1. Introduction

So-called "Frege" cases arise when an agent has two conceptions of a single thing yet she mistakenly takes them as being about distinct objects. It can happen that the agent associates distinct proper names with the notions in question. For example, a person may mistakenly think that the person name 'Samuel Clemens' is not the person named 'Mark Twain'. But it can also happen that she associates no names or even the same name with the conceptions. An example of the latter can be found in Saul Kripke's *A Puzzle About Belief*. Kripke imagines an agent (Peter) who mistakenly thinks of Ignacy Paderewski as if he were two, but associates both conceptions with the single name 'Paderewski'.

Some theorists might challenge this description of Kripke's example. Richard Larson and Peter Ludlow, and Robert Fiengo and Robert May have, in effect, claimed that Peter's idiolect contains two 'Paderewski' "names" or "syntactic expression". The idea being that Peter's idiolect should reflect his unique perspective. In this paper, I give three arguments against the "two-name" view and further defend that as a result, (1) we must face a new challenging puzzle about logical form, and (2) under a certain dominant view of names, we are forced to accept a version of externalism about syntactic facts. The latter is particularly surprising since externalism has been thought to concern the contents of symbols but not the symbols themselves.
2. The Puzzle

Before developing the puzzle, I describe Kripke's example.¹ It concerns Ignacy Paderewski, a distinguished Polish politician and accomplished musician who lived in the beginning of the twentieth century. We imagine a man, Peter, who learns about Paderewski in his politician role. He later learns about Paderewski in his musician role. Peter mistakenly believes that although they share the same sounding name, the musician and the politician are distinct people. I embellish the story by supposing that Peter thinks the musician is also a secret spy whose job is to report on the politician.

One day, Peter learns that Paderewski will be giving a political speech in town. He then utters the following:

(1) If Paderewski is in town, then Paderewski is in town.

Peter hardly means to say something trivial. He speculates that since Paderewski the politician is in town, Paderewski the musician-spy must have followed him in.

The puzzle begins by noting that the utterance (1) does not appear to be a logical truth. If it were a logical truth, Peter who fully grasps his own speech, should be able to (in principle) prove its truth by a prioristic reasoning. Yet, Peter can’t do that. Here’s the problem. If we inspect the utterance, it seems as if it should be a logical truth. This is because its logical form appears to be If P then P. Any utterance with that form must be a logical truth. The puzzle can be formulated more precisely by noting that the following four are jointly inconsistent, though each is plausible on its own.²

(i) If an utterance is a logical truth, then it’s a priori.

¹ Kripke (1979).
² An utterance is a priori just in case any competent agent who fully understands it is in a position to know that it is true without appealing to further experience. By an utterance, I do not mean a speech act but rather something like a use of a sentence or alternatively, a disambiguated sentence in which all contextual parameters have been filled in.
(ii) Utterance (1) is not a priori.

(iii) Any utterance with logical form \( \text{if } P \text{ then } P \) is a logical truth.

(iv) Utterance (1) has logical form \( \text{if } P \text{ then } P \).

Having stated the puzzle, I will not seriously consider denying (i), (ii) or (iii). Giving up (i) is radical, because it severs the tie between logic and its traditionally understood epistemic import. Giving up (ii) seems to ignore the facts. Once Peter fully grasps (1), no amount of non-empirical deliberation can assure him of the truth of (1). Hence, (1) doesn’t seem to be a priori. Giving up (iii) seems close to rejecting well-established logical principles. The rest of the paper concerns the rejection of (iv).

2. Three ways of denying (iv)

In my view, the way of solving the puzzle is by denying that the logical form of (1) is \( \text{If } P \text{ then } P \). This is tantamount to denying that (1) is a logical truth. The philosophical interest lies in saying exactly how this should be achieved. I will survey three different ways of arriving at this result.

