Basic Semantics of Turkish Evidential

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Turkish is one of the most frequently quoted languages in the evidentiality literature with the suffix –(I)mIş as the marker of evidentiality. Although frequently studied, the literature on evidentiality involves discrepancy on the form and the function of the suffix, which makes it more complex to define. Parallelly, how different scholars refer to the notion grammaticalized by –(I)mIş vary.

Under the shadow of these discussions, in this paper, we try to outline the semantic features of the suffix –(I)mIş as the evidential marker in Turkish. Our aim is to present a review of the different approaches to evidentiality in Turkish, to state the problems in the literature, and to offer a brief semantic analysis of the evidentiality in Turkish. Accordingly, we hope to make it easier to locate the Turkish evidentiality system within the universal definition of the notion.

1. Literature review: Form, Function, and the Categorial Matters

“Evidentiality in Turkish is coded by the verbal suffix –(I)mIş.” A simple definition as it may seem, agreement has not been achieved on this statement in the literature. There are two different points of view on the matter. The first approach affirms that –mIş and –ImIş are two distinct suffixes with distinct functions in Turkish. In contrast to this view, there is another approach which claim that there is only one morpheme –(I)mIş. The form of this morpheme ‘–mIş’ is used after the nominal predicates, and –(I)mIş form is used after the bare verbal predicates and after particular aspect and mood markers. The initial ‘I’ of the form –(I)mIş is in fact the copular i-, which is necessarily used after the nominal predicates and after the verbal suffixes.

More complicated than the discussions on the form of the evidential marker are the ones on names of the grammatical categories associated with –(I)mIş. The discussions of the grammatical categories overlap with the discussions on the form of the suffix –(I)mIş. The studies which take –mIş and –ImIş as distinct agree on the idea that the –mIş is reserved for the past time reference in the language whereas –ImIş may not only refer to past but also denote a modal value, namely evidentiality. We can speak of three main different approaches in this respect.

The grammar studies (Ergin, 1986; Banguoğlu, 2000; Gencan, 2001;) are used to label –mIş as the past tense suffix. They name this item as the “hearsay past marker”, while they take –DI – the narrated past tense marker- as its counterpart. Some recent linguistic studies also use this label for what is marked by –(I)mIş. Lewis (2000), and Cinque (2001) use the term inferential past for the past tense that they claim to be marked by –(I)mIş.

Some other linguistic studies (Underhill, 1985; Kornfilt, 1997; Lewis, 2000; Erguvanlı-Taylan, 1984; Cinque, 2001, Göksel and Kerslake, 2005) refer to the completeness of the
event as perfectivity, and name –mlṣ as the perfective marker of Turkish, in indexical relation with –DI, which is taken to be the other perfectivity marker. Johanson (1974, 2000, 2003) refers to the aspectual value, that he claims to be expressed by –mlṣ, as ‘post-terminal’. Briefly, we can say that this aspectual value is an advanced notion referring to completed events.

Other group of linguists, on the other hand, do not agree with the idea that –(I)mIş is a tense and/or an aspect marker (Yavaş, 1980; Sezer, 1990; Zeyrek, 1990; Uzun, 1998, 2004). They specifically refer to the indirect evidence types of inference and hearsay (or reported, quotative) by the term evidentiality.

Johanson (2000) intentionally avoids using the term evidentiality depending on the “perceptive” (as he labels) uses of these items (e.g. (6), (7), (8)). He claims that evidentiality blockades the possibility that the speaker perceives the evidence. That is why, he considers it a necessity to define what is coded by -mlṣ/-ImIṣ as indirectivity.

Within the above picture, we uphold the approach which takes –(I)mIṣ as the single marker of evidentiality. If –(I)mIṣ were a past tense/completeness marker, then it should have been impossible to use in utterances similar to (1). That is why, we keep to the idea that initial ‘I’ is the copula, and the only related category to the use of the suffix is evidentiality.

(1) Şimdi sen anne-ymiş-sin, ben de kız-miş-sm.
Now you mother-EVID-2SING I DE daughter-2SINGPOSS-EVID-1SING
Beraber alışveriş-e çık-miş-ız tamam mı?
Together shopping-DAT go out-EVID-1PL okay QUES
Now, (supposedly) you are the mother, and I am your daughter. We have gone out for shopping/ we are out for shopping, okay?

