0. This paper is concerned with the distinction between speech act verbs and non-speech act verbs, special adverbial constructions with performative function, some types of illocutionary acts, and the relation between mood indicators and speech act verbs, particularly in Korean.

1. Illocutionary acts as acts are positive. First, I argue that all the illocutionary acts are positive, or constitute doing something (in saying something), and, therefore, the negation of a performative does not constitute a performative.¹ For instance (1), below, is a performative but not (2) (cf. Lee 1973).

(1) I promise (not) to finish my paper in time.
(2) I don't promise to finish my paper in time.

For most negation-implying performatives, negation is semantically associated with the complement of each corresponding positive performative verb, not the other way around, as in (3) and (4), below:

(3)(a) I forbid you to use my car.
     (b) I order you not to use my car.
(4)(a) I deny it.
     (b) I declare it is not true.

In (3) and (4), (a) is equivalent to (b).

Let us now observe how the illocutionary act of forbidding is realized in Korean as a case in point. Typically, it is realized as negative imperative, as is expected cross-linguistically. Consider:

(5) ka-ci mal -ara !
    go Comp Neg+DO Imp
     'Don't go.'

¹ Austin (1962, 79–80) has such tests as ‘Does he really?’, ‘I deliberately approved his action’, and ‘I am willing to apologize’, even though he doesn’t say anything about the negation of a performative explicitly.
Korean has two forms of negation and the negative imperative essentially takes the longer form. Observe:

(6)(a) an ka-as' -ta (without DO as in German and French)
not go Past Dec
'Someone) didn’t go.

(b) ka -ci an + h -as' -ta (with DO as in English)
go Comp not do Past Dec
'Someone) didn’t go.’

(6b) is the longer form just as (5) is. However, Neg+DO is obligatorily lexicalized as mal- in the imperative context (cf. Lee 1978), as the impossibility of (8) below shows. The short form negative imperative as in (7) appears only in some children’s acquisition data but never in adults. Take a look:

(7) an ka! (as in “Geh nicht”) (never in adults)
not go
'Don’t go.’

(8) *ka-ci an + h -ara!
go Comp not do Imp
Intended: ‘Don’t go.’

The illocutionary act of order involves the addressee’s volition to do something, and the negative imperative (4) can be paraphrased as:

(9) I do the saying act of causing you not to activate your volition to go.

Therefore, universally, a negative imperative is impossible with a non-volitional state predicate, as shown in (10), whereas it is better with a state-change (process) predicate (when the change is assumed controllable) and it is perfect with action predicate.

(10)(a) ?* changpaek-ha -ci mal -ara!
pale Comp Neg+DO Imp
Intended: ‘Don’t be pale.’

(b) (?) changpaek-hae -ci -ci mal -ara!
pale get Comp Neg+DO Imp
‘Don’t get pale.’

On the other hand, mal- can be used even in a situation where the speaker’s wish or hope of the addressee’s not doing the act concerned is expressed in a declarative sentence, as follows:

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(11) na -nin [ne -ka ka -ci mal/an+h -ki -ril] para -n -ta
I Top you Nom go Comp NOT+DO Nomlz Acc hope Prs Dec
'I hope you won't/do not go.' (-ki=Nominalizer)

With *mal*, the sentence becomes more volition-sensitive increasing its forbidding force. With *an+h* 'not+do', it remains more neutral or objective. The verb *kim-ha/-kimci-ha*-'forbid' of Sino-Korean origin can be used as a performative verb as shown in (12), but its corresponding pure Korean verb *malli* 'cause not to do; stop', as an action verb, cannot. Observe:

(12) na -nin [ne -ka ka -nin kOś -il] kim -ha -n -ta
I Top you Nom go Prs N Acc forbid Prs Dec
'I forbid you to go.' (kOś=to, that, thing; O= )

In the embedded complement, an action verb is possible but not a state predicate such as *be pale*, which is analogous to the negative imperative.

2. Speech act verbs vs. non-speech act verbs. In connection with this, let us turn to the classification of verbs. The group of non-speech act verbs as opposed to speech act verbs can be divided into two: one is the group of action//motion/process verbs and the other is the group of psych-predicates. Action verbs are either transitive (e.g. John *killed* a rabbit; taking Agent and Theme, and other possible argument roles) or intransitive (e.g. Mary *walked*; taking Agent only). Motion/process verbs involve Theme but not Agent (e.g. Bill *rolled* down the hill unconsciously; Joe *grew* up).