2.1 The Two-Name View.

One could claim that the syntactic properties of (1) are not what they seem on the surface. In Peter’s idiolect he has two 'Paderewski' names. One of them is used in the antecedent of (1) while the other is used in the consequent. It is obvious that on this view, the right way of individuating names is not by spelling (or phonetic properties) or by appealing to differences in what the name denotes. Given that Peter's utterance contains two names, the logical form of (1) is plausibly \( \text{if } P \text{ then } Q \). This gives us a solution to the puzzle. Let us call this the “two-name” view. This position is associated with the work of

2.2 The Two-Senses View

The second option says that the logical form of (1) is not *If P, then P* not because of the syntax of (1) but rather because of the proposition that is expressed by (1). It might be thought that the antecedent of (1) expresses a proposition that is distinct from the proposition expressed by the consequent. One way of achieving this result is to claim that the propositional contribution of the first and second occurrences of 'Paderewski' in (1) are distinct (despite the fact that they corefer). This is motivated by the idea that Peter thinks of those occurrences as representing different people. Let us call this view the "Two senses view". This view is associated with Gottlob Frege as well as modern Fregean defenders including Chalmers (2006).

According to the two-senses view, the Paderewski occurrences make distinct propositional contributions. There are good reasons to reject this sort of Fregeanism. Saul Kripke (1980), Nathan Salmon (1986), Scott Soames (2002) and others have made a good case that the view is false. I will then simply stand on their shoulders and assume this much.

However, there is another way to see that Fregeanism is not the right way to address the puzzle even if it is correct. The position holds that the logical form of an utterance is determined by the senses expressed by the non-logical constituents of the

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3 Strictly speaking, Fiengo and May claim that Peter is in possession of two "Paderewski" syntactic expressions. According to their view, syntactic expressions are the sorts of things that appear in logical forms and can be properly said to refer. They reserve the term 'name' to denote types of syntactic expressions (So that William Shakespeare and William Burroughs share the same name). Since names, in their sense, do not refer, it is best to treat my use of 'name' as corresponding to their use of 'syntactic expression'. See Fiengo and May, 2006, especially pages 161-163.
utterances. But it is commonplace to hold that logical form is independent of the particular meanings of the non-logical constants. As such, it seems wrong to say that the logical form of (1) is determined by the meaning of the proper names involved. I will say nothing more about the two-senses view.

2.3 Relationism.

This third option says that the semantic properties of (1) determine its logical form in such a way that it does not yield a logical truth. Yet, is achieved in some other way besides saying that the Paderewski occurrences make distinct contributions to the proposition expressed by (1).

What I have in mind corresponds to a theory recently developed by K. Fine (2003, 2007) and A. Pinillos (2006, 2008). The basic idea here is that what makes (1) not be of the form *If P, then P* is that despite the fact that the antecedent and consequent express the same proposition, they are not related in the right way. For them to be related in the right way, it must be that (at least) the two 'Paderewski’ occurrences corefer in virtue of meaning (de jure coreference). Instead, in (1) the occurrences corefer accidentally (de facto coreference). Crucially, whether two occurrences corefer in virtue of meaning is not something that can be determined from facts about what those occurrences refer to. We must also take into account how the occurrences are related. On this approach, it is then possible for an utterance such as (1) to have logical form *If P then Q*, even though the antecedent and the consequent share the same intrinsic semantic and syntactic properties.

In my view, relationism has the best chance of handling the puzzle. However, my concern here is not to defend the position. Hence I will say no more about it.

3. Against the Two-Name View
The two-name view gives an attractive and intuitive partial account of logical form. It says that logical form is closely connected to syntactic structure. Peter has two 'Paderewski' names in his idiolect. This is reflected in the syntactic analysis (LF) of his utterance (1). It contains two distinct names. Hence the logical form of (1) is If P then Q. This gives a solution to the puzzle.

It is somewhat intuitive to think that Peter has two 'Paderewski' names in his idiolect. Here are some possible motivations: (i) The symbols that compose a person's idiolect and hence the syntactic representation of her utterances are themselves mental representations. Since Peter has two mental representations for Paderewski, then it is plausible to think that he has two names for him. See, for example, Ludlow (1999). (ii) A related idea is that Peter has two 'Paderewski' entries in his Lexicon just as normal English speakers have two 'Bank' entries in their lexicon. And this is reflected in the syntax of a person's speech. See Larson and Ludlow (1993) for an elaboration of this view. (iii) A simpler way of getting at the idea was suggested to me by Kit Fine in correspondence. He points out that Peter might claim that he has two 'Paderewski' names and we should consider him an authority of his idiolect.4

