐣ ᓧᑦ ᐱᔨᐦᑖᐣ ᐱᒪ, …
   “ma-mâyisîhtâwak,” kititêyihtên.
   ma-mâyì-os =ihlà-w-ak kit-ît =êyiht -ê -n
   red-bad =make =do -3-pl 2-thus =by.mind.TI-DIR-LP
   ‘“They make poor juice,” you thought.’
   (Ahenakew 2000 3:4)

In strong contrast, 1st person subjects with -ê- are numerous in texts, and often occur with propositional attitude verbs like psych verbs (107), confirming the pattern expected by the elicitation judgments.

(107) **Speaker expressing own mental state with verb bearing –ê**

   êkwa mîna pêyak nîkî-koskwêyihtên mîn ê-nanâtawihât, …
   êkwa mîna pêyak ni-kî- koskw =êyiht -ê -n mîn ê- nanâtaw=ih -â -t
   and also one 1- PREV-surprise =by.mind.TI-DIR-LP also 1- doctor =by.neut-DIR-3
   ‘and I was also amazed at another case of his doctoring someone, …’ (Ahenakew 4:15)
This is exactly as expected if the object is interpreted within the perspective of the subject in these cases.\(^9\)

\[(108) \quad \text{a. Speaker as subject: True in Speaker’s perspective} \]

\[
\neg \land \delta \neg \lt \neg \lt \neg \lt ,
\]

\[
\text{ni-pikonèn wàpamon.}
\]

\[
\text{ni-píkw} = \text{n} \rightarrow \text{ê} \rightarrow \text{n wàpamon}
\]

\[
1- \text{break=} \text{by.hand-DIR-LP mirror}
\]

‘I broke the mirror,.’

(Presented S2)

\[
\text{Speaker <say>}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>x</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mirror(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXT(x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>break(S,x)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^9\) I am here putting the predicate in both the Speaker’s perspective and the embedded perspective because of the semantics of independent-order clauses (cf. Cook 2008); these clauses are always evaluated as true at least in the Speaker’s perspective.
b. HEARMER AS SUBJECT: TRUU IN HEARMER’S PERSPECTIVE

\[ p \wedge q \rightarrow r \wedge s \]

kipikonèn wàpamón.

Ki-pikw =n -ê -n wàpamón
2- break=by.hand-TR-PL mirror
‘You broke a mirror.’

\[ \text{(Presented S2)} \]

\[ \begin{array}{c|c}
\text{Speaker <say>}
\hline
x & mirror(x) \\
\text{EXT(x)} & \text{break(H,x)} \\
\hline
\text{Hearer <R>}
\hline
x & mirror(x) \\
\text{break(H,x)}
\end{array} \]

Thus, the interpretational restrictions and contextual distribution of forms coding 1\textsuperscript{st} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} person strongly suggest that these forms pick out perspectives for the subject.

Turning to the cases of “Proximate”s acting on “Obviative”s, I have already argued for independent reasons that the “Proximate” referent possesses a perspective in which the “Obviative” referent is evaluated (§3.4-5). Thus, a verb marked with ê that involves a “Proximate” subject acting on an “Obviative” is going to have the object embedded inside the subject.

(109) ñàpêw wàpamêw awásisa.

\[ \begin{array}{c|c}
\text{Speaker <say>}
\hline
x & mirror(x) \\
\text{EXT(x)} & \text{break(H,x)} \\
\text{Hearer <R>}
\hline
x & mirror(x) \\
\text{break(H,x)}
\end{array} \]

‘The man\textsuperscript{PROX} saw the child\textsuperscript{OBV}.’

\[ \text{(Presented S2)} \]
If we pushed this analysis, we would then predict that the “Obviative” acting on “Obviative” forms like (110) would mean that the subject possessed an embedded perspective in which the object is evaluated.

(110) ᐃᐢᑵᐘ ᐚᐸᒣᔨᐘ ᐊᑌᒥᔨᐘ.
iskwêwa wâpamêyiwa otêmiyiwa.
iskwêw-a wâp=am -ê -yi-w-a o-têm-yi-w-a
woman-XT see=by.eye.TA-DIR-DS-3-XT 3-dog-DS-3-XT
‘the woman$_{OBV}$ sees her$_{OBV}$ horse$_{OBV}$’

(cf. Wolfart 1996)
Thus, the “Proximate” “Obviative” forms confirm the expectation that the object introduced by –ê– is embedded in the perspective of the verb’s subject, while we know what to look for with “Obviative” ”Obviative” interactions.

Taken altogether, then, we see that –ê– consistently occurs in contexts in which the subject possesses a perspective for the evaluation of the object. This is expected if –ê– codes referential dependency; the object is c-commanded by the subject (§4.4.211), and thus it must be the subject that this referent is perspectivally-dependent on. So far, our expectations for –ê– have been fulfilled.

4.4.2122. –ê– cannot occur when the subject is not a perspective holder

The distribution of –ê– is only the positive half of the puzzle, and does not constitute definitive evidence for a treatment of –ê– as meeting the semantic constraints on referential dependency. In order to provide a definitive case, we must also consider where –ê– is not allowed, and ask if these restrictions follow from its posited referential dependency. Put another way, the positive data shows the sufficient conditions, but the addition of the negative data adds the necessary conditions to this.
In fact, there are two environments that disallow the application of –ê–: (i) contexts in which 1\textsuperscript{st} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} persons are not perspective holders, and (ii) contexts in which 3\textsuperscript{rd} persons are not perspective holders. In each case, the absence of –ê– correlates with the absence of a perspective for the subject of the verb. This gives us both the necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of this suffix.

Crucially, all of the contexts for the occurrence of the theme –ê– are in the Independent Order of verbal inflection. In fact, this form can never occur in any conjunct order verb.

(111) **Only Independent Order “Proximate-Obviative” Interactions Use –ê–**

a. <¡<¡º.
   wâpamêw.
   \[\text{wâp}=\text{am} -\dot{\text{ê}} -w\]
   see=by.eye.TA-\text{DIR}-3
   ‘s/he\text{PROX} sees him/her\text{OBV}.’

   (Presented S2)

b. * ∇ <¡<¡º.
   * è-wâpamêt
   \[\text{è}=\text{wâp}=\text{am} -\dot{\text{ê}} -t\]
   cl-see=by.eye.TA-\text{DIR}-3
   Intended: ‘s/he\text{PROX} sees him/her\text{OBV}.’

   (Presented S2)

(112) **Only Independent Order Speech-Act-Participant Interactions Use –ê–**

a. σ<¡<"U³.
   niwâpahtên.
   \[\text{ni}=\text{wâp}=\text{aht} -\dot{\text{ê}} -n\]
   l-see=by.eye.TI-\text{DIR}-LP
   ‘I see it\text{IN}.’

   (Presented S2)

b. * ∇ <¡<"U³.
   * è-wâpahtêyân
   \[\text{wâp}=\text{aht} -\dot{\text{ê}} -\text{yân}\]
   see=by.eye.TI-\text{DIR}-l
   Intended: ‘I see it\text{IN}.’

   (Presented S2)

As Cook (2008) has shown, verbs in these two orders differ as to their ability to be embedded; Independent Order cannot be subordinated to another verb, while conjunct order verbs can. For example, the independent order verb *kimiwan* ‘it rains’ cannot be subordinated with respect to another clause (113a), but the conjunct order form *è-kimiwahk* ‘it rains’ can (113b).
(113) **Independent Order Cannot Be Subordinated**

a. $\sigma \mathcal{P}^{n_{\mathcal{P}}} \mathcal{P}^{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{P}}} \mathcal{P} \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{P}}$.
   * nikiskêyihtên kimiwan.
   * ni-kisk=êyiht -ê -n kimiwan
   * l-know=by.mind.TI-TI-LP rain
   Intended: ‘I know that it’s raining/rained.’  
   (Cook 2008)

b. $\sigma \mathcal{P}^{n_{\mathcal{P}}} \mathcal{P}^{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{P}}} \mathcal{P} \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{P}}$.
   nikiskêyihtên ê-kimiwahkh.
   * ni-kisk =êyiht -ê -n ê- kimiwan-k
   * l-know=by.mind.TI-TI-LP c1-rain -0
   ‘I know that it’s raining/rained.’  
   (Cook 2008)

This has the result of preventing these Independent Order verbs from being made the object of propositional attitude verbs, since, as in English, these always induce c-command. The conjunct order, by contrast, has no embedding restrictions (cf. Wolfart 1996, Cook 2008). It can occur in matrix environments, or embedded environments equally well, as shown by the grammaticality of the double conjunct sentence in (114).

(114) **Conjunct Order Can Be Either Matrix or Subordinate Clause**

\[ \mathcal{P}^{n_{\mathcal{P}}} \mathcal{P}^{\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{P}}} \mathcal{P} \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{P}} \]
ê-kiskêyihtamân ê-kimiwahkh.
ê-kiskêyihtamân ê-kimiwan-k
* c1-know=by.mind.TI-TI-LP c1-rain -0
‘I know that it is raining/rained.’  
(Presented S2)

This has the result that verbs in the conjunct order can be embedded under propositional attitude verbs. The subject of this verb can be any kind of perspective-holding referent: first, (second),\(^{10}\) or third persons.

(115) **Conjunct Order Can Be Subordinated w.r.t. a Propositional Attitude**

a. $\sigma \mathcal{U}^{n_{\mathcal{U}}} \mathcal{U}^{\mathcal{I}} \mathcal{U} \mathcal{I}^{\mathcal{R}}$.
   nititêyihtên ê-nikamot awâsis.
   * nit-it =êyiht -ê -n ê-nikamo-t awâsis
   * l- thus=by.mind.TI-DIR-LP c1-sing -3 child
   ‘I think that a child is singing.’  
   (Volunteered S2)

\(^{10}\)Because of the restrictions on 2\(^{nd}\) person seen above, the 2\(^{nd}\) person subject with intentional verbs (e.g. kititêyihtên ‘you think thus of it’) is extremely difficult to get in elicitation. Hence, it is left out of this discussion.
b. $\Delta^q\sigma \nabla \Upsilon^\omega \zeta^\gamma \nabla \sigma \beta \rho \gamma \omega <\xi r^\eta\lambda>$. 
iskwêw itêyihtam ê-nikamoyit awâsisâ.
iskwêw it =êyiht -ê -n ê-nikamo-yi-t awâsis-a
woman thus=by.mind.TT-DIR-LP C1-sing -DS 3 child-XT
‘the womanPROX thinks the childOBV is singing.’ (Volunteered S2)

This means that, in the conjunct mode, 1st and 2nd person subjects are not guaranteed to be perspective holders; they could be embedded under a propositional attitude connected with some other referent.

(116)  

a. **1ST PERSON SUBJECT SUBORDINATED TO PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE**

Shujun $\Delta \Upsilon^\omega \zeta^\gamma \nabla <\xi \gamma \nu>$.
Shujun itêyihtam ê-wâpamak.
Shujun it=êyiht =am ê- âwâp=am -ak
Shujun thus=by.mind-ti C1-see =by.eye.TA-1>3
‘Shujun thinks that I saw her.’ (Presented S2)

b. **2ND PERSON SUBJECT SUBORDINATED TO PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE**

Shujun $\Delta \Upsilon^\omega \zeta^\gamma \nabla <\xi \gamma \nu>$.
Shujun itêyihtam kîya ê-wâpamat.
Shujun it=êyiht =am k-iya ê-wâp=am -at
Shujun thus=by.mind-ti 2-body C1-see=by.eye.TA-2>3
‘Shujun thinks that you saw her.’ (Presented S2)

c. **3RD PERSON SUBJECT SUBORDINATED TO PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE**

Shujun $\Delta \Upsilon^\omega \zeta^\gamma \nabla <\xi \gamma \nu>$.
Shujun itêyihtam ê-wâpamatât.
Shujun it=êyiht =am ê- wâp=am -â -t
Shujun thus=by.mind-ti C1-see =by.eye.TA-DIR-3
‘ShujunPROX thinks that shePROX saw him/herOBV.’ (Presented S2)

Here, the subject of the embedded verb is a speech-act participant, but it is not necessary that this proposition be evaluated in the perspective of that referent. The Speaker in (116a) or the Hearer in (116b) may have been unaware of this event, or think it did not happen (i.e. it could be true for Shujun’s perspective, but false for the Speaker). This is markedly different than independent-order forms, where 1st and 2nd person necessarily introduce their perspectives on the proposition (see above).

In fact, the only way for the subject of a conjunct-order verb to necessarily be a perspective-holder is if that referent is identified in the matrix clause as one.
This means that the perspectival properties of the subjects of conjunct-order clauses are accidental – context can always over-ride them.

Summarizing, we see that the clause types that do not confer a perspective on the subject of the verb are the exact set of clause types that do not allow the affixation of the theme sign –ê–. If –ê– codes that the object of the verb is embedded inside of the perspective of the subject, this behaviour is expected; a clause-type that is used where non-specification of perspective is desired (i.e. embedded environments; cf. Cook 2008) would not want to use a theme sign that codes exactly this specification.

4.4.213. Conclusion: –ê– constructs referential dependency

When we consider of both the structural and semantic properties of the theme sign –ê–, we find properties that look like those of referential dependency.

First, this theme sign always and only occurs in in environments where it is structurally-subordinated to the subject of the verb (§4.4.211).
According to the formulation of referential dependency in section, this means that the theme sign obeys the structural condition on referential dependency.

Second, as we saw in §4.4.211, this theme sign always and only occurs in constructions where its argument is embedded in the perspective of the dominating referent (i.e. the subject). This inherent subject-oriented embedding means that the theme sign also obeys the semantic condition on embedding; the dependent referent must be embedded in the perspective of its antecedent. The sensitivity to both of the conditions on referential dependency strongly suggests that this morpheme codes referential dependency, and that it does so independently of its relation to obviation constructions. This is what is expected under the model of referential dependency constructed here.

### 4.4.22. The inverse theme sign –ikw codes referential dependency

The theme sign –ikw– occurs in several constructions, including “Obviative” referents acting on “Proximate”’s (119),

(119) “Obviative” acts on “Proximate” : –ê–

    a. …<ê<Γ‘.
        wâpamik
        wâp=am –ikw
        see=by.eye.TA-INV
        ‘s/heOBV sees him/herPROX.’
        (Presented S2)

    b. …∇<ê<Γd‘.
        ê-wâpamikot
        ê-wâp=am-ikw-t
        cl-see=by.eye.TA-INV-3
        ‘…s/heOBV sees him/herPROX.’
        (Presented S2)
Since this morpheme is used in some contexts to construct “Obviative” reference (119), we expect that it should code some kind of referential dependency (cf §4.1). This means that we expect the theme sign –ikw to show two specific sets of properties:

(i) **STRUCTURAL CONDITION**: The suffix –ikw should be sensitive to either linear precedence or c-command.

(ii) **SEMANTIC CONDITION**: The suffix –ikw should induce a perspectival embedding between the argument it is associated with and this structurally-dominating antecedent.

In the following sections, I demonstrate that both of these properties are confirmed for –ikw, and they are confirmed independently of “Obviative” contexts. In section 4.3.221, I consider the structural conditions on the use of –ikw. I show that it introduces a c-command relation between an IP-level argument and a topic-level operator (cf. Déchaine & Reinholtz 2008). If the topic-level operator is absent, inverse-marked verbs require a linearly-preceding predicate or an overt operator. This means that this morpheme shows systematic sensitivity to both halves of the structural condition on referential dependency: (i) c-command and (ii) linear precedence. In section 4.4.222, I turn to the semantic properties of the inverse. I argue that this morpheme can be understood as coding that its argument is embedded within the perspective of its antecedent – the topic-level argument. This conclusion means that this theme sign codes referential dependency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Conditions</th>
<th>Semantic Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-command</td>
<td>Linear Precedence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>–ikw</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referential Dependency</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.7. The inverse meets the conditions of referential dependency**

Taken together, we see that the inverse theme sign –ikw satisfies both halves of the conditions on referential dependency, and thus it is safe to conclude that it codes a kind of referential dependency.
4.4.221. Structural conditions on –ikw

When we consider the structural properties of the inverse theme sign –ikw, we need to show two kinds of things. First, we need to identify the location of this form in the structure of the verbal complex. Second, we need to identify the kinds of structural relation this form has to other parts of the verb.

When we do both of these, we find that the theme sign –ikw has the following structural properties: (i) it is located in IP, and (ii) it is subordinated with respect to the topic operator in CP. This yields the structure as in (120).

(120)

Here, the inverse suffix –ikw introduces an argument in the IP-layer of the clause, and is structurally c-commanded by an operator located in the specifier of CP. Existing in this kind of c-command relation, we see that the suffix –ikw obeys the structural condition on referential dependency.

4.4.2211. Evidence for IP position of theme sign -ikw

Déchaine and Reinholtz (1997, 2008) consider the position of the theme sign –ikw relative to the rest of the verb. They conclude that, in contrast to the position of the ‘direct’ theme signs (e.g. –ê–, §4.4.21), this theme sign is located in the IP domain, introducing the subject of the verb’s structure.
For Déchaine and Reinholtz (1997, 2008), this structural difference correlates with a difference in the case-marking of the two forms: the ‘direct’ forms are Nominative-Accusative, and the ‘inverse’ forms are Ergative-Absolutive. Plains Cree, then, exhibits split-ergativity in its verb system.

There are several kinds of evidence for this model. First, we notice that the inverse theme sign is in complementary distribution with the direct theme signs, but not with the verb’s finals (122), which means that it likely relates to the same VP-level argument that the direct theme signs do (cf. Déchaine 2003, §4.4.21).

(122)  a. …\( \triangledown \) \( \triangleleft \) \( \sqsubset \) \( \triangledown \).  
\( \ldots \text{é-wâpamikot.} \)  
\( \ldots \text{é-wâp}=\text{am} \) \( -\text{ikw-t} \)  
\( \ldots \text{c1-see}=\text{by.eye.TA-INV}-3 \)  
‘… s/he_{\text{OBJ}} sees him/her_{\text{PROX}}.’  

[Final + INV = √]  

(Presented S2)
Second, the inverse and direct theme signs occur on different sides of the diminutive suffix –s– (123), which means that, although the two theme signs relate to the same argument, they cannot be in the exact same position (cf. Déchaine & Reinholtz 2008).

(123) a. \( \langle s \rangle < \langle \# \rangle_3 \langle d \rangle' > < \langle \# \rangle_3 \langle \# \rangle_2 \langle \# \rangle \). 

\[ \text{nâpêw } \dot{\text{ê}} \text{-pakamahwâsit atimwa} \]
\[ \text{nâpêw pakam}=\text{ahw }-\dot{\text{ê}} -\text{si } -\text{w atimw}-\text{a} \]
\[ \text{man } \text{hit } =\text{by/tool.TA-DIR-DIM-3 } \text{dog } -\text{XT} \]
\[ \text{‘the man}_{\text{PROX}} \text{hit the dog}_{\text{OBJ}} \text{a little, just to scare it.’} \]

b. \( \langle s \rangle < \langle \# \rangle_3 \langle d \rangle' > < \langle \# \rangle_3 \langle \# \rangle_2 \langle \# \rangle \). 

\[ \text{nâpêw pakamahosikot awâsisa} \]
\[ \text{nâpêw pakam}=\text{ahw }-\text{si } -\text{ikw } -\text{w awâsis}-\text{a} \]
\[ \text{man } \text{hit } =\text{by/tool.TA-DIM-INV-3 } \text{child } -\text{XT} \]
\[ \text{‘the child}_{\text{OBJ}} \text{hit the man}_{\text{PROX}} \text{just a little bit.’} \]

Finally, the copy-to-object construction (cf. Dahlstrom 1986, 1991) picks out the verb final’s argument in direct forms, but the other argument in inverse forms (124), suggesting that the inverse correlates with an alteration in the subject of the verb.

(124) a. DIRECT: MATRIX VERB MARKS PROX

\[ \sigma ^{p} \eta ^{q} \lambda ^{l} \circ \text{George } \nabla \dot{\text{i}}{\text{p}}_{n} \hat{\text{q}} \hat{\text{r}} \hat{\text{h}} \hat{\text{k}} \hat{\text{l}} \hat{\text{m}} \hat{\text{n}} \hat{\text{o}} \text{nikisk'éymâw } \text{George } \dot{\text{ê}} \text{-sâkihât } \text{okosisa} \]
\[ \text{ni-kisk}=\text{eyim } -\dot{\text{ê}} -\text{w } \text{George } \dot{\text{ê}} -\text{sâk } =\text{ih } -\dot{\text{ê}} -\text{t o-ko-sis}-\text{a} \]
\[ 1\text{-know}=\text{by/mind.TA-DIR-3 } \text{George } \text{c1-love}=\text{by/neut-DIR-3 } \text{3-son } -\text{XT} \]
\[ \text{‘I know George}_{\text{PROX}} \text{loves his sons}_{\text{OBJ}}.”} \]

(Dahlstrom 1986: 87)
b. **Inverse: Matrix verb marks Obv**

\[ \sigma_{\text{IP}} \text{ George } \downarrow \text{ by.mind TA-DER DXT George } \text{ love by.neut INV-3 3-son} \text{ XT} \]

“I know his sons love George.” (Dahlstrom 1986: 88)

Taken together, the model that provides the best coverage for this data set is one that locates the inverse in the IP-level (cf. Déchaine & Reinholtz 1997, 2008); this captures both its subject properties, and its alteration in argument structure from the direct forms.

### 4.4.2212. Evidence for structural relations of –ikw

If the theme sign –ikw is located in IP, it is structurally higher than all the verb’s other arguments. This positioning has the result that the argument introduced by -ikw cannot be in a command relation with any of the verb’s argument positions.

(125)

![Diagram of IP structure](image)

While, at first glance, this would suggest that this argument cannot be structurally subordinated to any other argument, there are reasons to suppose that there is a higher position in the verb’s structure that the argument of –ikw can be subordinated to.

For independent reasons, linguists working on the verbal structure of Plains Cree have argued that the system has a rich set of CP-level coding that includes reference to person features. As Cook (2008) has argued, this coding can be broken into two sets: a set that inherently picks out a speech-act participant (the prefixes ni(t)- and ki(t)- of the Independent Order), and a set that introduces a variable that requires an antecedent (e.g. the clause-typing prefixes ê- and kâ- of the conjunct order).

Déchaine and Reinholtz (1997) and Blain (1997) consider the personal prefixes ni(t)- and ki(t)- of the Independent Order of verbal inflection (126).
(126) **Independent Order Person Prefixes**

a. $\sigma \lessdot <"\mathbb{U}\rangle$

niwâpahtén.