The group of psych-predicates, on the other hand, can be divided into cognitive verbs and emotive/sensational predicates. Cognitive verbs, particularly mental activity verbs, can occasionally be used as semi-performative (or even performative) verbs with the first person subject in present tense (e.g. *believe, know; presume, assume, suppose*; (classified by Austin as performatives) *conjecture, recognize, understand, don't mind, resent, am determined to, intend*). Such attitude predicates as *regret, resent, strange* might be called cognitive-emotive predicates.

Emotive predicates again can be divided into active ones such as *fear* and its corresponding Korean verb *musOwO-ha* and passive ones such as *be surprised* and its corresponding Korean intransitive verb *nola* or Korean psych-adjective series corresponding to *lonely, painful, sad, (home-)sick, have a (head-)ache, hatable*, etc. Those psych-adjectives usually take Experiencer as Topic/subject and Nom(inative)-marked Theme (or Stimulus). But they cannot take the third or second person Experiencer in present tense. Look at the following:
(13a) na -nin ki yOnghwa -ka silphi -ta
I Top the movie Nom sad Dec
‘To me, the movie is sad.’

(b) John -in ki yOnghwa -ka silphi -Os’ -ta
Past
‘To John, the movie was sad.’

(c) ??John -inki yOnghwa -ka silphi -ta
‘To John, the movie is sad.’

(13c) is normally unacceptable because of a pragmatic factor; the speaker has no way of knowing the other’s psychological state at speech time. The speaker alone knows his own psych-state at speech time and hence (13a). However, it is not an act nor a performative; it is simply a description of the speaker’s own psych-state. In past tense, any person as Experiencer is all right; the speaker could already get access to informational evidence regarding someone else’s psych-state to justify his utterance by the time of utterance, as in (13b).

3. Performative disjuncts. Korean has a special adverbial adjunct or rather a disjunct construction of ‘V-stem + kOntae’, which functions just like (semi-) performatives.


(b) yo(khOntae) ‘summarising, in brief’
ye(khOntae)2 ‘taking an example’

It is interesting to see the above natural class of verbs take the performative-like adverbial construction in Modern Korean, but in Middle Korean, far more types of verbs could take the same construction. The verbs of (14a) are transitive verbs that take complement clauses but they can take neither any object complement clause nor the subject in the adverbial construction in question. The following S either serves as an underlying object or is a consequence of the act of the preceding construction. The unrealized understood subject of the adverbial construction is necessarily the first person speaker.

2 Phonologically, -ha-kOntae becomes -khOntae obligatorily (vowel /a/ deletes and aspiration of /k/ occurs) in these two examples. Furthermore, the verb forms yo-ha-, ye-ha- do not exist in Modern Korean. In (a), the phonological process of contraction (with aspiration) is preferable but not obligatory.

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The disjunct formative -kOntae should be a (subordinate) conjunctive marker originally, even though underlyingly the construction constitutes a higher S of the following S, as its matrix performative (cf. Lee 1973). It resembles the present participial construction of English or other Indo-European but it does not always function as a performative (though it does in Frankly speaking, —', etc.) and typically its unrealized subject is same as that of the following S. The disjunct may be more like the parentheticals of English such as I imagine, I suppose, I assume, I gather, I think, etc. or such a performative adverbial as presumably. Even in English, those constructions are limited to mental activity verbs that can function as (semi-)performatives. The -kOntae construction is followed by a normal sentence in Korean. It is used in a formal, grave style, as in a judge's decision document.

Another such construction is the 'Vstem + noni' construction. This requires a full performative like iri- 'tell', mut- 'ask', and myOng-ha- 'order'. This construction is syntactically different from the above in that it can take all other elements (subject, indirect object) of a performative sentence except its complement clause. The original complement which now follows the disjunct construction surfaces as a main clause. Look at (15):

(15) nae -ka nO -eke iri-noni, chOnkuk-i kak'aw-Os'-ninira
    I Nom you to tell Disj heaven Nom near Past Dec(grand)
    'I tell you that Heaven is at hand.'

