An injured man dials 911 for help.  
**Operator:** Operator, operator, call me an ambulance!

1. **INTRODUCTION**

Much work has been done on the semantics of proper names, while their syntax has not received enough attention. Most semantic analyses view proper names as syntactically simplex, with no internal structure whatsoever. This is compatible with viewing proper names as directly referring rigid designators (starting with Kripke 1980), indexicals (Recanati 1997, Pelczar and Rainsbury 1998) or definite descriptions (Frege 1983, Russell 1911, Searle 1958, Kneale 1962, Burge 1973, Katz 1977, 1990, 1994, Bach 2002, Liu 2004, etc.). However, the definite description approach is also compatible with proper names being both semantically and syntactically complex (Geurts 1997, Elbourne 2002), in which case, they can be viewed as syntactically decomposable into a definite article (or a demonstrative, as in Larson and Segal 1995) and a predicate.

While proper names in argument positions have received a lot of attention, this cannot be said about proper names in the naming construction, exemplified in examples like (1), which are generally assumed to involve “mention” rather than “use” of proper names, or possibly to be completely meta-linguistic.

(1) a. **Call me Al.** naming construction  
b. In the end of the 20\(^{th}\) century the city was renamed *St. Petersburg*.  
c. The St. Olga of the Orthodox church was actually baptized **Helen**.

In this paper I show that naming verbs are essential for our understanding of the syntax and semantics of proper names. The syntax of naming constructions is such that proper names there have to be analyzed as predicates, whose contents mentions the name itself. This lends support to the so-called “quotation theories” of proper names in argument positions (Kneale 1962, Geurts 1997, Elbourne 2002, etc.).

The assumption that proper names can enter syntax as predicates makes it clear that they have a complex internal structure in argument positions, consisting of (at least) a determiner and its restriction, exactly like noun phrases whose heads are common nouns. Nonetheless, further consideration of the interpretation of proper names in the naming construction also shows that they have another argument slot, that of the naming convention. As a result, we will be able to compositionally derive the fact that proper names in argument positions generally become indexical (Kripke 1980, Recanati 1997, Pelczar and Rainsbury 1998, etc.).
The paper is arranged as follows. Though the first impression given by verbs of naming is that they are ditransitive, as in (2a), section 2 will show that this impression is false and they project a small clause structure, as in (2b):

(2) a. \( \text{vP ditransitive simplified} \)
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DP} \\
\text{they}
\end{array} 
\begin{array}{c}
\text{v}^0 \\
\text{name}
\end{array} 
\begin{array}{c}
\text{VP} \\
\text{xNP}_1 \\
\text{the king}
\end{array} 
\begin{array}{c}
\text{V}^0 \\
\text{V} \\
\text{xNP}_2 \\
\text{Arthur}
\end{array}
\]

b. \( \text{vP ECM/raising simplified} \)
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{DP} \\
\text{they}
\end{array} 
\begin{array}{c}
\text{v}^0 \\
\text{name}
\end{array} 
\begin{array}{c}
\text{VP} \\
\text{xNP}_1 \\
\text{the king}
\end{array} 
\begin{array}{c}
\text{V}^0 \\
\text{SC} \\
\text{xNP}_2 \\
\text{Arthur}
\end{array}
\]

If the second extended NP (xNP₂) in naming constructions is a predicate, proper names can enter syntax as predicates. This removes the standardly assumed difference between common nouns (assumed to start out as predicates) and proper names, and permits us to view them as definite descriptions when they appear in argument positions (unless some other determiner is present). Section 3 will show that the assumptions on the semantics of proper names that must be made if we are to explain their behavior in naming constructions suffice to account for their properties in argument positions and compositionally derive the indexicality of the proper names (rigidity, according to Kripke 1980) from their semantics in naming constructions. Section 4 is concerned with further predictions made by this approach, and in particular with the semantics of complex and modified proper names (e.g., the famous detective Sherlock Holmes). Section 5 is the conclusion and a discussion of new venues for future research. The Appendix in Section 6 provides evidence against possible alternative analyses of the naming construction.

2. Syntax of Naming Constructions

In this section I will argue that naming constructions, illustrated in (3a), have exactly the same syntax as the nomination construction in (3b), which have been argued to project a small clause:

(3) a. The king of all England was named Arthur.
   b. Arthur was named the king of all England.

First indications in favor of this hypothesis come from the fact that the same verbs may be used in both constructions: in the list below, italics indicate naming verbs, while boldface is used to mark verbs that can function both in naming and nomination constructions:

(4) anoint, appoint, baptize, call, choose, christen, crown, declare, designate, dub, elect, make, name, nickname, nominate, proclaim, pronounce, style, title, vote

In particular, nomination verbs can hardly be set apart from the verb make, which clearly takes a complement whose basic meaning is that of a predication, i.e. a small clause.

2.1. Small clauses

A small clause is a minimal syntactic structure containing a subject and a (non-verbal) predicate (Stowell 1981, 1983). Its exact internal structure is for the moment irrelevant:

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1 I use the term xNP rather than NP or DP where it is irrelevant which functional layers are projected.
2 Most verbs in this list come from Levin 1993, who places verbs of naming and nomination into the more general category of verbs that take predicative complements. Some verbs in the list are archaic in their naming or nomination use (dub), and a few (e.g. declare) are preferred with as-small clauses. I believe the list to be complete.
Small clauses can appear as complements to many verbs, some of them intensional, and their subjects receive Case either directly (the so-called Exceptional Case Marking, or ECM) or as a result of being raised to the [Spec, TP] of the matrix verb:

(5)  SC
subject  predicate
DP/CP  AP/PP/NP/DP

(6) a. They made [SC Alice (the) president/head of the association].  NP/DP predicate/ECM
b. Alice became [SC t₁ (the) president/head of the association].  NP/DP predicate/raising

(7) a. This proposition is/seems [SC t₁ preposterous/out of the question.  AP/PP predicate
b. [CP That Jessie should fight] was considered [CP t₁ obvious].  CP subject

Small clauses can have bare definite predicates as in (6) (Stowell 1991) and special Case-marking (Case-doubling, predicate Case). I will show that both these properties characterize also naming verbs, and furthermore that naming and nomination verbs behave the same syntactically across various languages (Arabic, Breton, English, Finnish, French, German, (Modern) Greek, Latin, Pima, Russian, Scandinavian…):

(8)  Major assumption
The structure that verbs of naming project is invariant across languages.⁴

Before we turn to cross-linguistic data, it should be observed that naming and nomination verbs do not all behave in exactly the same manner – some class-internal variation is present: for example, some naming and nomination verbs are morphologically derived (crown, appoint), and others are not (choose, dub). Semantically, some are clearly implicative, as shown by the fact that if examples (9) are true, it entails the truth of (10), with others (style, elect) the effect is less evident:

(9)  a. We dubbed her Tootsie.
   b. She was elected president.
   c. She managed to stay in office for 8 years.

(10) a. She was Tootsie.
     b. She was president.
     c. She stayed in office for 8 years.

Finally, syntactic class-internal variation is exemplified by the fact that some naming and nomination verbs allow xNP₂ drop (e.g. baptize, elect), while others do not (nickname, declare), and for those that do, a change in meaning may or may not accompany the drop of xNP₂ (baptize vs. elect). Since these facts are beyond the scope of this paper, they will not be discussed here.

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⁴ Some researchers consider infinitival VPs to also be small clauses. Since verbs of naming take only nominal predicates, we are not concerned with exact categorial specification of small clauses here.

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⁴ This is actually false for verbs of naming in Georgian (Lea Nash, p.c.) and Hindi (Anoop Mahajan, p.c.). In the latter case the verb is bi-morphemic and means “give a name” (incorporation). In the former case, the same is true for one of the two relevant verbs. These facts do not mean that the data presented in this talk need not be explained; they still show what they show: proper names can be predicates. See section 5.4 for discussion.
Finally, the verb *call* is often special, in many languages, and allows many more uses than the others. No conclusions will be based on its properties alone. Likewise, cases where the xNP₁ or DP₂ is introduced by a (Dative) preposition (e.g. Hebrew *k-r-h* ‘call’, English *promote*) will also be left aside, though this might be too much of a simplification.

### 2.2. xNP₁ is an argument, xNP₂ is not

The first step in arguing that verbs of naming appear with small clause complements is to show that the first extended noun phrase (xNP₁) is always a non-predicative one. Although it may not be referential (i.e. quantified subjects are allowed), it cannot be predicative and the article cannot be omitted with a singular noun:

(11) a. The Senate nominated/elected/declared Caesar consul. referential
    b. Gloria baptized every child Karl. non-referential
    c. * The Senate nominated senator consul. predicative

The interpretation of xNP₁ (GOAL) is the same for naming and nomination, suggesting a double-object analysis, which we will argue against (see section 6.1). The second xNP (xNP₂) is generally viewed as the THEME of this postulated ditransitive structure. Our first indication that this is not the case comes from the choice of the interrogative and anaphoric pronouns when xNP₁ is animate: the interrogative is *what* or *how* rather than *who*, and the anaphor is *so* and *that* rather than any animate pronoun:

(12) a. What/*who was Caesar nominated?
    b. What/*who did they christen the boy that Mr. Earnshaw found?

(13) Latimeria is called latimeria/that/so/*it/*itself after Miss Marjorie Courtney-Latimer.

Examples (12) merely confirm that the proper name in the naming construction does not have the same meaning as the proper name in an argument position: this is why anaphora is not by an animate pronoun. The fact that no referring pronoun (non even an inanimate anaphor like *itself*) can appear as xNP₂ argues that xNP₂ is not referential, but does not in itself show that xNP₂ is a predicate. A stronger argument comes from the behavior of the definite article with proper names in naming constructions.

### 2.3. Bare definites

As mentioned above, Stowell 1989 argues that verbs of nomination appear with a small clause complement and observes that they can have a bare nominal predicate, which is nonetheless interpreted as definite:

(14) a. The queen appointed her lover treasurer of the realm.
    b. Anne’s death made George (the) king of England.