$ni{-}_wâp=aht$ $-\hat{e}$ $-n$

1-see =by.eye.TI-DIR-LP

‘I see it$_{IN}$.’

(Presented S2)

b. $\sigma \lessdot <"\mathbb{U}\rangle$

kiwâpahtén.

$ki{-}_wâp=aht$ $-\hat{e}$ $-n$

2-see =by.eye.TI-DIR-LP

‘You see it$_{IN}$.’

(Presented S2)

These forms are in complementary distribution with a set of conjunct clause-typing elements (in particular $\hat{e}$- and $kâ$-: (127a)), and do not trigger conjunct agreement (127b)

(127) a. **Person Prefixes Cannot Co-Occur with Clause-Typing**

\* $\sigma \cup \lessdot <"\mathbb{C}\rangle$

\* nitê-wâpahtamân

$nit\hat{e}-wâp=aht-am-\hat{a}n$

$1{-}_c1$-see =by.eye.TI-TI-1

Intended: ‘I see it$_{IN}$.’

(Presented S2)

d. **Person Prefixes Do Not Trigger Conjunct Order Agreement**

\* $\sigma \lessdot <"\mathbb{C}\rangle$

\* niwâpahtamân

$ni{-}_wâp=aht-am-\hat{a}n$

1-see =by.eye.TI-TI-1

Intended: ‘I see it$_{IN}$.’

(Presented S2)

Based on this evidence, Blain (1997) and Déchaine & Reinholtz (2008) conclude that $ni(t)$- and $ki(t)$- are clause-level operators located in the specifier of CP. Being located in the CP layer, the prefixes $ni(t)$- and $ki(t)$- are in a position that structurally-dominates the argument introduced by the inverse theme sign –$ikw$. 

This means that, in a form involving a personal prefix, the argument introduced by -ikw is structurally-subordinated to that prefix. While this makes for a clean account about the structural relations when CP is filled with a person prefix in the Independent Order, the third-person set lacks a prefix in modern Plains Cree, as shown in (128).

(129) **No Pref** ex for 3rd Person

   a. …apeutics\(\Delta\) 
      …sêkikhk
      sêk =ih -ikw
      scare=by.neut-INV
      ‘s/he\(\text{PROX}\) was frightened by him/her\(\text{OBJ}\).’
      (Presented S2)

   b. * …apeutics\(\Delta\) 
      * …osêkikhk
      o-sêk =ih -ikw
      3-scare=by.neut-INV
      Intended: ‘s/he\(\text{PROX}\) was frightened by him/her\(\text{OBJ}\).’
      (Presented S2)

   With no overt form to correspond to the other forms, a simple-minded assumption about the syntax of these forms would be that the CP lacks content.
If this is the case, and –ikw has a c-command relation to the referential contents of CP, the current model of referential dependency expects a particular pattern when this CP content is lacking. Either (i) the lack of content in CP should cause the inverse to be ill-formed, or (ii) the form will depend on linear-precedence to satisfy what cannot be satisfied by structural c-command.

(131) **Option 1: Lack of C-command = Ungrammatical**
In fact, the second option is taken – the lack of a filled CP induces a linear dependency for the inverse-marked verb forms.

The inverse theme sign is restricted in out-of-the-blue contexts, but the direct themes are not. In particular, the inverse cannot be used with two third persons unless there has been a previous predicate that introduced the “Proximate” referent. In (133), the direct verb form \( \text{tahkomëw} \) ‘it\(_{\text{PROX}}\) bit it\(_{\text{OBV}}\)’ in (133a), affixed with the direct theme –ê, is felicitous in a context where I run into the room and announce what has happened outside, while the inverse verb form \( \text{tahkomik} \) ‘it\(_{\text{PROX}}\) was bitten by it\(_{\text{OBV}}\)’ in (133b), using the affix –ikw, is not. Consultants (e.g. S2) explain that, although (133b) is comprehensible (i.e. the hearer knows that a dog has bitten a cat outside), it is not the way anyone would ever begin talking.

\[\text{(133) Inverse} \ -\text{ikw requires previous predicate, Direct} \ -\text{ê} \ -\text{does not}\]

a. \(<\langle \cap \rangle \ C\"d\^\sigma \ G \wedge \ \wedge \ ^\delta \wedge ^\psi \wedge ^\eta \cap X!\)

\(\text{atim tahkomëw minôsa wiyawihtimihk!}\)
\(\text{atim tahko=m \ -ê \ -w minôs-a wiyawihtim-ikh}\)
\(\text{dog seize =by.mouth-DIR-3 cat -XT outside -LOC}\)
\(\text{‘A dog}_{\text{PROX}}\) bit a cat\(_{\text{OBV}}\) outside!’\)  
(Presented S2)

b. \# \(<\langle \cap \rangle \ C\"d\^\sigma \ G \wedge \ \wedge \ ^\delta \wedge ^\psi \wedge ^\eta \cap X!\)

\(# \text{minôs tahkomik atimwa wiyawihtimihk!}\)
\(\text{minôs tahko=m \ -ê \ -w atimw-a wiyawihtim-ikh}\)
\(\text{cat seize =by.mouth-DIR-3 dog -XT outside -LOC}\)
\(\text{‘A dog}_{\text{OBV}}\) bit a cat\(_{\text{PROX}}\) outside!’\)  
(Presented S2)

This requirement of previous context for –ikw is universally supported in texts as well; there are no cases of a discourse beginning with an inverse verb form involving two third persons. This is expected if the inverse requires structural-domination by something in CP.

\[\text{11 Note that the word order has to be switched in these two examples because of the constraint on “Proximate”-} \]
\[\text{“Obviative” nominal precedence, discussed in section 4.4.1 above.}\]
The inverse-licensing predicate that precedes this verb can either be a verb (134a) or a possessed nominal (134b), further cementing the parallels between direct verb forms and possessor constructions (cf. §4.4.1). In the pair of sentences in (134), a predicate making reference to the “Proximate” referent linearly-precedes the inverse verb form. In (134a), this preceding predicate is a verb wâpamêw ‘hePROX saw itOBV,’ while in (134b), the preceding predicate is a possessed nominal niminôsim ‘my catPROX.’ Both of these sentences are acceptable without previous context.

(134) PRECEDING PREDICATE LICENSES –ikw

a. ᐃᐦ ᐄ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<ᑯ<ᒥ<fortunately,长时间的逐字翻译可能会影响阅读体验，我建议使用机器翻译，然后人工校对，确保翻译的准确性和流畅性。
(135) a. 1ST PREFIX WITH –ikw REQUIRES NO CONTEXT

σC"dF  \( \Delta^r \Delta^r \Delta^r \Gamma \)!
nitahkomik atim wîyawîtimihk!

ni-tahkw=m –ikw atimw wîyawîtim-ihk

I- seize =by.mouth-INV dog outside -LOC

‘A dog bit me outside!’

(Presented S2)

b. UNPREFIXED VERB BEARING –ikw REQUIRES PREVIOUS CONTEXT

# C"dF  \( \Delta^r \Delta^r \Delta^r \Gamma \)!
# minôs tahkomik atimw wîyawîtimihk!

minôs tahko=m –ikw atimw-a wîyawîtim-ihk
cat seize =by.mouth-INV-3 dog -XT outside -LOC

‘A dogINV bit a catPRX outside!’

(Presented S2)

This data makes sense if we posit that –ikw needs to be structurally-dominated by the referent in CP; the first- and second-person forms have something that fills CP: ni(t)- and ki(t)- respectively, which means they do not need linear precedence to provide for the licensing of –ikw (136).

(136) niwâpamik

ni-wâp=am-ikw

I- see=by.eye.TA-INV

‘s/he sees me.’

By contrast, the third-person forms do not have content in CP in the Independent Mode, and thus they must have linearly-preceding predicate to license -ikw.
Thus, testing the hypothesis that \(-ikw\) induces a c-command relation results in a search that yields new data (the occurrence restrictions on inverse-marked clauses) and a way to understand this data.\(^{12}\)

Turning to the Conjunct Order, it is widely assumed that these prefixes are in C, since they code clause-typing properties (cf. Blain 1997, Cook 2008).

\(^{12}\) Note that this suggests something interesting about the logic of personal prefixation in Blackfoot (Algonquian, Alberta). In that language, Obv>Prox inverse forms obligatorily have prefixation for third person, and lack any kind of agreement for the “Obviative” referent(i):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{i. } & \text{ otsikákomimmoka nohkówa otánksi.} \\
& \text{ot-ìkákomimm-mm-a n-okhó-wa ot-án } \text{-iki} \\
& 3\text{-love-INV.AN.SG 1\text{-son-AN.SG 3\text{-daughter-PL.}}}
\end{align*}
\]

‘Her daughters\text{_{Obv}} love my son\text{_{Prox.}}’ (Frantz 1991:56)

Crucially, Blackfoot lacks the Algonquian Conjunct Order, instead using Independent Order in embedded environments (cf. Frantz 1991). Assuming a parallel shift in syntactic structure, there will never be any referential material in CP sufficient to license the inverse’s structural dependency. To compensate, the system inserts an overt variable (\textit{ot-}) in the structure so that the inverse can be fed its antecedent via normal pronominal binding relations.
This element is also higher than the argument introduced by –ikw, and, according to Cook (2008) it introduces a variable in its specifier position, which is bound anaphorically. According to Cook (2008), the function of this variable construction is to provide a situation for the proposition to be evaluated with respect to. Since situations include referents (cf. Kratzer 2007), it follows that the clause-typing prefixes è- and kâ- introduce a variable in their specifier that brings clause-external referents into the calculation. This means that they introduce a variable that can function much like the topic operators ni(t)- and ki(t)- seen above; the operator in conjunct clauses has referential content. Included in this is their ability to structurally-dominate the argument introduced by –ikw.

This means that, on a view where –ikw requires c-command in order to be licensed, conjunct clauses provide the necessary structural configurations.
4.4.222. Semantic conditions on –ikw

If –ikw codes referential dependency, it is not enough to show that it is c-commanded by some antecedent (§4.4.221). According to the model of referential dependency developed here (§4.1), it is also necessary to show that –ikw codes that its referent is embedded in the perspective of this antecedent. Based on the conclusions we reached about the structural relations of –ikw, this perspectival requirement means that the argument introduced by –ikw must be embedded in the perspective of the referent related to the topic operator.

One way to test this expectation is to consider what kinds of referents can be associated with the topic position in an inverse construction. If only referents that hold a perspective can, then the argument introduced by –ikw is always c-commanded by a perspective-possessing referent. If any kind of referent at all can be associated with this topic position, then the argument introduced by –ikw is not necessarily c-commanded by a perspective-possessing referent. In fact, a consideration of the evidence shows that only perspective-possessing referents can be associated with the topic-position. Conversely, if the referent introduced by –ikw is restricted in its ability to possess a perspective, then it will necessarily be the case that it is evaluated in some other referent’s perspective. Taken together, the evidence supports the conclusion that the argument introduced by –ikw is always evaluated within the perspective of the referent related to the topic operator in CP. This means that the theme sign –ikw obeys the semantic condition on referential dependency.
4.4.2221. Semantic restrictions on the identity of topic op

If the inverse form is used, the identity of the referent in the topic position is constrained in a particular set of ways; it can be 1st person, 2nd person, and “Proximate,” but nothing else.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st / 2nd</th>
<th>Prox</th>
<th>Obv</th>
<th>Inan</th>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>Unfamiliar</th>
<th>Generic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Topic op</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8. Restrictions on the identity of topic op in Plains Cree

It can be overtly filled with the 1st and 2nd person prefixes ni(t)- and ki(t)-, which code that the proposition is evaluated with respect to their perspective (cf. Cook 2008, §4.4.2121), as the example in (140) shows.

\[(140) \sigma \rho^o \Delta \eta.
\]
\[\text{nísèkikih.}
\]
\[ni-sèk =ih -ikw
\]
\[1\text{-scare=by.neut-INV}
\]
\[\text{‘s/he scared me.’} \]

(Presented S2)

The topic position can also be filled with a “Proximate” 3rd person, so long as the “Proximate” third person precedes the verbal complex (cf. §4.4.2212) and is in previous discourse (e.g. a proper name), as shown in (141).

\[(141) \text{Clare } \sigma \rho^o \Delta \phi <\cap \Lambda.\\
\]
\[\text{Clare sèkikow atimwa.}
\]
\[\text{Clare sèk =ih -ikw-w atimw-a}
\]
\[\text{Clare scare=by.neut-INV-3 dog -XT}
\]
\[\text{‘Clare PROX was scared by the dog OBV.’}^{14}
\]

(Volunteered S2)

The topic position cannot be filled with an “Inanimate,” as shown by the ungrammatical examples in (142a-b). In these examples, the possessed nominal nimôhkomân ‘my knife,’ which precedes the verbal complex, cannot be construed as the topic of the verb otinikow ‘it IN picked him AN up’ that involves an “Animate” (142a) or “Obviative” (142b) referent nápêw ‘man’.

Instead, the only interpretation available is the infelicitous reading where the argument of –ikw is the “Inanimate” referent nimôhkomân ‘my knife,’ and the other argument nápêw occupies the topic position.

---

\[\text{Since there are no examples of the inverse with an “Obviative” antecedent in the Independent Order (i.e. -ikoyiwa) in any text that I have access to, and my consultants do not produce or recognize it, I am here agnostic on its ability to occur as the topic operator, although the lack of evidence for its existence is certainly suggestive.}

\[\text{Notice that a proper name can license the inverse form. This is likely to be a discourse effect of proper names.}

---

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The topic position cannot be filled by an unfamiliar referent, as shown in (143). Here, I have set up a dialogue, in which a familiar referent Heather is introduced as a topic, identified by a proper name. In subsequent discourse, new referents must be identified with the argument introduced by –ikw rather than this topic. For example, the inverse verb form ôcêmik ‘s/he kissed him/herPROX’ can only mean that the new, unfamiliar referent (nâpêw ‘man’) is acting on this familiar, old referent (Heather). The other reading, in which Heather kisses the man, is unavailable in this context.

(143) A: \n\nDid you hear what happened to Heather?’ (S2)

B: \nNamôya.

A: # A\n# nâpêw ôcêmik.

Intended: ‘SheOBV kissed a manPROX.’

#: (? ) ‘A man? kissed her?’
It cannot be filled by a generic referent when the other referent is in the discourse. Consider the examples in (144). The verb *miywêyimik* ‘s/he OBV likes him/her PROX’ bears –*ikw* and has a familiar referent (Shujun) as one argument and an unfamiliar, generic referent (*ayisiyiniw* ‘people’) as its other argument. In such a construction, Shujun must be interpreted as occupying the topic position and *ayisiyiniw* ‘people’ as the argument introduced by –*ikw* (144b), rather than the reverse (144a).

(144)  

a. # ighet’r’σ* Ψ+¥ΩΨ’ Shujunigail.  
   # *ayisiyiniw miywêyimik Shujuna.  
   *ayisiyiniw miyw=êyim –*ikw Shujun-a  
   person good=by.mind.ta-inv Shujun-xt  
   Intended: ‘Shujun<sub>OBV</sub> likes people<sub>PROX</sub>.’  
   = (#) ‘A specific person<sub>PROX</sub> likes Shujun<sub>OBV</sub>.’ (Presented S2)  

b. Shujun Ψ+¥ΩΨ’ ighet’r’σ<.  
   Shujun miywêyimik ayisiyiniwa.  
   Shujun miyw=êyim –*ikw ayisiyiniw -a  
   Shujun good=by.mind.ta-inv person -xt  
   ‘People<sub>OBV</sub> like Shujun<sub>PROX</sub>.’ (Presented S2)

It cannot easily be filled with an animal (145a-b), and consultants will contravene all other grammatical rules of the language and interpret pragmatically-difficult meanings to avoid this configuration. Consider the examples in (145), where the verb *sêkihik* ‘s/he OBV scares him/her<sub>PROX</sub>’ has a human, *nipâpa* ‘my father,’ and an animal, *sisîpa* ‘a duck’ as its arguments. The only possible interpretation associates the duck with the –*ikw* argument and my father with the topic argument – even if this means directly violating the argument coding of the nominals, as in (145b).

(145)  

a. σ<.  
   nipâpa sêkihik sisîpa.  
   ni-pâpa sêk =ih –*ikw sisîp-a  
   l. father scare=by.neut-inv duck-xt  
   ‘My father<sub>PROX</sub> was scared by a duck<sub>OBV</sub>.’ (Presented S2)
The only way any consultant has been willing to allow an animal to be the topic operator is if Speaker has a special relation to the animal (e.g. a pet), and the other referent is either “Inanimate” or a total stranger (146). Only one consultant was willing to tolerate this form.

(146) $\sigma \in C^\circ \text{ } C^n_b \Delta_{\hat{\delta}}$. 
\[\n \text{nitêm tahkiskawik aiwiya nápēwa.} \]
\[\text{ni-têm tahk=iskaw -ikw aiwiya nápēw-a} \]
\[\text{1-dog seize=by.ta-INV some man -XT} \]
\[\text{‘My pet dog was kicked by some guy.‘} \]

(147) 
\[\text{niki-mēkwa-atoskânän kā-tahkomikoyâhk atim.} \]
\[\text{ni-kī- mēkwa-atoskē-nân kā-tahko=}m \text{ -ikw-yâhk atimw} \]
\[\text{1-PREV-midst- work -1pl c2-seize=by.mouth-INV-1pl dog} \]
\[\text{‘We were working when the dog bit us.’} \]

(ii) “Proximate” referents are possible antecedents, as in (148), where the verb kā-tahkomikot ‘it bit her’ is coded with –ikw and is subordinate to the verb kī-mēkwa-atoskēw ‘she was working,’ which codes reference to a Proximate third person (Shujun).

(148) Shujun $\hat{\rho}$ \[\text{Shujun kī-mēkwa-atoskēw kā-tahkomikot atimwa.} \]
\[\text{Shujun kī- mēkwa-atoskē-w kā- tahko=}m \text{ -ikw-t atimw-a} \]
\[\text{Shujun PREV-amidst- work -3 c2- seize=by.mouth-INV-3 dog -XT} \]
\[\text{‘Shujun was working when the dog bit her.’} \]
“Inanimate” referents are not allowed, as in the ungrammatical examples in (149) show. Here, the verb \( k\-otinikot \) is coded with \( -ikw \) and is subordinate to the verb \( pikopayin \) ‘it\textsubscript{IN} broke,’ which codes reference to an “Inanimate” referent.

\[
\text{Intended: ‘This dish\textsubscript{IN} broke when the child\textsubscript{AN} picked it up.’ (Presented S2)}
\]

Taking stock of these generalizations, we see that the only kinds of referents that can be connected to the topic operator position are those that possess a perspective; this includes 1\textsuperscript{st} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} person in the independent order and “Proximate” third persons, and not “Inanimate” referents, which are inherently extentional (§2.4). This looks exactly like the semantic conditions on the antecedent for \( -yi- \) (§4.3.22), and the semantic conditions on the possessor in possession constructions (§4.4.12); the antecedent of the argument introduced by \( -ikw \) must be perspective-possessing.

### 4.4.2222. Perspective-less properties of \( -ikw \)

When we consider the properties of the argument introduced by \( -ikw \) in the context of the properties of the referent identified with CP, a strong generalization emerges: either the referent associated with \( -ikw \) does not have a perspective, or their perspective is embedded within the perspective of their antecedent. This includes “Obviative” referents, “Inanimate” referents, Animals, unfamiliar referents, and generic referents, as summarized in Table 4.9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1\textsuperscript{st} / 2\textsuperscript{nd}</th>
<th>PROX</th>
<th>OBV</th>
<th>INAN</th>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>Unfamiliar</th>
<th>Generic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inverse</td>
<td>( \checkmark )</td>
<td>( \checkmark )</td>
<td>( \checkmark )</td>
<td>( \checkmark )</td>
<td>( \checkmark )</td>
<td>( \checkmark )</td>
<td>( \checkmark )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.9. Restrictions on the identity of the argument introduced by \( -ikw \)**

This means the properties of the argument introduced by \( -ikw \) are almost completely opposite to the properties of the referent associated with the topic \( op \) position. “Inanimate” subjects triggers
the application of –ikw when they are the subjects of transitive verbs, as seen in both examples in (150).

(150)  a. \( \sigma^{i} \Psi \Psi \delta^{i} \varphi^{i} < \varphi \varphi \varphi \varphi \) fountain.
      nikisîpêkinikon anima fountain.
      \( \text{nì-kísìpèk} \text{=} \text{i} \text{kw-n an=} \text{ima} \text{ fount} \text{ain} \)
      \( l\)-wash =by.hand-INV-LP PRX=IN.SG fount
      ‘That fountain_{IN} washed me.’
      (Presented S2)

      b. Cora \( \rho^{i} \Psi \Psi \delta^{i} \varphi^{i} < \varphi \varphi \varphi \varphi \) fountain.
      Cora kisîpêkinikow anima fountain.
      Cora kisîpèk=in -ikw-w an=ima fount
      Cora wash =by.hand-INV-3 PRX=IN.SG fount
      ‘That fountain_{IN} washed Cora.’
      (Presented S2)

Animals can be associated with –ikw when acting on human beings. Consider the example in (151), where the inverse form of the verb \( \text{nisêkihik} \ ‘\text{it} \_\text{AN} \text{scared me}’ \) codes that \( \text{atim} \ ‘\text{the dog}’ \) is acting on the Speaker.

(151) \( \sigma^{i} \Psi^{i} \Delta^{i} \varphi^{i} < \varphi \varphi \varphi \varphi \) fountain.
      \( \text{nisêkihik} \text{ atim} \)
      \( \text{nì-sêk} \text{=} \text{ih} \text{-ikw atimw} \)
      \( l\)-scare=by.neut-INV dog
      ‘The dog scared me.’
      (Presented S2)

With third persons, consultants once again interpret the animal as the inverse argument regardless of the fact that the human-referring nominal is coded as associating with the –ikw argument (152b).

(152)  a. Clare \( \psi^{i} \Psi^{i} \Delta^{i} \varphi^{i} < \varphi \varphi \varphi \varphi \).
      Clare sêkihik atimwa
      Clare sêk =ih -ikw atimw-a
      Clare scare=by.neut-INV dog -XT
      = ‘The dog_{OBV} scared Clare_{PROX}.’
      ≠ ‘Clare_{PROX} scared the dog_{OBV}.’
      (Presented S2)

      c. \* \( \sigma^{i} \cup^{i} \psi^{i} \Psi^{i} \Delta^{i} \varphi^{i} < \varphi \varphi \varphi \varphi \) Clare<.
      \* \( \text{nìtêm sêkihik} \text{ Clare’a.} \)
      \( \text{nì-têm sêk} \text{=} \text{ih} \text{-ikw Clare-a} \)
      \( l\)-dog scare=by.neut-INV Clare -XT
      = (? ) My dog_{OBV} scared Clare_{OBV}.
      ≠ # Clare_{OBV} scared my dog_{PROX}.
      (Presented S2)

“Obviative” referents obligatorily induce –ikw when acting on anyone but “Inanimate”s.
Simple “Animate” referents only trigger inverse coding when they interact with first and second persons, or are animals; in all other contexts, they do not occur as the argument of –ikw.