That –(I)mIṣ frequently refers to perfective events does not require it to be an aspect marker. The relation is due to the notion of evidentiality. To give permission, be willing, or having the necessity to act in a proper way, notionally, imply that the event has not taken place yet. With the driving vision to the analysis of –mlṣ as perfective, –Abil, –(s)A or –mAlI should have been defined as future tense markers and/or non-perfective aspect markers. Sezer (1990) clearly states that the perfective meaning added to the sentence is a side meaning implied by evidentiality, not a function of –(I)mIṣ by itself. Similar claims have been confirmed by different analysis of various languages (Aikhenvald, 2005; Izvorski, 1997).

Throughout the study, we are going to analyze –(I)mIṣ I in terms of evidence values that it conveys. The reason why we focus on the semantic analysis of evidentiality is that literature on the semantics of Turkish evidential is remains limited. That is because, most of the named studies in literature (Underhil, 1985; Lewis, 2000; Göksel and Kerslake, 2005; Erguvanlı Taylan, 1994, 2001; Kornfilt, 1997) deal with –(I)mIṣ as a part of the grammar. Their priority is not to analyze the particle specifically in semantic terms. Moreover, the questions concerning which evidential values are marked by –(I)mIṣ, what differences should be highlighted between these values, and how come it is possible for evidential statements to have ironic, scorn or surprise denotations are not answered in every respect.
Semantic classification of the morpheme should be presented in terms of universal notions associated with the category of evidentiality. We claim that such a classification supported by a broad semantic analysis may be of grand use. That is why; we present the semantic classification of evidentiality by Plungian (2001) as presented in the next section.

2. Semantic Analysis: Evidential Values
It is important for us to specify here what we understand of the concept of evidentiality. Here, we base our definition and classification of evidential values on Plungian’s (2001) proposal. What makes us chose Plungian’s typological study over others is that, he not only openly puts forward the sub-distinction among the indirect evidence values, but also offers such a universal system that the distinction between the personal evidence and impersonal evidence types are fully detached. As will be presented in the following, the distinctions propose highly efficient explanations.

The classification of evidential values of Plungian (2001) are presented as in Figure 1.

![Figure 1](image1)

**Figure 1.** The classification of evidential values (Plungian, 2001: 353)

Direct evidence

- Visual
- Sensoric

Indirect evidence

- Non-visual
- Inference
- Endophoric
- Synchronic
- Retrospective

The quotative is not present in the above figure. Plungian asserts quotatives as distinct from the indirect evidence types here, because of the fact that “speaker is directly separated from the situation by the barrier of another observer”. That is why he adds another type of indirect evidence to the classification where quotative is placed under the indirect evidence as the only evidence type that is not personal. This adopted schema is shown in Figure 2.

![Figure 2](image2)

**Figure 2.** Different types of evidential oppositions (Plungian, 2001: 353)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct evidence</th>
<th>Indirect evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reflected evidence</td>
<td>Mediated evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(=Inferentials and Presumptives)</td>
<td>(=Quotatives)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The notions named in Figure 2 are paraphrased by Plungian as follows (2001: 354):

A. Direct evidence (including direct access to P)

Visual: ‘P, and I see/saw P.’

Sensoric: ‘P, and I perceive(d) P’ [P may be heard, smelled, tasted, etc.].

Endophoric: ‘P, and I feel(felt) P’ [P is the speaker's inner state]

B. Reflected evidence (including direct access to some situation Q related to P)

Synchronous inference: ‘P, because I can observe some signs of P’ [P at T₀]

Retrospective inference: ‘P, because I can observe some traces of P’ [P before T₀]

Reasoning: ‘P, because I know Q, and I know that Q entails P’

C. Mediated evidence (including neither direct nor reflected access to P)

Quotative: ‘P, because I was told that P’
The paraphrases noted by Plungian supply an efficient tool to distinguish between somewhat fuzzy sub-categories of evidentiality. The paraphrases above make it clear what kind of a relation holds between the evidence and evident situation. The synchronous evidence value is akin to the relation of signifier-signified. Retrospective evidence implies a cause-effect relation (P occurs and leaves traces. By analyzing these traces we infer that P.) Reasoning holds entailment relation between what speakers know (Q) and evident situation P. Note that the entailment is not a conceptual term for the inner structure of the described event. Rather, it holds between the personal knowledge of the speaker and the evident situation. The synchronous and retrospective evidence are based on what is obvious (observed) by the speaker. That is such evidence belongs to the real world situations, whereas reasoning is attached to speaker’s knowledge. In this manner, we may conclude that reasoning seems more subjective than the synchronous or retrospective evidence. Mediated evidence on the other hand involves the quotative, hearsay and third-hand information. We consider any information gathered via another conscious mind as mediated, including the written forms as well as spoken. That is, when one reads the newspaper and shares the information in an evidential sentence, his utterance codes mediated evidence.