Not every definite description allows the omission of the definite article in such cases. It is conditional on there being only one individual satisfying the predicate at every given moment:

(15) We named him public enemy *(number 1)/*enemy of the state.

An important connection between bare definite predicates and naming constructions is the fact that in languages where proper names in argument positions appear with definite articles (the

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5 I have nothing to say about why the choice of the interrogative vacillates between *what* and *how* depending on the choice of the verb (or the choice of a language), and why some verbs (e.g. *rename*) allow both.
so-called *preproprial articles*, they don’t do so with verbs of naming (unless the proper name is modified):

(16) a. Ich habe den Karl gesehen. Bavarian German (Nina Rothmayr, p.c.)
   I have the-Acc Karl seen.
   *I have seen Karl.*

b. Ich habe ihn (*den) Karl genannt
   I have him-Acc the-Acc Karl called
   *I called him Karl.*

c. Die Polly wird *(die)* neue Mary Poppins genannt ✓ for some speakers
   the Polly was the new Mary Poppins called
   *Polly was called the new Mary Poppins.*

A non-Indo-European language with the same phenomenon is the Uto-Aztecan language Pima, where proper names in argument positions must appear with an article (data due to Marcus Smith, p.c.):

(17) a. Hegam Pimas gamhu ha'ab 'ab 'e- 'a'aga 'oob. Pima
   Those Pimas over.there side DX ANA- say Apache
   *Those Pimas on the other side [of the border] call themselves Apache.*

b. M 'ac 'aacim 'ab 'ep 'i ha- 'a'aga heg 'o''ob 'i ha'ab 'oob.
   DX AUX:1pl we DX too INCEP3pl- say DET PL.Apache here side Apache
   *We also call the Apaches on this side [of the border] Apache.*

Tagalog xNPs (including proper names) require a determiner, which takes a special form with proper names. xNPs can be bare only in the predicate position and in a particular existential construction (Norvin Richards, p.c.):

(18) Kalabaw si Marcos Tagalog: predication
    water-buffalo DEF-PrPr Marcos
    Marcos is a water buffalo.

The special preproprial definite article disappears in the naming construction, which can thus be assimilated to other instances of predication:

(19) Pinangalanan ko siyang Alice. naming
    named I her-LÍ Alice
    *I named her Alice.*

Catalan (data due to Louise McNally and Maria Núria Martí Girbau, p.c.) also has a special definite article used with proper names. This article disappears when the proper name appears in a naming construction, as shown by the contrast between xNP1 and xNP2 in ():

(20) a. Va resultar que *(en) Joanet el van anomenar *(en) Jonathan
   go-3sg turn-out that the John-DIM him go-3sg name the Jonathan
   *It turned out that Johnny had been named Jonathan.*

As in the case of Bavarian German above, the surface form of the preproprial article varies depending on whether it appears with a bare proper name or with a modified one. A modified
proper name appears with the regular definite article _el_/la, while a bare proper name appears with the special definite article _en_/na.6

b. Li diuen *(el) Lord Nelson francés.
   him call-3sg the Lord Nelson French
   They call him the French Lord Nelson.

The fact that modified proper names necessitate the definite article in naming contexts shows that there’s no syntactic ban on definite DPs in that position.

Likewise, in colloquial Icelandic, Northern Norwegian and Northern Swedish argument proper names also require a preproprial article (Delsing 1993:54). In Northern Norwegian, the preproprial article takes the form of a 3rd person pronoun (exx. by Peter Svenonius and Øystein Alexander Vangsnes, p.c.):

(21) a. ho Marit så han Øystein
   she Marit saw he Øystein
   Marit saw Øystein.

b. han Øystein så ho Marit
   he Øystein saw she Marit
   Øystein saw Marit.

In naming constructions (as well as some others, such as vocatives, play-acting and certain possessives) this preproprial article disappears (Delsing 1993):

(22) a. Dæm døpte barnet (*ho) Marit
    naming they baptized child.the (she) Marit
    They baptized the child Marit.

b. Han heter (*han) Øystein.
   he is-called he Øystein
   He is called Øystein.

If proper names in naming constructions are used predicatively, article “drop” is explained by analogy with bare predicate definites in (14) discussed by Stowell 1989. Another possible parallel can be drawn with the lack of the indefinite article with nominal predicates in French (Kupferman 1979, Pollock 1983, Boone 1987, Longobardi 1994, Chierchia 1998, Roy 2001, Matushansky and Spector 2004, among others), in Dutch (de Swart et al. 2004) and in German, even though it is unclear whether the article has actually ever been there, given that predicates are not interpreted as indefinites and the only reason to postulate such an article is its presence in English.

However, the lack of the article does not by itself argue in favor of the theory that proper names are predicates in naming constructions. Indeed, one could argue that the reason for article “drop” is the non-referentiality of proper names here – something fully consistent with the idea that naming constructions involve “mention” rather than “use” of proper names. The data that we will consider now are, however, incompatible with those “mention” theories that assume that the proper name in the naming construction is an unanalyzable quote of the name itself, i.e. _Alice_ in the naming construction means [ælɪs] and nothing more (REF).

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6 The feminine preproprial article _na_ is only preserved in the more conservative dialects, such as the Balearic Catalan – other dialects use the regular feminine article _la_ (Maria Núria Martí Girbau, p.c.). See Longobardi 1999 and Coromina i Pou 2001 for some discussion of Catalan and Campbell 1991 as cited by Delsing 1993 on the subject of special preproprial articles in Tagalog, Malagasy, and Maori.
2.4. Predicate marking

In Korean, proper names in naming constructions appear with the copula (Shin-Sook Kim, p.c.):

he-Top self-Gen daughter-Acc Miran-be-Assertive-Quot call-Past-Decl  
He called his daughter Miran.

person-PL-Top he-Acc Korea-Gen Elvis-be-Assertive-Quot call-Past-Decl  
People called him the Korean Elvis.

Irrespective of whether the copulative particle -i is the overt realization of the head of the small clause, its presence cannot be squared with either the simplex “mention” theory or with the view that proper names in naming constructions denote something like “the name X”, since in neither of these two approaches is a copulative element expected to appear.

Even stronger evidence for a small clause analysis of naming constructions comes from languages with morphological Case-marking.

2.5. Case-marking

In languages where predicates are Case-marked as such, the Case on xNP2 is predicative. Such predicative Case-marking falls into two categories: dedicated predicate Case and Case-doubling.

2.5.1. Predicate case

The languages to be considered in this sub-section are Hungarian, Syrian Arabic and Russian. While none of these three languages has a dedicated predicate Case, predicates are nonetheless consistently marked with a particular Case (Dative, Accusative and Instrumental, respectively). This Case-marking extends to naming constructions.

In Hungarian, predicates are marked Dative, as shown by the ECM construction in (24a) and the nomination construction in (24b) (examples due to Veronika Hegedüs):

(24) a. okos-nak tart-om a la’ny-om-at ECM  
clever-Dat keep-1sg the daughter-1sg-acc  
I consider my daughter clever.

b. a la’ny- om-at elnök-nek jelölt-em nomination  
the daughter 1sg-Acc president-Dat nominated-1sg  
I nominated my daughter president.

In Hungarian naming constructions xNP2 bears Dative, and xNP1 is marked by Accusative:

(25) a la’ny- om-at Mari-nak nevezt-em el  
the daughter 1sg-Acc Mary-Dat named-1sg PREVERB  
I named my daughter Mary.

This is the exact reverse of what happens in ditransitives (Dative on the GOAL, Accusative on the THEME), showing that naming constructions project a different structure.

In Syrian Arabic the predicate Case is Accusative, as shown by the ECM and nomination constructions below (examples due to Nisrine Al-Zahre). The passivized variant is there to show that Accusative is not copied from the Case of xNP1 (Case-doubling):

(26) Salma i’ttabarat walad-a-ha wazir-an ECM  
Salma consider-Prf child-Acc-her minister-Acc  
Salma considers her child to be a minister.
(27) a. salma ʕayyanat wazir-an
nomination
salma nominate. Caus-Prf minister-Acc
Salma nominated her child to be a minister.

b. walad-u-ha ʕuyyna wazir-an
child-Nom-her nominate. Pass-Prf minister-Acc
Her child was nominated to be a minister.

As expected, in naming constructions, xNP₂ is also marked Accusative:

(28) a. salma laqqabat ʕaliy-an
naming
salma nickname. Caus-Prf Ali-Acc
Salma nicknamed her child Ali.

b. walad-u-ha luqqiba ʕaliy-an
child-Nom-her nickname. Pass-Prf Ali-Acc
Her child is nicknamed Ali.

In Finnish, xNP₂ in naming constructions is marked with the Translative Case, which is the Case marking resultative primary and secondary predicates (examples due to Liina Pylkkänen, p.c.):

(29) a. Me valits-i-mme Sue-n presidenti-ksi. nomination: primary
we elect-PST-1pl Sue-Acc president-Trs
We elected Sue president.

b. Me maalas-i-mme seinä-n keltaise-ksi. resultative: secondary
we paint-PAST-1pl wall-ACC yellow-Trs
We painted a/the wall yellow.

Case-marking in Finnish being partly semantic, xNP₂ in naming constructions is marked Translative, rather than Essive (the Case of primary predication not involving a change of state).

we call-1pl William Gates-PART Bill-Trs
We call William Gates Billy.

In Russian (and many other Slavic languages) predicates are marked Instrumental (Bailyn and Rubin 1991, Bailyn and Citko 1999, Pereltsvaig 2001, among many others):

(31) a. Ja sčitaju ee lingvistkoj. ECM (primary predication)
I consider her-Acc linguist-Instr
I consider her a linguist.

b. Ona vernulas’ krasavicej. depictive (secondary predication)
she came back beauty-Instr
She came back a beauty.

(32) a. Senat izbral Cezar’a konsulom nomination
Senate-Nom chose-M Caesar-Acc consul-Instr
The Senate elected Caesar consul.

b. Cezar’ byl izbran konsulom
Caesar-Nom was-M chosen-M consul-Instr
Caesar was elected consul.