This disjunct is not a subordinate but a superordinate clause in spirit. It is used in a grand(ious), imposing style as in the Bible.

Differently from disjuncts, a copular construction functions like a performative, sometimes, as in (16) below. Its null subject cataphorically refers to the following utterance of a sentence.

(16)(a) myOngnyOng -i -ta. na -ka -ra!
    order Cop Dec out go Imp
    'This is an order. Go out.'

(b) macimak chungko -i -ta. t'Ona-ci mal -ara.
    last advice Cop Dec leave Comp Neg+DO Imp
    'This is my last advice. Don't leave.'

(c) tow -a cu -kes' -ta. yaksok -i -ta
    help give will Dec promise Cop Dec
    'I will help you. It is a promise.'
In (16c), the copular construction follows the utterance expressing intention. There must be correspondence between the construction of ‘the name of an illocutionary act + Copula + Dec’ and the following or preceding sentence: if an order, an imperative S; if a promise, an intention expression, and so on.

As we have observed, various syntactic constructions other than a regular performative sentence are employed for the purpose of performative function in Korean.

4. Illocutionary act types and sentential types. Let us consider now some aspects of the relation between different types of illocutionary acts and sentential types. One sentential type can serve different illocutionary acts and one type of illocutionary act can take different sentential types (cf. Lee 1973). As argued in Lee (1973), permission is not an assertion type, differently from Heringer’s (1972) claim, even though it takes the declarative S form like You may leave, or ka-to coh-a ‘It is all right even if you leave’ in Korean. Heringer claims that it is an assertion type just as You are able to leave is. However, we can respond to the latter with That is true but not to the permission type, just as we cannot say “yes” or “no” to the explicit performative of permission like I permit you to leave,³ Harnish (in the same conference) may not agree (see section 6).

Deontically, obligation and permission are inter-related in the sense that the negation of one is equivalent to the other and both acts involve authority on the part of the Agent. So the permission-seeking modal expression can be used in (17a) but not in (17b) below.

(17)(a) May I suggest that you run for the Presidency
(b) ?? May I permit you to run for the Presidency
(c) ?? May I order you to run for the Presidency

The Agent of suggest does not need the pragmatic presupposition of his authority but the Agent of permit does. In (17a), the modal expression shows the speaker’s politeness to the hearer, giving the impression of leaving the option to the addressee and enabling the sentence to function as performative. In (17b, c), however, there occurs a conflict of presuppositions on authority in the speaker; s/he presupposes that s/he has the authority of the act of permission or order but, at the same time, s/he presupposes, by means of the modal expression, that the addressee has the authority of giving permission

³ Austin (1962, 154) states that an excercitive such as permit is ‘the giving of a decision in favor of or against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it’. He further states ‘it is a decision that something is to be so, as distinct from a judgment that it is so: it is advocacy that it should be so, as opposed to an estimate that it is so...’.

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for that (cf. Lee 1975). But authority is one-way or asymmetric in a single act of authority-requiring illocutionary act. Therefore, (17b) and (17c) cannot constitute a permission and an order, respectively, while (17a) does constitute a suggestion. The modal expression of (17a) already lost its independent force of permission-seeking or question except its presupposition involved because of the force of the embedded performative.

There are various expressions of promise in Korean and one form originating from intention (or futurity) expression came to serve as a promise marker, as in (18).

(18)(a) t’o o -l k’O-ya  
    again come will  
‘(I) will come again.’  
(b) t’o o -l-k’e  
Promise Marker  
‘I promise to come again.’  

(18b) is a promise in the sense that it is used only in a promise context. The futurity/intention marker is longer than the promise marker, which comes from the former by contraction historically. The shorter the form of futurity/intention expression becomes, the more intensely does the speaker’s intention get expressed, so as to be bound as a promise (in (18), (b) may be accompanied by crossing baby-fingers as promise gesture but not (a), among children in Korea). It should be a reflection of iconicity in language. It is witnessed in any language (see the deontic reading of (27) in English later). The most immediate, peremptory illocutionary act of order is expressed by a single verb (and possibly a minimal element) in any language. Go! in English, ka (from ka-a, Vstem + S ending) in Korean, and Geh (Vstems) in German.