I will argue against this position. But just to have a comparison in mind as I go through the arguments, I will briefly describe (though not argue for) my preferred alternative. This is nicely summed up by Graeme Forbes (1996):

…while we could say that there are two names in Peter's idiolect, it seems more likely that he uses just one, mistakenly thinking there are two, just as he met only one person, mistakenly thinking there are two…certainly,

4 Strictly speaking, Kit Fine in his (2007) does not say that Peter has two 'Paderewski' names in his idiolect (although he suggested this to me in correspondence). Yet, he does write that Peter's syntax must be "transparent" in the sense that 'one's take on the expressions of the language should always be presumed to be the same, even if one's take on the their referents is not' (page 109). As I explain below, this is at odds with the view I endorse in which Peter has one 'Paderewski' view in his idiolect but that he takes his expressions in two different ways.
Peter did not introduce two names into his idiolect via some private and explicit dubbing, but rather, takes himself to have picked up two names in the usual sort of way. What seems right is that in Peter's mind there are two distinct groupings of information, or two dossiers, his uses of 'Paderewski' sometimes linked to one and sometimes to the other (from footnote 12).

The key point here is that just as Peter bears a "divided" cognitive relation to a single man Paderewski, so does he to the single name 'Paderewski'. In my view, words are objects with as much reality as chairs, planets and people and certainly capable of giving rise to similar confusion.

Having put the alternative out on the table, I now turn to the argument against the "two name" view. But before I do this, I offer two important caveats. First, my methodology is not to seek direct intuitions about whether or not Peter has two 'Paderewski' names in his idiolect. Rather, my approach is better described as trying to identify some of the things we expect names to do within linguistic theory and arguing that the two-name view makes these hard to fulfill. Of course, in any foundational investigation one has to start somewhere, so at places I do rely on a natural understanding of words and names, but my hope is that when I do so, it is relatively uncontroversial.

The second caveat is that I am interested in showing that Peter's idiolect does not contain two Paderewski names. It is important that my claim is not simply that his public language doesn't have two names for Paderewski. I think it is fairly uncontroversial to show that. And if we identify a person's idiolect with her public language, then the result immediately follows. For example, Mark Richard (1990 page 181) suggests that "Peter's spoken dialect is ours" and so we ought to reject the two-name view. I do not want to argue this way. Following much work in linguistics, I think there is a perfectly good

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5 Of course I am making the simplifying assumption that Peter does not know some other person with the same sounding name 'Paderewski'.
sense in which a person's idiolect is distinct from a person's public language. In fact, my argument is consistent with the claim that there are no public languages at all. Given these remarks, how then should we characterize a person's idiolect?

We might try to follow Noam Chomsky (1995) in speaking of an "I-language" which must be understood as being "internal", "individual" and "intensional". I find these notions too theoretical if taken as starting assumptions. For our purposes, it will suffice to point out one difference between an idiolect and a public language we can all recognize. Usually, an idiolect will contain less words than the corresponding public language. This is why it makes sense to say that one learns new words (of English, say). And if we have an intuitive understanding of what it means to add a word to a person's idiolect, then we must have an idea of what it means to say that a person has \( n \) many words in her idiolect. Hence my claim that Peter has one 'Paderewski' name for Paderewski as opposed to two can be understood at this pre-theoretic level without having to make hard decisions at the outset about what an idiolect is supposed to be.

My arguments rely on two assumptions about names in an idiolect. I dub these “Shareability” and “Identification”.

**Shareability.** There are cases similar to the paradigm cases (such as the one detailed below) in which a person may learn a name from someone else. In those cases (and as a result), the participants come to share that same name.

Here is a paradigm case: A competent person who does not possess the name “Bill Clinton” asks his friend who the U.S. president was in 1999. His friend says: 'His name is...
“Bill Clinton”. He was a governor of Arkansas. Bill Clinton attended Georgetown and Yale. His wife Hilary is running for president…’ In normal circumstances, giving information like this is enough for the agent to learn the name in question. Furthermore, it is very natural to suppose that as a result, the participants come to share the same name. In fact, if there is ever a case where two agents share the same name, this should be one.