Possible extensions that go with –(I)mIş are shown in (2)-(5). The extensions in (2), exemplifies mediated evidence where the speaker uses what has been told by a unique speaker (quotative) or by (an) anonymous speaker(s) (third-hand, hearsay). Sentence (2), on the other hand, exemplifies the synchronous type of evidence. The evidence speaker uses observable at the time of utterance (p at T₀). Different from (3), the evidence observed by the speaker is a trace of the evidentially marked situation. Because of this, (4) denotes retrospective evidence. (5) exemplifies reasoning type of reflected evidence. The adverbial ‘demek ki (then)’ clarifies the relation between the two segments. Without this example will be ambiguous between the mediated evidence reading and the reasoning reading.⁵

(2) Ali git-miş-Ø. Anne-si söyle-di- Ø/ Öyle di-yor-lar./ Öyle de-n-iyor- Ø. (Mediated-quotative hearsay-third-hand)
Ali go-EVID-3SING. Mother-3SINGPOSS say-PERF-3SING/ So say-PROG-3PL/ So tell-PASS-PROG-3SING
Ali has gone away! My mother says so. They say so. It is said so.

(3) Ne de çok elbise-m var-miş-Ø! (Synchronous)
What DE many dress-1SINGPOSS exist-EVID-Ø
So many dresses I have got!

(4) Yer-ler ıslak-Ø. Yağmur yağ-mış Ø. (Retrospective)
Flor-Pl. wet-3SING. Rain fall-EVID-3SING
The flor is wet. It must have rained. (lit. It has rained.)

(5) On February 2:
1 Şubat-ta Samsun’a dön-eceğ-iz de-miş-ti.- Demek ki,
1 February-LOC Samsun-DAT turn-FUT-1PL say-EVID-PERF. Then,
PRO dön dön-miş-le-r.- (Reasoning)
PRO yesterday turn-EVID-3PL
She told me that they were planning to go back to Samsun on February 1. Then, they must have gone back yesterday. (lit. They have gone back.)
In the following sub-sections (§ 2.1, 2.2, 2.3), we are going to put forward how Turkish evidentiality fits with the classification.

2.1 Direct Evidence
Direct evidence is said to be coded by the perfective suffix –DI. Guided by this definition, generally tendency is to categorize –(I)mIş as in complementary distribution with –DI. Such an analysis also leads scholars to define –(I)mIş as the past tense or perfective marker. Far remote from these categorizations, Uzun (1998, 2004) offers an alternative verbal paradigm for Turkish⁶. Basing our definitions on the relevant picture drawn by Uzun, we evaluate –(I)mIş as the evidential marker, and accept that its non-existence implies direct evidence whenever no other modal value is plausible. Turkish does not have a single direct evidence marker.

2.2 Reflected Evidence
Reflected evidence is of three types: synchronous, retrospective evidence and reasoning. It to emphasize is that it involves evidence where the speaker has direct access to the evidence implied or presented. That is, it does not obstruct the possibility that speaker achieves the evidence situation through his senses. What speaker perceives is not the event expressed in the evidentially marked utterance. It is the evidence situation. This is to say that when the speaker perceives the result or sign of a situation, then he may use it as evidence for a particular event. Consequently, the reflected evidence belongs to the speakers own conscious, which makes it personal. The personal status of this kind of evidence makes it easier to distinguish it from the mediated evidence, which has the contrastive value as impersonal.