“Proximate” referents also only trigger inverse coding if they interact with first and second persons.

First and second person interactions never trigger the inverse, under any context, in Plains Cree, which is the stable Algonquian pattern (Goddard 2007) except for Blackfoot (cf. Frantz 1976, 1991).

The only way that an inverse verb form can code a perspective-possessing referent is if that perspective is itself embedded, either in the Speaker’s (157a), or in the “Proximate’s” (157b).
a. –ikw argument embedded in Speaker’s perspective

\[ \sigma^{\text{tr}} \text{Clare} \nabla \text{see(S,Clare)} \]

niwihtämak Clare è-wápamikoyåhk.

\[ ni-wiht=amaw \text{-ikw Clare è- wâp=am } \text{-ikw-yåhk} \]

1- tell=APPLIC-INV Clare c1-see =by.eye.TA-INV-1PL

‘Clare\text{AN} told me that she\text{AN} saw us.’

(Presented S2)
b. –ikw argument embedded in “Proximate’s” perspective

Clare Δ’Çl’ Δ∩/ô b Δ  Δ<γ ‘d’.
Clare wihtamâk wîcêwâkana ê-wâpamikot.
Clare wiht=amaw-ikw w-wîcê =w=â=kan -a ê-wâp=am-ikw-t
Clare tell=APPLIC-INV 3-accompany=3=dir=nom-XT 1-see =by.eye.TA-INV-1PL
‘Clare’s PROX friendOBJ told herPROX that sheOBJ saw herPROX.’ (Presented S2)

Crucially, this second perspective-possessing referent (e.g. Clare’s friend), whose perspective the inverse argument’s (e.g. Clare’s) perspective is embedded in, occupies the topic op position of the matrix clause.

Summarizing, –ikw almost always codes with a perspective-less argument, and the only way that –ikw can introduce a perspective-possessing argument is if it is embedded in the perspective of its antecedent. This is exactly the inverse of the properties of the topic operator’s referent.
Table 4.10. Topic operator and Inverse pro are opposites in their properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st / 2nd</th>
<th>PROX</th>
<th>OBV</th>
<th>INAN</th>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>Unfamiliar</th>
<th>Generic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Topic op</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>?15</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inverse pro</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>× (✔)</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The argument of the inverse, and the Topic operator are two sides of the same coin.

4.4.223. Conclusion: –ikw as referential dependency

From the preceding discussion, we see that the theme sign –ikw is sensitive to both conditions on referential dependency, and that it is sensitive to these independent of obviation constructions. In section 4.4.221, we saw that the suffix –ikw introduces an argument that is either c-commanded by the topic operator in CP, if that position is filled, or linearly-dependent on an antecedent, if that position is empty. Then, in section 4.4.222, we saw that the referent associated with the argument introduced by –ikw is always interpreted within the perspective of this antecedent. This means that –ikw satisfies both halves of referential dependency, and thus its relation to obviation becomes transparent; when the subject of a verb is third person and contextually extentional it is simultaneously “Obviative” and a candidate for for –ikw. In this context, the properties of obviation and –ikw overlap.

4.5. Conclusion

The evidence presented here suggests that referential dependency in Plains Cree is constructed out of two components:

(i) **A SYNTAX COMPONENT**: Linear precedence or c-command
(ii) **A SEMANTIC COMPONENT**: Perspectival embedding

Together, these two mechanisms define how it is that one referent can become the context for the interpretation of another.

This evidence also suggests that the “Obviative” referential category is constructed out of components that code various kinds of referential dependency. Some of these elements have been shown to obey the two conditions on referential dependency, in particular nominal ordering

15 Since there are no examples of the inverse with an “Obviative” antecedent in the Independent Order (i.e. -ikoyiwa) in any text that I have access to, and my consultants do not produce or recognize it, I am here agnostic on its ability to occur as the topic operator, although the lack of evidence for its existence is certainly suggestive.
(§4.3.1), the suffix –yi– (§4.3.2), possessor constructions (§4.4.1), the direct theme sign –ê– (§4.4.21), and the inverse theme sign –ikw (§4.4.22). Further, the last four of these domains show referential dependency effects even when they are not used in “Obviative” constructions. This independence of their referential dependency from their “Obviative” functions provides confirmation of the constructional view of obviation taken in chapter 3 (§3.3); “Obviative” reference is opportunistically constructed out of semantically and structurally compatible pieces.

I have not been able to consider all of the components of obviation (e.g. –im, –a, –ihi: §3.3). It is left up to further investigation to consider if these other components of obviation also show the same behaviour. If they do, the current analysis can be extended to full coverage of “Obviative” forms. If they do not, they may be telling us something interesting about the different kinds of components that construct obviation (i.e. some are referential dependencies, some are plurality coding, and some are repair strategies when referential dependencies fail). Either way, we will have learned more about Plains Cree than we knew before.
Chapter 5
Eliciting obviation and animacy

5.1. The place of methodology in linguistic analysis

As the physicist Werner von Heisenberg said, “what we observe is not nature in itself but nature exposed to our method of questioning” (Heisenberg 1958). The Plains Cree data presented in the previous chapters did not grow on those typewritten pages; it came from someone and was gotten by someone. This state of affairs is a necessary part of all linguistic work – all language always has a human source, and only humans (to our knowledge) work on it. This presents a complex set of methodological challenges to anyone seeking a systematic account of anything in human language. In particular, we must consider properties of both the human conducting the investigation (i.e. the linguist) and the human that the linguistic forms have come from (i.e. the consultant).1

This chapter considers these questions in the context of the data and analysis presented in this thesis. I first consider the broad question of what fieldwork is, and what we ask it do for us (§5.2), dividing fieldwork into elicitation and text collection. I then turn to the specifics of elicitation methodology, considering how the “method of questioning” impacts the picture of Plains Cree’s referential system that we develop (§5.3–5.6). In doing this, it is hoped that the reader will be provided with the tools necessary to evaluate the data that has been crucial to the argumentation of the previous chapters. Although “objectivity” is not possible in linguistic analysis, transparency is.

5.2. Fieldwork in linguistics

The linguistic data in this thesis has been gotten in two ways, both of which fall under the domain of “Fieldwork,” meaning someone has literally gone out to meet language speakers and collected the linguistic material from them. Traditionally, this fieldwork has been divided into two kinds: (i) text collection, and (ii) elicitation. These two kinds of fieldwork agree on their purpose – to collect linguistic data suitable for systematic analysis of the language, but differ as to the directness of the method. A useful analogy is fishing: text collection drags nets through the water, catching all fish in its path, while elicitation baits its hook for a particular fish.

1 As is shown below, sometimes these two roles are conflated; the linguist is the consultant, and the consultant is the linguist.
Fieldwork that consisted of text collection is indirect in its method; it seeks to collect the needed linguistic forms by collecting a large body (called a “corpus”) of language material, and then sorting through it later. This approach has the advantage of catching many things in its net – numerous pieces of which were never imagined to exist by the linguist, giving the linguist a wide knowledge of the language and its many features. Much like fishing with a net, however, this method also drags in a great deal of extraneous, murky material, making it an intimidating undertaking for the novice linguist. Further, there is never any negative data – lack of evidence for a form does not constitute proof that it does not exist. This limits the kinds of linguistic analysis that can be done (cf. Matthewson 2004).

Fieldwork that consists of elicitation is direct in its method; it seeks to collect a linguistic form by targeting it specifically. This approach has the advantage of providing negative evidence; the linguist can (theoretically) prove that a form does not exist in the language. However, it has the disadvantage of being unnaturally narrow; the linguist does not see much of the language under study, and most often only finds out information about the forms being sought. Further, the relation between the intent of the elicitation (the target) and the resulting data is not easy to discern. Following the fishing analogy, when targeting a particular fish, it is crucial to know the relation between the bait and the fish caught; just because you’ve baited your hook for trout doesn’t mean that whatever you pull from the water is a trout.

Since elicitation fieldwork has been a significant component of the data collection methods for this thesis, it would be wise to consider the relation between the intended target and the result. This is the topic of the following discussion.

5.3. Obviation and animacy data fluctuates in elicitation

Obviation and animacy phenomena do not behave in standard elicitation tasks as they do in corpus material. This is true of both the form of obviation and animacy and their content/context. For example, transitive clauses as in (1a) often lack overt obviative marking on the nominal construed as denoting an obviative referent (1b), which is at variance with obviation’s formal properties (§3.3).
Likewise, sentences that contrast in obviation patterns are sometimes said to be equivalent in meaning, suggesting that obviation does not have any content at all (2), which is at variance with obviation’s contentful and contextual properties (§3.4-5).

This fluctuation means that any linguist conducting elicitation that targets obviation and animacy phenomena must think carefully about the nature of elicitation, and its relation to these phenomena.

In this chapter, I consider these issues in detail. I begin by considering the kinds of tasks typically done in elicitation work (§5.4), the kinds of confounds they can introduce, and the way that obviation and animacy behave in each of these tasks. I divide these tasks into five types:
(i) Translation tasks (§5.4.1)
(ii) Judgment tasks (§5.4.2)
(iii) Utterance-in-context tasks (§5.4.3)
(iv) Correction tasks (§5.4.4)
(v) Analysis tasks (§5.4.5)

From this data, I conclude that elicitation is a particular kind of performance task, requiring the speaker to construct imaginary discourses to judge others’ sentences (§5.5). In the subsequent sections, I turn to the contextual properties of obviation and animacy in elicitation. In section 5.5.1, I show that the unmarked, animate referent is (almost) always preferred in elicitation. In section 5.5.2, I show how to contextually support the occurrence of obviatives in elicitation. Finally, in section 5.5.3, I consider data that suggests that contextless obviation is semantically similar to inanimate forms. With these generalizations in hand, the reasons for behaviour of animacy and obviation in elicitation become transparent: elicitation lacks context. If obviation codes a contextual, rather than an inherent, property of the referent (§3.4), lack of context will cause a lack of obviation. If animacy relies on the construction of a perspective (§2.5), the lack of a perspective in discourse means that consultants will either fall back on statistically probably forms or lose animacy contrasts entirely.

Within the context of the current model of obviation, the necessity of context for the disambiguation of obviative and animacy forms is expected. Because they code distinctions in extentionality and perspective anchoring, these referential types are purely intensional. Being intensional, contrasts in meaning will only appear when we attempt substitution tests (cf. Church 1941, etc.). In contextless elicitation, speakers systematically rely on extensional semantics, whether they speak Cree or English, and thus intensional differences are not offered. Only when a context is supplied that destroys substitutability does the equivalence of forms break down. Thus, using tasks that alternately enrich and impoverish context provide crucial support for the model of extentionality that is developed in this thesis.
5.4. A taxonomy of elicitation tasks and their effects on obviatio and animacy

Linguists that conduct elicitation-type fieldwork typically ask the speaker to perform a limited number of tasks. These include what Cook and Mühlbauer (2007) have labeled Translation tasks (§5.4.1) and Judgment tasks (§5.4.2). Some linguists expand this repertoire to include Utterance-In-Context tasks (§5.4.3). In addition, linguists may also take data into consideration that comes from Correction tasks (§5.4.4) and Analysis tasks (§5.4.5).

The amount of each of these tasks that any elicitation session has is a function of the linguist and the consultant. For the linguist, the relevant factors are (i) competency in the target language, (ii) specificity of the target forms (e.g. “aspect” versus $kî$-), and (iii) the kind of forms targeted (e.g. agreement vs. kinship terms). Beginning work on an unfamiliar language, translation tasks constitute the majority of elicitation time. If the linguist becomes more competent in the language, judgement tasks and utterance-in-context tasks become much more frequent. Consultants likewise bring different skills; some are comfortable only with translation tasks, some prefer judgement tasks, while others will only do complex utterance-in-context tasks and analysis tasks resulting from these.

In my own work, the majority of tasks have been judgement tasks ($\approx 50\%$), with utterance-in-context tasks ($\approx 40\%$) and analysis tasks ($\approx 10\%$) providing numerous crucial insights. Translation has only been used to find lexical items and forms that I do not know, and to produce basic minimal pairs for grammatical exposition. Towards a more complete taxonomy of methods, the following discussion includes methods that I have never used, but have seen other linguists use.

Relevant to the present discussion, obviation and animacy behave differently in these different environments. In what follows, I consider the interaction of these phenomena with each task type.

5.4.1. Translation tasks

Translation tasks involve the transfer of some form from the shared language to the target language (Cook & Mühlbauer 2006). In a typical translation task, the speaker is asked how to say some sentence in the target language.
LINGUIST: How do you say, “I am tired” in Cree?

CONSULTANT: umm, ninêstosin.
\[ \text{ni-nêstosi-n} \]
\[ I\text{-tired-LP} \]

Another kind of translation task works in reverse to this: the speaker is asked what some sentence that has been constructed in their target language means.

LINGUIST: What does it mean if I say “ninêstosin”?

CONSULTANT: You said “I’m tired.”

Here, the target language is used to produce an utterance in the shared language.

5.4.11. Confounds in translation: Non-correlation and priming

Translation tasks can be thought of as a mapping operation, from one language to the other. This mapping is only partial, in that it does not necessarily pick out identical elements. At issue is the difference between translation and equivalence. If a form in one language translates into a form in another language, this does not mean that the two forms are equivalent, merely that they have related meanings. For example, when I asked a native German speaker\(^2\) to do a translation task that targets the german ‘conversational perfect,’ using English as the shared language, the exchange in (5) resulted.

LINGUIST: How do you say “I saw a movie yesterday” in German?

CONSULTANT: uhh, Ich bin gestern ins Kino gegangen.
\[ \text{uhh ich bin gestern in das Kino ge-gang-en} \]
\[ \text{hes I am yesterday in the cinema prtcpl-go,pst-prtcpl} \]

Here, the English verb phrase “saw a movie yesterday” is translated into a German verb phrase that has three components that differ from the English sentence: (i) the lexical meaning of the verb (gehen ‘go’ vs. see), (ii) the use of a prepositional phrase (ins Kino ‘into the Cinema’) instead of a determiner phrase as the direct object (a movie), and (iii) a perfective verb form (bin … gegangen) instead of a simple past verb (saw). At best, what this shows is that the German

\(^2\) Thanks to Sonja Thoma (p.c.) for discussion of these forms.
perfective construction occurs where English often uses its past tense form; it does not
demonstrate total equivalence between the forms.

In the sample German data just seen, the speaker was able to respond to the English
sentence with a natural German sentence, but this is not always the case. In a translation task, the
context of the target-language sentence is often the shared-language sentence (Cook &
Mühlbauer 2006). This means that, unless the speaker manages to abstract away from the task,
priming becomes a significant problem. This causes the target language to more closely resemble
the shared language. For example, in the German sample above, a speaker that had priming
interference would produce the following dialogue instead.

(6) LINGUIST: How do you say “I saw a movie yesterday” in German?

CONSULTANT: uhh, Ich sah ein Film gestern.

| uhh Ich sah ein Film gestern |
| hes 1 see.pst a Film yesterday |

Here, the German speaker has produced a form that much more closely mirrors the English form:
(i) the German Imperfekt has been used, which has the closest formal equivalence to the English
simple past (sah vs. saw), (ii) the word order has shifted placing the adverb gestern ‘yesterday’
in the position of ‘yesterday’ in the English sentence, (iii) the choice of a lexical item that more
closely approximates English ‘movie’ (Film instead of Kino), and (iv) the use of a direct object,
like English (sah ein Film vs. ‘see a movie’), instead of a prepositional phrase (ins Kino). While
this is a well-formed German utterance, it is not said in the same context as the English
utterance. Instead, it means something strange, as though the Speaker had gone and sat in a
cinema, staring at the screen listlessly. Thus, the English framing has interfered with the
production of an utterance that accurately reflects the grammar of German.

5.4.12. Obviation in translation tasks

As Cook and Mühlbauer (2006) point out, translation tasks are one of the most common places
for obviation to disappear, particularly when a speaker is first acclimating to the performative
demands of elicitation. Thus, examples like (7) are not uncommon, particularly in the first few
months of a consultant’s elicitation work.
LINGUIST: How do you say “A man saw a woman” in Cree?

CONSULTANT: Umm, nâpêw wâpamêw iskwêw
  nâpêw wâp=am -ê- w iskwêw
  man see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 woman

Here, the consultant has produced a sentence that differs from expected Plains Cree patterns in several ways: (i) the word order matches English (SVO) instead of the more common Plains Cree pattern of VSO (cf. Wolfart & Reinholtz 1996), (ii) the verb is in the independent order of inflection instead of the more often-used conjunct order (wâpamêm vs. ê-wâpamât), and (iii) the nominal iskwêw ‘woman’ lacks the suffix –a (§3.2.1).

Based on the model of obviation proposed in this thesis and our understanding of what is entailed in a translation task, this fact should not be surprising. While Plains Cree nominal reference is organized around extentionality (chapters 2 & 3), it appears that English nominal reference is not; the English sentence “the man saw the woman” could be interpreted within the perspective of either referent, depending on the discourse context (cf. Kuno 1988). Thus, both obviative and unspecified (in this context, proximate) nominals in Plains Cree map onto the unmarked English nominal. This means, when asked to translate an English sentence into Cree, a speaker could either invent a reason to treat a referent extentionally (since the English provides no information), which takes a great deal of energy and cannot be maintained for a two-hour session, or simply translate the unspecified English into the unspecified Cree. This produces sentences that directly mirror the English form, both in word order and in absence of obviation contrasts (cf. Cook & Mühlbauer 2006).

5.4.12. Animacy in translation tasks

Translation tasks do not appear to interfere with animacy coding, either noun-verb agreement or nominal marking. Consultant do not translate an English sentence into a Cree form that is lacking in animacy agreement.

LINGUIST: How do you say “I saw that dish” in Cree?

CONSULTANT: niwâpahtên anima wiyâkan
  ni-wâp=aht -ê -n an -ima wiyâkan
  I- see=by.eye.TI-TI-LP DIST-IN.SG dish

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Here, the form offered by the consultant matched its animacy across the forms: (i) the verb stem uses the TI final –aht– instead of the animate form –am–, (ii) the theme sign used is –ê– for inanimate and obviative objects (§3.3.3) rather than –â– used for animate, and (iii) the demonstrative used has the inanimate suffix –ima rather than the animate –a. In all respects, this coding matches text data and natural speech, which means there do not appear to be any clause-level coding discrepancies between translation tasks and text material. There are two likely reasons for this stability: (i) word-level and clause-level agreement patterns are robust in elicitation, and (ii) elicitation usually works with nominals that fall easily into English “natural” animacy.

First, the Cree system of agreement is extremely stable in elicitation; once an agreement pattern is picked, it always follows across all contexts. For example, the clause-typing system never gets mismatches (i.e. no mixing of independent and conjunct mode), for any speaker, under any conditions (9).

(9) **Clause-typing is stable in elicitation**

a. σ⟨↓<<“U⟩⟩
   niwâpahtêñ
   ni-wâp=aht –ê -n
   l- see=by.eye.TI-TI-LP
   ‘I see it<inanim>.’

b. ▽ ⟨↓<<“C⟩⟩
   ê-wâpahtamâñ
   ê-wâp=aht -am-âñ
   c1- see=by.eye.TI-TI -l
   ‘…(as) I see it<inanim>.’

b. * ▽ ⟨↓<<“U⟩⟩
   * ê-wâpahtêñ
   ê-wâp=aht –ê-n
   c1- see=by.eye.TI-TI -LP
   ---

(9) **Clause-typing is stable in elicitation**

The presence of these robust, word-internal agreement patterns in elicitation supports the maintenance of clause-level agreement.
Second, elicitation tends to rely on canonical forms, because these have well-established linguistic properties and high levels of acceptability. If the linguist is trying to target only one component of a structure, other factors need to be kept constant. Non-targeted forms will thus be picked from a canonical set, to reduce the possibility of their interreference. For example, a linguist targeting the formal properties of animacy coding will restrict nominal forms to things that are known to be canonically animate in Plains Cree (dogs, cats, women, men, children, relatives), or things that are known to be canonically inanimate (dishes, shoes, hats). That is, linguists are intentionally picking forms that are easily mapped from English into Cree. Thus, the English sentence already provides information about animacy in these cases, making the Cree consultant’s translation task straightforward.

5.4.2. Judgment tasks

The other most common task that linguists ask speakers to perform is the judgment task (Cook & Mühlbauer 2006). Defined broadly, tasks of this kind require that the consultant consider some form (or forms) in the target language and rule them appropriate or not. While this requirement on judgment remains constant, the method of getting these judgments is quite varied.

The most common way to obtain a judgment from a speaker is to produce a form and ask if it is acceptable (these have been labelled “Presented” throughout this thesis).

(10) **LINGUIST:** Is it a good sentence if I say “Adé dá ní apá”?

| Adé dá | ní | apá |
| Adé break | LOC | arm |

**CONSULTANT:** Yes. That’s good.

Here, the linguist has uttered a Yorùbá (Kwa, Nigeria) form and asked a native speaker of Yorùbá if it is acceptable.³ The consultant hears the form, considers it, and judges it to be well-formed in their language.

Of course, this method requires some competene in the target language on the part of the linguist. Linguists who have not achieved this minimal competency often resort to writing them on paper and ask the consultant to judge it. This is sometimes carried as far as to place (hypothesized) morpheme breaks in the examples, dropping (hypothesized) surface phonology.

³ Thanks to Oladiipọ Ajibóyé (p.c.) for discussion of this example.
This tactic of presenting a speaker with highly analyzed forms has significant methodological problems. First, it assumes literacy on the part of the consultant – an assumption that should not be made for Plains Cree, where literacy in the first language is between 1% and 5% (SIL 1982). Assuming that the consultant is one of this 1-5%, presenting them with analyzed forms can cause other problems:

(i) It makes significant assumptions about the relation between surface phonology and underlying forms (e.g. nit- is the underlying form of the surface [ʔn]?).

(ii) It assumes that speakers have direct, conscious access to underlying morphology (e.g. a speaker can quickly reconstruct –îhkaw–isw– to –îhkâso–).