Here’s my second assumption:

**Identification.** If an agent utters a sentence managing to successfully communicate with another agent and there is nothing defective about the exchange, then the second agent has correctly identified the words in the sentence.

This condition makes use of the concept of “correctly identifying a word”. It is natural to think that if I utter a sentence intending to communicate with you, I have an expectation that you will correctly identify the words I have used. On the other side of things, hearers will attempt to correctly identify the words in the utterances they hear. Although much more could be said about these claims, these truisms exemplify the sense of “correctly identifying a word” that I mean to invoke, and make it sufficiently clear for the purposes of this paper.

“Identification” also invokes the concept of a “defective linguistic exchange”. I believe we also have a natural understanding of that notion. When we engage in conversation we are often aware of what could go wrong. As such, if we are cooperative participants, we will try to minimize or compensate accordingly. For instance, if I know it is windy I will raise my voice. If I know that you are looking away, I will not use visual clues. Not engaging in such practices may lead to defective exchanges. We have a
general understanding then of what a defective and non-defective exchange is supposed to be. We often actively try to avoid them.

Putting these ideas together, it seems right to say that in linguistic exchange we expect the hearer to identify the speaker's words. And we judge that something has gone wrong if they failed to do so.\(^6\)

I now develop three arguments against the "two-name" view.

4.1 The First Argument--Using only "Shareability".

I assume, in accordance with the two-name view, Peter has two 'Paderewski' names in his idiolect. But let us backtrack a bit and give a plausible story about how he might have gotten the names.\(^7\)

Suppose Jones possesses a single name 'Paderewski' and knows Paderewski as both the musician and the politician. One day at a music festival, Peter (who has never heard of Paderewski before) asks Jones: 'Who is that guy playing the piano?' Jones answers 'That is Paderewski'. Sometime later, at a political rally, Peter turns to Jones and asks 'Who is the guy giving the speech'. Jones answers: 'That is Paderewski'. Peter, who thinks that politicians aren't musical thinks that there are two "Paderewski" persons and hence comes to possess two names in accordance with the two-name view.

The problem for the two-name view arises because it seems as if each of the two acquisitions described above satisfy "Shareability". If this is right, then we must also

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\(^6\) Now, sometimes one can get lucky and manage to lock on to what one is trying to communicate by identifying the wrong words. For example, suppose I utter 'John is a lawyer' in a loud room and that (by chance) you take me to have uttered “John is an attorney”. Although there is a sense in which I have managed to successfully communicate, this isn't a counter-example to "Identification". This is because we judge that the exchange was defective to some degree. We don't normally expect luck to play this sort of role in linguistic communication.

\(^7\) The description I give is similar to one found in Kaplan (1990) and Fine (2007).
accept that the names acquired are identical to Jones' single 'Paderewski' name. And this in turn means that Peter has acquired one name and not two.

The reasoning just rehearsed constitutes my first argument against the two-name view. I note that it may be resisted by denying that the second name "acquisition" above is a proper instance of "shareability". The duplicating factor might render it dissimilar enough to the paradigm cases of name acquisition. Instead of including here a long discussion about what counts as similar enough to the paradigm case, I will settle for giving two more arguments that aren't subject to this sort of criticism.

4.2 The Second Argument—Using both "Identification" and "Shareability".

We are assuming that Peter has two names. Let us dub these 'Paderewskiₘ,' and 'Paderewskiₚ,' respectively for the names Peter associates with the musician and politician properties.⁸ Suppose that Paderewski is walking in the park. Jones (who has never heard of Paderewski before) and Peter are also in the park. Jones asks Peter about the identity of Paderewski. Peter, who thinks the walking man is the musician utters 'That is Paderewskiₘ, he is a living legend in Poland'. Crucially, the information given, does not hint at the idea that the man in the park is a musician rather than a politician. This seems like a non-controversial case where Jones now comes to possess 'Paderewskiₘ' according to "Shareability".