In naming constructions, xNP₂ can be marked Instrumental as well:
They baptized her Anna.

Russian differs from Hungarian and Syrian Arabic in that with the default verb `zvati` ‘call’ and some of its derivates, xNP₂ can also be marked Nominative:

   my sister-Acc call-3pl Nina-Nom/Instr  
   My sister is called Nina.

b. Septimija prozvali Sever/Severom.  
   Septimius-Acc nicknamed-pl Severus-Nom/Instr  
   Septimius was nicknamed Severus.

c. Ego obozvali *plaksa/ plaksoj  
   3Msg-Acc dubbed-pl crybaby-Nom/Instr  
   He was stigmatized as a crybaby.

There is some difference in meaning between Nominative and Instrumental, but it is very elusive, and the entire phenomenon resembles that of the Nominative/Instrumental variation with the copula `be` (Bailyn and Rubin 1991, Bailyn and Citko 1999, Pereltsvaig 2001, among others). As suggested by David Pesetsky, p.c., the Nominative Case-marking here is probably the Nominative of direct quotation. Support for this theory comes from examples like (35):

(35) Liza nazyvaet svoju sestru moja radost'/*mojej radost'ju  
   Lisa calls self's sister my joy-Nom/Instr  
   Lisa calls her sister "my joy".

The 1st person pronoun in (35) is interpreted as referring not to the speaker of the utterance, but rather to the subject of naming verb (i.e., Lisa's sister).

Furthermore, with proper names that are not names of humans or animals only Nominative is allowed in naming constructions (many thanks to Barry Schein for drawing my attention to this fact):

(36) Tolstoy nazval svoj roman “Anna Karenina”/*”Annoj Kareninoj”  
    Tolstoy called self's novel “Anna Karenina”-Nom/Instr  
    Tolstoy called his novel “Anna Karenina”.

The unavailability of Instrumental Case-marking may correlate with the fact that inanimate individuals such as books are never properly “called” or “addressed” by their names.

2.5.2. **Case-doubling**

Case-doubling is an agreement phenomenon whereby the structural Case assigned to the subject (Nominative or Accusative) is transmitted to the predicate. This means that it is a characteristic property of small clauses (especially in secondary predication, even in languages that don’t have it in primary predication).³ ³

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³ Czech also allows the two Cases in naming constructions and with the copula `be`; Instrumental is interpreted as more temporary (REF).

⁸ Case doubling also occurs in Japanese and Korean with inalienable possession. This might be relevant: Massam 1985 and following her Cho 1998 argue that Korean Case doubling involves ECM. This is suggestive since one of the contexts in Northern Norwegian where the preproprial article disappears is possession, but it is more likely that, like with indefinite article drop in French, Dutch and German predicates, we are dealing with a different phenomenon here.
An example of a language with Case-doubling is Latin. In Latin small clauses, the Case on the predicate is the same as that on xNP1: when passivization renders xNP1 Nominative, this is reflected in the Case of the predicate:

(37) a. Ciceronem clarum habent. small clause
   Cicero-Nom famous-Nom consider/hold
   They consider Cicero famous.

   b. Cicero clarus habetur     passive
   Cicero-Nom famous-Nom consider/hold-Pass
   Cicero is considered famous.

(38) a. Ciceronem consulem creat     verb of nomination
   Cicero-Nom consul-Nom make-3sg
   S/he makes Cicero consul.

   b. Cicero creatur consul     passive
   Cicero-Nom create-Pass-3sg consul-Nom
   Cicero is made consul.

The fact that Case-doubling also takes place with naming constructions shows that verbs of naming take a small clause complement:

(39) a. Filium meum Lucium voco. verb of naming
   son-Acc my-Acc Lucius-Acc call-1sg
   I call my son Lucius.

   b. Meus filius vocatur Lucius passive
   my-Nom son-Nom call-Pass-3sg Lucius-Nom
   My son is called Lucius.

There is no accepted theory of Case-doubling, but while “copying” the Case of the subject onto the predicate can be viewed as a kind of agreement, no relation is commonly assumed to exist between two internal arguments of a ditransitive verb that would permit to connect their Case-marking. In other words, Case doubling is only compatible with a theory where xNP2 is a predicate.

The same effects obtain in Modern Greek (examples due to Dimitra Papangeli):

(40) a. Theoro to Yani ilithio ECM
   consider-1sg the-acc Yani-acc idiot-masc-acc
   I consider Yani an idiot.

   b. O Yanis theorite ilithios passive
   the-nom Yanis-nom consider-Psss.3sg idiot-nom
   Yani is considered an idiot.

(41) a. Diorisa to Yani diefthindi nomination
   appointed-1sg the-acc Yani-acc director-acc
   I appointed Yani (the) director.

   b. O Yanis dioristike diefthindis passive
   the-nom Yanis-nom appoint-Pass.3sg director-nom
   Yani was appointed (the) director.

9 Of course, Case is not the only formal feature transmitted from the small clause subject to its predicate, but unlike gender and number agreement, it cannot possibly be attributed to semantics.
As examples (40) and (41) show, besides being a Case-doubling language, Modern Greek also necessitates an article for proper names in argument positions. In naming constructions, the definite article on xNP₂ disappears and the Case on xNP₂ is the same as that on xNP₁:

(42) a. Vaftisa to Yani Petro naming
    baptised-1sg the-acc Yani-acc Petro-acc
    I baptized Yani Petro.

b. O Yanis vaftistike Petros passive
    the-nom Yanis-nom baptise-Pass.3sg Petros-nom
    Yani was baptized Petro.

Finally, Albanian is similar to Modern Greek in having both Case doubling and preproprial definite articles (examples due to Dalina Kallulli, p.c.):¹⁰

(43) a. Mësues-ja e saj e konsideronte Ronë-n ECM
    teacher-the.Nom agr her.Poss her.Acc considered Rona-the.Acc
    student-e-n më të mirë të klasës.
    student-F-def.Acc more agr good agr class-the.Dat
    Her teacher considered Rona the best student in class.

b. Ron-a konsidero-hej student-ja më e mirë e klasës.
    Rona-the.Nom considered-NAct student-def.Nom more agr good agr class-the.Dat
    Rona was considered the best student in class.

Similarly to Russian, however, Albanian also allows Nominative Case on xNP₂ in addition to Case-doubling. The distinction is clear when a modified proper name is used and the definite article is not dropped:

(44) a. Britni Speërsi-n e quajnë Madon-a e re naming
    Britney Spears-the.Acc her-Acc call-3pl Madonna-def.Nom agr new

b. Britni Speërsi-n e quajnë Madonë-n e re
    Britney Spears-the.Acc her-Acc call-3pl Madonna-def.Acc agr new

c. Britni Speërsi-n e quajnë Madonë të re
    Britney Spears-the.Acc her-Acc call-3pl Madonna agr.Acc new

They call Britney Spears the new Madonna.

The behavior of proper names in naming constructions in Albanian also suggests that their status there is that of predicates.

2.6. Other predicate positions

If there are ECM verbs of naming, there should be raising verbs of naming, such as the Dutch *heten* (Eddy Ruys, p.c.) and the German *heissen* ‘to be called’:

(45) Zij heet Marie
    she be-named Marie
    She is named Marie.

Further evidence in favor of our hypothesis comes from the fact that proper names can also appear in other predicate positions, such as secondary predicates and complements of other ECM verbs (see also Bach 2002):¹¹

¹⁰ The Accusative clitic results from obligatory clitic doubling (Kallulli 2000, 2001).
(46) Born [PRO Charles Lutwidge Dodgson], the man who would become Lewis Carroll was an eccentric and an eclectic.

The general analysis of depictive secondary predication is that it involves a small clause with a PRO subject.

A possible objection to be raised at this point is the absence of extended VP complements to verbs of naming. While most ECM, raising and nomination verbs allow infinitival, indicative or subjunctive complements (sometimes with a subtle change in meaning), verbs of naming can only appear with a nominal small clause, as shown by the contrast between the nomination verbs in (47) and the naming verb in (48):

(47) a. They proclaimed Arthur to be the king of all England.\hspace{1cm} \text{infinitival}
    b. The prince declared that the war was inevitable.\hspace{1cm} \text{indicative}
    c. Gawaine chose that Dame Ragnell be a beauty by day and a hag by night.\hspace{1cm} \text{subjunctive}

(48) a. Earnshaw named the foundling Heathcliff.
    b. *Earnshaw named the foundling (to) be Heathcliff.
    c. *Earnshaw named that the foundling is/be Heathcliff.

I can envisage two explanations, a syntactic one, which I find uninteresting, and a semantic one, which seems to be less arbitrary, but has the problem of predicting uninterpretability rather than ungrammaticality.

The syntactic explanation capitalizes on the fact that a head can c-select its complement. Thus no verb of perception, for example, allows infinitival complements, but finite complements are permitted with all of them and some also permit small clause ones:

(49) a. Carol saw that the sentinel had left.\hspace{1cm} CP
    b. Claire saw Claire running/run/*to run.\hspace{1cm} \text{small clause/xVP/*IP}

It is possible therefore that verbs of naming restrict the lexical category of the predicate of the small clause they combine with. Examples such as (50) show that other ECM verbs can c-select an xNP small clause (cf. Stowell 1981, 1983):

(50) a. I consider Elizabeth clever/a friend/in the running/*(*to) live in Paris.
    b. I let Elizabeth *clever/*a friend/into the house/*(*to) live in Paris.
    c. I made Elizabeth clever/a professor/*into the house/*(*to) live in Paris.

The alternative is that an embedded verb would introduce an event argument, which would be incompatible with the semantics of naming verbs. This solution has more to recommend itself, since the semantics of naming verbs that we propose below does indeed make them incompatible with events, but it predicts that (48b, c) should be uninterpretable rather than ungrammatical.

2.7. **have/be alternation**

An interesting albeit minor piece of evidence in favor of the predicate analysis of proper names in English naming constructions and against those “mention” theories that treat proper names as unanalyzable quotes comes from the interpretation of a proper name in these constructions.