(iii) It builds analysis directly into the discovery procedure, which introduces biases into the data collection process.

(iv) By appealing to written forms, prescriptive, rather than descriptive judgments become central.

(v) It often violates the cultural traditions of the speech community, both in terms of a preference for orality and a preference against dissecting language forms (cf. Lightning 1996, Valentine 2001).

With so many confounds, it is impossible to know why a Speaker would prefer or disprefer a form presented in this way.

Another method for obtaining judgments that I have seen used is to record sentences from one speaker and play them to another speaker for judgments. This has the advantage of not requiring language competency on the part of the linguist, and controls for accidental mispronunciations, but also introduces a number of confounds. In many cultures, including Plains Cree (Lightning 1996) but also English-speaking cultures (e.g. my own), offering judgments on other people’s speech is usually taboo. Even if the consultant is willing to violate their own cultural pattern in order to perform the task, speakers are often not willing to rule utterances produced by someone else as “bad,” especially if the recording of the other speaker is perceived to be highly competent or higher in status than the consultant (e.g. an elder in the community). This makes getting negative data – a crucial part of elicitation – difficult.
5.4.21. Confounds in judgment tasks: Metalinguistics

The difficulty with judgment tasks lies in their metalinguistic nature. In these kinds of tasks, the speaker is being asked to consider a form for acceptability. As Cook and Mühlbauer (2006) point out, this can lead a speaker to lose the connection between the forms being considered and the context they are being considered in. Losing context, the speaker may fail to control the forms correctly, allowing contextually-determined components to fluctuate without the consultant noticing it. Thus, a sentence that could be uttered in a real speech context can sometimes be ruled “bad” because of a failure to identify the felicitous context. Consider the English sentence in (12).

(12) The window, my brother broke.

I asked a class of approximately 35 native English speakers if this was a good sentence. More than half of the group aggressively claimed it was not, identifying it as a ‘sentence fragment.’ When asked to repeat the target, they uttered (12) as one intonational unit with pitch declination throughout and main stress on ‘brother,’ as in (13).

(13) [də wɪndo mai brəðər brok]

In English, a form uttered this way is interpreted as a nominal and a relative clause (i.e. “the window that my brother broke …” ), which is not a complete sentence. Crucially, the form that I had intended them to understand had two intonational units, with two intonational peaks in it, as in (14).

(14) [də wɪndo mai brəðər brok]

Thus, the speakers that had claimed the utterance was ill-formed had not controlled their intonation sufficiently the speakers had failed a judgment task; they had not kept all the variables identical between my production and their own. This means that they were judging a target form that was not the target form of the linguist. The fact that more than half of these students failed to do this should give anyone who relies heavily on judgment tasks pause.

---

4 Thanks to two tutorials (p.c.) of Ling100 students from the Fall Semester of 2007.

5 This problem is not restricted to linguistics novices, of course. I have listened to many professional-level discussions about English judgments, even among native speakers, wherein one or more of the linguists was unable to control their intonation.
5.4.22. Judgment tasks and obviation

With respect to obviation, judgment tasks produce interesting and telling results. Recall from Chapter 3 that nominal forms that code obviation have two kinds of variables, with respect to their morphosyntax. On the one hand, they are identical to inanimate plurals (15), and on the other, they are ambiguous for singular or plural interpretations (16).

(15) “Obviative” is identical to “Inanimate” Plural

a. $\Delta \wedge \lambda \sigma \Delta \beta \Gamma \tau r P$.
   onâpêma anihi kâ-miyosiyit.
   $\alpha-nâpê=m-a \ an \ -ihi \ kâ-miyw=isi \ -yi-t$
   3-man =DJ-XT DST-XT C2-good=STAT-DS-3
   ‘That is her$_{PROX}$ husband$_{OVB}$ who is good-looking.’ (Presented S2)

b. $\Delta \wedge \rho \rho \alpha \beta \Delta \Delta \gamma \phi \Delta$.
   omaskisina anihi kâ-miywâsiki.
   $\alpha-maskisin-a \ an \ -ihi \ kâ-miyw=âsi-k-i$
   3-shoe -XT DST-XT C2-good=stat-0-PL
   ‘Those are her$_{AN}$ shoes$_{IN}$ that are nice.’ (Presented S2)

(16) “Obviative” is ambiguous for number

a. … $\forall \theta \ \forall \Gamma \tau r P$.$\lambda \sigma \Delta \Delta \gamma \phi \Delta$.
   … pêyak ê-miyosiyit anihi iskwêwa.
   pêyakw ê-miyw=si-yi-t \ an \ -ihi iskwêw-a
   one \ c1-good=STAT-DS-3 DST-XT woman-XT
   ‘…(as) that one woman$_{OVB}$ is pretty.’ (Presented S2)

b. … $\sigma \rho \theta \ \forall \Gamma \tau r P$.$\lambda \sigma \Delta \Delta \gamma \phi \Delta$.
   … nîsw ê-miyosiyit anihi iskwêwa.
   nîsw ê-miyw =si \ -yi-t \ an \ -ihi nâpêw-a
   two C1-good=STAT-DS-3 DST-XT man -XT
   ‘…(as) those two woman$_{OVB}$ are pretty.’ (Presented S2)

For a speaker to make a judgment on the acceptability of an obviative form, then, they must hold both of these variables constant; that is, they must control for the potential interpretation of the nominal as denoting an inanimate, plural entity. Sometimes, consultants do not succeed in doing this, as the example in (17) shows.
LINGUIST: Can I say “atim nipahêw minôsa”?
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{atim nip} & =ah \quad -ê \quad -w \text{ minôs-a} \\
\text{dog sleep=by.neut-DIR-3 cat -XT}
\end{align*}
\]

CONSULTANT: Yes. … Wait, no. You wanted to say that the dog killed a cat? minôsa is plural. You need to say minôs. atim nipahêw minôs.
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{atim nip}=ah \quad -ê \quad -w \text{ minôs} \\
\text{dog sleep=by.neut-DIR-3 cat}
\end{align*}
\]

Here, the speaker has initially accepted the sentence, but, upon further consideration, she has ruled the obviative form bad, based on a perceived desire to encode “singularity.” Misinterpreting the suffix -a as intended to denote “plural” (an Analysis task, see §5.4.5 below), which it is in other contexts (cf. §3.3.1), she rules the sentence bad. Thus, the judgment task has invited the consultant to engage in metalinguistic consideration of forms – a process that resulted in the loss of context necessary to support the felicity of the form.

This data demonstrates the constructional nature of obviation (cf. §3.3). In voluntarily taking on the metalinguistic task of considering forms in (17), the consultant has repeated the nominal minôsa ‘cat’ out of its sentential context. In contextless environments, this suffix most often codes inanimate plurality (§3.3.3). Without its formal context (i.e. a verb bearing animate agreement), there is no way to determine that the suffix –a was being used to construct an obviative referent (cf. §3.3.1, Wolfart 1973). Thus, the fluctuation in the data caused by a metalinguistic loss of context actually provides crucial insight into the nature of the construction of obviation in Plains Cree.

5.4.23. Animacy in judgment tasks

In judgment tasks, animacy is erratic. A typical elicitation session for animacy begins with a few clear judgments, where the consultant is able to clearly and easily express the target meaning contrasts. However, this quickly becomes chaotic after only a few questions.

(18) SAMPLE ANIMACY JUDGMENT SET

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{maskisina ê-kinwâki.} \\
\text{maskisin-a ê-kinw} & =â \quad -k-i \\
\text{shoe} & -\text{XT C1-long=STAT-0-PL} \\
\text{‘… (as) the shoes are long.’}
\end{align*}
\] (Presented S2)
Here, the initial set of judgments were unambiguous for the consultant: the inanimate form was good and the animate form was bad. However, after more animacy-related elicitation tasks were done, all forms became equally acceptable, and the earlier clarity of judgments completely disappears. All forms are said to now “mean the same thing.” At that point, the task must be set aside until a later session.

If Animacy were a lexical property of nominals (§2.3), this kind of data would be extremely puzzling. In a lexical model, either a nominal is inanimate or it isn’t. Why should the data fluctuate so much? By contrast, the current model expects this kind of fluctuation; animacy is a property of a nominal in a context. Judgment tasks are typically very context-poor, and the context can fluctuate (§5.4.2). Without a stable context, judgments on animacy cannot be stable either.

5.4.3. Supporting judgment tasks: Utterance-in-context tasks

One way to help deal with the potential confounds of judgment tasks is to work harder to support the task with a richer context. Thus, the tasks Cook and Mühlbauer (2006) label Utterance-in-context tasks can be thought of as an enriched form of standard Judgment tasks. There are numerous ways to construct the needed context, and I here consider a few them.

One way to construct context for a judgment task is to simply provide more linguistic material to frame the target form. For example, if we are targeting a judgment on the
acceptability of subject-topicalized structures in English, the addition of preceding linguistic context can be used to support test the target form.

(19)  a. ? The window, my brother broke.

       b. Fiona broke the vases in the living room, but the window, my brother broke.

Here, the addition of extra linguistic material significantly improves comprehension of the form. In the class of 35 students I tested, all of them agreed that this was well-formed, even if they had claimed the topicalized form alone was bad.

Another way to construct context is with pictures or other visual aids. This works particularly well when targeting forms that have spatial semantics encoded in them. For example, the Plains Cree preverb nitaw- codes that the event is moving away from the speaker. We can test this by drawing a picture and asking the consultant which form is appropriate.6

(20)  Craig $\sigma \Delta \sigma \bigsqcup \Gamma \bigtriangleup \Delta \bigtriangledown \cdot \sigma_{b.}\bigcap \cdot \sigma_{b.}\bigcap$.  
Craig ê-nitawi-kakwêcimât iskwêwa ka-nikamocîk.
Craig ê-nitawi-kakwêc=im -â -t iskwêw-a ka- nikamo-t-ik
Craig C1-go.off -try =$by.mouth.TA-DIR$-3 woman-XT FUT-dance -3-PL
Craig $^{\text{PROX}}$ went and asked the girl $^{\text{OBV}}$ to dance.' (Presented S2)

Here, supporting a judgment task with a picture makes the judgment clear both for the linguist and the consultant. Because of this clarity, some linguists rely heavily on this picture-elicitation method, employing animated computer animations to aid elicitation tasks (cf. Burton 2005, Munro 2006).

6 For a discussion of visual-based elicitation techniques that target spatial reference, see Munro (2006).
An easy way to provide context for a judgment task is to use the speech situation that is actually happening, since this provides many of the crucial ingredients to speech; times, places, and people. Taking advantage of the spacial context, it is easy to get consistent judgments on an element like nitaw- in Plains Cree.

(21) **CONTEXT:** A linguist and a consultant are sitting in Vancouver, British Columbia. The consultant’s cousin is visiting from Edmonton, Alberta.

a. ∨ ṛ静静地.
   pe-kiyokêw
   pê- kiyokê-w
   c1-come-visit-3
   ‘She has come to visit.’
   (Presented S2)

b. # ∨ σcontexts ṛ静静地.
   # nitawi-kiyokêw
   nitawi-kiyokê-w
   go- visit -3
   ‘She has gone to visit.’
   (Presented S2)

A task of this kind can be easily constructed for anything that relies on speech time or place.

Another way that a linguist can get a consultant to perform utterance-in-context tasks is by asking the consultant to imagine a situation they describe before introducing a judgment task. For example, if I want to test the familiarity conditions on bare nominal forms in Yorùbá (Kwa, Nigeria), I can construct situations and ask for judgments in these situations.\(^7\)

(22) **LINGUIST:** If I just walked into the room, without warning, and said Ayò ó dá igo, is that a good form?  
   *Ayò ó dá igo*
   *Ayò HTS break stick*

**CONSULTANT:** Yes, I would understand. You just said that Ayò broke a stick.

**LINGUIST:** Suppose I walked into the room and said Ayò ó dá orí instead?
   *Ayò ó dá orí*
   *Ayò HTS break head*

**CONSULTANT:** No, that does not make sense. You have just said “Ayò broke head.” But whose head has he broken?

**LINGUIST:** Suppose I came in and reported to you about a horrible fight that Ayò had been in, where he beat up many, many people. Could I tell you about it saying that sentence?

---

\(^7\) Thanks to Oladiipò Ajibóyé (p.c.) for discussion of these forms.
CONSULTANT: *pause* Yes. Yes, if you were coming in and said that there was a battle, and Ayò had been fighting, then this sentence would be good. It would mean that he “broke heads.” Just anyone’s heads. The heads of the unknown people he was fighting with.

Thus, asking the consultant to imagine a set of situations allows for a more sophisticated set of judgments to be obtained.

One final way that consultants can perform utterance-in-context tasks is to use corpus materials. In such a situation, the linguist can use both well-formed discourses and manipulated discourses as contexts for obtaining judgments about a particular target form. For example, consider the following pair of discourses.

(23) “My dear Mr. Bennet,” said his lady to him one day, “have you heard that Netherfield Park is let at last?”

Mr. Bennet replied that he had not.

“But it is,” returned she; “for Mrs. Long has just been here, and she told me all about it.”

Mr. Bennet made no answer.

"Do you not want to know who has taken it?" cried his wife impatiently.

"YOU want to tell me, and I have no objection to hearing it."

This was invitation enough. (Pride and Prejudice by Jane Austen: Chapter 1, page 1)

(24) “My dear Mr. Bennet,” said a woman to her husband one day, “have you heard that Netherfield Park is let at last?”

Her husband replied that he had not.

“But it is,” returned she; “for Mrs. Long has just been here, and she told me all about it.”

He made no answer.

"Do you not want to know who has taken it?" cried the woman impatiently.

"YOU want to tell me, and I have no objection to hearing it."

This was invitation enough. (Altered form)

Here, I have taken a section from the beginning of a well-formed discourse (23) and altered the pronominal and relational forms (24). Presenting first one and then the other to a native speaker
of English, judgments can be sought about the effect on a discourse that relational forms have. While these are both well-formed discourses with different properties, I could also manipulate the discourse to cause it to be ill-formed.

(25) “My dear Mr. Bennet,” said she to him one day, “have you heard that Netherfield Park is let at last?”

# A man replied that he had not.

“But it is,” returned she; “for Mrs. Long has just been here, and she told me all about it.”

# Her husband made no answer.

"Do you not want to know who has taken it!" cried the girl’s mother impatiently.

"YOU want to tell me, and I have no objection to hearing it."

This was invitation enough. (Altered form)

This is the form of elicitation used most extensively in the current thesis.

5.4.31. Obviation in utterance-in-context tasks

Utterance-in-context tasks significantly improve the stability of obviation’s occurrence (Cook & Mühlbauer 2006). This task is particularly good at getting disambiguation in forms that are, with less context, ruled “identical.”

(26) a. …∇ влад.сут неев. сут.сут. 序幕.сут.
…ê-wâpamât nápêw iskwêwa.
ê-wáp=am -ât nápêw iskwêw-a
cl-see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 man woman-XT
‘…(as) the manPROX saw the womanOBV.’ (Presented S2,S3,S4)

b. …∇ влад.сут неев. сут.сут. 序幕.сут.
… ê-wâpamikot iskwêw nápêwa.
ê-wáp=am -ikw-t iskwêw nápêw-a
cl-see=by.eye.TA-INV-3 woman man -XT
‘…(as) the manOBV saw the womanPROX.’ (Presented S2,S3,S4)

With pairs like this that lack clear context, consultants invariably say that these forms “mean the same thing,” and are usually unable to offer more explicit discussion of the difference. I then constructed a drawing and context to support the judgment task.
In this picture, the man is behind a hill, out of the Speaker’s sight, and the woman is standing next to the Speaker. With this more explicit context set up, the consultant’s (S2) judgments suddenly became clear; the form with an obviative agent was required (26b), and the form with a proximate agent (26a) was infelicitous. In explaining this, the consultant relied heavily on the necessity that the woman must have told the Speaker about it, given the situation; the Speaker could not have known what this man was doing without the woman’s help. This is in line with the analysis of obviation’s content and context considered in section 3.4. and 3.5.

Utterance-in-context tasks that employ texts are particularly good at getting clear, insightful obviation judgments. As one example, I located a passage from a text (kâ-pimwêwêhak 1998) in which two unmarked referents are used within the same clause – an occurrence that is fairly rare in Plains Cree. I first presented this entire discourse (approximately 2 pages of Cree) to three consultants in an unchanged form, to make sure it was acceptable. The target sentence of this discourse is shown in (28).

(28) **TARGET SENTENCE: TWO “ANIMATE” FORMS IN SAME CLAUSE**

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{éwakw ékwa kâ-kiskisômit nôhtâwiy o-pîkiskwêwin;} \\
\text{he then reminded me of my father’s words;’}
\end{align*}
\]

After all of the consultants determined that the entire discourse was coherent and were able to interpret and translate it, I altered the crucial passage so that one of the referents was obviative, rather than unmarked.
Upon considering the altered form, all three consultants responded that they preferred the first form. One consultant, S4, then went on to explain that the reason for the preference was that the speaker was emphasizing that the words of his mentor and his father were identical, and that he had fully-remembered both. According to S4, if he had marked one of the referents as obviative, he would not have remembered that person’s counselling well. In the terms of the current analysis of obviation’s content (§3.4) and context (§3.5), we can understand this as a judgment on extentionality and accessibility (§3.5.4); the obviation of nôhtâwiy ‘my father’ makes that referent contextually extentional (§3.4), and that referent’s perspective (i.e. intentions) becomes inaccessible directly to the Speaker. Thus, the textual task provides for rich context and rich judgments, and gives data that is crucial to our understanding of obviation in Plains Cree.

5.4.32. Animacy in utterance-in-context tasks

Animacy judgments become much clearer in utterance-in-context tasks. For example, in a particular session, I had tried a series of largely context-less judgment tasks, and animacy marking had begun to fluctuate (§5.4.22). After some other elicitation was done, the consultant was getting up to leave, and noticed a realistic-looking plastic snake that was on a nearby table. She flinched and then laughed, explaining that she had thought it was a real, live snake. Seizing this opportunity, I asked her how to describe the event before and after finding out it was a plastic snake.

(30) **LINGUIST:** Before you found out it was plastic, could you say “nikî-wâpamâw awa kinêpik”?

\begin{align*}
\text{ni-kî-} & \quad \text{wâp=am} \quad -\dot{\text{a}} \quad -\text{w} \text{aw} \quad -\text{a} \quad \text{kinêpikw} \\
1- & \quad \text{PREV=by.eye.TA-DIR-3} \quad \text{PRX-AN.SG snake}
\end{align*}

**CONSULTANT:** Yes, you would say it that way, because I thought it was real! I thought it was going to bite me.
LINGUIST: What about now? Would you now say “nikî-wâpahtên ôma kinêpik”?

CONSULTANT: *laughing* Well, yes, because it’s not a real snake. It’s made out of plastic.

Thus, the availability of a rich discourse context supports a clear, definite judgment about animacy marking. This further supports the current analysis of animacy as a discourse-dependent mechanism in Plains Cree (§3.4-5).

5.4.4. Correction tasks

Another task that recurs during elicitation work is what Cook and Mühlbauer (2006) label a “Correction task.” In a task of this kind, consultants are presented with an unacceptable form and then asked to correct it.

Consultants often volunteer a corrected form when presented with an unacceptable form. For example, if a linguist wants to test the presuppositions of Turkish (Turkic, Turkey) cleft constructions, the consultant may voluntarily fix the forms offered.8

(31) LINGUIST: What if I walked into the room, out of the blue, without any context, and I said kadın gördüğü adamı?

CONSULTANT: I think in that case, I would say, if I were you, kadın adami gördü

Here, the consultant has voluntarily, and explicitly, fixed the form offered to a form that would be acceptable in the context described. This has provided crucial insight about the nature of these cleft constructions; they are dispreferred in environments where the referents are not already in the discourse.

8 Thanks to Kerim Demirci (p.c.) for this data and discussion of it.
Sometimes, consultants are explicitly asked to provide a better form than the one offered. For example, in the Turkish cleft examples, an explicit prompt for a corrected form can produce sentences with more sophisticated forms and better acceptability.

(32) **LINGUIST:** Would "kadının gördüğü adamdı" be more appropriate if I was arguing?

\[
\text{kadin} \quad \text{-in} \quad \text{gör-düğ-ü} \quad \text{adam-di}
\]

\[
\text{woman-nom see-part-acc man-past}
\]

‘It was the man that the woman saw.’

For example, if I wanted to say "Hayır, hayır! kadının gördüğü adamdı!"

\[
\text{Hayır, hayır} \quad \text{kadin} \quad \text{-in} \quad \text{gör-düğ-ü} \quad \text{adam-di}
\]

\[
\text{no} \quad \text{no} \quad \text{woman-nom see-part-acc man-past}
\]

‘No, No! It was the man that the woman saw.’

**CONSULTANT:** The man is not defined and I don’t know him

**LINGUIST:** Is there a better way to say it than these sentences?

**CONSULTANT:** You should say kadının gördüğü şey adamdı.

\[
\text{kadin} \quad \text{-in} \quad \text{gör-düğ-ü} \quad \text{şey} \quad \text{adam-di}
\]

\[
\text{woman-nom see-part-acc EVID man-past}
\]

‘The thing that the woman saw was the man.’

Thus, correction tasks may either be a part of the linguist’s elicitation plan, or an unplanned event offered by the consultant. Either way, the correction tasks provide important information about target forms.

### 5.4.41. Confounds in correction tasks: Un-noticed corrections

Consultants sometimes make non-explicit corrections. This is particularly true if the linguist does not have much competency in the target language, especially the morphophonology of it. For example, I have seen exchanges like the following.

(33) **LINGUIST:** Is it a good form if I say [nitʰisatʰuskʰiy]?

\[
\text{nit-kis-} \quad \text{atoskê-yân}
\]

\[
1- \text{finish-work} \quad -1
\]

**CONSULTANT:** Uhh, no. No. I wouldn’t know what you’re trying to say.

**LINGUIST:** How about if I change it and say [nitpʰunatóskêy]?

\[
\text{nit-pôn-atoskê-yân}
\]

\[
1- \text{stop-work} \quad -1
\]
CONSULTANT: Okay. [epunatoskeyan] is good.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{é-} & \quad \text{pôn-atoskê-yân} \\
1- & \quad \text{stop-work} \quad -1
\end{align*}
\]

Here, the linguist is trying to test the acceptability of the two preverbs kîs- and pôn- by applying them to the same verb form. However, they have unintentionally produced a series of Plains Cree forms that are unacceptable for other reasons: (i) they have mixed the independent order and the conjunct order (nit- plus -yân), (ii) they have employed the wrong form of the person prefix (nit- instead of ni- before the preverb pôn-), (iii) they have heavily aspirated the stops when in onset position (something that Cree never does), and (iv) they have produced vowel qualities that are never heard in the natural language (e.g. [nit-] for [nît-] or [nt-] or [nd-]). The first time these forms were presented, the consultant ruled them bad. However, after it was clear that the linguist was unable to “do better,” the consultant appears to have found a compromise. The linguist would be mistaken were they to conclude that such data said anything about the relative acceptability of the preverbs kîs- and pôn-.