A few weeks later Peter walks past a statue of Paderewski. Peter recognizes it as the politician. Smith (who like Jones never has heard of Paderewski before) asks Peter about the statue. Peter responds by uttering 'It is of Paderewskiₚ, who is a living legend in Poland.' Paralleling what happened with Jones, the information Peter gives does not hint

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⁸ Of course, these names are pronounced the same way. The subscripts are just there to help us distinguish the (alleged) names.
at the idea that the man the statue depicts is a politician but not a musician. This seems like a non-controversial case where Smith now comes to possess 'Paderewski'.

Now if we reflect about what Smith and Jones know about Paderewski from the exchange with Peter, it is perfectly plausible that they can come to believe a lot of the same things about Paderewski. Moreover, we can also suppose that they are not confused about Paderewski in the way that Peter is and that each of them has a single name, though not the same one, for Paderewski.

Now let us imagine that Smith and Jones meet for the first time. They can have the following perfectly felicitous conversation about Paderewski.

Jones: Have you heard of Paderewski?
Smith: You mean the polish legend? Paderewski is a genius.

The success of this exchange, however, violates "Identification". This is because Smith identifies Jones' use of 'Paderewski' as 'Paderewski'. I conclude then that the two-name assumption is mistaken.°

4.3 The Third Argument—Using only "Identification"

Consider a woman, Jane, who possesses a single name 'Paderewski' but over the span of a decade comes to revise many of her beliefs about Paderewski. In 1930, Jane believed that Paderewski was a famous musician and no politician. By 1939, Jane comes to think that many of her original beliefs about Paderewski were false (perhaps through a gradual

° It might be objected that Smith does correctly identify the name since he can identify it as the name that Jones is using. If there is such a sense of "correctly identify", it would be rare or even impossible for someone to misidentify a word. The sense I invoke in "Identification" is the natural one where it is not uncommon for people to misidentify words. Think of conversations being held in loud rooms.
change). Jane comes to think that Paderewski was not after all a famous musician, but is instead a politician. Intuitively, we may suppose that Jane maintained the same 'Paderewski' name throughout this change. We don't suppose that changing one's beliefs about a person obliterates whatever name one had for that individual. Let us call her name for Paderewski, 'Paderewski_j'.

Now return to Peter for a second. We are supposing for the sake of argument that he possesses two names. Let us dub these 'Paderewski_m' and 'Paderewski_p'. We may suppose (as before) that Peter associates the former with the relevant musician features and the latter with the relevant politician features, and that he does so in a stable manner from 1930 until 1939. Now at least one of these names must be distinct from Jane's 'Paderewski_j'. Let us suppose that it is 'Paderewski_m' (a parallel argument can be given if we suppose 'Paderewski_p').

Imagine further that a core of the predicates Jane associates with 'Paderewski_j' in 1930 are just the core that Peter associates with 'Paderewski_m'. Now suppose that Jane has written a review of Paderewski's recent piano performance in the local newspaper. The headline reads 'Paderewski plays at Carnegie hall.' When Peter reads this headline, he fully understands it. There is no doubt that Jane has successfully communicated. However, given our scenario, Peter has misidentified Jane's word 'Paderewski_j' as 'Paderewski_m' which by hypothesis is numerically distinct. So despite fully grasping the headline, he has misidentifying a word contained in it. This is then a violation of the independently plausible principle "Identification". I conclude that it is false that Peter has two 'Paderewski' names.¹⁰

¹⁰ We can make a stronger case against the "two-name" view by adding "Shareability" and modifying the case just presented. Suppose that Peter's name 'Paderewski_p' was gotten from Jane so that it is identical to
5. Syntactic Externalism

I have just argued that Peter's idiolect contains one Paderewski name. The conclusion that I draw from it is that a certain initially plausible way of solving the logical form puzzle is no longer available. I now turn to another (perhaps surprising) consequence of the result that concerns the determinants of a person's language.

According to a version of externalism about semantic content, the semantic content of a person's words depend on more than just her internal make up. To repeat a famous example from Hilary Putnam (1975), we suppose that there is "twin earth" which is just like earth except that its lakes and rivers are filled not with H$_2$0 but with XYZ, a superficially indistinguishable substance. An English speaking person on earth (who we may suppose knows nothing about chemistry) refers to H$_2$0 and not XYZ with her use of "Water". However, this person's doppelganger on twin-earth, refers to XYZ with her use of "Water". The semantic properties of the twins' languages differ even though internally the twins are as similar as can be. I now want to argue for a more radical claim: which words an agent has in her idiolect, and moreover how many words an agent has in her idiolect does not just depend on internal features of her make up. If this is right, externalism is right not just perhaps about a person's semantics but also the syntax of their language.