Suppose that the naming construction indeed involved a simple mention of a proper name, just like (51) do:

---

11 Proper names cannot appear with verbs like seem or believe. Two possible explanations can be envisaged: (1) These verbs impose a scalarity constraint on their complement (Matushansky 2002), to which proper names do not conform, and (2) proper names have no (s) argument slot, which would make a de dicto reading and therefore the possibility to appear as predicates in intensional contexts impossible for them.
(51)  
(a) The word fry has three letters.  
(b) A hand wrote (the words) Mene, mene, tekel, upharsin on the wall.

The italicized expressions in (51) involve mention rather than use, as can be shown by the fact that they can be preceded by such explicit indications of their meta-linguistic status as “the word(s)”, “the expression”, etc. However, a proper name X cannot be replaced with the/a name (of) X in naming and nomination constructions, which means that X does not denote the name X:

(52)  
(a) They named him (*the name (of)) Heathcliff.  
(b) The Senate nominated him (*the office/function/duty… (of)) consul.

One potential counter-example due to Roger Schwarzschild, p.c., involves the default verb call:

(53) She called him every name in the book.

This example (under the assumption that it can have the non-idiomatic reading) raises two separate problems. On the one hand, it would seem that a proper name can after all be replaced by a regular xNP. On the other, how can a predicate be universally quantified?

To answer these questions we compare the construction in (53) to that in (54), which also has a predicational meaning and contains universal quantification (see Partee 1987 answering Williams 1983):

(54) This house has been every color.

Both (53) and (54) are English-specific, and be means have there. The similarity between the two argues in favor of our theory, because it means that the default naming verb call shares some properties with the copula be. Nonetheless, given how often call has special syntax, we do not consider this result important.\textsuperscript{12}

2.8. Summary

On the basis of the following facts I argued that verbs of naming take a small clause complement (like verbs of nomination and other clearly ECM verbs):

- The preproprietal definite article on the predicate proper name is dropped in naming constructions
- Case-marking of the proper name parallels that of a predicate (the usual predicative Case, or Case-doubling)
- Proper names can function as both primary (ECM, raising) and secondary (depictive) predicates, and are compatible with have/be alternation

Evidence against alternative analyses can be found in the Appendix (section 6). Importantly, there is nothing about the semantics of the naming construction that requires it to be analyzed as involving predication. It is the cross-linguistic syntactic evidence that rules out semantic analyses where proper names are treated as unanalyzable quotes or mentions (along the lines of “(the sound) [ælθis]”).\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12} As Philippe Schlenker (p.c.) notes, a straightforward naming counterpart of (53) is impossible:

(i) * She has been every name.

One possible explanation of this fact is that the noun name in itself is not a naming predicate (in the sense to be made precise below) and so cannot be used to substitute for one. The same reasoning can be used to explain why the French predicate pronoun le cannot be anaphoric to a proper name (Philippe Schlenker, p.c.):

(ii) * Sa femme s’appelle Tania, et sa soeur se l’appelle/le s’appelle aussi.
By Occam’s razor, proper names in argument positions should incorporate the meaning that they have in the predicate position, just like definite argument DPs incorporate the meaning of corresponding NP predicates. Two sides of the question must be taken into account: on the one hand, proper names are predicates, but on the other hand, they must be sufficiently different from common nouns to explain such differences between the two as the ability to appear with verbs of naming (excluded for common nouns) and the _de dicto_ reading (generally considered impossible for proper names).

3. **ANALYSIS**

The goal of this section is to provide a lexical entry for proper names. Since they enter syntax as predicates, we will be able to account for modified and complex proper names in a way parallel to modification inside DPs. I will show that they are more than simple predicates, and need to incorporate into their meaning how they are used. As a result the meaning that we will give for predicate proper names will also explain the peculiarities of their behavior in argument positions.

The meaning of proper name predicates in naming constructions allows us to immediately discard the class of hypotheses with artificial predicates making reference to the denotation of a proper name, like \( \lambda x. x = Alice \) or with abbreviated definite descriptions such as _Aristotle = “the one who Aristotelizes”_. Neither of such artificial predicates gives us the right meaning in naming constructions.

However, a simple predicate hypothesis along the lines in (55) also cannot be right, for the reasons discussed in section 3.1 below:

(55)  
\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{[[cat]]} = \lambda x. x \text{ is a cat} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \text{[[Cate]]} = \lambda x. x \text{ is a Cate}
\end{align*}

My proposal is summarized in (56). I propose that proper names are two-place predicates: besides the standard individual argument slot, they also include an argument slot for the naming convention:

(56)  
\[ \text{[[Alice]]} = \lambda x \in D. \lambda R. x \text{ is the referent of } [æls] \text{ by virtue of the naming convention } R \]

Besides this additional argument slot, the lexical entry in (56) means that the contents of the name quotes the (phonology of) the name itself, which makes my approach a special case of the so-called “quotation theories” of proper names (see Kneale 1962, Geurts 1997, Bach 2002). This reference to phonology is essential, because phonology is the only clue that allows us to distinguish different proper names (Sylvain Bromberger, p.c., see also the discussion in Abbott to appear).

3.1. **The naming convention**

Why is the lexical entry in (55b) problematic? At first blush, a simplex predicate is all we need to account for naming constructions. However, problems arise when we consider the question of raising and ECM verbs that are not naming verbs:

(57)  
\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \# \text{The happy parents made their daughter Alice.} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \# \text{She was Beth Clark.}
\end{align*}

Since we have seen that proper names can be predicates in environments other than naming constructions, what’s wrong with (57)? Once we have examined (46) again, we see that there the proper name predicate means something like “named Lewis Carroll” – in other words, there is a naming implicit in the meaning of the predicate:

(46)  
\text{Born [PRO Charles Lutwidge Dodgson], the man who would become Lewis Carroll was an eccentric and an eclectic.}
Taking this into account and setting up the context accordingly improves on the examples (57):

(58) Her first marriage made her Mrs. Narcisse Pensoneau. Her second marriage she was Mrs. Enrique (Henry) Emillio Hernandez.

http://www.electricscotland.com/history/america/donna/lizzie-f.htm

(58) shows that in order to combine with non-naming verbs, proper names must include the meaning of “being named”. This is exactly what the naming convention argument slot is set up to accomplish. The question is, can we do better than that?

So far, we have remained strictly neutral on the question of whether small clauses contain any functional heads, in addition to the extended lexical projection of the predicate. Suppose we make the naming small clause more complex by adding a new head with the special “be named” meaning, as in (59) (strikethrough indicates that the head is phonologically null). Such a solution would seem to have the advantage of obtaining the lexical entry in (56) from the meaning of the predicate head s₀ and that of the proper name, in a compositional way.

(59) vP
   DP v
   the marriage xNP₁ make xNP₂
   sP s₀ s₁
   s₀ be-named Mrs. N.P.

sP stands for a small clause with the head s₀

The first issue that arises with respect to (59) is that of the meaning of the proper name, which can no longer be that of a predicate. Instead the proper name is an argument of the s₀ head and presumably denotes whatever the phonological string Mrs. N.P. does (“mention” rather than “use” of the proper name, with no additional complications in the semantics of a proper name). All semantic similarity to other small clauses immediately disappears and we are left wondering why the proper name in a naming construction should behave like a predicate when it has turned out to be a denoting expression, after all. Even if we overcome this problem, (59) also predicts that a definite description with explicit “mention” vocabulary should be allowed – and we have already showed that this is not the case:

(60) *Her first marriage made her the name/the words/the sound Mrs. Narcisse Pensoneau.

Naming constructions give rise to another sort of questions. Since they take small clause complements, which type of small clauses are these? On the one hand, we would want to use the structure in (59) for all naming predicates – on the other, in naming constructions it is arguably the naming verb that determines what naming relation is established between the name and its bearer (nicknaming, naming, etc.). This means that either the syntactic evidence we saw so far is misleading and the naming verb takes two arguments, or in naming constructions, proper names do have a predicate meaning, and we then have two ways of arriving at this meaning – either via a naming construction or via the structure in (59).

A apparent possible solution is to say that since naming verbs already include the “being named” part in their meaning, we can analyze them as involving incorporation/movement of the small clause head into the functional v₀ head (cf. Hale and Keyser 1993 and Harley 2003):
However, the incorporation hypothesis means that s^0 cannot be a normal small clause head, because different naming verbs introduce different naming relations (e.g. *dub* vs. *nickname*) and the difference will have to be in s^0 (given that the CAUSE component has a standard meaning). In other words, s^0 becomes suspiciously similar to a regular verbal root, and we once again have to explain why xNP_2 behaves as a predicate.

An even more serious problem is the fact that proper names in argument positions also involve as part of their meaning the “being named” part. This means that the hypothetical s^0 name head is also present in argument positions – and therefore, it cannot be a small clause head or a verb.

We conclude that the attempt to exclude the argument slot for the naming relation from the semantics of proper names and place it elsewhere creates more problems than it solves.

### 3.2. Predicate proper names

Given the sample lexical entry in (56), how can we compositionally obtain the meaning in (62)?

(62)   [[Alice is nicknamed Al]] ≈ Alice is the referent of [æl] by virtue of * nicknaming*

We begin with the natural assumption that the naming small clause is combined with the naming verb directly. The question arises how to interpret the resulting VP.

#### 3.2.1. The semantic structure

I propose that the naming verb (or actually, its root) quantifies over the naming relation argument slot of the proper name. This means that naming verbs project the complex structure in (63):

(63) simplified

The role of the verbal root in this structure is to introduce existential quantification over a naming relation and to restrict it. The verbal root functions as a modifier on this quantification (cf. Hale and Keyser 1993 and Harley 2003):

(64)   [[vp √call [his heroine Alice]]] = 1 if there exists a naming convention R such that R is a calling relation and his heroine is the referent of [æl] by virtue of R
Naming verbs therefore resemble intensional verbs: while the latter introduce restricted quantification over possible worlds, the former restrict and quantify over naming relations. The reason to assume that naming verbs introduce existential quantification (rather than a universal or an iota operator) is the fact that (63) does not exclude the existence of other calling relations involving the subject of the naming small clause:

(65) Her parents called her Elisabeth, but everyone calls her Libby.