In the previous example, the linguist was lucky enough to hear the form that the consultant had settled on as acceptable (e.g. é-pôn-atoskêyân ‘I stopped working’), which fixed all of the errors in the linguist’s proffered form. This is not always the case; correction can often be done silently. This usually happens when the consultant has been pushed with bad forms for too long and finally finds something improved in a proffered form. Consider the continuation of the exchange in (33), which exemplifies this kind of scenario (34).

(34) LINGUIST: Is it a good form if I say [nitkʰisâtʰuskbʰiyan]?

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{nit-kî-} & \quad \text{atoskê-yân} \\
1- & \quad \text{finish-work} \quad -1
\end{align*}
\]

CONSULTANT: Uhh, no, that’s not good. I don’t know what you’re trying to say.

LINGUIST: How about if I change it and say [nitpʰunâtʰuskbʰiyan]?

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{nit-} & \quad \text{pôn-atoskê-yân} \\
1- & \quad \text{stop-work} \quad -1
\end{align*}
\]

CONSULTANT: Okay. [epunətoskeyan] is good.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{é-} & \quad \text{pôn-atoskê-yân} \\
1- & \quad \text{stop-work} \quad -1
\end{align*}
\]

LINGUIST: Can I add [kʰi-] in there? Something like [nitpʰunikʰiâtʰuskbʰiyan]?

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{nit-} & \quad \text{pôn-kî-} \quad \text{atoskê-yân} \\
1- & \quad \text{stop-prev-work} \quad -1
\end{align*}
\]

CONSULTANT: No, that is not understandable.
LINGUIST: How about if I said [nikʰiʔunikʰiʔəuskʰiyan]?

\[\text{nit-kí- pón- atoskē-yán} \]
\[\text{1- PREV-stop-work -l}\]

CONSULTANT: Yes. That’s good. You’re saying “I stopped working.”

Here, the linguist has repeatedly produced forms that are obviously not possible in Plains Cree. The linguist was corrected a few times, but has then unintentionally introduced another confound: the preverb \(kí-\) is in the wrong place in the preverbs; it should be ordered before \(pón-\) ‘stop,’ not after it. When the linguist fixes this problem, placing it before \(pón-\) instead of after it, and also has the correct form of the person prefix (\(ni-\) vs. \(nit-\)), the consultant identifies the improvement and responds positively, despite the impossibility of the form. Accommodating the linguist’s bad forms, the consultant reconstructs a correct form in her head (\(é-kí-pón-atoskēyán\) or \(nikí-pón-atoskán\)).

(35) a. ACCOMMODATED FORM

\[\sigma\hat{\rho} \gg \langle \xi^{\alpha b} \rangle.\]
\(nikí-pón-atoskēyán\)
\(ni-kí- pón- atoskē-yán\)
\(1- PREV\text{-stop-work} -l\)

--- (?) (Presented S2)

b. ACTUAL FORM

\[\sigma\hat{\rho} \gg \langle \xi^{\alpha b} \rangle.\]
\(nikí-pón-atoskán\)
\(ni-kí- pón- atoskē-yán\)
\(1- PREV\text{-stop-work} -l\)
‘I stopped working.’ (Presented S2)

c. ACTUAL FORM

\[\nabla \hat{\rho} \gg \langle \xi^{\alpha b} \rangle.\]
\(é-kí-pón-atoskēyán\)
\(é-kí- pón- atoskē-yán\)
\(C1\text{-PREV\text{-stop-work} -l}\)
‘I stopped working.’ (Presented S2)

This means that a consultant’s affirmation of a form is not always a straightforward case of grammaticality; the context of the judgment must be carefully considered.
If a linguist unintentionally establishes with a consultant that the linguist is both incompetent in the language and unable or unwilling to improve, the elicited data can diverge from the target forms. The consultant will cease focussing on the production of natural forms that would be ideal for the given context and instead accommodate the linguist’s disfluency by making the utterances merely functional. Lost will be all the more sophisticated structure of the language, and elicitation results will be a pared-down, simplified form of the target language. If complex linguistic structure is the target, then, the development of basic competency in the target language is a necessity.

In tandem with improved competency, there are strategies for making these silent corrections overt. This can be done by simply asking the consultant to repeat the “good” form. If the form has been silently corrected, this will become immediately apparent; native speakers have a difficult time producing these bad forms. By constantly asking for the repetition of the form, then, the linguist will gain feedback, both on their own production skills, and on the forms that the consultant is judging acceptable.

5.4.42. Obviation in correction tasks

When we consider obviation data with respect to correction tasks, an interesting pattern emerges. Consultants only rarely offer forms that are corrected for obviation coding.

(36)  **LINGUIST:** Is it a good sentence if I say “Clare wâpamêw Sucun”?

\[ Clare \text{ wâp}=am \text{ -}â \text{ -}w \text{ Shujun } \]
\[ Clare \text{ see } =by.\text{eye} TA\text{-DIR-3} \text{ Shujun } \]

**CONSULTANT:** Yes, that’s a good sentence. You’re saying “Clare sees Sucun.”

Instead, obviation mistakes are passed over silently, and more attention is paid to other features, such as morphophonology.

This suggests that a form that is lacking in obviative marking can usually be fixed silently by the consultant, which would mean that obviation information is usually reconstructable from other contextual information. This is expected within the current framework, because obviative coding is constructed from several distributed parts of the grammatical system (§3.3): (i) the stem-level agreement of verbs, (ii) the morpheme –yi–, (iii) the suffix –im, (iv) the theme-sign system, and word ordering. All of these provide redundant cues to the identity of the missing obviative marking (i.e. reinforcement, as in Bateson 1972). Understanding obviative-less forms, then, is not too difficult for a Cree speaker.
If this is the case, and the consultant is silently reconstructing obviative forms, we would expect this reconstructed obviation to show up when the consultant is asked to repeat the obviative-less sentence. In fact, this is exactly what happens.

(37) LINGUIST: Is it a good sentence if I say “Clare wâpamèw Sucun”?

Clare wâp=am -ê -w Shujun
Clare see =by.eye.TA-DIR-3 Shujun

CONSULTANT: Yes, that’s a good sentence. You’re saying “Clare sees Sucun.”

LINGUIST: Could you say it, so I can hear how it’s said?

CONSULTANT: Sure. Clare wâpamèw Sucuna.

Clare wâp=am -ê -w Shujun-a
Clare see =by.eye.TA-DIR-3 Shujun-XT

Thus, the obviative marking (here, the suffix –a) reappears when the consultant repeats the sentence. This underlines the importance of getting constant feedback from the consultant.

5.4.43. Animacy in correction tasks

Based on memory and records, only one consultant (S4) has ever corrected an animacy form, in any context. This particular instance was when the consultant was instructing me on the canonical words for parts of the body.

(38) CONSULTANT: The word for this *pointing to legs* is nskâta. nskâta òhi.

ni-skât-a. ni-skât-a aw-ihi
1-leg -PL PRX-PL
‘…legs. These IN are my legs IN.’

LINGUIST: nskâtak òki

ni-skât-ak aw-iki
1-leg -PL PRX-PL
‘These AN are my legs AN.’

CONSULTANT: Namôya, nskâtá

namôya ni-skât-a
NEG 1-leg-XT
‘No, my legs IN.’

Here, I had purposely said the ‘wrong’ form, out of curiosity to see what the speaker would do. My form had the animate plural suffix –ak, and the corresponding animate demonstrative òki, rather than the consultant’s proffered –a and òhi. The speaker responded by repeating the correct
form, with an added prominence (high pitch, increased amplitude) on the suffix –a, so that I could attend to the relevant feature.9

Crucially, the form that was corrected was not ungrammatical. This is demonstrated by further questioning.

(39) CONSULTANT: The word for this *pointing to legs* is niskâta. niskâta ôhi.

LINGUIST: niskâtak ôki

CONSULTANT: Namôya, niskátá

LINGUIST: Could I ever say niskâtak ôki?

CONSULTANT: êhâ. Yes. You could, you could. If your legs were kicking you, out of your control, you would say niskâtak for them.

Thus, the consultant, in offering the correction, has a particular context in mind. The correction is not a judgment between a good form and a bad form, then, but between a felicitous form and an infelicitous one relative to an implicit context.

---

9 Goddard (p.c.) points out that this kind of final stress pattern often occurs when eliciting paradigmatic variation; the consultant will stress the element that changes with each iteration.
5.4.5. Analysis tasks

In an analysis task, the consultant considers the structure of their own grammar, either the properties of forms or concatenations of forms. Thus, this is the kind of task done when the consultant is themselves the linguist.

Analysis tasks are often done in tandem with other kinds of elicitation tasks, or are embedded within an elicitation task. For example, a judgment task, wherein the consultant is asked to consider the acceptability of the form, will often lead the consultant to analyze the form, particularly when giving a negative judgment on the form. From this analysis, a correction is offered.

(40) **LINGUIST:** Is it a good sentence if I say “âhâsiw ê-kitocik” in Cree?

\[
\text{âhâsiw ê-kitocik} \quad -t-ik
\]

\[
\text{crow} \quad c1-\text{call-3-pl}
\]

**CONSULTANT:** No. The “âhâsiw,” there’s only one of them, but the “ê-kitocik” says there is more than one. You need to put [ak] on the end of “âhâsiw” if you want to say that. That makes it mean more than one crow. âhâsiwak ê-kitocik. The crows were making noise.

\[
\text{âhâsiwak ê-kitocik} \quad -t-ik
\]

\[
\text{crow} \quad -\text{PL} \ c1-\text{call-3-PL}
\]

Thus, an analysis task is here an intermediate stage within two other kinds of tasks (here, a transition from a judgment task to a correction task).

5.4.51. Confounds: Decontextualizing forms, pseudo-linguistic explanations

One confound of analysis tasks has to do with decontextualization. When a consultant considers a form in their language, the form is *de facto* removed from its context. It has ceased to be a part of the language structure and become an object of perception in itself. This means that whatever contextual properties it has will recede, and whatever formal properties the element has (i.e. those pertaining strictly to its form, rather than its function) will become foregrounded. If the element that is being analyzed in this fashion has little contextual functionality, such a process will not alter it significantly, but if the form has rich contextual properties, these will be greatly diminished or disappear under scrutiny. This is something that linguists must keep in mind when considering data from analytic tasks performed by consultants.

Another confound for analysis tasks pertains to the tools the consultant uses for analysis. If the consultant has no linguistic training, the number of grammatical terms that the consultant
has will be very limited. Typically, there are two sets of terminology that consultants appeal to: time for verbs and plurality for nouns. Consider the example in (41).

(41) **LINGUIST**: Is it okay if I say niwâpamâw ana nâpêw.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ni-wâp-a-w~an} & \quad =a \quad \text{nâpêw} \\
1\text{-see-dir-3} & \quad \text{DIST=sg man}
\end{align*}
\]

**CONSULTANT**: Yes. niwâpamâw ana nâpêw. I see that man.

**LINGUIST**: What if I changed it a little bit and I said niwâpahtên ana nâpêw?

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ni-wâp=aht} & \quad -\text{e-n} \quad \text{an} =a \quad \text{nâpêw} \\
1\text{-see=by.eye.TI-TI-LP DIST=SG man}
\end{align*}
\]

**CONSULTANT**: Hmm. Yes. It’s still good. niwâpahtên ana nâpêw.

**LINGUIST**: What is the difference between the two ways of saying it?

**CONSULTANT**: Well, the first form is if you’re seeing the person now, I guess, and the second form is if you saw them in the past.\(^{10}\)

Here, the consultant has appealed to a contrast in tense readings to explain a contrast in animacy coding on the verb. This is not ironclad proof that the animacy agreement is temporal in nature, however; almost all verbal contrasts are explained as contrasts in tense. Thus, the consultant is here appealing to tense because she has little else in the way of grammatical categories to employ. This makes the linguistic training of consultants particularly relevant to elicitation work, a topic that I specifically address below.

### 5.4.52. Obviation in analysis tasks

When consultants analyze obviative forms, they almost invariably remove the obviative suffix. Almost invariably, the pattern of this kind of removal follows the sequence in (42).

\(^{10}\) This data was actually collected from (S2). I have no idea what it means, and have been unable to find parallel data anywhere else. On other occasions, she rejects these offered TI forms. This makes me think it is an elicitation confound of some kind. Notice, in particular, that the TI form was offered by the linguist, rather than volunteered by the consultant.
LINGUIST: Is it a good sentence if I say ê-wâpamât awâsis minôsa
ê-wâp=am -â -t awâsis minôs-a
c1-see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 child cat -XT

CONSULTANT: Yes. ê-wâpamât awâsis minôsa. minôsá. Hmm. Usually, we say minôs. I
don’t know what the [ә] is doing at the end.

LINGUIST: So you don’t need the [ә] on minôs?

CONSULTANT: No, minôs is fine.

In this exchange, the consultant has begun by accepting an obviative form, but then has
considered the obviative-referring nominal minôsa ‘the cat(s)_{obv.’ To consider this form, she
repeats it without the rest of the sentence, in what amounts to a citation form. This time, she
places English-type stress on the suffix –a (increased amplitude). She then rules the obviative-
marked form as ill-formed.

Crucially, the consultant has here pulled the nominal form minôsa out of its sentential
context and considered it by itself. In so doing, she has removed the reason for the obviative
suffix to be affixed; the nominal was obviative-marked because of the context it was used in.
Removed from this context, there is no reason to mark the nominal with obviation, and thus the
obviative disappears. This is as expected by a model that treats obviation as a property of
contexts and constructions (cf. Chapters 3 & 4).

5.4.53. Animacy in analysis tasks

In elicitation settings, Cree speakers often analyze animate forms as being “alive” in some way.

LINGUIST: Is it a good sentence if I say “niwâpamâw awa asiniy” in Cree?

ni-wâp=am -â -w aw =a asiniy
1- see =by.eye.TA-DIR-3 PRX=AN.SG rock

CONSULTANT. niwâpamâw awa asiniy. Yes. That’s good.

LINGUIST: What about if I say “niwâpahtên ôma asiniy?”
ni-wâp=aht -ê -n aw=ima asiniy
1- see =by.eye.TI-TI-LP PRX=AN.SG rock

CONSULTANT: niwâpahtên ôma asiniy. Hmm. I prefer the other way [niwâpamâw awa
asiniy]. This way sounds funny.

LINGUIST: Okay.
CONSULTANT: *pause* Do you think rocks are alive? Do you think they have power of some kind? I mean, they stay together. They don’t fall apart, through time. *pause* What about airplanes? They have powers, I guess…

Here, the consultant has been asked to consider which form is preferred for animacy marking. She rules that the animate form *awa asiniy* ‘thisAN rock’ is preferred. She then begins to consider the animate-marked *asiniy*, and wonders aloud if her grammatical coding of it as animate means that it is “alive” in some sense. She then thinks of other forms that she codes this way (e.g. *pimhâkan* ‘airplane’) and extends the “living” property to them by analogy. Thus, an analysis task has led the consultant to interpret the animate form as denoting a “living” thing.

With the model of animacy proposed by Goddard (2002) and adopted in this thesis, we can understand this “animate” interpretation as arising from setting up a contrast between animate and inanimate forms. Recall from Chapter 2 that “animate” acquires an intentional reading in the context of an “inanimate” form, via blocking. In this kind of elicitation, we have done exactly this; the animate form and inanimate form of the same nominal are considered, and the animate form is selected. Thus, analysis contexts lead consultants to consider alternatives, and alternatives inherently involves the notion of blocking. Blocking with animacy ends up conveying that some referents are inherently intentional, even though they are not normally used that way in the language. Elicitation, then, has provided an interesting environment to study the effects of animacy and blocking, and supports the model of animacy proposed in this thesis.

5.5. Elicitation and impoverished context

In all of the elicitation data seen here, the recurrent theme is one of context impoverishment. In translation tasks, the context for the target sentence often becomes the shared-language sentence. In judgment tasks, the consultant often fails to transfer the target form with its context, something that is fixed by utterance-in-context tasks. Finally, in analysis tasks, the process of analysis itself can often decontextualize a form, altering judgments on its well-formedness.

While it may be tempting to conclude that elicitation is the wrong place to test contextually-sensitive forms, since it has so little context, in fact there is evidence to suggest that the context-impoverishment of elicitation provides crucial insights. So long as we are aware that elicitation often lacks context, we can use this to our advantage, considering what the target phenomenon does under this strain.
In the following sections, I consider how obviation in particular behaves in context-less constructions. I argue that the behaviour of obviation in elicitation environments demonstrates the contentful, marked nature of obviation. The obviative form bears semantic content, and, as such, it has conditions on its use in context. Elicitation, being context-poor, does not usually provide enough specification for these conditions of use to be met, and thus, the speaker does not produce obviative forms. Only when the linguistic environment that exists in elicitation is altered do obviative constructions begin to appear; the consultant learns to accommodate the linguistic context of elicitation.

5.5.1. The proliferation of simple animates in elicitation

Probably anyone who has done elicitation on an Algonquian language will attest to the fact that obviative forms are not as easily obtained as simple animates. For example, asking a Plains Cree speaker how to translate “the dog is barking” will invariably result in the use of a simple animate referent (44).

(44) ᐊᑎᑦ ᐁᒥᓯᑭᒧᐟ

atim ë-ma-misikimot.

atimw ë- ma- misikimo-t

dog c1-RED-bark -3

‘The dog is barking’ (Translation S3)

While this is a form that could, in theory, occur in natural speech, the preference for simple animate forms goes beyond the boundaries established by textual data (cf. Cook & Mühlbauer 2006). Crucially, these unexpected animates occur in contexts where obviation is expected to occur. For example, simple animate referents can be possessed by third persons (45), which is not supposed to happen (cf. Wolfart 1973, Cook & Mühlbauer 2007, Chapter 4, etc).

(45) a. Offered form

niwâpamâw awa opôsîms

ni-wâp=am -â -w aw=a o-pôsî=m -is

1-see =by.eye=TA-DIR-3 prx=an.sg 3-cat=DSJ-DIM

‘I saw this person’s cat.’ (Translation S1)
b. **Expected form**

\[
\text{niwâpamimâwa awa opòsîmsa}
\]

\[
i-\text{wâp}=am \quad \text{-im} \quad -\text{â} \quad -w \quad aw=a \quad o-\text{pôsî}=m \quad \text{-is} \quad -a
\]

\[
\text{1-see} \quad =by.\text{eye}=\text{TA-DSJ-DIR-3-XT} \quad prx=\text{an.sg} \quad 3-\text{cat}=\text{DSJ-DIM-XT}
\]

‘I saw this person’

Simple animate forms can also occur as both arguments of a transitive verb (46), which is unexpected based on grammatical descriptions of textual data (cf. Wolfart 1973).

(46) a. **Offered form**

\[
\text{Tomio} \quad \sigma<"\n^\circ \quad \triangleleft \quad \rho-\sigma\Lambda\sigma.
\]

\[
\text{Tomio nip=hêw} \quad \text{awa kinêpik.}
\]

\[
\text{Tomio nip=ah} \quad -\text{ê} \quad -w \quad aw =a \quad \text{kinêpikw}
\]

\[
\text{Tomio kill=by.tool.TA-DIR-3} \quad \text{PRX=AN.SG snake}
\]

‘Tomio, AN killed this snake, AN.’

(Translation S1)

b. **Expected form**

\[
\text{Tomio} \quad \sigma<"\n^\circ \quad \Delta \quad \rho-\sigma\Lambda\sigma\nu.
\]

\[
\text{Tomio nip=hêw} \quad \text{ôhi kinêpikwa.}
\]

\[
\text{Tomio nip=ah} \quad -\text{ê} \quad -w \quad aw =ihi \quad \text{kinêpikw=â}
\]

\[
\text{Tomio kill=by.tool.TA-DIR-3} \quad \text{PRX=XT snake} \quad \text{-XT}
\]

‘Tomio, PROX killed this snake, OBV.’

Further, simple-animate forms can occur in clauses embedded under third person subjects (48), which is also not usually seen in texts.\(^{11}\)

(47) a. **Offered form**

\[
\text{ânsi è-si-wâpahtahk Misti è-si-sipwêhtêt Wâpastim?}
\]

\[
\text{how} \quad \text{C1-RR-see=by.\text{eye}.TI-TI} \quad \text{-0 Misti C1-RR-away=by.walking-3 Wâpastimw}
\]

‘How did Misti, AN see Wâpastim, AN leave?’

(Translation S1)

\(^{11}\) Proper names also seem to resist obviative-marking in texts. See, for example, the full extent of obviative-less proper names in Emme Minde (1997).
b. **EXPECTED FORM**

\[ \text{Ҫσ}$/^\prime\ \n$/^\prime\ \hat{\text{ Buccaneer\:Misti }}
\]
\[ \text{ çe- } \text{ wâp}-\text{ aht } \text{ -am-k Misti çe- si- sipwê}=\text{ hêtë } \text{ -yi-t Wâpastimw-a}
\]
\[ \text{ how } \text{ C1-RR-see}=\text{ by. eye. TI-TI } \text{ -0 Misti C1-RR-away}=\text{ by. walking-DS-3 Wâpastimw-XT}
\]

‘How did Misti see Wâpastimw leave?’

(Translation S1)

Altering elicitation techniques to avoid translation likewise nets largely simple forms. Thus, presenting a speaker with forms (‘judgment’ tasks), asking for Cree sentences in a context (‘context’ tasks), or asking for their consideration of forms (‘analysis’ task) results in the same patterns.

We can try to account for the gaps by relying only on context-less “grammatical” explanations, but the attempt will fail. It cannot be a simple morphological gap, where affixal material on nominals is lost: (i) speakers readily produce other nominal affixes such as the suffix -ak (48),

(48) \[ \text{ awâsisak mâtowak.}
\]
\[ \text{ awâsis-ak mâtow-ak}
\]
\[ \text{ child } -\text{ PL cry } -\text{ 3-PL}
\]

‘The children cried.’

(Translated S1)

and (ii) the verbal equivalents to obviation (e.g. the suffix -yi-) is also missing (51). It likewise cannot be an issue of syntactic agreement between words: (i) plurality is coded readily on both nouns and verbs, in both sets of clausal agreement (48), and (ii) more complex chains of adjunct extraction agreement (e.g. ‘relative roots,’ see Cook 2005) are intact, even across multiple clauses (47).