In particular, I want to claim that the argument from the previous section together with a certain dominant syntactic-semantic conception of proper names leads to

'Paderewski', Focusing on the newspaper case, Peter now could have correctly identified the words in the headline since he possesses Jane's 'Paderewski'. However, if he had correctly identified it, then his understanding of the headline would be degraded. How could it be that better communication is achieved by misidentifying rather than correctly identifying one's words?
externalism about syntax. The conception I have in mind treats proper names as logical constants. For our purposes, this will mean that the extension of a proper name, relative to a language, must include at most one object and must not vary from context to context. A consequence of this view is that Aristotle the shipping magnate and Aristotle the philosopher bear two distinct names relative to a single language (theorists often capture this idea by using disambiguating subscripts such as $\textit{Aristotle}_1$ and $\textit{Aristotle}_2$). More generally, it cannot be that two people are called by the same name relative to the same language. We call this view the "logical constant" view of names. It seems to be the default position in philosophical theorizing about names. It is to be distinguished from views that treat names as predicates or as indexicals.

Let us now see how the externalism is achieved. We suppose, as I have been arguing, that Peter has exactly one 'Paderewski' name. Now imagine that there is a twin earth that is just like ours except that there are two "Paderewski" people, one a Pianist and a one a Politician. Twin Peter will utter things such as 'Paderewski the musician is not Paderewski the politician' and in his mouth this will be true. Now, according to the logical constant view of names, Twin Peter must have employed two distinct names. But now this means that in his language he has (at least) two 'Paderewski' names. This means that Peter and Twin-Peter, although internally identical, don't have the same number of words in their idiolects. And so they don't have all the same words.\footnote{To be precise: If the cardinality of the set of words in Peter's idiolect and the cardinality of the set of words in Twin-Peter's idiolect are distinct, then the sets must be distinct. But if the sets are distinct, then by extensionality of sets, one set must have an element that is not present in the other. Hence, Peter and twin-Peter can't share all the same words.} Putnam famously

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summed up his point with the dictum 'meanings ain't in the head'. We can now add 'and neither is syntax'.

Interestingly, the result just discussed does not hold for all accounts of names. For example, on the view in which they are treated like indexicals (Recanati 1997, Pelczar and Rainsbury 1998) or as predicates (Burge 1974, Elbourne 2005, Geurts 2005, Higginbotham 1988, Larson and Segal 1995), there is no requirement that twin-Peter have two Paderewski words. On the predicate view, for example, twin Peter has a single predicate 'Paderewski' with an extension that includes the two men. And without this requirement, syntactic externalism doesn't get off the ground.

6. Conclusion

I have argued against the two-name view concerning Peter's idiolect. I hope to have shown that this is a significant fact since (1) we seem to be stuck with a new puzzle about logical form, and (2) under a certain syntactic-semantic conception of names, the view leads to externalism about the syntactic features of an agent's idiolect.

12 It might be tempting to argue for syntactic externalism in the following way. If the logical constant view of names is right, then 'George Bush' in a twin-American's mouth must refer to twin Bush (not Bush). But then a present day American and his twin will have distinct words, and so syntax externalism is achieved without having to appeal to the complicated Paderewski cases. This reasoning is fallacious since the logical constant view says that the referent of a name is relative to a language. Just because 'George Bush' refers to Bush relative to English and 'George Bush' refers to twin-Bush relative to Twin-English, one cannot conclude (on the logical constant view) that they are distinct names.

13 I note that the predicate and indexical views do not seem to help with our puzzle concerning logical form. For they still do not obviously provide a way to syntactically distinguish the two occurrences of 'Paderewski' found in (1). For example, on Burge's view (1) may be treated as If that paderewski is inside, then that Paderewski is inside. Unless descriptive information is added at the level of syntax, the views will have a difficult time providing a solution to the puzzle.
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