Importantly, the difference between verbs of naming and verbs of nomination is in how they compose with their complements rather than in the structure they appear in: although both project a small clause, with verbs of naming, the verbal root introduces existential quantification over the naming convention argument slot of the small clause predicate, and thus semantically resemble attitude verbs more than verbs of nomination.

3.2.2. Functional structure

The tree in (63) contains two functional vP layers: the agentive v0 head introduces the BECOME component of the meaning, and the structure is topped by a causative v0 head CAUSE (cf. Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995, Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1998).

The presence of the aspectual BECOME layer is confirmed by Case-marking on xNP2 in the Finnish examples (29) and (30), repeated below. (29) shows that in standard resultatives, both primary and secondary, the predicate is marked with the Translative Case, presumably assigned by the BECOME v0. (30) shows that in naming constructions xNP2 is also marked Translative.

(29) a. Me valits-i-mme Sue-n presidenti-ksi. nomination: primary
    we elect-PST-1pl Sue-ACC president-Trs
    We elected Sue president.

b. Me maalas-i-mme seinä-n keltaise-ksi. resultative: secondary
    we paint-PAST-1pl wall-ACC yellow-Trs
    We painted a/the wall yellow.

(30) Me kutsu-mme William Gatesi-a Billi-ksi. naming
    we call-1pl William Gates-PART Bill-Trs
    We call William Gates Billy.

Another argument, due to Danny Fox, p.c., in favor of having more than one event in the structure associated with verbs of naming is modification by again. As shown by von Stechow 1995, 1996 and Beck and Johnson 2004, with a change of state verb, again can modify either of the events involved.13

(66) Ali Baba opened Sesame again.

a. Ali Baba restored Sesame to the state of being open
b. Ali Baba repeated the action of opening Sesame.

von Stechow 1995, 1996 argues that the restitutive reading of (66), paraphrased in (66a), results from again scoping below the CAUSE v0, while in its repetitive reading, paraphrased in (66b), again scopes higher than the CAUSE v0. Exactly the same argument can be offered for verbs of naming:

(67) You can’t call her Griselda again.

13 Both this and the next example face the same problem: the final state cannot be readily distinguished from the transition to this state (Was Sesame open again or did it become open again? Is the BECOME component of the meaning merely an implicature?). We will not address the issue here, as not directly relevant.
In its repetitive reading (67) can be used in a situation where the challenge is to give a doll
different names without ever repeating oneself. The restitutive reading of (67) suits the situation
where the task is not to repeat someone else’s (i.e. not to cause the doll to have the same name).
We therefore see that naming verbs have as complex an event structure as change of state verbs,
with the final state described by the predication in the small clause.

Since CAUSE and BECOME are both functional heads, we expect them to project higher than
the lexical head containing the root. However, are there independent reasons for excluding the
alternative structure where it is the act of naming that serves as a cause for a becoming event, as
in (68)?

(68) * [CAUSE [BECOME [his heroine Alice]] by naming]?

The reason to dismiss the structure in (68) is that it gives rise to incorrect truth-conditions.
To see this, consider the fact that in some Arabic cultures, a woman drops her own name when
she bears a (male) child and instead becomes Umm plus the child’s name, as in Umm Kulthum
(umm means “mother”). If the structure in (68) were correct, then bestowing the name Kulthum
on a woman’s son could be described as naming her Umm Kulthum, contrary to our intuitions.

3.2.3. Contexts other than naming

We now return to proper names with ECM and raising verbs, as well as in secondary predication:

(46) Born [PRO Charles Lutwidge Dodgson], the man who would become Lewis Carroll
was an eccentric and an eclectic.

The syntax and semantics proposed above require that a naming small clause combine with
a naming verb. Why is then (46) grammatical and comprehensible?

Two possibilities can be imagined. One is saturation of the naming convention argument
slot by a free variable getting its reference from the context, and the other is existential closure.

The free variable proposal suggests that proper name predicates are to be compared with
adjectives like local and close, and nouns like friend:

(69) a. Lucy went to a local bar. = local to Lucy, or local to HERE
b. She is a good friend. = my friend

Both local and friend require an internal argument that is not overt in examples (69). One
possible analysis (cf. Mitchell 1986, Partee 1989 and Martí 2003) is to assume that it is saturated
by a covert free variable, which receives its value from the context. The first occurrence of a
proper name in (46) is then interpreted as in (70). 14

(70) [[ [SC [ PRO₁ Charles Lutwidge Dodgson ] (R₃) ] ]] = 1 iff g (1) is the referent of [tʃʌɭz
lʌtwidʒ dɔdʒsʌn] by virtue of the naming convention g (3)

An alternative assumption is to suppose that a covert variable is quantified over by the freely
introduced existential closure (indicated below as ∃R₃). In this case, the secondary predication in
(46) is interpreted as in (71):

(71) [[ [SC ∃R₃ [PRO₁ Charles Lutwidge Dodgson]] ]] = 1 iff ∃R₃ : R₃ is a naming convention . x₁
is is the referent of [tʃʌɭz lʌtwidʒ dɔdʒsʌn] by virtue of R₃

One reason in favor of choosing the second option is that we do not seem to have any clear
intuitions about which naming conventions are involved:

14 Unlike Partee 1989 and similarly to Martí 2003, we assume that such contextual variables are syntactically
projected.
Dr. Asher is Claire in France and Klara in Germany.

The only thing that (72) claims is that someone calls her Claire when she is in France – we have no idea who, why, or under what circumstances. This intuition is probably best captured by a hidden existential. Moreover, negation also favors the existential closure reading:

Dr. Asher is not Claire, she is Klara.

(73) does not mean that Dr. Asher is not named Claire in some circumstances – rather it means that there is no naming convention according to which she is Claire.

Once this assumption is made, it can be extended to proper names in argument positions, to which we now turn. As a result, we will see that there are cases where the argument slot for the naming convention is saturated by a contextually supplied free variable.

### 3.3. Argument proper names

The behavior of proper names in the naming construction shows that they can enter syntax as predicates, just as common nouns do. By Occam’s razor we must then assume that in argument positions they behave exactly like common nouns, and that conversion from the predicate type \langle e, t \rangle to the argument types \langle e \rangle and \langle \langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle is accomplished by the same means. In other words, when proper names are interpreted as definite, they are in fact definite descriptions:

(74) a. A Jane Smith to see you. \hspace{1cm} existential quantifier or choice function
    b. The Alice is here. \hspace{1cm} iota operator

The proposal that in their most familiar meaning proper names are definite descriptions is in itself not new. On the one hand, there exists a long list of syntactic and semantic arguments in favor of this view (see e.g. Geurts 1997), some of which will shortly be presented. On the other hand, a number of proposals have been presented as to the exact nature of the predicate serving as a basis for these definite descriptions.

#### 3.3.1. Proper names as definite descriptions

The first, most evident, argument in favor of the definite description analysis comes from the fact that the definite article is obligatorily overt in some languages (some of which were discussed above) and in other languages, the definite article can appear with some (sub-classes) of proper names (which Strawson 1950 calls quasi-names, see Burge 1973, Geurts 1997, Elbourne 2002, and Borer in press):

(75) a. the Thames, the Pacific, the Alps…
    b. the States, the Netherlands, the Sudan…

If argument proper names are definite descriptions, the appearance of the definite article is unsurprising (it is its absence that needs to be explained). Under any other hypothesis, the has to be treated as part of the proper name, which makes it all the more strange that it can sometimes disappear:

(76) a. our ugly little Thames
    b. this beautiful Paris

Definite proper names with overt determiners, as in (76), offer additional support for the definite description view, and will be discussed in section 4.1.
3.3.2. Binding and scope

Just like definite descriptions, proper names can be used as bound variables (Geurts 1997) and as E-type expressions (Elbourne 2002):

(77) a. If a child is christened ‘Bambi’, then Disney will sue Bambi’s parents.
   b. Every woman who has a husband called John and a lover called Gerontius takes only Gerontius to the Rare Names Convention.

The slight awkwardness of examples (77) is due to a general constraint against repetition, and resurfaces in parallel examples involving definite descriptions:

(78) a. If a man is elected president, the president will be male.
   b. Mary talked to no senator before that senator was impeached.

As Geurts 1997 points out, such examples can be improved by introducing a competing antecedent as a reason for repetition:

(79) a. If you call your children Bamby and Thumper, Thumper is not likely to thank you.
   b. If a man is elected president and a woman, vice-president, only the president will be male.

Whatever analysis is adopted to treat bound and E-type definite descriptions can be used to treat proper names in (77).

3.3.3. Generic use

Yet another argument in favor of treating proper names as definite descriptions comes from the fact that both can be used as singular generics (Geurts 1997):

(80) The light bulb/Coca Cola was invented by an American.

Geurts 1997 provides other arguments in favor of the definite description hypothesis and concludes that proper names are definite descriptions whose meaning is quite similar to what we proposed, i.e., ‘the individual named N’, although this meaning is not arrived at compositionally. There is, however, a serious flaw in this kind of an analysis: proper names in argument positions do not generally behave as straightforward definite descriptions in that they exhibit the well-known property of rigidity of reference (Kripke 1980):

(81) Mary considers Peter to be a fool.
   a. ⇒ The individual called Peter in w₀ is a fool in Mary’s belief-worlds.
   b. ⇔ The individual called Peter in Mary’s belief-worlds (who might be John in w₀) is a fool in Mary’s belief-worlds.

Whereas a definite description can be interpreted either de re or de dicto, a proper name is only interpreted de re. A perceptive reader can object at this point that proper names in Geurts’ examples (77) are not rigid: the referent of Bambi changes from situation to situation. However, this observation does not explain why proper names are generally rigid.