Definition of reflected evidence compels us to refine the term “indirective”. Johanson labels (6)-(10) as such, depending on the reason that the speaker has direct access to the evidential event. However, the statement seems misleading in that the speaker does not have direct access to the evident situation, but the evidence which makes the speaker infer it. In related examples, what is perceived by the speaker is a signal of the evident situation (as in synchronous (8)-(10)), a result or end-state of the event (as in retrospective (6)-(7)). (6) would not be acceptable with –(I)mIş if, for example, speaker accompanies Ali for any interval during his motion. In such a case speaker has to use progressive -Iyor or perfective –DI. He can use –mIş when he sees Ali throughout the window at the garden, or getting out of his car etc. only due to the fact that he judges that Ali has finished the act of coming, and reached the end-point of his motion. Speaker of sentence (7) also indicates that he has not witnessed the exact moment when the clock has stopped. Suggest that the speaker is staring at the clock and at that very moment, the clock stops. Then, the only possible marker would be –DI⁸.

(6) Aaa! Bak! Ali gel-miş- Ø. (Johanson, 2000) (Retrospective)
Oh! Look! Ali come-EVID-3SING
Oh! Look, Ali has arrived/is here.

(7) Saat-im dur-muş- Ø. (Johanson, 2000) (Retrospective)
Watch-1SING POSS stop-EVID-3SING
My watch does not work. /lit. My watch (must) have stopped.
Other examples of ‘indirectives’ are presented in (8)-(10). These utterances are similar to (6), (7) in that they imply that the speaker has not witnessed the situations become the way they are.

In the examples above, (6), (7), the situations used as evidence are over. However, this is not the only possibility. As synchronous evidence exemplified below, (8)-(10), allows the option that the evidence and evident situation are still available at the utterance time. Paraphrasing (8) as “I observe that you are grown up, then you are grown-up” fits well with the definition of synchronous utterance. Speaker’s evidence to utter the evidential sentence is what he observes at the utterance time ($T_0$). Note that three of the examples define a characteristic feature of the theme(s)/agent(s) of the sentences. That is why, although the speaker does not observe the duration of them to become the way they are, he uses what he observes at the utterance time as evidence to his statement. (8)-(10) present examples to ‘indirectivity’ according to Johanson (2000). Confirmed by the definition presented above, the fact that speaker observes the evident situation and the evidence itself is perfectly compatible with the definition of evidentiality. Thus, we regard defining a distinct category basing on such examples as puzzling.

(8) Çok büyü-müş-sün. (Synchronous)
Very grow up-EVID-2SING
You are so grown up!

(9) Kız-mız çok iyi piyano çal-yor-muş- Ø. (Johanson, 2000: 83) (Synchronous)
Daughter-very good piano play-PROG-EVID-3SING
Your daughter is playing the piano very well.

(10) Çorba çok güzel ol-muş- Ø. (Johanson, 2000: 83) (Synchronous)
soup very beutiful be-EVID-3SING
The soup is so delicious.

Göksel and Kerslake (2005: 356-7) classify Turkish evidential distinguishing between information based evidential statements, result based evidential statements, and expressions for newly discovered state of affairs. It is one of the most open classifications made for uses of –Imş, still it does not distinguish among (11) and (12). Additionally, the third category that Göksel and Kerslake present does not seem to fit well with the first two. It seems more like a pragmatic feature that goes with the item, or is about the informational status of the sentence. Thus, the reader cannot clearly learn what the difference between (12) and (13) is. When someone notices that he has not taken his eyeglasses with him, it is also new information to him. Besides, although Göksel and Kerslake title (12) and (13) as similar, the evidence that speakers of these sentences use differs.

(11) Ressam iki figür-ün ara-si-nı boş bırak-muş-.
Artist two figure-GEN space-2SINGPOSS empty leave-EVID-3SING
(I can clearly see that) The painter left the space between the two figures empty.

Eyeglasses-1SINGPOSS-ACC side-1SINGPOSS-ACC take-NEG-EVID-1SING-
I (have just noticed that I) haven’t taken my glasses with me.
(13) Aaa! Yiyecek hiçbirşey yok-muş-Ø.
    Oh! Eatable nothing absent-EVID-3SING-
    Oh! (I notice that) There is no food left!

According to Plungian’s classification, sentences (11) and (13) are similar to each other in that they both make use of synchronous evidence. The speaker makes use of the evidence that he observes at the utterance time. That is equal to the paraphrase “P, because I can observe some signs of P [P at T₀]”. The negation operator may make it difficult to consider such a relation; nevertheless, it exactly describes the correlation between the evidence and evident situations in referred examples. Speaker of (12), on the other hand, evaluates the present situation that he does not have his eyeglasses with him as an evident to the fact that he has not taken it, which can be paraphrased as “I haven’t taken my eyeglasses because I observe p (p=that do not have them now).” The evidentially marked situation is before the utterance time. Then, the evidence relation is that of retrospective.