Threatening, though involving intention, is different from promising in that the speaker believes that the hearer does not want, rather fears, the speaker’s future act and that the speaker’s performing a threat does not obligate him to do the future act. It cannot be an act of contract. Threatening is not used as an explicit performative except in an embedded clause in a round-about way of performing the act, as in I wish I wouldn’t have to threaten you . . . . Illocutionary acts adverse to the addressee are typically represented with the expression of inevitability of the act concerned on the part of the speaker, with such modal expressions as I must . . . , I have to . . . , followed by an adverse performative. In Korean, a round-about implicature may be mobilized for a threatening act, as, for example, in wihyOp-iro til-li-l-ci morici-man. . .  ‘This may sound like a threat, but . . . .’ However, a straightforward expression,
such as one corresponding to *I will kill you (completely)*, is frequently used. Threatening can constitute a perlocutionary act, on the other hand. It is not an institutionally well accepted formal illocutionary act and does not give a pleasant impression, even though it may not necessarily constitute a criminal act.\(^4\) It is something you want to avoid as an explicit matrix S performative expression, even when you are performing it.

Typologically speaking, performatives as main clauses do not abound in Korean, probably not in any language, as already painted out on the first day of the conference. It occurs in an emphatic, bureaucratic, or fictional (as in a drama) situation. Instead of performatives, major mood indicators that show illocutionary forces regularly occur toward the end (verbal part) of a sentence in this SOV language. And even when those are reported, they regularly appear in the embedded complement sentences, as shown below:

(19) Sue -nin [[Joe- ka ka-as’ -ta] -ko] mal-ha -yOs’ -ta
   Top            Nom go Past Dec Comp say   Past Dec
   ‘Sue said that Joe went.’

(20) Sue -nin [[Joe -ka ka -as’ -ninya]- ko] mul -Os’ -ta
   Top            Nom go Past 0 Comp ask Past Dec
   ‘Sua asked whether Joe had gone.’

(21) Sue -nin Joe -ke [ [ka -ra] -ko] myOngnyOng-ha -yOs’ -ta
   Top            to go Imp Comp order Past Dec
   ‘Sua ordered Joe to go.’

(22) Sue -nin Joe -ke [ [ka -ca] -ko] ceeuy -ha -yOs’ -ta
   Top            to go Prpst Comp propose Past Dec
   ‘Sue suggested to Joe they go.’

Typically, those declarative, interrogative, imperative and propositive mood markers show their corresponding illocutionary acts and they also appear in complement sentences when reported. And the reporting verbs correspond to the names of the illocutionary acts or performative verbs. Because the sentences from (19)–(22) are reported sentences, they are statements and end in the Dec(larative) mood marker.

All the speech act verbs that can occur as reporting verbs can be replaced by the verb *mal-ha* ‘say’, and this possibility suggest that all the speech acts verbs can be covered by the same term *mal-ha* ‘say’ in Korean at least in reporting. As a matter of fact all the illocutionary act verbs must have originated

\(^4\) Mey in the conference rightly indicated that ‘criminal’ varies from society to society.
as reporting or quotation verbs. Because of the mood markers in embedding we can tell which illocutionary act is reported, even if we simply put the reporting verb mal-ha 'say' in the matrix S. In other words, we can replace the matrix V mul- 'ask' by mal-ha- 'say' in (20) above and so forth.\footnote{However, the verb mal-ha- 'say' does not properly function as performative even if it is used in the 1st person in present tense, when applied to question, order, proposal, promise, etc., which are not statement, because it lacks its respective illocutionary intent, though it represents the part of saying in the illocutionary act involved.} This is not so tidy in Indo-European languages, though we can frequently tell from different syntactic forms (mainly complementizers). Consider:

(23) John told Mary to go. (Imperative force)
(24) *John said whether Mary had gone.

Thus, in Korean, mood indicators and speech act verbs are closely interrelated, and important functional elements are placed toward the end of a sentence, differently from SOV languages like English. For instance, S-ending mood indicators together with speech-level addressee honorification show the speaker's illocutionary intent and different degrees of interpersonal honorification in a straightforward way. However, in English, as in any other Indo-European language, there is no linguistic way of independent addressee honorification and that is why indirect speech act forms develop in Indo-European languages to show the speaker's attitude toward the addressee. Those forms are interrogative forms or speaker-based modal expressions such as hypothetical subjunctive mood, to take the form of giving an option or soften coercive or other illocutionary force involved.