3.3.4. Indexicality of proper names

A possible solution to this puzzle comes from the widespread proposal that the rigidity of proper names results from indexicality. To arrive at this compositionally, one has to assume that proper names contain an indexical – and the question is, which indexical?

One proposal (Burge 1973) is that the meaning of proper names contains a demonstrative and Alice is in fact that Alice. Larson and Segal 1995 implement this proposal by assuming that the null demonstrative that is present in syntax. Of several arguments against this view presented
by Elbourne 2002, the most basic one comes once again from languages with an overt definite article with proper names: why is there no overt demonstrative?

An alternative view, due to Lerner and Zimmermann 1984, 1991 and Haas-Spohn 1995, makes reference to the usage that is salient in the context. A variation of this view (Recanati 1997, Pelczar and Rainsbury 1998) makes use of the indexical of the name-assigning convention or dubbing in force. As is clear from the sample lexical entry in (56), repeated below, this latter hypothesis is the one I would like to use.

(56) \[ \text{Alice} = \lambda x \in D_x . \lambda R . x \text{ is the referent of [ælɪs] by virtue of the naming convention R} \]

If R can be saturated by the contextually provided indexical of the naming convention in force between the speaker and the hearer, proper names in argument positions will be rigid.

(82) \[ \text{the Alice}^c = \iota x . x \text{ is the referent of [ælɪs] by virtue of the naming convention in force between the speaker and the hearer} \]

Importantly, although saturation by a contextual indexical argument is always available, it is by no means obligatory: a third person pronoun such as she can take its value from the context or be bound. We will now see that the indexical of the naming convention can also be relativized to immediate context (i.e., it is a shiftable indexical in the sense of Schlenker 1999).

3.3.5. Context-dependence

That naming conventions are not always those of the actual speaker and the actual hearer can be seen from examples like (83), where, as noted above, the naming convention argument slot is existentially quantified over:

(83) She was Lo, plain Lo, in the morning, standing four feet ten in one sock. She was Lola in slacks. She was Dolly at school. She was Dolores on the dotted line. But in my arms she was always Lolita (Vladimir Nabokov, Lolita).

Once we make this assumption we can claim that predicate proper names behave in exactly the same way as regular nominal predicates, which can also be relativized to the situation:

(84) a. He is a shy student by day, a go-go boy by night.
    b. He is a quack for the majority and the greatest surgeon ever for a few.

Comparing proper name and common noun predicates in this environment we can address the question of why in examples like (85a) it is always xNP₂ that is relativized to the situation introduced by the frame adverbial:

(85) a. To everyone except her parents, Elizabeth is Libby.
    b. To everyone except his patients, this surgeon is a quack.

The explanation is the same as in (85b): predicates cannot be interpreted de re because they do not have independent saturation of their argument slots for time and world of evaluation (cf. Farkas 1993, Percus 2000).

A natural question to ask at this point is whether existential quantification over the naming convention is available for proper names in argument positions. The answer is positive: since we assume that the naming convention in force between the speaker and the hearer is always present in the context, it is always there to render the existentially quantified variants true. However, as we saw from Geurts’ and Elbourne’s examples above, it can also happen that a different naming convention is made use of.
3.4. Attributive vs. referential distinction

As Geurts 1997 following Kripke 1980 points out, the referential/attributive distinction due to Donnellan 1966 applies to names just as it applies to definite NPs. One interesting example of this is given in (86):

(86) The probe had been programmed to choose the planet most likely to be earth-like, and to home on it. We had named that planet Centaura. <…> Centaura did exist; we knew that now.

Larry Niven, *Convergent Series*, p. 56

What is interesting about (86) is the second use of the proper name, where it effectively means “the object that we named Centaura” and is completely parallel in use to the DP *the planet most likely to be Earth-like*. The definite description picks out the unique individual that satisfies it – Donnellan’s referential use.

3.5. Summary

In this section I have proposed and motivated a novel analysis of proper names as underlyingly predicates with an additional argument for the naming convention. As a result, naming verbs are viewed as introducing an existential quantifier over naming conventions, in exactly the same way as attitude verbs introduce a universal quantifier over possible worlds.

No part of this analysis is in itself surprising. The proposal that proper names are definite descriptions quoting the phonological form of the name itself dates back at least as far as Kneale 1962. The idea that their rigidity is due to a hidden indexical has also been discussed, as noted above. My contribution as I see it is to provide independent evidence for a definite description analysis with a “quotation” predicate and make it follow from compositionality.

We have seen that in order to obtain the correct meaning for the VP consisting of a naming verb and a small clause with a proper name predicate, certain assumptions must be made. One of these assumptions is very straightforward: the proper name can be interpreted as a predicate. The other is more complex: proper names contain an argument slot for the naming convention. This argument slot is quantified over when the naming small combines with a naming verb.

As the result of the first assumption we derive the meaning of argument proper names in the following way: if proper names can enter syntax as predicates (as argued in section 2), then in argument positions they are definite descriptions (unless some other determiner is present). As a result, argument proper names are compatible with there being more than one person with a particular name in the same way definite descriptions are compatible with there being more than one entity satisfying the restrictor of the article: as a result of covert domain restriction à la von Fintel 1994 (cf. Bach 2002, who observes the same facts but does not subscribe to the domain restriction approach).

The second assumption permits us to derive the general rigidity of argument proper names: in the general case, the naming convention argument slot is saturated by the indexical of the naming convention in force between the speaker and the hearer. Other naming conventions are equally available, permitting us to treat proper names in predicate positions not associated with verbs of naming.

4. Predictions

Apart from the results discussed above, we can now treat several recalcitrant phenomena in the domain of proper names. That names can now be treated as definite descriptions (cf. Frege 1983, Russell 1911, Searle 1958, Kneale 1962, Burge 1973, Katz 1977, 1990, 1994, Bach 2002, etc., in philosophy, Geurts 1997 and Elbourne 2002 in linguistics – see Abbott 2002, to appear for some objections to this approach) *and* as indexicals simultaneously allows us to provide compositional
semantics for environments where proper names may appear in combination with modifiers and with determiners, and to account for the facts explained by previous “quotation” theories.

4.1. Complex and modified proper names

Treating proper names as unanalyzable entities makes it difficult or impossible to address the syntax and semantics of complex proper names (Miss Alice Liddell) and modified proper names (the young Frankenstein). Our semantics makes the task relatively simple.

4.1.1. Complex proper names

Under the assumption that proper names are underlyingly predicates (once the argument slot of the naming convention has been taken care of), they can combine with other predicates in the same way nouns do:

(87) a. \[
\begin{align*}
  & \text{the Miss Alice Liddell} \\
  \approx & \ 1x . x \text{ is a miss AND x is the referent of } [\text{name}] \text{ by virtue of the naming convention in force between the speaker } c \text{ and the hearer } c \text{ AND x is a referent of } [\text{Liddell}] \text{ by virtue of the naming convention in force between the speaker } c \\
  & \text{and the hearer } c
\end{align*}
\]

b. \[
\begin{align*}
  & \text{the famous detective Sherlock Holmes} \\
  \approx & \ 1x . x \text{ is famous AND x is a detective AND x is the referent of } [\text{name}] \text{ by virtue of the naming convention in force between the speaker } c \text{ and the hearer } c \text{ AND x is the referent of } [\text{Holmes}] \text{ by virtue of the naming convention in force between the speaker } c \text{ and the hearer } c
\end{align*}
\]

One gratifying result of this approach is that it allows us to easily derive the entailment that Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock and that he is Holmes.

Plural proper names such as the Clintons and perhaps certain morphologically transparent hypocoristics (such as Nin-oč-k-a in Russian) can also be analyzed as compositional.

The question that we have to leave outside the scope of this paper is the syntax of complex and modified proper names. Noun-noun combinations are not normally allowed. While (88a) is ungrammatical unless understood as a compound, (88b) and (88c) both involve more than one determiner:

(88) a. my student friend

b. my sister the economist

c. Chomsky the philosopher

* unless understood as a compound

The compounding analysis cannot be applied to complex proper names, since (a) they are fully compositional (in the sense that their interpretation is always understood intersectively), (b) their stress pattern is not that of compounds and (c) complex proper names exist in languages (e.g. Russian) that do not have productive noun-noun compounding without a connective affix.

The restrictive modification structure in (88b) is also not a likely candidate for complex proper names. On the one hand, the first noun in this construction is generally a relational noun (sister, neighbor, etc.) – on the other, a possessive is obligatory.

Our third possibility is also not very promising – and not because the second noun must be introduced by an overt article: after all, we are assuming that proper names contain a null definite article. The problem with (88c) is the fact that the second noun is necessarily contrastive (e.g., Chomsky the philosopher as opposed to Chomsky the linguist).

The only consolation that we can derive from (88b) and (88c) is that DP-DP combinations are in fact allowed. However, we have to leave the question of complex proper names for future research.
4.1.2. Restrictive modification

Examples like (87b) are intriguing in more than the fact that they contain two proper names in juxtaposition. Proper names in such examples resemble common nouns in that they are modified, and the modification can be restrictive or non-restrictive:

(89) a. the older Miss Challoner there are two people named Miss Challoner
    b. the charitable Miss Murray there’s only one Miss Murray (Anne Brontë, *Agnes Grey*, p. 165)

Our approach, where proper names in argument positions are treated exactly as common nouns, predicts the availability of modification, and so nothing special needs to be said about the semantics of modified proper names, with one possible exception:

(90) The Paris of the forties was not a nice place to be.

At first blush, temporal modification in (90) (Kayne 1994, Gärtner 2004) is something that names do and definite descriptions seem not to, and the similarity between proper names and common nouns seems to break down. However, once we draw a parallel with kinds (cf. Kripke 1980), we observe that in this interpretation common nouns permit temporal modification:

(91) The human of that era was not yet fully bipedal.

If the interpretation of (91) involves stages of a kind-individual (cf. Carlson 1977), while the interpretation of (90) is obtained by reference to stages of an object, then in both cases, all we need is predicate modification.