2.3 Mediated Evidence
Mediated evidence includes quotative, hearsay and third-hand knowledge available to the speaker. Classically, this kind of evidence is analyzed under the indirect evidence type without any particular notice (Willett, 1988). Plungian (2001) underlines the fact that quotative differs from the inference and reasoning as being impersonal. He states that there is a barrier (the producer of any written or spoken information) between the evidence and the evident situation. The barrier hinders utterances marked as such to imply commitment of the speaker. (14)-(18) are examples of mediated evidence. All of the examples are appropriate with the extensions of ‘As X says/has written’, ‘As told’, ‘As it is said’.

(14) Ayşe’nin anne-si (dün) biraz rahatsız-muş-Ø. (Göksel & Kerslake, 356)
    Ayşe-GEN mother-POSS (yesterday) a little ill-EVID-3SING
    They say that Ayşe’s mother is ill./ was ill yesterday.
    Ali this-ACC know-PROG-3SING
    (I was told that/I learned that) Ali knew that beforehand.

Göksel and Kerslake denote the ambiguity of the examples parallel to (15): the sentence may refer to the past situation or a present one. Such sentences can be disambiguated within the context or addition of a relevant time adverbial. As for example (15), we chose the reported evidence extension in this section over a couple other accurate extensions.

The definition impersonal value implied by mediated evidence explains a number of issues on the semantic analysis of –(I)mIş. Remember that Yavaş labels the evidentiality as non-commitative mood. The explanation of Plungian clarifies the motivation underlying Yavaş’s term.

Similarly, what has been mentioned in the literature as ‘psychological distance’ can be explained via the impersonal status of the quoted events (Aksu-Koç, 1988, 2001; Yavaş, 1980; Zeyrek, 1990; Göksel & Kerslake, 2005, Lewis, 1986; Kornfilt, 1997; Johanson, 2000). Aksu-Koç (2001) presents the detailed analysis of this pragmatic phenomena saying
that –(l)mlş does not only imply physical, but also psychological lack of a conscious mind. This is to say that speaker assumes a distance between himself and the event. Concept of psychological distance is not proper to be analyzed within the language world, but one that requires much of real world information. Thus, it is difficult to outline the notion or formalize it in the semantic structure of the language.

The irony or scorn extensions, which are said to go with evidential statements in Turkish, occur owing to the ‘psychological distance’. In our terms, that is to say impersonal value of mediated evidence is the underlying reason why such a relation is said to hold between evidential morpheme and the named extensions. Denial of truth of the proposition leads ironic reading with the support of particular intonation patterns. Plungian’s classification is helpful with a semantic explanation to these uttered cases.

Further, Yavaş (1980) claims that –(l)mlş may make it possible for the speaker to “deny the truth of the proposition”. In this section, we see that this statement only applies to the quotative uses. In fact, Yavaş affirms that quotatives are different from the reported speech in that they are acceptable with the extension of “but I do not believe”. We propose that speaker can deny the truth of a proposition only if the evidence implied or presented is that of mediated evidence, not of reflected type. This is a claim to be verified by the addition of ‘güya’ (supposedly) to the quotative utterances. Since adverb ‘güya’ implies the speaker’s denial of the truth of the proposition, it can only be acceptable with the quotatives. Reflected evidentials cannot remain as such if they happen to be underspecified by this adverb. They have to shift to mediated evidence value under that condition.

3. Concluding Remarks

The necessity of the classification of semantic implications marked by –(l)mlş has led the study presented here. Though having left the similar forms that may occur with the morpheme, the semantic analysis presented here solves a couple of problems.

First of all, the definition of retrospective evidence (i.e. p before T0) explicates how a situation at the time of utterance (T0) can be used as evidence of a situation that is over. Retrospective value rationalizes the underlying reason for the so-called relation between perfectivity and evidentiality to be defined in the first place.

Secondly, it is clear with the analysis presented above that the evident situation is observed at T0 does not justify that there is a need to define a distinct category. Neither is
there adequate reason to label the morpheme as aspect or tense marker depending on the cases where evident situation is observable before $T_0$.