Even in Korean, change is taking place; speech levels are getting simplified—the pair of polite and familiar levels becoming far more predominant than the formal pair of deferential and plain levels. Then, what happened is that the new predominant pair of levels came to develop various modality expressing variant forms. Thus, the basic -O(-yo) level expresses a categorical judgement (in Kuroda's sense) of the speaker, and the S ender -ne, as an evidential, shows the speaker's unexpected immediate finding. So ka-as'-O 'he went, is gone' can mean that the speaker found the fact earlier in the past, but ka-as'-ne 'I find right now that he's gone' means that the fact is found immediately at the time of speech, and the exclamatory S ender -kun(-a) usually shows expected or expectable finding. The quotative S endings -tae, -ninya, -ræe, -cae, coming from complex S's of embedding, express the speaker's report of someone else's statement (-ta Dec), question (-ninya), order (-ra), and
proposal (-ca), respectively. Cliticization occurs in each case (-tae from -ta -ko hae ‘(someone) says that ... Dec’, and so forth).

In English, the modal verb must is ambiguous between the deontic meaning and the epistemic meaning, as in (25), but in Korean, two different constructions for the different meanings are employed, as in (26) below:

(25) John must be at home.
(26)(a) John -i thillim-Opsi cip-e is’-il-k’O-ya (epistemic)
       (b) John -in cip-e is’-Oya(-man) ha-n -ta (deontic)
(27) John mustn’t be at home. (deontic only)

In (26a), the epistemic meaning is expressed by the Conjectural modal construction plus an adverbial showing certainty. In (26b), the deontic meaning is expressed by the deontic modal construction consisting of the compositional meaning of ‘all right only if...’. The deontic modal construction with its binding force, is shorter than the epistemic one at least in negation in its contracted form as in (27). The meaning of deontic binding is more urgent to the speaker and its form is shorter, reflecting iconicity as mentioned earlier. On the other hand, the epistemic meaning of may is translated into Korean like (24) below:

(28) John -i o -l -ci -to mori -n -ta
       Nom come Fut Dubitat Concessive not know Pres Dec
       ‘John may come.’

The modal part of sentence (28) comes from Dubitative plus a main V (‘not know’) undergoing reanalysis in this case as a light predicate or an auxiliary. So it cannot take its own original subject, i.e., the 1st person, and it is almost limited to the present tense.

5. Factivity. In English, modal inflection has developed well as modal auxiliaries but instead factivity distinctions in complement sentences are rather poor. In contrast, observe the fine factivity distinctions in Korean shown in (29)–(33).

(29) Sue- nin [[Joe -ka t’Ona -n kOs] -il] kaethan-haes’ -ta
      Top Nom leave Past Nmlrz Acc regretted Dec
      ‘Sue regretted that Joe had left.’
(30) Sue- nin [[Joe -ka t’Ona -s’ -ta -nin kOs-il] ic -Os’ -ta
      Top Nom leave Past Dec Pren N Acc forgot Dec
      ‘Sue forgot that Joe had left.’

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(31) Sue-nin [Joe -ka t’Ona -n kOs] -iro] al -n -ta
    Top Nom leave Past N Dir know Pres Dec
    ‘Sue believes Joe to have left.’

(32) Sue-nin [Joe -ka t’Ona -s’ -ta] -ko saengkak -ha-n -ta
    Top Nom leave Past Dec Quot think Pres Dec
    ‘Sue thinks that Joe had left.’

True inner factivity is marked in (29), as is the case with the higher cognitive-emotive verb like regret; external factivity for publically known fact is marked in the complement with such cognitive verbs as forget, know, as in (30); the Korean V al- ‘know’ is ambiguous between factive and non-factive, depending on whether the embedded complement takes Acc or the oblique case of direction, and (31) shows the latter non-factive case. If the verb al- ‘know’ is factive, it can be either of inner factivity or external factivity, depending on whether its complement clause takes a prenominal tense form before the Nominalizer kOs followed by Acc or a finite full clause form + -nin- (←-ko ha-nin- ‘say that’) kOs followed by Acc as in (30), respectively. Thus factivity shows different degrees from strong to weak down to none, and all the differences are grammatically marked in Korean as shown. This feature of factivity presupposition is not well appreciated by the GB framework because it sticks to syntactic principles.