4.2. Other determiners

Our semantics also predicts that proper names should be able to combine with determiners other than (the covert or overt) *the*, and such in fact is the case:

(92) a. There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton. Burge 1973
    b. Some Alfreds are crazy; some are sane.

The meaning of the subject in (92) can be paraphrased as “few individuals named Alfred”. In view of the fact that in our semantics the predicate proper name denotes the set of individuals named N, this reading is fully expected.

The indefinite article and demonstratives (in particular, the so-called expressive *that*; see Barker 1998) are also possible:

(93) a. There’s a Mr. Smith to see you, sir.
    b. This Rover of yours has overturned the garbage again!

Possibly the most interesting example of this kind is (94a), where definiteness is somehow preserved in the meaning, despite the absence of the definite article. However, parallel examples with common nouns, such as (94b), show that we are not required to postulate a covert definite article in (94a) – proper names do not differ from common nouns in this syntactic environment either.

(94) a. …but no Catherine could I detect, far or near. Emily Brontë, *Wuthering Heights*
    b. There is no sun today.

Finally, the meaning shift triggered by conversion to a common noun in scalar contexts supports the hypothesis that proper names are interpreted as suggested above:

(95) He is such a (typical) John – he always has to appear as the subject of a sentence!
Here the name is no longer “proper”: John is interpreted as a (typical) representative of the kind defined by being named John. The difference between (92) and (95) is that (95) presupposes that there are properties that all people called John share (i.e. there’s a kind referred to as John).

4.3. Naming and necessity

One argument frequently levied against definite description theories of proper names is the fact that substitution of a proper name such as Alice for the corresponding definite description the individual named Alice does not yield the same truth-conditions: (96a) (with named understood as a current state) is a logical truth with existential import, whereas (96b) is not (Kneale 1962, Geurts 1997 vs. Kripke 1980):

(96) a. The individual named Alice is named Alice. a logical truth: F (ιx. F(x))
   b. Alice is named Alice. not a logical truth

In our system, the interpretation of (96b) is roughly equivalent to (96c):

(96) c. The unique individual who is the referent of [ælɪs] by virtue of the naming convention in force between the speaker and the hearer is named [ælɪs].

The naming convention in force between the speaker and the hearer is not necessarily the same as the naming convention established by the verb name (e.g. the namer(s) may not be the same), and so the subjects in (96a) and (96b) need not denote the same individual, which is why the substitution fails.

4.4. Summary

The proposal that argument proper names are definite descriptions built on the basis of predicate proper names that contain an argument slot for the naming convention explains many previously disregarded phenomena. The simplest of these is the existence and interpretation of complex and modified proper names, which can now be treated as arising via the regular process of predicate modification. The ability of proper names to appear with various determiners is expected, as is their interpretation with these determiners. Finally, the argument slot for the naming convention explains why a proper name such as Alice does not have the same interpretation as the definite description the individual called Alice.

5. CONCLUSION AND TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

I have used cross-linguistic evidence to argue that proper names can enter syntax as predicates when they appear in the naming construction. In order to obtain the correct truth-conditions for proper names in this environment, it is necessary to assume that besides the usual (e) argument slot, they also have an additional argument slot for the naming convention. This argument slot is quantified over when a naming small clause is combined with a naming verb. Naming verbs are therefore viewed as existential quantifiers over naming conventions, parallel to the interpretation of attitude verbs as universal quantifiers over possible worlds.

The meaning assumed for proper names in the predicate position becomes essential when we consider proper names in argument positions. If proper names can be predicates, argument proper names can be viewed as definite descriptions, which explains why in some languages and with some proper names the definite article is obligatory. We can also deal with complex and modified proper names in the same way as with modified common nouns, and demonstrate that just like definite descriptions, argument proper names can be used attributively or referentially.

Furthermore, the postulated argument slot of the naming convention permits us to explain why argument proper names are rigid (Kripke 1980) by proposing that this argument slot is saturated by the indexical of the naming convention in force between the speaker and the hearer.
The most important feature of the analysis is that this definite description theory of proper
names is independently motivated in all its components. Cross-linguistic syntax of the naming
construction shows that proper names can be predicates, and that in the naming construction they
must be analyzed as predicates. Its compositional semantics makes it imperative that the meaning
of a proper name make use of a naming convention, and the nature of this convention be supplied
– either by the verb, or by the context. This new argument slot becomes essential when we turn
to proper names in argument positions, because it allows us to provide an natural source for the
rigidity/indexicality of proper names.

However, we are still far from having solved all the problems posed by the syntax and the
semantics of proper names. In the rest of this section I will introduce those that I find the most
pressing.

5.1. Article omission

The proposal that argument proper names are definite descriptions raises the question of why it is
only in some languages and with some names that this article becomes overt. Why is the definite
article absent in such proper names as Alice?

I believe that the ability to “absorb” the definite article is a purely morphological property
of a particular lexical item, and is essentially the same property as the ability to appear with a
special preproprial article in languages like Catalan or Northern Norwegian.

Some support for this view comes from the fact that modification interferes with this
ability: thus modified proper names in English nearly always appear with articles (see Gallmann
1997 and Borer 2005 for some discussion):

(97) a. the *(French) Mary Poppins restrictive
    b. the *(young) Mozart
    c. the *(incomparable) Callas non-restrictive

Evidence for the similarity between article drop and the ability to appear with a dedicated
preproprial definite article in Tagalog (Norvin Richards, p.c.) or Catalan (Louise McNally, p.c.),
comes from the fact that the special article is regularized in modification contexts:

(98) Li diuen *(el/*en) Lord Nelson francés. Catalan
    him call-3sg *(the/the-PrPr Lord Nelson French
They call him the French Lord Nelson.

While unmodified Catalan proper names appear with the special preproprial article en (na
for feminine names), modified proper names must take the usual definite article el (la). If the
ability to “absorb” the article is morphological in nature, increasing syntactic complexity will
block it. The existence of proper names that appear with an overt definite article ought to shed
further light on these issues.

Another interesting fact about proper names bearing an obligatory definite article is that
this article does not disappear in the predicate use:

(99) a. Why did they nickname New York the Big Apple?
    b. My suburb is called the Bronx.

This seems to lend support to the idea that proper names are linguistically treated as if they
are inherently definite (like the king), which makes article omission in the naming construction
(section 2.3) all the more similar to article omission in predicate positions.
5.2. Default and non-default names

One interesting phenomenon that we may have to reconsider in view of our approach is that of default and non-default names, discussed by Saul 1997 and Zimmermann to appear, among others:

(100) a. Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out.
    b. I never made it to Karl-Marx-Stadt, but I visited Chemnitz last year.

We have already observed that more than a single naming convention can be present in a given context. Since naming conventions are constrained solely by social conventions, they may be complex enough to permit such factors as ‘pen-name’, ‘nom de guerre’, etc. If so, default and non-default names are simply different ways of referring to the same individual.

5.3. Modification and proper names

One interesting thing about modification of proper names in English is the fact that sometimes it does not require the definite article (101a) and sometimes it requires a definite determiner other than the definite article (101b). In both these cases modification is clearly non-restrictive, but non-restrictive modification requires the definite article in other environments (101c).

(101) a. *The/our/Ø poor Thomas was cheated once again.
    b. *The/our/this/Ø damn Mary always sticks her nose in what doesn’t concern her!
    c. The/Ø charitable Miss Murray is always there to help.

Also, modification inside proper names can take rather unusual forms:

(102) a. Brueghel the Younger
    b. Jack the Ripper
    c. the young Richard the Lion-Hearted

Although Longobardi 1994, 1999 et seq. treats (102a) as involving N-to-D raising over the modifying adjective, this analysis cannot possibly be extended to (102b), where the modifier is nominal, or to (102c), where two articles are present.

5.4. Benefactives and incorporation

Although we have only discussed languages where naming constructions involve small clauses, many languages use the ditransitive structure to convey the same meaning, as in the example (103) from Georgian (Lea Nash, p.c.).

(103) man kališvils meri jaarkua
    georgian he-erg daughter-dat Mary-Nom name-3-Aor
    He named his daughter Mary.

This means that in some languages proper names can be treated as direct objects and have one of the possible argument types ⟨e⟩ or ⟨⟨e, t⟩, t⟩. The most natural meaning for a proper name in such a language would be the actual quotation, i.e., the phonology of the name (“mention”, as opposed to “use”). We then expect substitution of the proper name by an expression like “the name N” to be possible.

Interesting questions arise. If proper names can have the “mention” meaning as well as the predicate meaning, can one be derived from the other? We have discussed and dismissed (section 3.1) the possibility of incorporating the predicative component of predicate proper names into the main verb, but could the meaning of predicate proper names itself be composed, not just in the lexical entry, where a proper name does contain the “mention” of itself, but compositionally, in syntax and semantics?
6. **APPENDIX: DECISIONS, DECISIONS**

In section 2.1 I argued that cross-linguistically, the naming construction involves a small clause. In this section I will discuss various alternative proposals: a ditransitive structure, resultative or depictive secondary predication, and control.

6.1. **Double object**

For languages with overt copulas, like Korean (section 2.4), or overt Case-marking (section 2.5), it is well-near impossible to argue that xNP₂ may not be a predicate. This is why we constrain our discussion of double object analyses to languages where no overt morphology or preproprional definite articles (section 2.3) can give us a clue as to whether xNP₂ is referential.

6.1.1. xNP₁ is not the GOAL, xNP₂ is not the THEME

At a first glance, the naming construction seems to involve ditransitive syntax, with xNP₁ serving as the GOAL of the action and xNP₂ as its THEME. The naming construction would then involve two objects:

(104) a. give one’s daughter a name  
   b. name one’s daughter Alice

To exclude this analysis in English it is enough to consider the passivization properties of naming verbs. It is a general property of English that to passivize, an argument has to start out as the object of a verb (or of a preposition, in pseudo-passives). GOAL and THEME can both do so:

(105) a. Marie was given a book.  
   b. A book was given to Marie.