By contrast, the current model offers a way to understand this patterning. In chapter 2, I argued that the simple animate form is unmarked with respect to content (§2.4); it bears no special meaning. By contrast, the obviative referents are specified as contextually extentional (cf. §3.4-5), which means that they fundamentally require a context to be evaluated in. Without a context, obviative constructions will not be called for. Elicitation, being naturally context-poor (cf. Matthewson 2004, Cook & Mühlbauer 2006, Calecott & Koch 2007), would be exactly such an environment.
5.5.2. Obtaining “obviative” forms in elicitation

While simple animate forms are freely volunteered by consultants, the situation is much different with obviative forms. Obviative forms are never volunteered for simple declarative sentences. In fact, getting an obviative form at all in elicitation requires work, since, as we have just seen (§5.5.1), obviatives do not even appear where the grammar expects them to be.

Presenting an obviative form to a consultant out of the blue will usually\(^\text{12}\) end in rejection (49).

(49) **Out-of-the-blue “Obviative” is rejected**

\[ \text{a.} \quad \nabla^{\nu \eta} \nabla \Gamma \langle r \rangle'. \]
\[ \text{iskwêw } \bar{e} - \text{miyosit.} \]
\[ \text{iskwêw } \bar{e} - \text{miyo}=isi - t \]
\[ \text{woman } c1 \text{-good}=\text{STAT-3} \]
\[ \text{No context} = \text{‘A woman is beautiful’} \quad \text{(Judgment S2)} \]

\[ \text{b.} \quad \nabla^{\nu \eta} \nabla \Gamma \langle r \rangle'. \]
\[ \# \text{iskwêwa } \bar{e} - \text{miyosiyit} \]
\[ \text{iskwêw-a } \bar{e} - \text{miyo}=isi-yi - t \]
\[ \text{woman-XT } c1 \text{-good}=\text{STAT-DS-3} \]
\[ \text{COMMENT (S2): “Who are you talking about?”} \]

While the “Animate” form in (49a) is readily accepted, the speaker rejects the obviated form because she does not know who the referent is. In attempting to repair such a sentence, the speaker will have to invent a context; for example, the form in (49b) was repaired by creating a context in which we were discussing the girlfriend of a man we knew. Without such a context, the sentence is completely infelicitous.

While subordinate clauses often lose their obviation in elicitation (see 47), there is one kind of subordination that seems to consistently produce it. When then matrix verb denotes an act of speaking, the referents of subordinate clauses will regularly be obviated. Thus, the same speaker who produced the obviation-less example in (47) ruled the parallel quotative form in (50) – which lacked obviation – ungrammatical at nearly the same time.

---

\(^{12}\) Sometimes consultants will accept these forms, but their judgments are always based overtly on ‘being able to understand what you mean,’ i.e. the truth-conditions are clear (some woman is pretty), even though the contextual structure is wrong. When questioned, they will affirm that they themselves would never utter such a sentence in the (non-)context considered here.
Correcting this offered form, the speaker produced (51), which obviates the embedded referent and its clause.

\[
\text{(51) QUOTATIVE CLAUSE CORRECTED FOR OBVIATION}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{tânsi } & \text{-esi-twêt Misti } \text{-esi-sipwêhtêt Wâpastim.} \\
\text{how } & \text{c1-rr-thus=at-3 Misti c1-rr-away =by.walking-3 Wâpastimw} \\
\intended: & \text{‘What did Misti say was the way Wâpastim walked away?’ (Correction S1)}
\end{align*}
\]

Based on the textual evidence above, we have already concluded in Chapter 3 that obviation is highly sensitive to quotative environments. Thus, introducing a verb of speaking in elicitation provides the right kind of contextual specification to meet the obviative’s conditions of use; building context supports the occurrence of obviative constructions.

### 5.5.3. Contextless obviation = “inanimate”

Recall from Chapter 2 that inanimate nominals are distinguished by their inability to have intentions; they denote ‘mindless’ referents (extentional). Thus, the inanimate-marked nominal in (52) denotes an entity that will never be able to think, feel, or speak without a supernatural intervention (at which time, it must be shifted to animate – see Chapter 2).

\[
\text{(52) INHERENTLY EXTENTIONAL REFERENT = “INANIMATE”}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ni-ki- } & \text{wâp=aht } \text{-ê-n aw=ima kinêpikw} \\
\text{I-PREV-see=by.eye.TI-TI-LP PRX=in.sg snake} \\
\text{‘I saw this in snake’} \\
\intended: & \text{I saw this snake} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Context: Speaker sees a snake, then realizes it is just a rubber toy.

If obviative-referring nominals share semantic properties with inanimate nominals (i.e. both refer to extentional referents, differing only in their contextuality; §2.4, 3.4), we expect that, in certain situations, obviative constructions will give rise to a ‘mindless’ interpretation. This is exactly
what happens when an obviative referent is not adequately embedded in a discourse. This is easily done in elicitation, where contexts are often too impoverished. For example, when I attempted to construct a canonical reportative context, the speaker rejected it on the grounds that I was making one of the human referents mindless (53).

(53) HUMAN REFERENT MADE ‘MINDLESS’ BY OBVIATION

i. */# Clare \n patég\n Martha\n \n >σ\n. …
*/# Clare ê-kiyokawât Marthawa ê-piponiyik.
Clare ê-kiyok=aw-â –t Martha-a ê- pipon -yi-k
Clare c1=visit=TA -DIR-3 Martha-xt c1-winter-DS-0
Intended: ‘Clare\textsubscript{PROX} went to visit Martha\textsubscript{OBV} during the winter\textsubscript{OBV}. …’

ii. … “σ\n+\n>U\n D\n, ” \n Δ\n+\n >r\n. … “nimyêyihten ôma,” e-twêit osîmsa.
ni-miywêyiht-ê-n aw-ima ê-itwê-yi-t o-sîmis-a
1-like-ti-lp prox-sg C1-say-dep-3 3-young.sis-ovb
… “I’m happy about this,” her\textsubscript{PROX} younger sister\textsubscript{OBV} said.’ (Presented S2)

Comment (Speaker 2): “If we use ‘ê-twêit,’ it would be more like a recording, something coming off of an answering machine. It doesn’t sound like it’s coming from a person. Maybe if it was a big committee.”

Here, the speaker takes the obviation of the referent osîmsa ‘her younger sister’ (‘Martha’ in the context) to mean that the referent is not human or is not speaking as a human. Based on the data we saw in chapter 2 (e.g. §2.4), this is an inanimate interpretation; the referent is only speaking as a mechanical entity produces noise (i.e. ‘mindless speaking’).

Data of this kind, where obviative speakers are rejected based on claims of “mindlessness” is likely an artifact of the elicitation environment. This is confirmed by going back and being more careful in the construction of the context of the utterance (e.g. saying the sentence altogether, in one clean utterance, rather than hesitating between sentences). When this is done, the sentence in (53) is judged perfectly acceptable by both (S2) and (S3). Thus, the ungrammaticality or infelicity was a product of a failure to link the discourse-dependent structures together (i.e. a failure to embed the obviative in the proximate’s perspective; §3.5), not a failure in obviation to co-occur with human referents.
5.6. The consultant as linguist

Many of these elicitation tasks surveyed in this chapter crucially rely on the analytic and linguistic ability of the consultant as well as the linguist. This raises the issue of how much knowledge a consultant should have of the targeted material in an elicitation situation. There are essentially two positions on this that have been taken by linguistic fieldworkers: (i) the “experimentalist” approach, and (ii) the “cooperative” approach. In this section, I consider what the differences are between these approaches, and how those differences affect the kind of fieldwork carried out.

5.6.1. The “experimentalist” position: Consultant as data bank

One view is that the consultant should be as naїve as possible, with absolutely no idea of what the linguist is doing during the elicitation session. This is based on the idea that, were the consultant to understand something about the grammatical targets, it would bias the data. Based on its parallelism to experimental work, I label this model the “experimental” position.

Linguists who take this approach cannot allow for much discussion or reaction during an elicitation session, because they believe it could lead to biases in the data. Likewise, discussion among the linguists present, about what forms should next be considered, cannot be done, since this would undo the principle of keeping the consultant naїve as to what is being targeted. This means that “experimentalist” linguists must rely on careful planning sessions ahead of time.

Since the lists of forms to be obtained are pre-planned, they are usually systematic in their organization. For example, a pre-planned list for a Plains Cree session targeting possession forms may look like (54).

(54) **Elicitation plan for October 18, 2007**

1. minôs
2. niminôs
3. niminôsim
4. kiminôs
5. kiminôsim
6. ominôs
7. ominôsim
8. ominôsimâ
...
These lists are then presented to the consultant one after the other. The consultant’s role is to provide the grammaticality judgment for each form; the consultant is a data bank for the grammaticality of forms.

5.6.2. The “cooperative” position

Another approach to elicitation is to train the consultant in linguistics as far as the consultant desires it. On such a view, the more the consultant understands the context of fieldwork, the better the data they will offer. In line with work on conversational analysis done by Schlegloff and Sacks (e.g. Schlegloff & Sacks 1992), the consultant is taken to have numerous intuitive linguistic analytic abilities which are crucial in understanding the properties of the grammar. The primary goal is to develop a cooperative relationship between the linguist and the consultant (who is a natural, intuitive linguist, and a soon-to-be-trained linguist); I label this the “cooperative” position. Linguists who take this position will often discuss the data with the consultant, explaining what forms are being targeted, what has been puzzling about them up to now, and, as far as the consultant can understand the linguists’ jargon, what the linguist thinks may be happening. Sometimes, this work is done with a consultant who is themselves a fully-trained linguist.

Going into an elicitation situation from this perspective means that the linguist can never be sure what kind of data will become the center of discussion, since it depends on more than their own goals. Thus, making engagement of the consultant in the linguistic analytic process a primary goal means that there is necessarily less ability for the linguist to follow a planned elicitation schedule. Instead, the linguist comes with an idea of what kind of forms they are curious about, perhaps even a detailed plan, and often begins the elicitation session by discussing them with the consultant. However, this plan is always only tentative.

This has the result of producing a relaxed, informal setting. The consultant is as involved in the linguistic work as they want to be, and the conversation is unimpeded, and can take whatever direction it happens to. As fieldwork of this kind progresses, the consultant becomes more and more of a trained linguist, and thus becomes a colleague in the work, instead of a data bank.

Most people are interested in their own language. Anybody that speaks a language has had to consider linguistic issues in considerable detail, and thus not only are most speakers capable of considerable insight about their native language, but are quite happy to talk about it and think about it more. In such a situation, the consultant often “takes their work home,”
thinking about targeted forms when not even in the elicitation setting. This has the significant advantage of engaging the consultant directly in the process of constructing context to support forms.

5.6.3. The two types of fieldwork and obviation data

In this thesis, it has been shown repeatedly that the forms under consideration are highly sensitive to discourse context: (i) the use of animate-marking is sensitive to the knowledge of the Speaker and the contextual ability of the referent to hold a perspective (Chapter 2), (ii) the use of obviative constructions is sensitive to the contextual knowledge of the Speaker about a referent and that referent’s (non)ability to possess a perspective (Chapter 3), and (iii) the construction of referential dependency requires a context in which the dependent referent can be embedded inside the perspective of its antecedent (Chapter 4). Since these two approaches to fieldwork produce significantly different speech contexts, it should be no surprise that they often produce different kinds of data with respect to these constructions. Here, I consider how they effect one of these areas – obviation.

Experimentalist elicitation tactics obtain only obviation patterns that can be produced with reference to extremely local information. Minimally, this means that third-person-possessed forms can reliably be gotten.

(55) **Word-level obviation**

\[\downarrow \text{ominôsima} \]

\( o\text{-}\text{minôs}=\text{im}-\text{a} \)

\( 3\text{-}\text{cat}=\text{DSJ-XT} \)

‘his/her\textsubscript{PROX} cat\textsubscript{OBV}’

Often, speakers can produce and control sentence-level obviation forms.

(56) **Sentence-level obviation**

\[\downarrow \text{iskwêw wâpamêw awâsis.a} \]

\( \text{iskwêw wâp}=\text{am} \quad -\epsilon \quad -\text{w awâsis}-\text{a} \)

\( \text{woman see}=\text{by. eye.TA-DIR-3 child -XT} \)

‘The woman\textsubscript{PROX} saw the child\textsubscript{OBV}.’
However, the more complex discourse-driven forms are often absent, for example, all the multi-clause and logophoric judgments seen in Chapter 3. Crucially, because the linguist has not provided the consultant with any linguistic training, the consultant cannot provide a check on the linguist’s conclusions. The linguist, believing that these forms have been gotten in a proper experimental way, without bias on the part of the consultant, concludes that this is an accurate representation of obviative forms.

In a cooperative approach, conversations like (57) are not uncommon, which happened when I talked to a consultant specifically about obviative forms.

(57) LINGUIST: I’m curious about the funny ‘-a’ that shows up on the end of nouns some times, like in “nâpêw wâpamêw minôsá.”

\[\text{nâpêw wâp=am \ -ê \ -w \ minôs-a} \]

\[\text{man \ see=by.eye.TA-DIR-3 \ cat \ -XT} \]

CONSULTANT: Oh, yes. nâpêw wâpamêw minôsá. Hmm. minôsà. You see, you have to use it that way when it’s in a sentence. It’s because it’s in a sentence.

LINGUIST: But what about if I say “minôs wâpiesksiw”? There’s no –a there, is there?

\[\text{minôs wâpiski=sî \ -w} \]

\[\text{minôs white=STAT-3} \]

CONSULTANT: Yeah, there isn’t. minôs wâpsksiw. Hmm. *pause* It’s because the one before had another noun in it. Otherwise you wouldn’t know who was the one being seen, maybe. nâpêw wâpamêw minôs. No, you still know who’s being seen. Hmm.

LINGUIST: Some linguists have thought it had to do with how the speaker thinks about that character, the one with the -a on it. They call that thing an “obviative marker.” And they say that it’s on there because that character is less important, somehow.

CONSULTANT: Well, yes, the cat is definitely less important than the man in that example, so I see what they’re saying.

LINGUIST: Is it always less important? What about if I say

“aymihêwiniw ê-manskö=mât mântowa”?

\[\text{ayamihêwiyiniw ê- \ mamiskô=m \ -â \ -t \ mânitow-a} \]

\[\text{priest \ c1-talk.about=by.mouth-DIR-3 \ god \ -XT} \]

‘The priest \text{PROX} is talking about God\text{OBV}.’

CONSULTANT: Oh! Hmm.
LINGUIST: Is it better to say it the other way around?

“mântow ê-mamskômôt aymhêwînîwa”?

mânitow ê-mamiskô=m -iko -t aymihêwiyînîw -a
god c1-talk.about=by.mouth-INV-3 priest -XT

‘GodPROX is talked about by the priestOBJ.’

Is that…

CONSULTANT: ✽interrupting✽ Okay. The sentence is good. ãymhêwînîw ê-mamskômât mantowa. But it’s not that the priest is more important than God. It’s just that the priest is talking at the time. He’s just the one you’re hearing about it from.

Thus, by educating the consultant about the form, and the claims that are made about this form, the consultant has produced an insightful judgment about obviation. Some of the most crucial data in this thesis could never have been gotten from an uninformed speaker.

One of the speakers I have learned a great deal from (S4) was completely uninterested in traditional elicitation at all, much less the formal approach of experimentalists. Instead, we13 took a cooperative approach and discussed forms with him. For example, when considering the evidential properties of clauses and obviation, we found a passage in a text that was of interest for the particular forms we were puzzled about (Ahenakew’s telling of her husband’s bear vision), explained that we were looking for, and then went through the text line by line with him, to his great interest. When we were about halfway through it, a conversation ensued in which the spaker produced a crucial set of obviative forms as a paradigm, with an explanation of what they meant and what contexts to use them in.

(58) a. ∇dr  ∆U  <a  <<b⃗.
êkos itwêw ana pawâkan.
êkosi it  =wê-w an  =a pawâkan
thus thus=A1 -3 DST=AN.SG dream.spirit

‘That’s what the dream spirit said’ (Volunteered S4)

b. ∇dr  ∇  ∆U  <a  <<b⃗.
êkos êtwêt ana pawâkan
êkosi ê-  it  =wê-t an  =a pawâkan
thus c1-thus=A1 -3 DST=AN.SG dream.spirit

‘That’s what the dream spiritAN said’ (Volunteered S4)

13 This work was done jointly with Clare Cook.
5.7. Conclusion: Elicitation as performance, not competence

All of the elicitation data, when properly understood, supports the claim that animacy and obviation are context-dependent.

As we have surveyed the kinds of events that occur in elicitation environments, we continually come back to the same conclusion: elicitation is a task. Elicitation is something that consultants and linguists do; it is an action. As an action, it became relevant to ask if it is like other linguistic actions or not. In answer, we have seen repeatedly that elicitation is not like other speech tasks that a consultant does in their use of their language. Thus, elicitation is a task, and elicitation is a new task.

Chomsky (1965:3) has made reference to what he considers a fundamental division in linguistics: performance vs. competence. Performance can be defined as “the production of specific linguistic forms in specific situations,” while competence means “the fluent native speaker’s knowledge of the language” (Radford 1988:3). Competence is thought to underly performance, and is considered the proper realm of linguistic study (cf. Chomsky 1965:3). In studying a particular language, then, a linguist seeks to cut away all of the performance, and expose the the underlying knowledge that a fluent speaker has.

Considered in light of this division, one can conclude that elicitation data is performance data. That is, it reflects the ability of the consultant to perform a certain set of tasks in a context-poor environment. As performance data, its relation to the abstract properties of the language system (“Competence”) are not always immediately obvious.

Since it is performance data, elicitation data can mislead the linguist if it is taken to provide straightforward evidence about competency. Instead, the nature of elicitation tasks must be considered carefully, with awareness that different tasks produce different results. With this approach established, there is no longer bad data, only misunderstood data.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Further Research

6.1. Conclusion: Constructing intentionality in Plains Cree

In this thesis, I have shown that Plains Cree systematically distinguishes between four classes of referents with respect to perspective possession (intentionality):

(i) “INANIMATE”: Referents that never have perspectives (§2).
(ii) “ANIMATE”: Referents that are unspecified for this property (§2).
(iii) “OBLIVIATIVE”: Referents that have no contextual perspective (§3).
(iv) “PROXIMATE”: Referents that have a contextual perspective (§4).

While class (i) and class (ii) are coded by dedicated forms in the language (§2.3), and thus represent primitives of Plains Cree grammar, class (iii) is a constructed category, being built out of forms that code referential dependency (§4). Class (iv) differs from the other three in having no grammatical exponence at all, being built solely from contextual contrast.

In modelling the semantic properties of these classes, I have used the notion of a ‘perspective’ (Kölbel 2002), which situates a proposition as being true with respect to someone’s perspective (§1.3). The possession of a perspective, then, results in what is commonly called “Intentionality.” Plains Cree constructs intentionality from the linguistic forms that code dependency and perspectival embedding, discriminating perspective-holders (Intentional referents) from those not allowed to possess a perspective (Extentional referents).

Returning to the explanation of this system given by language speakers, kā-yóskātahk óma nēhiyawēwin (‘Plains Cree is a soft language’), it is hoped that the current description makes a small step towards understanding how a Plains Cree speaker goes about “making truth happen” for their listener. The question of why a speaker makes truth happen is not mine to answer, belonging instead to the speakers themselves to ask and to answer.

In the following sections, I consider directions for future research in Plains Cree suggested by the current work, and also present approaches to the typology of referential typing in Cree and Athabaskan.
6.2. Approaches to –a via the verbal suffix –i: Plurality and obviation

When the suffix –a restricts an “Animate” referent, it is insensitive to the number of the nominal (1), but when this suffix restricts an “Inanimate” referent, it can only be interpreted as non-singular (2).

(1) “Obviative” –a can be singular or plural

a. √’ ∨’ Γ∩ū’’ ∥σ” ⊠ ∪<.  Ĕ<.√<.
péyak é-miyosi Git anिनापेंग 배
péyak é- miyw=si -yi -t an=īhi nāpēw-a
one c1-good=STAT-DS-3 dst=XT man -XT
‘ThatINAN one manINAN is goodANIM.’ (Presented S2)

(2) “Inanimate” –a can only be plural

a. ∗ √’ ∨’ Γ∩’’ ∥σ” ⊠ ∪<.  Łɔp’<.
∗ péyak é-miywásis anिनापेंग 배
∗ péyak é-miyw=āsi -k-i an =īhi maskisin-a
one c1-good=STAT-0PL DST=XT shoe -XT
Intended: ‘ThatIN AN one shoeIN is niceIN.’ (Presented S2)

b. ∗ √’ ∨’ Γ∩’’ ∥σ” ⊠ ∪<.  Łɔp’<.
níso é-miywásis anिनापेंग 배
níso é-miyw=āsi -k-i an =īhi maskisin-a
two c1-good=STAT-0PL DST=XT shoe -XT
‘ThoseIN OBV two shoesIN are niceIN.’ (Presented S2)

If –a is only one suffix, how does it get these two seemingly different readings?

An approach to answering this question is suggested by surveying the forms of “Inanimate” plural marking in the verb system. The verbal system uses a morpheme both to mark “Inanimate” plurality and subjunctive contexts.
(3) a. “INANIMATE” NON-SINGULAR

\[ \n\begin{align*}
\n\text{They are nice}. \\
\n\end{align*} \]

(Presented S2)

b. HABITUAL PAST$^1$

\[ \n\begin{align*}
\text{And so in the morning, finally, dawn would break, …} \quad \text{(Ahenakew 2000: §1.9)}
\end{align*} \]

c. IRREALIS

\[ \n\begin{align*}
\text{If it/they are nice.'} \\
\end{align*} \]

(Presented S2)

Here, the same suffix -i is affixed in the same place to the same person marking. In the first example (3a), it occurs in a changed conjunct clause (signalled by the prefix ê-, see Wolfart 1973, Cook 2007), and means that there is a non-singularity of referents. In the second case, this marker co-occurs with a different kind of changed-conjunct clause (signalled by the infixation of -iy- in the stem, see Wolfart 1973, Cook 2007), and denotes a habitual set of events (Cook p.c.). In the third case (3c), it occurs with a simple conjunct clause (signalled by the absence of clausetyping prefixes, see Wolfart 1973, Cook 2007), and means that the clause is irrealis (i.e. that it denotes an event that has not happened).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLAUSE TYPE</th>
<th>MEANING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changed ê-</td>
<td>Non-Singular Referent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed -iy-</td>
<td>Habitual Realis Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple</td>
<td>Irrealis Event</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1. A Summary of the occurrences of -i

$^1$ The use of text data here is because I have been unable to elicit internal change from any consultants. Speakers have control of it in natural speech, but it disappears in elicitation (cf. Blain 1997).
That is, the verbal system uses a syntactically and phonologically identical morpheme to mark non-singular referents, habitual realis events, and irrealis events.