Third, distinguishing between personal reflected and impersonal mediated evidence values designates the pragmatic extensions, such as irony or scorn readings, possible with evidential utterances. The opposing values of the two indirect evidence values are purified with addition of ‘güya’ (supposedly) as an underspecification tool that which is only acceptable with the reading of an evidential utterance with the mediated evidence.

What should be included in the notion of evidentiality is, thus, any relation between the evidence and the evident situation, which may occur in synchronous or retrospective manner, should be defined under the category of evidentiality. It is clear throughout the study that, unless the nature of evidentiality itself is understood or classified properly, it is unavoidable to label Turkish –(I)mIş as a member of any other verbal category.

REFERENCES


Uzun, N. E. 2004 Dilişigisinin temel kavramları: Dünyada dillerinden örneklerleyle. İstanbul: Mehmet Ölmez Yayınları.

ENDNOTES

1 -mIş and –ImIş are labeled as distinct suffixes in Turkish. Many scholars name three different –mIş suffixes: i) the non-finite –mIş which is responsible for the past time reference in the subordinate closes; ii) finite –mIş which functions as the past tense and perfective aspect marker; iii) finite –ImIş which codes evidentiality in Turkish. Johanson, Göksel and Kerslake, Lewis, Kornfilt support the idea that the evidential meaning of the –mIş is reflected to the homophonic suffix –mIş. They claim that the only true evidential marker is the –mIş. Another point of view (Yavaş, 1980; Sezer, 1980; Uzun, 1998, 2004) denies this distinction and speaks of two suffixes: non-finite –mIş, and the homophonic finite evidential suffix –(I)mIş.

We focus on the discussion throughout the paper. We support the second approach and refer to the verbal suffix –(I)mIş as the evidential marker of Turkish. However, we may have to make use of other forms of the suffix (–mIş or –ImIş) when the quoted study does so. If we name the distinct suffixes as –mIş or –ImIş, it should be kept in mind that we do it for the sake of our discussion.

2 Here, we do not need to name the non-finite –mIş since it is not related to the evidentiality under any circumstances.

3 A detailed definition of the term postterminality proposed by Johanson can be found in Johanson (1971, 1994; Schaaij; 2001:65).


5 If the evidential marker is supported with another modal suffix –Dır, which also holds the reasoning relation between two situations, then the adverbial “demek ki” (then) can be omitted without any confusion. We do not expand our explanation to that end for sake of unity.

6 Uzun (1998, 2004) affirms that Turkish, by its nature, makes use of non-existence of the morphological item in the system as well as their existence. The so-called “zero-suffix” is the key term to this kind of a system, referring to the value assigned by the non-existence of a particular morpheme. The zero-suffix, which is usually referred to by “Ø” symbol used in the glosses, can be responsible for the encoding of any relevant function dependently, e.g. 3rd person singular. Within the overall system of verbal suffixation, while existence of –(I)mIş assigns “+indirect evidence” value to the sentence, its non-existence, namely zero-suffix refers to “direct evidence”, if plausible. Uzun (2004) presents the whole picture of the Turkish verbal morphology. See Uzun (2004:165) for a detailed justification of the paradigm as outlined as below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Suffixes</th>
<th>Mood Suffixes</th>
<th>Tense Suffixes</th>
<th>Finite Suffixes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>-yor</td>
<td>-acak</td>
<td>past i-di</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perfective</td>
<td>-di</td>
<td>possibility</td>
<td>-ar non-past</td>
<td>Ω</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-commercial</td>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>quoted</td>
<td>–(I)mIş</td>
<td>factual Ω</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 See Aksu-Koç (2001) for details of related discussion. We do not have enough space for the details.

8 -DI is the only possibility not because it is the only directive marker, but because the verb “dur-“ is punctual. A durative verb may as well be marked by –Iyor, or else.

9 However, one should note that such extensions are pragmatic phenomena at the end of the day and are not unique to the evidential statements. One may mark any kind of sentence as ironic or scorny by the help of intonation or pragmatic features.

10 As a final remark, depending on the analysis above, we categorically assert that such translations of –(I)mIş with the adverbials ‘apparently, as I infer, I guess, supposedly’ fail to fully communicate what is marked by –(I)mIş in all sentences. Instead, we suggest the paraphrases of the assigned evidence value be translated for sake of lucidity.