However, in naming constructions only xNP₁ can passivize:¹⁵

(106) a. Caesar was nominated/elected/declared consul (by the Senate).  
   b. *A/the/Ø consul was nominated/elected/declared Caesar (by the Senate).

(107) a. I was called/christened/named/baptized Al.  
   b. *Al was called/named/baptized me.

This means that xNP₂ does not behave like the THEME object in English, and therefore, the naming construction cannot involve two objects. A similar argument can be constructed for Dutch, where in double object constructions, only the most internal argument (the Accusative one, though it is not Case-marked) can be passivized (Eddy Ruys, p.c.):

(108) a. het Marie/een meisje gegeven boek  
   the Marie/a girl given book  
   the book given to Marie/to a girl

¹⁵ One could argue that passivization failure in (107) is due to the non-referentiality of the proper name, since it is equally impossible to passivize the direct object in idioms like give someone a break, give someone a start, etc. One possible objection is that the naming construction is not idiomatic and semantically fully transparent; another – that in ditransitive analyses of naming verbs, the proper name is intended to denote something.
If verbs of naming had ditransitive syntax, we would have expected the THEME to be able to passivize, and the GOAL to be unable to do so. In other words, the proper name should behave like a book and the name-bearer should behave like a girl. The facts are exactly the opposite:

(109) a. de Marie genoemde/gedoopte vrouw
the Marie named/baptized woman
the woman named/baptized Marie
b. *de een vrouw genoemde/gedoopte Marie
the a woman named/baptized Marie

The GOAL in the Dutch naming construction can be “externalized”/passivized, while the THEME cannot. This is unsurprising if the naming construction is not a ditransitive, but contains a small clause, and the behavior of the nomination construction supports this conclusion:

(110) a. ?de de baas gemaakte vrouw
the the boss made woman
the woman made the boss
b. **de een vrouw gemaakte baas
the a woman made boss

It is easy to see that xNP1 doesn’t behave like the GOAL object in Dutch, either. The same kind of argumentation can be attempted for any language with suspected ditransitive syntax.

6.1.2. **xNP1 movement**

In modern English, genuine ditransitives (Dative or applicative) do not allow Heavy NP Shift, unless the Dative preposition is inserted:

(111) a. They gave the office *(to) the most talented candidate they could lay their hands on.
b. Hadrian built a city *(for) the young man he loved most dearly.

Verbs of naming behave like ECM and nomination verbs in grudgingly allowing right-dislocation of xNP1 if xNP1 is very heavy and/or contrastive (Heavy NP Shift):

(112) She will consider stupid *Harriet/??only the most obvious idiot in the whole country.

A possible objection to this line of reasoning is that the phenomenon is the same with ditransitive and ECM verbs, but with ECM verbs the inserted preposition is hidden. There doesn’t seem to be any counter-argument to this.

6.1.3. **The lexical category of the predicate**

A major difference between ECM and ditransitive verbs is that ECM verbs allow non-nominal predicates, while ditransitives only permit nominal objects. Verbs of naming seem to behave more like ditransitives than like ECM here, since as a rule, xNP2 cannot be replaced by an AP or a PP:

(114) a. Alice gave Beth a book/the book/*interesting/*in the room.
b. Name/christen/baptize me *French/*talented/*charming/*in the room.

However, verbs of naming share this inability to take a non-nominal predicate with some verbs of nomination:
b. Amy was declared innocent/amazing.

The only naming verb allowing adjectival predicates is *call, but as we have already noted, *call is too often exceptional and appears in constructions other than naming:

(116) a. My friends call me charming.
b. Here’s a pot calling the kettle black.

The inability of naming verbs to take non-nominal predicates is not conclusive, since we know that ECM verbs can constrain the lexical category of the predicate in their complement (Stowell 1981):

(117) a. I consider Elizabeth clever/a friend/in the running/*(to) live in Paris.
b. I let Elizabeth *clever/*a friend/*into the house/*(to) live in Paris.
c. I made Elizabeth clever/*a professor/*into the house/*(to) live in Paris.
d. I allowed Elizabeth *clever/*a friend/*into the house/*(to) live in Paris.

Another possible explanation comes from the fact that the semantics of naming verbs is such that they must combine with proper names, and proper names are generally nominal. Though some names are morphologically adjectival, they behave as nouns:

(118) a. Red, Black
b. Shorty, Golden

This means that the restriction may not be on the naming verbs but on names – naming verbs do not constrain the lexical category of the predicate, but names happen to be always nominal.

6.1.4. Alternation classes

Another possible argument against analyzing naming verbs as ditransitives is the fact that ditransitives usually allow some sort of an alternation in the argument ordering, effected via a preposition:

(119) a. give Coraline the key → give the key to Coraline
b. bake Mommy a cake → bake a cake for Mommy

No similar PP-alternate exists for verbs of naming, just like there is no such alternation with ECM verbs and verbs of nomination:

(120) a. dub the knight Sir Lancelot → *dub Sir Lancelot for/to/… the knight
b. declare Arthur king → *declare king for/to/… Arthur
c. make/consider Arthur great → *make/consider great for/to/… Arthur

Once again, a null preposition analysis is impossible to rule out.

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16 Interestingly, some nomination verbs permit an alternation where the xNP2 predicate turns into the (Accusative) object (David Pesetsky, p.c.):

(i) declare the winner, elect the president

The object in this case must be definite, which makes the construction resemble certain semantic incorporation cases such as play the piano.
6.1.5. Conclusion

There’s nothing *a priori* wrong with the double object hypothesis, and this is consistent with the fact that some languages employ this strategy. It just seems unlikely for the languages considered.

6.2. Control

The control structure is potentially compatible with the syntactic data discussed above: it would still allow the proper name in the naming construction to be predicative (and marked as such), but it would avoid the necessity of treating naming verbs as ECM verbs. The structure in (121) can be interpreted as “Carroll named his heroine, and his heroine became Alice”, which in a sense is just the resultative construction:

(121) vP control structure simplified

Two objections can be raised against the control hypothesis. The first one is that known control verbs, such as *persuade* or *promise*, never combine with non-verbal predicates and do, with xVPs.17 Exactly the opposite is true of naming verbs, as discussed in section 2.6: verbs of naming can combine with naming small clauses only.

The second objection is that the semantics of the naming construction does not fall into the range of control verb semantics. As Comrie 1984 observes, there is a clear semantic difference between subject and object control verbs, and between two types of subject control verbs:

- Subject control verbs, type 1: have the meaning of “mental orientation”, expectation or desire. Examples include *want, wish, hope, need, hate* and *expect*.
- Subject control verbs, type 2: verbs of “commitment”, including *try, promise, decide, agree, refuse* and *threaten*.
- All the object control verbs are verbs of “influence” (*convince*).

Verbs of naming do not belong to any of these classes and do not necessitate a human subject:

(122) Tolstoy named his book “Anna Karenina”.

However, there exists another environment projecting the control structure with a small clause: that of secondary predication.

6.3. Secondary predication

Secondary predicates (depictives or resultatives) also often feature Case-doubling. Can it be that verbs of naming and nomination do involve small clauses, but not as primary predication?

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17 Iatridou 1990, Matushansky 2002: the epistemic version of *sound* and other perception verbs might involve control. See Miller 2003 for the counter-argument.
The first major argument against this view is the fact that secondary predicates are always optional. With certain verbs, such as the exceptional verb *call* or *baptize*, the predicate can be omitted (and the meaning changes drastically), but other naming verbs do not allow predicate omission:

(123) a. Will you call your daughter, please?
    b. Every Christian is baptized.
    c. *Every gangster is nicknamed.

*A priori*, the secondary predicate analysis fares better than the primary predicate analysis because it can deal with examples like (123a, b). However, we can easily see that this hypothetical secondary predicate behaves neither like a depictive nor like a resultative.

6.3.1. **Finnish: against depictives**

A straightforward example of a recognized depictive is (124):

(124) Alice returned to her hometown [SC PRO rich/a president/in a good mood].

The first argument against analyzing verbs of naming as involving a depictive secondary predicate is the simple fact that its interpretation is incompatible with the meaning of the depictive: the small clause predication in depictives describes the state of affairs that obtains at the culmination of the event denoted by the main verb, while with verbs of naming and nomination, the small clause describes the result of the naming/nomination.

As mentioned above, the distinction between these two interpretations is reflected by Case-marking in Finnish: Finnish depictive DPs bear essive Case, as opposed to xNP₂ in the naming construction, which is marked translative. Translative also appears with verbs of nomination and in resultatives (exx. due to Liina Pylkkänen, p.c.):

(125) Alice palas-i kotikaupunki-in-sa rikkaa-na/presidentti-na depictive
    Alice return-past hometown-illative-3sg.poss rich-Ess/president-Ess
    Alice returned to her hometown rich/a president.

(126) a. Me nimi-t-i-mme William Gates-in presidentti-ksi nomination
    we name-PST-CAUS-1pl William Gates-ACC president-Trs
    We named William Gates president.

b. Me kutsu-mme William Gatesi-a Billi-ksi naming
    we call-1pl William Gates-PART Bill-Trs
    We call William Gates Billy.

c. Me maalas-i-mme seinä-n keltaise-ksi resultative
    we paint-PAST-1pl wall-ACC yellow-Trs
    We painted a/the wall yellow.

We conclude that the depictive analysis is inapplicable in Finnish, which means that at least for this language we need an alternative explanation, involving a small clause. This brings us to the next question – can verbs of naming and nomination be resultative?

6.3.2. **Russian: against resultatives**

The same kind of an argument can be used in this section – for at least some languages in our sample, the resultative proposal cannot work, and thus a different hypothesis is necessary. Since we already have such a hypothesis, the resultative analysis, even if it works for some languages, is unnecessary.
One reason for rejecting the resultative analysis comes from the fact that no language that I know of allows nominal resultatives without a preposition:

(127) We hammered the metal flat/*sword/*a sword/√ into a sword.

The fact that Russian does not allow nominal or adjectival resultatives provides a further argument against the resultative approach to the naming construction.

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