6.2.2. The “plural” reading

In the case of non-singular reference, it is easy enough to see that the morpheme \(-i\) is responsible for the addition of a plural-type interpretation. Consider the pair in (4).

(4) a. NO \(-i\) = “SINGULAR”

\[
\begin{align*}
\& \ \hat{\nu} \Gamma + \langle r^p \rangle \\
\& \ \hat{\nu} \text{-miywásik} \\
\& \ \hat{\nu} \text{-miyw}=\hat{\nu} \text{si} \ -k \\
\& \ cI \text{-good}=\text{STAT-0} \\
\& \ \text{‘It} \text{IN is nice.’} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(Presented S2)

b. \(-i\) = “PLURAL”

\[
\begin{align*}
\& \ \hat{\nu} \ \Gamma + \langle r^p \rangle \\
\& \ \hat{\nu} \text{-miywásiki} \\
\& \ \hat{\nu} \text{-miyw}=\hat{\nu} \text{si} \ -k-i \\
\& \ cI \text{-good}=\text{STAT-0-PL} \\
\& \ \text{‘They} \text{IN are nice.’} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(Presented S2)

Here, the first example lacks \(-i\), and receives an interpretation of a singular referent. The second example has changed only by adding \(-i\), and now has an interpretation of relating to more than one referent.

6.2.2. The habitual reading

With the internal-change form of clauses, the use of the subjunctive appears to denote past habitual contexts. For example, in the example in (3b), both the clause itself and all the surrounding clauses are marked with \(mána\), which denotes a habitual event (cf. 5).

(5) \(mána\) = “HABITUAL”

\[
\begin{align*}
\sigma b^\circ \ \text{Lo}.. \\
\text{nikamow} \ \text{mána.} \\
\text{nikamo-w mána} \\
\text{sing} \ -3 \text{usual} \\
\text{‘S/he usually sings.’} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(Presented to S2)
The context for (3b) is a story about Alice Ahenakew’s childhood. In this story, which runs for a page of text, this particle mâna occurs on almost every clause (27 out of 36). To further cement the habitual properties of this clause, a speaker that has overt control of internal change (S4) explicitly responded that it gives a habitual interpretation to the clause it is applied to. This comment was gotten by finding an example of internal change in a text and asking the speaker to comment on it.

(6) \( \nabla dC \rightarrow L \rho \rightarrow \nabla \rho \Delta d \nabla x < \nabla \rho +. \)
Ákota ôma kiyê-ohcihikoyahk askiy--askiy.
Ákota aw =ima iy-ka-ohcih-ikw-yahk askiy
there PRX=im.sg IC-FUT-fight-INV -21pl land
‘It will be then that they fight us over the land.’ (Ká-pimwêwêhahk 1998:§7.7)

Here, the speaker (S4) said that the sentence meant that the referents will come to fight over and over again. Importantly, this example lacks the suffix -i, and denotes a future event. Thus, with changed conjunct clauses, it seems that -i is only used in past realis contexts.

A habitual event is easily defined as an event that has happened more than once. That is, a habitual event is a non-singularity of events. When Alice Ahenakew uses the habitual construction in (3b), then, she is referring to a non-singularity of past events; it was morning more than once during the events she was discussing. Thus, the morpheme -i can here be said to denote a non-singularity of realis events, rather than a non-singularity of referents.

6.2.3. The irrealis reading

The third context of use for the suffix -i is in simple conjunct clauses. Simple conjunct always has an irrealis interpretation (Wolfart 1973, Cook 2007). The simple conjunct itself is exceedingly rare in connected speech and unattainable in elicitation (Wolfart 1973, Cook 2007). Most often, it occurs with the addition of the suffix -i. This suffix can be affixed to any kind of person agreement, and thus is clearly not marking some kind of “INANIMATE” referent.

(7) -i is insensitive to Animacy

a. ñ-b-j"p...
nikamoyâhki...
nikamo-yâhk-i
sing -1PL-SBJ
‘If/when we sing…’ (Presented to S2)
b. σ- b J˘ ᓂ...  
nikamoci...  
nikam-o-t-i  
sing -3-SBJ  
‘If/when s/he AN sings…’  
(Presented to S2)

c. φ< <d> nφ...  
kimiwahki  
kimiwan-k-i  
rain -0-SBJ  
‘If/when it IN rains…’  
(Presented to S2)

When -i affixes to this kind of clause, it consistently induces an irrealis interpretation. For example, this kind of clause is required with dependent temporal clauses modifying future events (8).

(8)  DEPENDENT TEMPORAL CLAUSE IN FUTURE CONTEXT REQUIRES ka–

σ- b  Δ˘< ∆ SPECIAL TENSE b  d˘ σ- I  Ṗ  Ṗ.  
nika-tohtân atawêwikamikohk nîso-kîsikâkî.  
ni-ka- itohtân atawê=w=kamikw-ihk nîsw-kîsikâ-k-i  
l- FUT-itohtâ-n buy =3=place -loc two- be.day-0-SBJ  
‘I will go to the store on Tuesday.’  
(Presented to S2)

The event denoted by the verb has not happened, but may happen in the future, under certain conditions. In (9), the Speaker is saying that, should Tuesday come, they will go to the store. The Speaker’s going is dependent on Tuesday’s arrival. For all possible contexts in which Tuesday arrives, the Speaker will go to the store. Thus, the addition of -i always induces a conditional sense; “If or when Tuesday happens, I will to the store.”

This kind of irrealis, then, has to do with a multiplicity of potential contexts. There are many routes the world could take before Tuesday gets here, and the Speaker does not know which one will happen. It could snow all week, or there could be a war, or the Speaker could break her leg painting the house. It is even possible that next Tuesday never comes at all – the world could end before then, or the Speaker could die. Thus, this kind of irrealis has to do with a non-singular event. There are, in a very fundamental way, many Tuesdays that could happen.

6.2.4. Conclusion

Thus we see that Plains Cree exploits a single morpheme to code both non-singularities of referents and non-singularities of events in its verbal domain. This correlation between referential non-singularity and eventive non-singularity should not be surprising to any linguist.
that looks at irrealis constructions in natural language (i.e. averidicality; Farkas (1992), Giannakidou (1999)). For example, Kratzer (1981) models parts of the modality system of German and English by building on the “possible worlds” analysis of the subjunctive to refer to pluralities of possible events. Based on entirely independent criteria in unrelated languages, Emmon Bach (1986) has concluded that it is necessary to bring the descriptive and theoretical tools of nominal plurality into the discussion of verbal event semantics.

Returning to our original concern, the picture developed for the obviative/”Inanimate” parallel no longer looks so exotic. If we conceive of habitual and irrealis contexts as ones that introduce eventive plurality, then the recruitment of plural coding to express this is expected. In the nominal domain, the obviative form codes a referent whose intention is unknown (i.e. averidical; Giannakidou 1998), which suggests an analysis in which the suffix –a codes either a plurality of referents or a plurality of perspectives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Plurality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Inanimate” Nominal</td>
<td>Referent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“ANIMATE” Nominal</td>
<td>Perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>É- or KÀ-CLAUSE</td>
<td>Referent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC-CLAUSE</td>
<td>Realis Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARE CLAUSE</td>
<td>Irrealis Event</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2. A summary of contexts for plurality

In the cases of the subjunctive and obviative, the non-singular quantification is being used to denote Speaker non-knowledge (averidicality). That is, the addition of -i to irrealis clauses denotes a multiplicity of potential events, while the addition of -a to nominals denotes a multiplicity of potential perspectives.

6.3. –yi– across Cree

Plains Cree is the westernmost member of a group of languages or dialects that form an unbroken chain across Canada. While all of these languages possess forms that are straightforwardly related, the organization of these forms varies significantly. All of these languages possess forms related to those considered in this thesis. However, these formal parallels should not be taken to indicate functional parallels. As Cook (2004) has shown for Athabaskan, several languages may possess forms that are obviously related without those forms sharing much in functional properties. This means that it is not automatic that the properties of the Plains Cree system would be mirrored in every other Cree language. In this section, I begin
to sketch out the parallels and differences for one morpheme: the disjoint subject marker –yi–. I focus on three other Cree languages: (i) Moose Cree (around James Bay), (ii) Montagnais (Québec), and (iii) Innu-Aimun (Labrador). Together with Plains Cree, these make up a sample of the Cree spoken in all of the four quadrants of its range.

6.3.1. All Cree languages have a reflex of –yi–

Plains Cree is categorized as one of the ‘y’ languages in the Cree group; this is because systematically has [y] where other Cree languages have other segments. Relevant to the current discussion, the morpheme –yi– translates into other Cree languages as –li–, or –ni– depending on the language. It appears that all Cree languages have a form of the Plains Cree suffix –yi–.

6.3.2. –yi– occurs with “obviative” possessors

This suffix occurs with obviative possessors an all four languages (1-4).

(9)  PLAINS CREE

\[\text{otêmiyiwa} \]
\[o-têm -yi-w-a\]
\[3\text{-horse-DS-3-XT}\]
\[\text{‘his/her}_{\text{OBV}} \text{horse}_{\text{OBV}.}\]

(Presented S2)

(10)  MOOSE CREE

\[\text{nâsic nahêlimi}liwa \text{otânisa ocawâšimišîw.}\]
\[nâsic nah=êlim -iko-li -w-a o-tânis -a o-cawâšimiš-li-w-a\]
\[\text{very fond=by.mind.TA-INV-DS-3-XT 3-daughter-XT 3-child -DS-3-XT}\]
\[\text{‘Her}_{\text{PROX}} \text{daughter’s}_{\text{OBV}} \text{children are very fond of her}_{\text{OBV}.}\]

(Ellis 2000:332)

(11)  MONTAGNAIS

\[\text{pon ọkosmwa}\]
\[\text{pon o-}k̑s-w-a\]
\[\text{Paul 3-son-DS-3-XT}\]
\[\text{‘Paul’s}_{\text{OBV}} \text{son}_{\text{OBV}}’\]

(Martin 1991:80)
(12) **INNU-AIMUN**

Tshi-tshissenimâuâ Mânî tshekuân kuet aimiât Pûna utshimâmînua?

\[ Tshi-tshiss=enim \quad -u-á \quad Mânî tshekuân kuet aimi-á-t \]

\[ Pûn-a \quad u-ishimâ=m-in-u-a \]

\[ Paul-xt \quad 3-chief=DSJ-DS-3-XT \]

‘Do you know why Marie\textsubscript{PROX} called Paul’s\textsubscript{OBJ} boss\textsubscript{OBJ}?’ (Branigan & MacKenzie 2002)

6.3.3. –yi– occurs with intransitive subjects

The suffix also occurs with the subject of intransitive verbs in all four languages.

(13) **PLAINS CREE**

\[ s-b-ł=ç' \]

nikamoyiwa.

\[ nikam-o-yi-w-a \]

\[ sing=DS-3-XT \]

‘s/he\textsubscript{OBJ} sings.’

(Presented S2)

(14) **MOOSE CREE**

\[ ʊb<çʃʃç-ç' \]

vakawâšibilidadiwa
cakawâšiliwa

\[ cakawâšíš-li \quad -w-a \]

\[ be.few=DS-3-XT \]

‘They\textsubscript{OBJ} are few.’

(Ellis 2002:328)

(15) **MONTAGNAIS**

\[ apətəhmwa \]

\[ apətəh-ni \quad -w-a \]

\[ useful=DS-3-XT \]

‘S/he\textsubscript{OBJ} is useful.’

(Martin 2000:88)

(16) **INNU-AIMUN**

...ekue kutapanîuniti.

\[ ...ekue kutapanii \quad -ni \quad -i. \]

\[ ...and \quad go.underwater=DS-3-SBJ \]

‘...and it\textsubscript{OBJ} went underwater.’

(Hasler 2000:99)

6.3.4. –yi– occurs with transitive subjects

Finally, the suffix occurs with the subject of transitive verbs in all four languages.
(17) Plains Cree

a. ...<dL<…‘
…ê-wâpamâyit.
ê-wâp=am -â -yi -t
c1-see=by.eye.TA-DIR-DS-3
‘…s/hePROX sees him/herOBJ.’ (Presented S1)

b. ...<dC<…‘
ê-wâpahtamiyit
ê-wâp=aht -am-yi -t
c1-see=by.eye.TI-TI -DS-3
‘…s/heOBJ sees itIN.’ (Presented S1)

(18) Moose Cree

a. a."\n\n\ncnahêlimiko li wa
nah =êlim -iko-li -w-a
fond=by.mind.TA-INV-DS-3-XT
‘s/heOBJ children is very fond of him/herOBJ.’ (Ellis 2000:332)

b. a."\n\n\ncnatawêlihtami li wa
nataw=êliht -am-li -w-a
want =by.mind.TI-TI-DS-3-XT
‘s/heOBJ wants itIN.’ (Ellis 2000:332)

(19) Montagnais

a. wapamikonwa
wap=am -ikw-n -w-a
see=by.eye.TA-INV-DS-3-XT
‘s/he is seen by him/her.’ (Martin 2000:95)

b. wapatammwa
wapat=am n-w-a
see -TI -DS-3-XT
‘s/heOBJ sees itIN.’ (Martin 1991:79)

(20) Innu-Aimun

a. Nânâtuâkamenua mishtikua.
nânâtuâkam -e -ni-u-a mishtkw -a
break.in.two.dup -DIR-DS-3-XT tree -XT
‘TheyOBJ were chewing down treesOBJ.’ (Hasler 2002:133)
b. …tuâshkunamuenîshapanî.
   tuâshku -am-u-ênî-shapanî
   knock down sticks -TI -3-DS -EVID
   …he_{OBV} must have taken away too many sticks_{IN}.  
   (Hasler 2002:140)

6.3.5. \(-yi\) is insensitive to animacy

It is insensitive to animacy in all the languages, occurring equally well with both animate and inanimate arguments.

(21) Plains Cree

   ...\(\n\n\) \(\n\)
   ...\(\)\(\)\(\)
   \(\)
   é-kïsikâyik.
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The use of \(--\text{-yi}\) on non-possessed nominals in these other Cree languages could suggest that these languages use it to code disjunction from other Referring-expressions (i.e. nominals) in the clause, rather than the argument of some preceding predicate (see Saxon 1986 for the Athabaskan language Dogrib, §6.3 below). If this is the case, it would mean that the disjunction properties of \(--\text{-yi}\) in these languages are A (argument) disjunction rather than A' (adjunct). This means that these other Cree languages would show behaviour more like Navajo and other Athabaskan languages (see. §6.3 below).

Related to this difference in distribution of the affix is a difference in the distribution of the clause types. In Plains Cree, the independent order of clausal morphology is highly restricted (cf. Wolfart 1973, Cook 2007, 2008), occurring only rarely in developed discourse. What is striking, from a Plains Cree perspective, when looking at some of the other Cree languages is their heavy use of independent-order clauses. Consider the following passage from Swampy Cree.
Here, the Speaker has strung together multiple independent-order verbs in a row. Further, the second clause contains an independent-order verb marked with –yi– (–ni–), a situation that is highly uncommon in Plains Cree. In comparison to Plains Cree, then, some Cree languages appear to make much more use of independent order clauses in general and independent order clauses marked with –yi– in specific. The differences in clausal architecture, then, could be forcing differences in the domain of dependency for –yi–. In systems where the independent order is highly specialized to the text-level of discourse (i.e. Plains Cree; Cook 2008), –yi– will either be highly restricted (if it codes a cross-predicate dependency: Plains Cree) or be allowed to code a clause-internal dependency (perhaps Innu-Aimun?). If the independent order is less specialized, and occurs in broader discourse contexts than just text-level (perhaps Swampy Cree?), then the suffix –yi– can be manipulated to either code cross-predicate (A') or clause-internal (A) dependencies. Further research is needed to see if these speculations are borne out.

6.4. A comparison of the Plains Cree system to Athabaskan


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Navajo</th>
<th>Dogrib</th>
<th>Dene Suliné</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>shi-</td>
<td>se-</td>
<td>se-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ni-</td>
<td>ne-</td>
<td>ne-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3’</td>
<td>bi-</td>
<td>we-</td>
<td>be-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3’’</td>
<td>yi-</td>
<td>ye-</td>
<td>ye-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3. Navajo, Dogrib and Dene Suliné pronominal affixes
When we compare the functions of these prefixes to the Plains Cree system described in this thesis, some striking resemblances emerge. For example, the alternation between yi- and bi-corrrelates with a change in the argument structure of the verb (cf. Hale 1973), as in (30), and sometimes yields passive English translations (cf. Reichard 1951).

(30)  “PASSIVE” TRANSLATION OF BI- IN NAVAJO

a. 'ashkii at’ééd yiïltsá
   boy    girl 3-3.Pf.see
   ‘The boy saw the girl.’

b. at’ééd 'ashkii biïltsá
   girl    boy 3-3.Pf.see
   ‘The girl was seen by the boy.’

(31) “PASSIVE” TRANSLATION OF –ikw IN PLAINS CREE

a. …▽◁<L’ ∂∩r^n ∆^q-◁.
   …ê-wâp=am -â -t nápê=sis iskwê =sis -a
   c1-see =by.eye.TA-DIR-3 man=DIM woman=DIM-XT
   ‘…the boy PROX saw the girl.’

b. …▽◁<R’d’ ∂∩r^n ∆^q-◁.
   …ê-wâpamikot nápêsis iskwêsis.
   ê- wâp=am -ikw -t nápê=sis iskwê =sis -a
   c1-see =by.eye.TA-DIR-3 man=DIM woman=DIM-XT
   ‘…the boy PROX was seen by the girl.’

Further, the prefix yi- occurs when the predicate’s argument is distinct from some other third person (cf. Saxon 1986).

(32) DISJOINT REFERENCE OF ye- IN DOGRIB

Patrick ye₃mǿ tsʾąhtla.³
   DA.mother 3.PF.visit
   ‘Patrick visited her (someone else’s) mother.’

---

² Glossing is that of Horseherder (1998). ‘PF’ = ‘Perfect’
³ The glosses are Saxon’s (1986). ‘DA’ stands for ‘disjoint anaphor.’ ‘PF’ stands for ‘perfective.’
This bears a strong functional resemblance to the Plains Cree suffix –yi– (§3.3.4, §4.3.2). These resemblances mean that a consideration of the parallels between the systems would be useful.

When we compare these systems in detail, a number of generalizations emerge. We see the following similarities:

(i) Both Athabaskan yi– and Plains Cree –yi– code disjunction in the third-person system.
(ii) Both Athabaskan yi– and Plains Cree –ikw are used in transitive contexts.
(iii) Both Athabaskan yi– and Plains Cree –yi– are used in the third person system.
(iv) All forms are sensitive to animacy distinctions.

We see the following differences:

(i) The Athabaskan system is pronominal but the Plains Cree system is not.
(ii) Plains Cree –ikw does not code disjunction but Athabaskan yi– does.
(iii) Plains Cree –yi– is insensitive to transitivity but Athabaskan yi– is.
(iv) Ordering relations in Plains Cree are between predicates but Athabaskan appears to be sensitive to argument ordering.
(v) Plains Cree is strictly sensitive to A’ (adjunct) dependencies while Athabaskan is either mixed or A (argument) oriented.
(vi) Plains Cree –ikw is insensitive to person while Athabaskan yi– is.

These generalizations are summarized in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Disjunction</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Transitivity</td>
<td>1-ARG</td>
<td>2-ARG</td>
<td>2-ARG</td>
<td>2-ARG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td>A’</td>
<td>A’ &amp; A’</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4. Comparing Plains Cree –ikw and –yi– to Athabaskan yi–

From this comparison, we see that the two systems distribute the work differently, but appear to reach similar results. Both systems appear to build structures in which third persons are disambiguated via disjunction and subordination, but the means to these ends are different.

This use of third person dependencies and subordination means that, if the picture of referential dependency developed in this thesis holds across languages, the reference system of Athabaskan should be tracking ex/intentionality. Based on the discussion of Horsherder (1998) for Navajo, there is suggestive evidence that this is in fact the case; Horsherder (1998:18) argues that one of the primary semantic properties of the yi–/bi– alternation is agentivity or control. In considering this alternation in Navajo, Horsherder argues that the choice has to do
with whether or not the subject is conceived of as agentive. Something that is conceived of as agentive is something that is capable of having intentions – the referent must be capable of having mental states in order to act towards achieving some end. However, this association of yi-/bi- with agenttivity leads to some familiar paradoxes – lightning and rain are agentive, because they have movement, Horseherder concludes. If this argument is turned on its head, in parallel to the animate argument made in Chapter 2 (§2.1), then the yi-/bi- alternation could be understood as coding non-agentivity.

6.4.1. Athabaskan yi-/bi- are pronominals, Plains Cree’s are not

The set of prefix alternations in Athabaskan languages are typically described as pronominal in nature (cf. Saxon 1986, Sandoval & Jelinek 1989, Horseherder 1998, Cook 2004, etc.). For example, consider the forms in (33) from Navajo.

(33) NAVAJO yi- and bi-

a. 'ashkii at’édé yi yiiltsá
   boy    girl     3-3.Pf.see
   ‘The boy saw the girl.’

b. at’édé 'ashkii biiltsá
   girl     boy     3-3.Pf.see
   ‘The girl saw the boy.’ (Horseherder 1989:12)

Here, the prefixes bi- and yi- occupy the pronominal position on the verb.

By contrast, the relevant components of Plains Cree’s grammar are clearly not pronominal in nature. Both –yi- and –ikw stack with pronominal prefixes (34).

(34) CO-OCCURRENCE OF PC –yi– AND –ikw WITH PRONOMINALS

a. …\( \sigma\)b.\( \Delta\)’
   …é-nikamoyit
   é-nikamo-\( yi \) -t
   c1-sing   -\( ds \)-3
   ‘…s/he\( obv \) sings.’ (Presented S2)

b. …\( \sigma\) ’\( p”\)d’.
   …é-sêkihihkot.
   é-sêk    =ih    -\( ikw \)-t
   c1-scare=by.neut-\( inv \)-3
   ‘…s/he\( obv \) scared him/her\( prox \).’ (Presented S2)
Further, the two forms both are required to co-occur with pronominal marking.