An interesting phenomenon regarding the cognitive verbs al- ‘know’ and mori- ‘not know’, its negative form, is that the former can be ambiguous between factive and non-factive as mentioned, and ambiguity can further be shown by the following dependent Nominal. Observe:

(33)(a) na-nin [ai -ka t’Ona -n cul-il] al -as’ -ta
    I Top child Nom leave Past way Acc know Past Dec
    ‘I knew that the child had left.’

(b) na-nin [ai -ka t’Ona -n cul-lo] al -as’ -ta
    Dir
    ‘I thought that the child had left.’

This ambiguity is in parallel with (31), between kOs-il (Acc) and kOs-iro (Dir). However, in (31), when Acc replaces Dir and makes factive presupposition possible, even if the Acc marker is deleted, still factivity remains, and it cannot be taken as delation of Dir. Dir must be marked to be interpreted as non-factive. However, in (33), if there is no marker after the dependent Nominal cul, there occurs an ambiguity between factive and non-factive. However, there is a disambiguating phonological cue: if there is no pause between the dependent

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Comp N and the matrix V al- 'know' and a slight stress on the complement V, then the S is non-factive. On the contrary, if there is some pause between the dependent Comp N and the matrix V 'know' and a slight stress on the matrix V, then the S is factive. In the former, the complement V is focused, whereas in the latter, the matrix V 'know' is. But the negative V form mori- 'not know' cannot take the non-factive creating Direction marker -(i)lo, as follows:

\[(34) \quad \text{*Sue- nin [Jo-t'ona -ccul/kOs] -iro} \text{mol -as'-ta} \]
\[
\text{Top Nom leave P N Dir not know P Dec}
\]

'Sue didn't believe (know) Joe to have left.'

The V mori- 'not know' can only take Acc in the complement as a pure factive verb, whereas al-ci mot-ha- 'not able to know' (V+Neg) can take Dir, gaining the sense of weak factive presupposition this time. Because of the presupposition of mot-ha- 'unable to' cul/kOs-iro al-ci mot-ha comes to gain factive presupposition even with the Dir marker, meaning 'unable to reach the state of knowing . . . , (thinking some other way)'. (If the ability Neg mot-ha- is replaced by the neutral Neg an-ha-, the gained factivity disappears.) If Dir is replaced by Acc in this context, the construction comes to be purely factive, meaning 'unable to know the fact that . . . '. Factive presupposition is primarily due to the matrix verb and is marked in the complement by case (Acc), but the same cognitive verb can be non-factive by taking an oblique Dir case in the complement. The lexical negative ability cognitive verb behaves only as factive but the syntactic version with Dir also behaves so.

Even in English, only non-factive predicates allow the matrix Acc plus infinitive construction as follows (cf. Kiparsky–Kiparsky 1971):

\[(35)(a) \quad \text{I believe Mary to be the one who did it.}
\]
\[
\text{(b) *I resent Mary to be the one who did it.}
\]

In (35a), to originally meant direction and it implies not reaching or touching the goal in the mind, whereas factive presupposition requires some fact’s touching the mind. That is why the to-infinitive cannot be used for cognitive-emotive factive verbs such as resent, regret, etc. (know is slightly weaker in factivity, allowing a to-infinitive, as in I knew him to be a fool.). We can conclude from the above discussion that surface syntactic phenomena are semantically and pragmatically motivated.

6. Residual discussion. As already argued, illocutionary acts are acts and they are positive. Potentially negative illocutionary acts tend to have negation in their complements. Otherwise, negation is lexicalized and the verb can behave
like a positive action verb as a performative (e.g., disagree, so I don’t disagree is not a performative, and neither is I don’t object). These lexicalized verbs are not subject to negative polarity phenomenon (for instance, *I disagree at all but I also disagree.) differently from syntactic negative constructions (cf. I don’t agree either.). I agree is used as a performative when the issue in question is specific and the response is counted as voting or something like that as an instantaneous act. Therefore, its negation I don’t agree is exceptionally felt by many people as at least an ‘implicit’ performative (in Austin’s sense when he calls an imperative S an ‘implicit performative’ of the illocutionary act of order) in that kind of particular context, as if it were a positive act of disagreement or objection. The reaction must be just like “yes” or “no”, so I don’t agree is felt to be the contradiction rather than any contrariness of its affirmative counterpart, as indicated also by Fretheim in the conference. As a matter of fact, I don’t agree in the sense concerned corresponds to a denial of agreement, and, according to Barwise–Etchemendy (1987), a ‘denial’, differently from ‘negation’, ‘rejects some claim that has already been raised’. In the case of I agree or I don’t agree, the issue should not be broad or general so as to be cumulative (like I (don’t) agree on any points whatsoever), habitual (like I agree all the time, or futuristic, to be interpreted as a performative or an implicit performative, otherwise it becomes the (objective) description of the mental state of the speaker (for instance, as an answer to Do you agree with what the President said on television?). Likewise I don’t agree in the performative sense if any is equivalent to I do the instantaneous act of causing you to see that I have a different opinion. In that sense, illocutionary acts as acts can be said to be positive, in any case.

As for the thesis proposed by Harnish in the conference that ‘performatives are also constatives’, he is raising a very important and old philosophical issue but he is not distinguishing between performative acts as acts performed instantaneously, i.e., synchronously with saying the performatives or “immediately” (in Récanati’s sense) on one hand and constatives as representations (descriptions or reports) of states of affairs independent of the utterances on the other.

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6 Some non-typical performative forms are witnessed such as passive performatives like You are dismissed, and All passengers are requested to proceed to gate ten, or embedded performatives as already exemplified.

7 If performativity is defined too broadly, as seemingly done by Pocheptsov in the conference, then it can hardly be distinguished from illocution.

8 As Hadland suggested in personal communication.
Performative verbs are uttered in present tense, but not in the habitual or progressive aspects of the tense. As soon as performative verbs are interpreted in those aspects, they become constative verbs. So, if someone says “Are you really (or truly) promising?” he is constating a (progressive) state of performing a promise, exploiting the momentary performative act as if it had some duration. Also, when I say “I promise to be there”, if the hearer can say “Is that true?” and I say “That’s true”, then that should refer to the finished promising utterance. Bach–Harnish (1979) crucially exploit the progressive aspect of the performative verb for their argument for applying ‘truth’ to performatives, but the progressive aspect is for constatives from the beginning and their reasoning process makes a false start. Furthermore, as admitted by everyone, performative or illocutionary acts involve social, institutional or presuppositional appropriateness conditions, not truth conditions. Those appropriateness conditions are not necessarily part of the performative expressions concerned, whereas Snow is white is true iff snow is white. If I order you to leave as performative and Leave! as imperative have the same illocutionary force, and if the former can be true as a constative because it is an utterance associated with ordering, then the imperative sentence can also be true as a constative because it is an utterance associated with the addressee’s leaving. If this reasoning could be correct, then all the varieties of truth-conditional semantics and logic could have treated all the types of sentences such as imperative, interrogative and propositive plus performatives from the beginning. But we could try any kind of truly justifiable innovation, and one can be easily tempted to make generalizations between performatives and constatives on the basis of their common declarative sentence form and common verb form.

Lastly, Verschueren (1989, also in the conference) argues that question (asking) is more basic than request cross-linguistically. It is an interesting point of view, but I view request as a subtype of the illocutionary act of IMPEREing (imposition). Its another subtype is order or command. Therefore, a request can be realized even in English in a polite imperative form such as Please come to me. And in Korean, request and order are distinguished merely by honorific speech level sentence ending differences (Deferential/Polite vs. Non-deferential/Non-polite). Another dimension of difference is the pragmatic presupposition of ‘authority’; an order needs it but not a request. Furthermore, a request by means of an interrogative sentence type is an indirect speech act.
Even in acquisition, a one-word imperative (N or V) comes far earlier than an interrogative type. The latter is more information-related, whereas the former more action-related. The whole issue might turn out to be a basic matter of how to use the term 'basic'.

References

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