(35)  **PC –yi– AND –ikw MUST HAVE PRONOMINAL MARKING**

a.  * ∇  σ-b-ɋ*
   * ē-nikamoyi
   ē-  nikamo-Ɋyi
   c1-sing  -DS
   ‘…’  

(Presented S2)

b.  * ∇  \ r^nA\d
   * ē-sêkihiko
   ē-sêk  =ih  -ikw
   c1-scare=by.neut-INV
   ‘…’  

(Presented S2)

Likewise, both forms are not sufficiently specified for person distinctions; they both can occur with either animate or inanimate referents.

(36)  **–yi– IS INSENSITIVE TO ANIMACY**

a.  …∇  r^e\r^r^r^r.
    …ē-kinosiyit.
    ē-  kinw=si  -yi -t
    c1-long=STAT-DS-3
    ‘…s/he\OBV is tall.’

(Presented S2)

b.  …∇  r^e^z^r^r.
    …ē-kinwâyik.
    ē-  kinw=â  -yi -k
    c1-long=STAT-DS-0
    ‘…it\IN is tall.’

(Presented S2)

(37)  **–ikw IS INSENSITIVE TO ANIMACY**

a.  …\ r^nA\r.
    …sêkihik.
    sêk  =ih  -ikw
    scare=by.neut-INV
    ‘s/he\PROX was scared by him/her\OBV.’

(Presented S2)

b.  …\ r^nA\d^0.
    …sêkihikow.
    sêk  =ih  -ikw-w
    scare=by.neut-INV-0
    ‘s/he\PROX was scared by it\IN.’

(Presented S2)
While the suffix –yi– is restricted to third persons, the inverse –ikw is not.

\[(38) \quad -ikw \text{ OCCURS WITH SPEECH ACT PARTICIPANTS} \]

\[
\sigma \mathrel{<} \mathrel{<} \Gamma \\
niwâpamik \\
i-\text{wâp=am} \quad -ikw \\
i- \text{see} =\text{by.eye.TA-INV} \\
\text{‘s/he saw me.’} \quad \text{(Presented S2)}
\]

From this data, it is necessary to conclude that the Plains Cree system uses non-pronominal structures to code these referential distinctions. Instead, the affixes used appear to be argument-structure related – a generalization that makes sense when we consider the argument-structure independent nature of most pronominal forms in Plains Cree (cf. Déchaine & Reinholtz 2008, etc.).

\subsection*{6.4.2. Plains Cree –yi– and Athabaskan yi- code disjoint reference}

As I argued in Chapter 3 (§3.3.5), the suffix –yi– in Plains Cree has already been argued to encode disjunction; the subject of the predicate is disjoint from some previous 3rd person referent.

\[(39) \quad \text{PRESENCE/ABSENCE OF –yi– CODES CO/DISJOINT REFERENCE} \]

\[\text{a. } \nâpêw \text{ê-wâpamât iskwêwa ë-nikamot.} \]
\[\text{nâpêw ê- wâp=am } -â -t \text{ iskwêw-a ë-nikamot-t} \]
\[\text{man } c1-\text{see}=\text{by.eye.TA-DIR-3 woman-XT C1-sing } -3 \]
\[\text{‘The man}_\text{PROX saw the woman}_\text{OBV when he}_\text{PROX was singing.’} \quad \text{(Presented S2)}
\]

\[\text{b. } \nâpêw \text{ê-wâpamât iskwêwa ë-nikamoyit.} \]
\[\text{nâpêw ê- wâp=am } -â -t \text{ iskwêw-a ë-nikamoyit-yi-t} \]
\[\text{man } c1-\text{see}=\text{by.eye.TA-DIR-3 woman-XT C1-sing } -\text{DS-3} \]
\[\text{‘The man}_\text{PROX saw the woman}_\text{OBV when she}_\text{OBV was singing.’} \quad \text{(Presented S2)}
\]

Here, the presence/absence of –yi– on the predicate nikamo- ‘sing’ tells us who is singing; if it is absent, the singer is the same referent that was the previous proximate referent. If it is absent, it is not this referent - it is the woman, or someone else. This also works with possessed nominals, as the pair of examples in (40) demonstrate.
Presenee/Absence of –yi– signals co/disjoint referent on nominals

a. ā.V°  ċ<˂L°  Δ^q.L  D^U^g.L
nâpêw wâpamêw iskwêwa otêmiyiwa

nâpêw wâp=am -ê -w iskwêw-a o-têm -yi-w-a
man see =by.eye.TA-DIR-3 woman-XT 3-horse-DS-3-XT
‘The manPROX saw the woman’SOBY horseOBV.’ (Presented S2)

b. ā.V°  ċ<˂G°  Δ^q.L  D^L^a^p.L  ŋó°
nâpêw wâpahtam iskwêwa omaskisiniyiw

nâpêw wâp=aht -am iskwêw-a o-maskisin-yi-w
man see =by.eye.TI-TI woman-XT 3-shoe IN 3-DS
‘The manPROX saw the woman’SOBY shoeIN.’ (Presented S2)

Here, the possessed form that carries –yi– cannot be interpreted as the horse or shoe of the man – it must be someone else’s.

The Athabascan prefix yi- has also been analyzed as disjoint reference (cf. Saxon 1986). When this prefix is added to a possessed nominal, it codes that the possessor is not the verb’s subject.

(41) Dogrib ye- codes disjoint possessor

Patrick yem₃ ts’ahtla.⁴
DA.mother 3.PF.visit
‘Patrick visited her (someone else’s) mother.’ (Saxon 1986:103)

Likewise, when a third person object is acted on by a third person subject, yi- is used to code that the object is disjoint from the subject.

(42) Dogrib ye- codes disjoint object

Patrick yet’s’ahtla
DA.3.PF.visit
‘Patrick visited her.’ (Saxon 1986:108)

This analysis of disjunction has been extended to many other Athabaskan languages as well (cf. Horsherder 1998 for Navajo, Cook 2004 for Déné Sųliné).

⁴ The glosses are Saxon’s (1986). ‘DA’ stands for ‘disjoint anaphor.’ ‘PF’ stands for ‘perfective.’
6.4.3. Plains Cree –yi– and Athabascan yi- differ in transitivity

The suffix –yi– in Plains Cree is entirely insensitive to the transitivity of the predicate it attaches to. It can occur equally well with single-argument predicates (43a) or two-argument predicates (43b).

(43) –yi– IS INSENSITIVE TO TRANSITIVITY

a. …▽ σ-b-Jh'.
   …ê-nikamoyit.
   ê-nikamo-yi -t
   c1-sing -DS-3
   ‘…s/he_{OBV} sings.’ (Presented S2)

b. …<i><Lj>'.
   …ê-wâpamâmâyit.
   ê-wâp=am -â -yi -t
   c1-see=by.eye.TA-DIR-DS-3
   ‘…s/he_{PROX} sees him/her_{OBV}.’ (Presented S1)

c. …<i><Gj>'.
   …ê-wâpamikoyit.
   ê-wâp=am -ikw-yi-t
   c1-see=by.eye.TA-INV-DS-3
   ‘…s/he_{OBV} sees him/her_{OBV}.’ (Presented S1)

Since this suffix codes disjoint subject properties (cf. §3.3.5), this insensitivity to transitivity makes sense – both one and two-argument predicates have a subject.

By contrast, the Athabascan prefix yi- codes objects, possessors, and preposition-like elements (cf. Saxon 1986, Horseherder 1998, etc.). Consider the following examples from Navajo.

(44) a. POSSESSED NOMINAL

yimá
3.mother
his/her mother’

b. VERB OBJECT

…yitzal.
3-3.kicked
‘…he kicked him.’
c. **Preposition**

...yi...
3. with
‘...with him...’

(Horseherder 1998)

Here, *yi-* can be associated with an object (15a), a possessor (15b), and preposition (15c), but not with a subject (Saxon 1986, Horseherder 1989, Cook 2004).

Considered from a Plains Cree perspective, the morphosyntactic parallel between objects of transitive verbs and possessors in Athabascan is striking. In Plains Cree, there is a systematic correspondence between possession and transitive verbs; possessors behave exactly like verbal subjects. Athabascan, on the other hand, appears to treat objects and possessors in parallel; non-subject possessors are like non-subject objects (cf. Saxon 1986, Horseherder 1998).

It is possible that this difference relates to the different positions of possessed nominals within clause structure. In Plains Cree, we have seen that possessed nominals are equivalent to verbs in terms of their ability to trigger dependency-marking, and not like other nominals (e.g. *–yi–* and *–ikw* : §4.3.2, §4.4.22). This suggests that their syntactic relations to the verb are like that of another verb, rather than a nominal. Thus, a chain of a possessed nominal and a verb is more like a serial verb or clause chain construction. If, in Athabaskan, the possessed nominal is dependent on the verb's argument structure (e.g. *yi-* marks that the possessor is not the subject of the verb), then the nominal is dependent on the verb. Plains Cree, then, can use possessed nominals to drive verbal morphosyntax, whereas Athabascan uses verbs to drive possessed nominal morphosyntax.

### 6.4.4. A and A' dependencies

In Plains Cree, I have argued that the suffix *–yi–* looks beyond the clause for their dependency relation. In Chapter 4 (§4.2.2), I argued that the disjoint subject marker *–yi-* depended for its reference on some preceding predicate.
Crucially, -yi- is not used to mark disjunction from other arguments of the same predicate. Thus, forms like (46), where the subject is disjoint from the third person object, do not use –yi–.

(46) **Disjoint Object ≠ –yi–**

...<d’> ‘d’.
...ê-wâpamikot.
ê- wâp=am  -ikw-t
cl-see=by.eye.TA-INV-DS-3
‘…s/he sees him/her.’  

(Presented S1)

This means that –yi– does not code argument (A) disjunction, but rather codes disjunction from some non-argument which is gotten from previous structure (i.e. A’; Ross 1967).

Likewise, in Chapter 4 (§4.4.22), I argued that the inverse suffix –ikw depended on the content of the Topic op position – in the spec of CP.

(47) 

This is, again, a classic case of an adjunct (non-argument; A’) (cf. Ross 1967).

Turning to Athabaskan, the A/A' properties appear to vary, but all systems minimally appear to have A dependencies. Horseherder (1998) considers the A/A' properties of yi-. She
argues that yi- in Navajo has two requirements: (i) it must be disjoint from the subject of the verb, and (ii) it must be co-referent with an A' antecedent. Consider the pair of sentences in (48).

(48) a. yi– is disjoint from Subject

    haayit’eego  Frank Joe yiika’elwod ...
    Q.in.what.way Frank Joe 3.for/after.run
    ‘How did Frank help Joe?’

b. yi– is co-referent with previous referent

    … yi-lii’ yaa yizloh
    … yi-horse 3.for 3-3.Pf.rope
    ‘… he roped his horse for him’  (Horseherder 1998:29)

Here, Horseherder argues that the use of yi- in the second sentence is well-formed because the possessor and object of the verb are disjoint from the subject of the verb (an A dependency) and co-referent with a preceding referent (a topic, A’ dependency). Horseherder (1998) then suggests that Dogrib lacks this A’ dependency, but it appears that the data is not conclusive (cf. Horseherder 1998:52).

Summarizing, Plains Cree is coding disjunction from an A’ (Adjunct) position, while Athabaskan is coding disjunction from an A (Argument) position, but co-reference with an A’ position. This difference likely has wide scale repercussions for the organization of the two systems’ syntax.
**Glossary**

**Animate (AN):** One of the two grammatical classes of nominals in Algonquian languages. Shown by the form of demonstratives, plural suffixes, and verbal agreement. In this thesis, it is argued that nominals treated in this way refer to discourse referents that have no specified inherent or contextual intentional properties.

**Change (C1, C2, IC):** A process that affects the phonological shape of an Algonquian verb structure, signalling one of several kinds of clausal dependencies. This change consists most often in vowel alterations (similar in process to Germanic Ablaut). In Plains Cree, change is shown in two places: preverbs (where the first vowel of the preverb is typically altered, e.g. *kî- ~ kâ-, wi- ~ wâ-*, or, if there is no preverb, the change occurs by itself, as a single vowel; *ê-*), or the verb stem (where change is shown by the alteration of the first syllable of the verb stem; e.g. *wâpam- ~ wiya~pam-*). Change is always limited to the **Conjunct** form of the verb. A **Conjunct** form lacking change is referred to as **Simple Conjunct**.

**Conjunct (Conj):** One of the two paradigms (orders) of verbal inflection found in most Algonquian languages (except Blackfoot). Characterized by suffixation of person marking. This paradigm is thought to be the older verb form (Goddard 1967).

**Cross-reference:** A relation between a noun and a verb signalled by marking on one or both members. Similar to the syntactic notion of ‘agreement,’ but making no specific structural claims. (see Bloomfield 1962)

**Different Subject (DS):** A suffix, taking the shape -*yî-*, that occurs on predicates when the subject of the predicate is disjoint from some previous subject. This previous subject must either linearly precede or c-command the predicate. Discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
**DIMINUTIVE** (DIM) : This is a suffix, -si(s), that occurs on both nouns and verbs and codes a reduction in degree. It can change the denotation of nominal predicates, as well (e.g. dog → puppy vs. dog → small dog).

**DISJOINT ARGUMENT** (DSJ): A suffix, taking the shape -im-, that affixes to stems. It codes that the argument it is related to is disjoint from some other referent. In the case of transitive verb forms, it codes that the verb’s object is disjoint from another referent. When affixed to transitive predicates, it codes that the predicate’s subject is not the object (i.e. it adds an argument). Discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.

**DISTAL** (DST) : Using the root an-, this is one of two spatial categories coded by demonstratives. It codes that the referent is far away from the Speaker, but also codes complex discourse properties that are not fully understood. It is often used as a substitute for English definiteness with apparently no spatial deictic meaning.

**DIRECT** (DIR): One of the THEME SIGNS used to signify that the agent-patient relation follows the pattern established in the previous discourse context. The name comes from a notion of DIRECTION.

**DIRECTION**: A reference to one of two models set up to describe the occurrence of different theme signs on Algonquian TRANSITIVE verbs. On the first model, direction is the order that morphemes are to be read on an INDEPENDENT ORDER, TRANSITIVE ANIMATE verb; if the form is ‘direct,’ the morphemes are to be read from left to right to get the agent-patient relation, while, if the form is ‘inverse,’ the morphemes are to be read from right to left to get the agent-patient relation. Since then, another idea has developed, wherein the notion of direction refers to a person hierarchy; the ‘direct’ form follows the hierarchical ordering, while the ‘inverse’ form goes in the opposite direction.

**EVIDENTIAL** (EVID) : One of the rich set of particles and preverbs in Plains Cree that code the Speaker’s relation to the proposition expressed. The most common ones in this data are êsa and êtikwê, which are thought to mark kinds of indirect knowledge.
EXTENTIONAL (XT): The suffixes –a and –ihi, which are here analyzed as coding that the referent is extentional (i.e. either inanimate or obviative).

FINAL: The final element in an Algonquin stem, selected from a closed class. This element gives the stem its categorical properties as well as some of its argument-structure.

FUTURE (FUT): A preverb that codes the verb as non-assertional, typically futurate in meaning, but also used in conjunction with other components to code different kinds of Plains Cree’s modality system.

INANIMATE (IN): One of the two grammatical classes of nominals in Algonquian languages. Shown by the form of demonstratives, plural suffixes, and verbal agreement. In this thesis, it is argued that referents coded in this way are judged to never have INTENTIONS.

INCHOATIVE (INCH): The verb final –ipayi–. This final occurs in environments that are often inchoative in meaning (e.g. kinosipayiw ‘s/he got tall / became tall.’), but it also occurs in contexts where the verb’s actor is simply out of control of the event (e.g. sêhkêpayiw ‘s/he/it rides away / is conveyed away’). Its meaning, then, is likely more abstract than “inchoative” and the gloss here should be considered a mere convenience.

INDEPENDENT (IND): One of the two paradigms (ORDERS) of verbal inflection found in Plains Cree. Characterized by circumfixal person marking.

INITIAL: The first required element in an Algonquian stem. This element carries the idiosyncratic lexical material of the stem. It is roughly equivalent to the more common linguistic term ‘root.’
**Initial Change (IC):** CHANGE that affects the initial syllable of a verb or preverb. The ‘elsewhere’ kind of change, based on frequency of appearance. Thus, kâ- and ê- are typically glossed as specific instances of change because they are heavily used, whereas a more general gloss is necessary for the -iy- segment in wîyâpamât-, since it occurs perhaps once in three books’ worth of Plains Cree. In some sense, ê- and kâ- may represent a diachronic change, whereas initial change appears to be synchronic.

**Inverse (INV):** One of the theme signs used to signify that the agent-patient relation runs contrary to the pattern established in previous discourse context. The name comes from a notion of direction.

**Local Person (LP):** A grammatical person category in Algonquian languages (cf. Bloomfield (1962), Hockett (1958), etc.). The collection of both the Speaker and the Hearer. Roughly equivalent to Speech Act Participant.

**Medial:** An optional element that occurs between the Initial and Final elements of an Algonquian stem.

**Mode:** A paradigm that is distinguished from all other paradigms in its order by the addition of some extra element. This extra element is, in the conjunct order, most often a prefix (e.g. ê- vs. kâ-), while it is most often a suffix in the independent order, (e.g. -n vs. -tokê).

**Nominalization (Nom):** A suffix that converts verbs into nominals. The suffix –win, which is itself possibly a set of suffixes, which is used to derive abstract nominals out of verbs (e.g. masinahikê- ‘write’ → masinahikêwin ‘writing’). The suffix –kan, which is also possible compositional, is used to derive a concrete nominal out of a verb, typically the element referent related to the verb or the outcome of the verb’s action (e.g. masinah- ‘inscribe/write’ → masinahikan ‘book / paper’).
OVIATIVE (OBV): A referential category in Plains Cree. It refers to a discourse referent that is judged by the Speaker to not have any intentions in a given context.

ORDER: The set of all paradigms that share the same personal inflections. Plains Cree has two such verbal orders; the INDEPENDENT Order, and the CONJUNCT Order. A sample paradigm, for intransitive forms, is shown here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intransitive Inflection</th>
<th>SINGULAR</th>
<th>PLURAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONJ</td>
<td>IND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>STEM-yân</td>
<td>ni-STEM-n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>STEM-yân</td>
<td>ki-STEM-n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANIMATE</td>
<td>STEM-t</td>
<td>STEM-w</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBVIATIVE</td>
<td>STEM-yit</td>
<td>STEM-yiwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INANIMATE</td>
<td>STEM-k</td>
<td>STEM-w</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G1. Summary of verbal morphology

PLURAL (pl): A morpheme that denotes non-singularity. Examples are nominal –ak (animate plural, nouns & independent order), –iki (animate plural, demonstratives), and –ik (animate plural, conjunct order).

PREVERB: A dependent, closed class of elements that affix loosely (open Sandhi) to the left of the verb stem. Preverbs may occur alone or be stacked, but have a definite order when stacked. Most of these elements mark some kind of temporal, aspectual, or modal property. Note that other elements may also occur in the preverb domain, either as-is or with the addition of the preverb marker -i.

PREVIOUS EVENT PREVERB (PREV): A preverb, taking the shape kî-, that is used to code that the verb’s event is previous to some other discourse-specified event. See Cook (2007) for discussion and diagnostics for this form; it is neither a tense marker nor an aspectual marker.
**Proximal (PRX):** Using the root *aw-*-, this is one of the two spatial deixis categories of modern Plains Cree. It codes that the referent is near the Speaker, but is also used to pick out topical referents, among other poorly understood effects.

**Proximate (PROX):** An simple *animate* referent that stands in discourse contrast to the *obviative* referent. This dissertation argues that, in this context, the proximate referent has a special relation the Speaker of the discourse. The Speaker knows about the *intentions* of this referent, and has received information from this referent. (Wolfart 1978)

**Reduplication (RED):** A prefix that copies the first consonant of the some grammatical form; usually either a preverb or a verb stem. The copied syllable either has the shape *Ca-* or *Cah-* , with the difference signalling a difference in aspectual properties. The *Cah-* kind is often referred to as “heavy reduplication”

**Reflexive (REFL):** A verbal suffix with the form *–iso*, that makes the agent act upon themselves (e.g. *wîcih* ‘help’ → *wîcihiso* ‘help oneself’).

**Relative Root (RR):** One of a closed class of elements that code different things in different positions. When standing alone, they typically code prepositional-like properties (e.g. *ohci* ‘from’ and *isi* ‘towards’). When inserted into the perverbs, they either code a relation to some element external to the verb structure (e.g. *êkosi ê-isi-wâpamât* ‘that’s how he saw her’), or, under negation, a tense-like effect. They are frequently used as the root of verbs, especially verbs that relate to propositions (e.g. *it– in itêyihtam* ‘think thus of it’).

**Stative (STAT):** A convenient gloss for a common pair of AI finals (*-isi / -â*), which often occur in stative environments (e.g. *kinosî* – ‘be tall’). Its exact nature is complex, however, and the gloss here is only meant as a convenience, not an final analysis.
**STEM** ([…]): The part of an Algonquian word that does not change when the rest of the inflection changes. Since changes in person interactions result in changes to some of the transitivity marking, the Algonquianist notion of ‘stem’ is not equivalent to the shape posited by formal linguists, who posit that the verb structure includes all transitivity marking. (Bloomfield 1962, Wolfart 1973, Hirose 2000, Déchaine 2003).

**SUBJUNCTIVE** (SBJ): A mode of the conjunct order, distinguished by the lack of change (ê- or kâ-) and the addition of the suffix -i. When it occurs with initial change, the subjunctive means that the verbal event has occurred multiple times (roughly like English “whenever”). When it occurs without initial change, it means that the verbal event is only hypothetical (roughly like English “if” or “when”). It is for this last usage that it is named.

**THEME SIGN**: A closed class of morphemes that occur immediately after the final on transitive Algonquian verbs. When combined with the information provided by person marking, these suffixes identify agents and patients.

**TRANSITIVITY CLASSES** (TA, TI, AI, II, AIT): A classification scheme for Algonquian verbs, based on the morphological marking they show. This marking identifies what kind of nominals the verb relates to. The classification assumes an SVO ordering; AI = Animate (Subject) Intransitive (Verb), TA = Transitive (Verb) Animate (Object). The classification is only a convenience, since forms exist that function as transitive verbs but lack transitive morphology (sometimes called AIT forms; Animate Intransitive Transitive).

**UNSPECIFIED SUBJECT** (USC): A construction in Plains Cree that suppresses reference to the Agent of a transitive verb. The resulting form has only a single argument, with only a generic or unspecified existential referent being understood to be the agent or possessor.
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